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Abstract 
This thesis examines the implications of the alleged rise of the `knowledge economy' 
for regional economic change in Europe. In particular, it is concerned with `post- 
industrial' trajectories of less-favoured regions, in both the Western and Eastern parts 
of the `New Europe'. In doing so, the thesis critically engages with the `new 
regionalism' economic geography approaches that draw on institutional/evolutionary 
economics, and on the `knowledge economy' or 'learning economy' discourses. 
These approaches invariably identify localised forms of knowledge production and 
learning and various supporting institutions as key factors behind regional prosperity. 
Considered as the most important organisational units of contemporary global 
knowledge-intensive capitalism, economically successful regions are understood as 
`learning regions' acting as collectors and repositories of knowledge, and displaying 
the ability to learn and innovate, while being supported by regional `institutional 
thickness'. Less-favoured regions are themselves claimed to have a capacity to 
improve their own economic fortunes by becoming `learning regions'. 
These claims are exposed to a theoretical scrutiny that reveals serious conceptual 
weaknesses in the `knowledge economy' and `learning region' paradigms and the 
thesis suggests an alternative conceptualisation of regional economic change. This 
alternative conceptualisation places emphasis on the `socio-spatial divisions of 
labour' and the accompanying `socio-spatial value chains/networks' as a useful prism 
through which increasingly uneven regional development in Europe can be 
understood. The case studies of two former industrial region-states are then presented 
- one in the `Western' periphery (Scotland) and one in the `Eastern' post-socialist 
periphery (Slovakia) of the `New Europe' - both attempting a transformation to the 
high value-added `knowledge-based' economy. The empirical evidence supports the 
view that, although institutions can play an important role in economic development 
of regions, their room for manoeuvre is nevertheless significantly constrained by their 
own historical legacies and the wider neo-liberal political economy. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
1.1 The issues 
The end of the 20th century was marked by two major processes: transformation of the 
advanced capitalist economies (seen by many as the rise of the `knowledge economy') 
and the fall of state-socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. To paraphrase 
Polanyi (1957), these two processes can be seen as `great socio-economic 
transformations', implying profound changes to the way society and the economy 
works. In Europe, these transformations have been met with great expectations. 
Indeed, the alleged arrival of the `knowledge economy' has been associated with the 
prospect of overcoming the contradictions of industrial capitalism and delivering at 
the same time both a competitive economy and a more equal society (see EC, 1996; 
EC, 1997a; EU, 2000; Leadbeater, 2000). Meanwhile, the dramatic collapse of the 
state-socialist block ended the Cold War and raised hopes that the formerly divided 
continent will be reunified within a `New Europe' (Pinder, 1998). In short, the two 
transformations fuelled expectations that Europe could move towards creating a 
borderless and economically and socially cohesive pan-European community. For the 
economically peripheral regions in both the East and the West of the `New Europe', 
such a process would signify better prospects for closing the economic `gap' with 
more prosperous regions of the continent. 
The recent decade, however, has offered a rather different picture. The `transition' 
from state-socialism to market capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe has proved to 
be much more difficult than expected, leaving the majority of people in the Eastern 
half of Europe worse-off (cf. Dunford and Smith, 2000) and further complicating 
European enlargement. Meanwhile, Western Europe as a whole recorded steady 
economic growth, although this was seemingly achieved at the expense of increasing 
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internal social and regional divisions. As a result of these processes, the space- 
economic landscape of the `New Europe' has experienced sharp fragmentation with 
deep lines of division (re)appearing within and between its Eastern and Western parts 
(Amin and Tomaney, 1995a; Hadjimichalis and Sadler, 1995; Hudson and Williams, 
1999; Agnew 2000; Dunford and Smith, 2000; Sokol, 2001). Deepening uneven 
development, of course, belies the objectives of the European Union's (EU) 
Maastricht Treaty (which seeks economic and social cohesion), thus highlighting the 
need to encourage critical debate on theoretical understanding of the causes of uneven 
development and to open a discussion on policy frameworks that could counter social 
and regional inequalities. 
This thesis aims to contribute to this debate by focusing on the regional dimensions of 
economic development in the context of enlarging Europe. In particular, it is 
concerned with the prospects of economically peripheral, former industrial regions, in 
both the East and the West of the emerging `New Europe' and the ways such regions 
cope with the allegedly emerging `knowledge economy'. In doing so, the thesis 
engages with the dominant approaches within economic geography primarily 
associated with the rise of the `new regionalism' (Lovering, 1999; MacLeod, 1999). 
Inspired by various institutionalist and evolutionary economics insights and drawing 
from the `knowledge economy' discourse, these approaches invariably identify 
localised forms of knowledge production and learning and various supporting 
institutional settings as the key factors behind regional economic growth and 
prosperity (see Cooke, 1998,2002; Malecki, 2000; MacKinnon et al., 2002; for recent 
reviews). Consequently, economically successful regions are conceptualised as 
`learning regions' (Florida, 1995a; Asheim, 1996; Morgan, 1997; Boekema et al., 
2000a) allegedly acting as `collectors and repositories of knowledge', with a strong 
ability to learn and innovate, supported by an appropriate regional `institutional 
thickness', `untraded interdependencies' and `entrepreneurial culture' (Amin and 
Thrift, 1994a; Storper, 1999; Saxenian, 1994). These institutional endowments 
remodel production structures into `clusters' (Porter, 1990,1998) organised around 
regionally based production nodes (cf. Amin and Thrift, 1992). Thus, `resurgent 
regions' (Storper, 1999) and `region-states' (Ohmae, 1993) are theorised with the 
power to determine their own economic fortunes (Florida, 1995a; Storper and Scott, 
1995; inter alia) or to `choose' their prosperity (Porter, 1990,1998), and are claimed 
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to be the most important organisational units of today's global `knowledge-intensive 
capitalism' (Florida, 1995a; Storper, 1995a, 1997a, 1999; inter alia). 
The proposition that regional prosperity is a `matter of choice' (cf. Porter, 1998) is of 
particular significance to former industrial regions on the economic periphery of 
Europe. Indeed, such regions are keen to overcome their structural legacies by 
`forgetting' old, obsolete and declining industrial paths, and `learning' how to emulate 
new `post-industrial' or `knowledge-intensive', high-value economic trajectories (cf. 
Cooke, 1995a; Morgan, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Morgan and Nauwelaers, 
1999; MacLeod, 2000; Lagendijk, 2000; see also Storper, 1995b). The vision of 
regions themselves `learning' how to prosper in a `new economy' is also attractive for 
national and supra-national bodies with squeezed public finances. Replacing costly 
and allegedly obsolete and inefficient regional policies of the old Keynesian era, and 
being framed in the context of highly flexible, `knowledge-intensive' capitalism, the 
`learning region' stratagem is seen as a cheaper, yet more efficient, way of addressing 
regional problems (Florida, 1995b; Nauwelaers and Morgan, 1999; Malecki, 2000). 
Unsurprisingly then, `knowledge' and `learning-based' strategies have become 
popular with policy makers at local, regional, national and supra-national levels 
(Lagendijk, 1999; Lagendijk and Comford, 2000; inter alia). More recently, various 
innovation-focused, network-centred and `learning-based' strategies have also 
received substantial attention within the context of post-socialist transformations in 
Central and Eastern Europe' (Mmjavac, 1997; Dyker, 1997; Swain, 1998; Dornish, 
1999; Radosevic, 1998,1999; Dyker and Radosevic, 1999; Knell et al., 1999; 
Petrakos, Maier and Gorzelak, 2000; van Zon et al., 2000; Mickiewicz and Radosevic, 
2001; Petrakos and Tsiapa, 2001). 
Despite its popularity in both academic and policy-making circles, the `learning 
region' and similar `fuzzy' concepts faced various `sympathetic' and `less 
sympathetic' critiques (Hudson, 1999; Lovering, 1998a, 1999; MacLeod, 2000; 
Markusen, 1999; Pike, 1998; Vigor, 2000; Oinas, 2000; van Gils and Oinas, 1997; 
Smith et al., 1999). These critiques have pointed at the fundamental weaknesses of the 
It could be argued that, within the post-socialist Eastern European context, 'learning' (and 
`forgetting') gain extra meaning as regions and whole countries have to 'learn' how to embrace the 
market economy model, while `forgetting' the legacies of the centrally planned society. 
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`learning region' paradigm and to open a debate on the dominant discourses within 
economic geography. This thesis aims to extend that critique while raising following 
questions: What are the implications of the emerging `knowledge economy' for 
regions in the `New Europe'? Can regions be conceptualised through learning and 
knowledge patterns? Can successful regions be seen as `learning regions'? In other 
words, do their economic fortunes depend on their ability to create and disseminate 
knowledge, to innovate and learn? More fundamentally, is regional prosperity a 
`matter of choice'? What is the role of regional institutions in promoting economic 
development? More specifically, can economically peripheral regions, through their 
institutions, improve their own economic performance? Can old industrial regions 
`learn' new `high road' post-industrial development trajectories? And finally, can a 
`learning region' stratagem deliver more balanced economic development in the `New 
Europe'? 
This thesis will attempt to address the above questions through both a theoretical 
discussion of conceptual issues and an analysis of empirical evidence from two 
economically peripheral region-states of the `New Europe' (Scotland and Slovakia). 
Arising from such examination, the thesis will support the view that economic 
geography concepts which rely on `learning' and `knowledge' as the most important 
(if not the only) factors behind regional economic prosperity have limited explanatory 
power. Indeed, in order to understand underlying causal processes, `knowledge' has to 
be seen alongside of and in interaction with `wealth' and `power'. Consequently, a 
much more complex but also a more accurate picture emerges, which acknowledges 
the possibility of the circular and cumulative causation as significant part of regional 
economic development process. Furthermore, the thesis will suggest that `regional 
institutions' and their power to influence regional economic trajectories should be 
seen within the context of wider social struggles over power, knowledge and wealth. 
These points will then provide a platform on which a possible alternative conceptual 
framework for the understanding of uneven regional development could be built. The 
thesis will outline elements of an alternative conceptualisation that highlights the 
explanatory power of `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial flows of 
value' in understanding divergent regional trajectories in the `New Europe'. Within 
such a framework, regions in general, and economically peripheral regions in 
particular, can be seen as constrained by their own historical legacies and by the 
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imperatives of the wider political economy. Consequently, regions of the `New 
Europe' are viewed as possessing limited room for manoeuvre in constructing 
sustainable economic trajectories. 
This alternative argument has important policy implications for the `New Europe'. 
The European Union (EU) is striving to become the most competitive `knowledge 
economy' in the world (see EU, 2000), while attempting to undertake its historic 
enlargement through the inclusion of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that 
have emerged from the ruins of state-socialism. In principle, these two commitments 
could be seen as positive steps. However, fundamental questions arise as to what kind 
of `knowledge economy' will be promoted, what kind of `Eastern enlargement' will 
be instituted, and what implications these processes will have for social and regional 
cohesion in the `New Europe'. Conversely, it could be argued that the fate of 
economically weaker regions has important implications for the future of a wider 
European integration project itself. One way or another, the issues related to the 
challenges of, and prospects for, regional cohesion deserve thorough examination (cf. 
Amin and Tomaney, 1995a). 
1.2 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis will address the above issues in the following steps. Part I of the thesis 
will deal with conceptual issues related to the regional dimensions of the `knowledge 
economy' and `post-socialist' transformations. Following this Introduction, Chapter 
2 will critically review various versions of the `knowledge economy' thesis, 
including the `post-industrial society', `information society', and the `learning 
economy' concepts (Bell, 1973; Castells, 1996,1997,1998; Leadbeater, 2000; 
Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; inter alia). In doing so the chapter will point to the 
serious shortcomings and problems of these concepts. In particular, the notion that 
advanced capitalist economies are entering a `new era' driven by knowledge, while 
overcoming the contradictions of industrial capitalism will be questioned. Instead it 
will be argued that the economy remains distinctively capitalist, profit-driven and 
continuously displays significant contradictory features. In addition, the abstract 
notion that the economy can be `knowledge-driven' will be challenged, and a search 
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for alternative ways of understanding the economy will be initiated. Elements of such 
an alternative framework will be suggested building on the strengths of 
institutional/evolutionary economics and more radical social science approaches. The 
chapter will support the view that the economy should be seen as an institutionalised 
social process, in which institutions are subjects, objects and outcomes of social 
struggles. The chapter will conclude that the concept of `socio-spatial divisions of 
labour' and `socio-spatial flows of value' may offer valuable insights into uneven 
economic processes within and between socio-economic systems. 
The factual disintegration of the `knowledge economy' thesis has profound 
implications for currently dominant economic geography approaches that will be 
reviewed in Chapter 3. These approaches see the regional dimensions of the 
`knowledge economy' as being manifested through the alleged emergence of 
`learning regions' (Florida, 1995a; Asheim, 1996; Morgan, 1997; Boekema et al., 
2000a; inter alia). As for peripheral regions, these approaches suggest that less 
favoured regions can emulate economic success by becoming `learning regions'. A 
key institutional role in ensuring such a transition is ascribed to regional development 
agencies acting as animateurs of regional renewal (Morgan, 1997,1998; inter alia). 
The base on which the `learning region' concept is built will be critically examined. It 
will be argued that the concept suffers from serious shortcomings that include vague 
definitions, fuzzy conceptualisation, poor empirical support and an ambiguous policy 
message for less favoured regions. Similarly, the `learning region' concept reflects the 
central flaw of the `knowledge economy' thesis in neglecting the mutual relations 
between knowledge, wealth and power (see Chapter 2). These and other fundamental 
weaknesses discussed in the chapter will point to the need for constructing an 
alternative conceptualisation of uneven regional development. Building on arguments 
developed in chapter 2 and drawing mainly on the work of Smith et al. (2002), the 
concept of socio-spatial divisions of labour together with socio-spatial flows of value 
will be discussed as a possible way forward in building such an alternative 
framework. This framework places a strong emphasis on the role of historical legacies 
and the wider political economy in shaping regional economic trajectories such as 
those in the `New Europe'. 
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Chapter 4 will focus the theoretical discussion onto the uneven geographies of the 
`New Europe' and the regional dimensions of the post-socialist transformation in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Initially, the chapter will concentrate on arguments made 
by heterodox economists and social scientists that explicitly link the rise of the 
`knowledge economy' with the fall of state-socialism. They argue that the demise of 
state-socialism could be explained as its inability to embrace the new modes of 
production associated with the emergent `knowledge economy'. These arguments, 
however, will be subjected to critical discussion that will point to alternative ways of 
understanding the collapse of state-socialism, linking it instead with the circular and 
cumulative nature of knowledge, power and wealth in socio-economic systems. 
Therefore, the chapter will move to discuss the regional fragmentation which has been 
experienced in Europe in the last decade or so. It will be argued that the dominant 
(neo-liberal) explanation fails to account for the significant regional fragmentation 
observed. Instead, the strengths of both radical and institutionalist approaches will be 
mobilised to suggest an alternative way of looking at uneven regional development in 
the `New Europe', with particular focus on regions and countries in `transition'. The 
importance for regional fortunes of historical legacies, and the way these legacies 
interact with the current imperatives of international political economy, will be re- 
emphasised. 
The alternative perspective on uneven regional development emerging from the 
discussions of Part I will be used subsequently to frame the analysis of the case study 
regions. These will be presented in Part II of the thesis. Initially, Chapter 5 will 
recapture earlier theoretical arguments and will provide a synthesis of an analytical 
framework for the empirical study. The chapter will also provide a justification of the 
choice of the two regional cases and set out the research methods employed. The 
empirical research focused on two region-states - one located in the `Western' 
periphery (Scotland) and one in the `Eastern' periphery (Slovakia) of the `New 
Europe' (see Figure 1.1 in Annex). Both region-states, with varying success, engaged 
with strategies to promote the `knowledge economy' in the last decade of so. Both 
seem to offer valuable empirical material on their own, while providing a sound basis 
for subsequent comparison. 
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Chapter 6 will present the empirical findings from the Scottish study. Scotland 
represents in the main an old industrial region of Britain, which suffered significant 
structural economic problems associated with de-industrialisation. More recently, 
however, there have been signs of economic renewal. In particular, (the attraction of 
key) `new economy' sectors in Lowland Scotland and the emergence of the `Silicon 
Glen' have become significant features of the Scottish economy. Throughout this 
period, Scottish Enterprise, the main Scottish development agency, has been 
consistently and actively implementing a stratagem akin to that advocated by the `new 
regionalist' literature. These developments, together with continuous institutional 
build-up, have prompted speculation that Scotland is a `learning region' mastering 
transition from industrial to `post-industrial' or `knowledge-intensive' capitalism (see 
MacLeod, 2000). The chapter will examine these claims while placing Scotland 
firmly within the context of historical legacies and the wider political economy. 
The case of Slovakia will be presented in Chapter 7. Slovakia underwent a `forced 
industrialisation' (Smith, 1998) within state-socialist Czecho-Slovakia after the 
Second World War. Following the fall of state-socialism and subsequent neo-liberal 
marketisation, Slovakia faced the collapse of its industrial economy and encountered 
severe economic problems. In part as a response to these `transitional' problems, this 
region-state has emerged as an independent country while facing several simultaneous 
challenges: establishing independent state institutions; attempting to join the 
European Union; managing transformation from state-socialism to market capitalism; 
and simultaneously responding to the imperatives of the emerging `global knowledge 
economy' by switching from industrial to `post-industrial' economic trajectories. The 
analysis will reveal that the above processes, and their problematic nature, have 
played a significant role in the Slovak attempt to emulate the Central European 
`Silicon Valley', seen by some as part of a reputed transformation towards a 
`knowledge society' in Slovakia. 
Following these empirical chapters, concluding reflections will be offered in Chapter 
8, forming Part III as the final section of the thesis. The chapter will first distil the 
theoretical arguments developed through the thesis and then summarise the empirical 
findings through comparing and contrasting the Scottish and Slovak case studies. 
Finally, the chapter will offer a discussion of the policy implications of this research 
S 
-l 
while highlighting challenges and prospects for regional cohesion in the `New 
Europe'. It will be argued that less favoured areas are constrained in their efforts to 
build successful renewal strategies in the pre-dominantly neo-liberal economic 
environment of current times, and that more balanced regional development can be 
achieved only through the appropriate and sustained transfers of knowledge, wealth 
and power to marginalised people, regions and countries. 
The APPENDIX of the thesis contains figures and tables, a list of interviews 
undertaken, a copy of a questionnaire used during interviews and a list of 
abbreviations. 
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PART I 
Chapter 2: 
The knowledge economy and 
theories of post-industrial 
transformation 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the fate of old industrial regions within the 
emergent `knowledge economy' in the context of the `New Europe'. Importantly, one 
of the arguments supported by this thesis is that regional economic processes cannot 
be satisfactorily understood without taking into consideration processes and changes 
in the wider political economy. Therefore, before discussing regional dimensions of 
the `knowledge economy' (in Chapter 3), it is appropriate to address the question of 
what is the `knowledge economy', and how post-industrial transformations should be 
understood. This Chapter thus aims to critically examine the theories and concepts 
that advocate the emergence of the `knowledge economy' or `knowledge-driven 
economy' (KE)1. 
Initially, section 2.2 will argue that the concept of an economy driven by knowledge 
appears in the literature under various guises and names. The most influential versions 
of these will be reviewed under the headings of the `post-industrial society', 
`information society', `knowledge economy' and `learning economy'. At the heart of 
these concepts lies a conviction that knowledge is now the fundamental economic 
resource (Bell, 1973; Lush and Urry, 1994; Castells, 1996; Giddens, 2000, 
Leadbeater, 2000; Cooke, 2002; inter alia), and learning is the most important 
economic process (Ludvall and Johnson, 1994). For many observers, the 
transformation towards a (global) `knowledge economy' is inevitable, but nonetheless 
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desirable, because it brings the hope that the old socio-spatial divisions and 
contradictions of industrial capitalism will give way to more socially and spatially 
balanced development as the emerging new `knowledge age' sets in (Bell, 1973; 
Leadbeater, 2000; Hodgson, 1999; inter alia). 
Although such outcomes would indeed be seen as desirable, the Chapter argues that 
the latter suggestions may prove to be largely illusionary. Indeed, while the concept of 
the `knowledge-driven economy' may seem to offer an attractive account of 
contemporary socio-economic change, the nature of the allegedly emerging 
`knowledge economy' is often misunderstood, as the concept itself suffers serious 
theoretical shortcomings. These shortcomings will be addressed in sections 2.3 and 
2.4. In particular, critics have already highlighted the ambiguous nature of various 
versions of the `knowledge society', the limits to economic `learning', the flaws of the 
`post-industrial' thesis, the contentious role of information technology, and the 
continuing pertinence of capital-labour relations (Webster and Robins, 1986; Cohen 
and Zysman, 1987; Lyon, 1988; Webster, 1995,1997; Hudson, 1999; May, 2000, 
2002). Furthermore, it has been argued that, far from removing old socio-economic 
contradictions, the `knowledge economy' may actually reinforce, and even create, 
new contradictions (Jessop, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the key assumption of the `knowledge-driven economy' - that 
knowledge is the most important factor of wealth creation - has to date remained 
largely unchallenged. This Chapter will therefore address this conceptual lacuna and 
examine the knowledge-wealth relationship from a critical perspective. Section 2.4 
will argue that the assumption of a simple and one-directional relationship - 
knowledge creates wealth - is wanting, as it overlooks the possibility of a reversed 
causality - wealth creates knowledge - and does not take into account the influence of 
another crucial factor: power. These fundamental `omissions' render the logic of the 
`knowledge-driven economy' thesis questionable, and open the way for an alternative 
conceptualisation of current socio-economic transformations. 
1 The terms `knowledge economy' and `knowledge-driven economy' will be used interchangeably 
through the thesis. 
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The elements for such alternative conceptualisation will be offered in section 2.5. 
Building partly on `radical' and `institutional/evolutionary' approaches, this 
alternative approach begins by acknowledging that the economy should be 
conceptualised as an `institutionalised social process'. As such, the economy (or 
rather `socio-economy' or `political economy') is shaped by institutions, which can 
simultaneously be seen as the objects, subjects and outcomes of struggles over 
knowledge, wealth and power. The section will go on to support the view that there 
are important continuities with the past struggles which have been unfolding within 
the framework of the capitalist political economy. Subsequently, it will suggest that 
the concepts of the `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial value 
chains/networks' may prove to be useful tools to approach socio-economic 
transformations within such an economy. Finally, section 2.6 will formulate some 
conclusions based on this analysis and highlight their implications for the remainder 
of the thesis. 
2.2 What is the `knowledge-driven economy'? 
This section addresses the question as to what the `knowledge-driven economy' 
actually is. This is not an easy task given the plethora of approaches that are grappling 
with recent social, economic and technological changes such as the rising economic 
share of services, technological progress, the perceived growing importance of 
research and development (R&D) and the overall knowledge-intensity of production 
in advanced capitalist societies. Indeed, since Daniel Bell (1973) published his 
influential book The Coming of Post-industrial Society, his vision of the `knowledge 
society' keeps coming back. Various similar approaches have been devised over the 
years, all sharing a powerful belief that we have been entering a new era of 
information, knowledge, learning and technology. The shift towards this new era, we 
are told, represents a radical change in the way society and economy works. The 
`new' economy allegedly plays according to `new' rules. Knowledge has become the 
most important source of wealth creation, while information and communication 
technology has secured productivity gains and sustainable growth. `Old' institutions 
such as trade unions and nation-states have become obsolete. Contradictions and class 
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struggles are being replaced by flexible networks based on co-operation, trust and 
knowledge-sharing. To many observers, the shift towards the `global knowledge 
economy' seems both inevitable and desirable. They believe that the emerging society 
will be socially more equal (see below) and that spatial disparities will be overcome, 
as regional prosperity becomes a matter of choice (see Chapter 3 for a detailed 
discussion). 
Invariably, these approaches jointly herald the emergence of the new `knowledge era', 
while differing in emphasis they place on various dimensions of such `era'. Some 
approaches specifically refer to the process of a fading industrial economy and the 
ascendancy of services by predicting the emergence of the `post-industrial society' 
(Bell, 1973; Richta, 1968; Touraine, 1974; Prosche, 1993), `service economy' (Bell, 
1993) or `new service economy' (Gershuny and Miles, 1983; Andersen et al., 2000). 
Others highlight the perceived growing importance of information and stipulate the 
rise of the 'information(al) economy' (Machlup, 1962,1980; Porat, 1977; Castells, 
1993,1996; Boisot, 1998), `information society' (Miles, 1988; W. J. Martin, 1988, 
1995; Carnoy et al., 1993; Duff, 2000) or `information age' (Castells, 1996,1997, 
1998). Meanwhile, another group of authors anchor their conceptualisation in the 
information and communication technology to argue that we are witnessing the 
coming of `digital capitalism' (Schiller, 1999), or the `electronic economy' or 
'digital economy' (Tapscott, 1995) out of whom are fundamentally representative of 
a `weightless economy' (Coyle, 1997; Quah, 1997) or `intangible economy' 
(Goldfinger, 1996). Others argue that such a society is best described as the `wired 
society' (Martin J., 1978) or `network society' (Castells, 1996). Several writers have 
examined changes in the capitalist production and highlighted the prominence of 
flexibility of the new era through concepts such as `flexible specialisation' (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984) and `post-Fordism' (see Amin, 1994a). Many writers remain hopeful 
that more palatable capitalism will emerge from the current socio-economic changes 
in the form of `soft capitalism' (cf. Thrift, 1998) or `associational economy' (Cooke 
and Morgan, 1998). Some believe that these changes are signs of the economic state 
of `late capitalism' that will eventually give way to the `post-capitalist society' 
(Dahrendorf, 1959; Drucker, 1993). Meanwhile, some authors refer to the emergence 
of the new era by using a simple term, the `new economy' (Kelly, 1998; Leadbeater, 
2000). However, more recently, the discourse seems to return back to the notions of 
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knowledge, learning or reflexivity, as principal characteristics of the emergent society. 
Thus the notion that we are witnessing a transformation towards the `knowledge 
society' (Bell, 1973; Drucker, 1993), `knowledge economy' (Leatbeater, 2000; 
Cooke, 2002; inter alia), 'knowledge capitalism' (Burton-Jones, 1999), `reflexive 
capitalism' (Storper, 1997a) or 'learning economy' (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; 
Gregersen and Johnson, 1997; Storper, 1997a; Hodgson, 1999) has proliferated. 
Furthermore, the theme of the `knowledge economy', `knowledge-based economy', 
`knowledge-intensive economy', `knowledge-driven economy' or `global 
knowledge economy' has become prominent in both policy documents (OECD, 
1996a, 1996b, 1997; EC, 1996,1997a, 1997b; EU, 2000; DTI, 1998a, 1998b) and 
theoretical discussions (Giddens, 2000; Stiglitz, 1999; Thurow, 1999; Hodgson, 
1998a, 1999; Leatbeater, 2000; Hutton and Giddens, 2000; Cooke, 2002). 
It could be argued, however, that the above terms might be deceptive. Indeed, many 
of them lack a clear definition and others are often used loosely and interchangeably. 
It is often the case that completely different terms are used to describe the same 
phenomenon, while many writers use similar if not the same terms to describe entirely 
different, if not contradictory processes (Sokol, 2002). Disentangling the meaning of 
each of the above concepts is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. In an attempt 
to answer the question what is the `knowledge-driven economy', four influential 
treatises will be briefly presented. These will be clustered under four headings, 
namely the `post-industrial society', `information society', `knowledge economy' and 
`learning economy'. 
Under the heading `post-industrial society', the original version of such society as 
portrayed by Bell (1973) will be revisited. Although clearly written as a `fiction' or a 
`logical construction what could be' (ibid, p. 14, emphasis orig. ), Bell's vision of a 
`post-industrial society' or `knowledge society' has become one of the most 
influential paradigms of its kind, an oeuvre that `set the terms of debate' (Webster, 
1997, p. 106). Despite the fact that the central arguments of Bell's thesis seem to be 
flawed (see section 2.3) many of his `post-industrial' ideas have been `recycled' in 
later concepts. One of these is the influential concept of the `information society'. 
Under this heading the work of Manuel Castells (1996) will be highlighted. Even for 
his critics, the opus of Castells (1996,1997,1998) on the information age `certainly 
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stands comparison with the seminal work of Daniel Bell' (Webster, 1997, p. 106) as 
`the most important analysis of the character of the society in which we live and the 
directions of its development from a social scientist in over twenty-five years' (ibid, 
p. 105). Under the heading of the `knowledge economy' the work of Charles 
Leadbeater (2000) will be briefly summarised. It could be argued that Leadbeater's 
work is based on `the power of fantasy' (see ibid, p. 219). But as importantly pointed 
out by a critic, `[w]hat makes this book noteworthy is its endorsement by British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and Leadbeater's major contribution to the British 
government's recent white paper Building the Knowledge Driven Economy' (May, 
2000, p. 145). Indeed, Leadbeater could be seen as an author whose work has been 
widely read by the public and who exercised considerable influence on policy makers 
in the UK. Importantly, Leadbeater also acted as an advisor to the Scottish 
administration while drafting strategy documents on how to build a `knowledge 
economy' in Scotland (cf. Chapter 6). The fourth version of the economy in the 
`knowledge era' will largely be based on the contribution by Lundvall and Johnson 
(1994) and their influential concept of the `learning economy'. 
There is no doubt that these four approaches represent only a `tip of the iceberg' in an 
already wide and continuously expanding debate on the nature of the allegedly 
emerging `knowledge-driven economy'. Consequently, an objection could be raised 
against the above selection of four approaches that they are but caricatures of a much 
larger body of literature. However, it is argued here that these four approaches are 
`good' caricatures in that they highlight the main lines of argument that have been 
subsequently embraced by the `new' economic geography that will be critically 
scrutinised in Chapter 3. In addition, all four concepts reviewed offer some vital links 
to any discussion on the fate of countries and regions in Central and Eastern Europe, 
by connecting the rise of the `knowledge economy' with the fall of state-socialism. 
This latter hypothesis will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
Post-industrial society 
The first concept to be presented is that of the American Daniel Bell (1973) - the 
vision of emerging society laid down in his influential book The Coming of Post- 
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Industrial Society. It is useful to note right at the beginning that Bell himself used the 
term `knowledge society' or `information society', `all of which are somewhat apt in 
describing salient aspects of what is emerging' (Bell, 1973, p. 37). Eventually, he gave 
preference to a term `post-industrial society' (hereafter PIS) that would underline a 
`sense of living in interstitial time' (ibid, p. 37). Bell observed the trend of a declining 
industrial economy and a rising share of the service sector in the US economy 
together with a notable expansion of science, research and development (R&D), 
business services and rising numbers of scientists, researchers, academics and 
professionals. Writing in the early 1970s, he predicted that industrial societies would 
undergo a massive transition within thirty to fifty years (ibid, p. x) resulting in an 
emergence of a `post-industrial society' that would be `based on services' (ibid, 
p. 127). Within such society `[w]hat counts is not raw muscle power, or energy, but 
information' (ibid, p. 127) and knowledge would become part of its `axial principle' 
(ibid, p. 20). `Post-industrial society', Bell claims, `is organised around knowledge, for 
the purpose of social control and the directing of innovation and change' (ibid, p. 20). 
The nature of the shift towards such society would be `economic' (a shift from 
manufacturing to services), `technological' (the centrality of new science-based 
industries) and `sociological' (the rise of a new technical elite). At the heart of this 
transition would be a changeover from goods-producing (industrial) society to a 
service-producing, `information or knowledge society' (ibid, p. 487). The `decisive 
category' of services in the `post-industrial society' would be health, education, 
research and government (ibid, p. 15) represented by the expansion of `new 
intelligentsia - in the universities, research organisations, professions, and 
government' (ibid, p. 15). 
Bell acknowledges that knowledge was always important (ibid, p. 20) but stresses that 
it is `the change in the character of knowledge itself that is fundamentally new. By 
this he means the rise of `theoretical knowledge' and the codification of such 
knowledge (as opposed to empiricism and a trial-error approach) (ibid, p. 20). Indeed, 
he claims, it is theoretical knowledge (science) that proves crucial, both for economic 
production (business innovation) and public policy formulation. Thus a university, as 
a site of production of theoretical knowledge, becomes a `primary institution' of the 
`post-industrial society', alongside with `academy institutes' and `research 
corporations' (ibid, p. 116-118). For Bell, knowledge is what is `objectively known, an 
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intellectual property [sic], attached to a name or a group of names and certified by 
copyright or some other form of social recognition' (ibid, p. 176, emphasis orig. ). 
The emerging society, despite being managed with an increasing support of science 
and knowledge, would not be friction-free and unproblematic. This is because 
knowledge itself becomes a commodity, possession of which reinforces the power of 
the owner. Thus, Bell argues, an emerging `knowledge class' (ibid, p. 213-221), 
scientists, engineers professionals and white-collar service workers form a dominant 
social group or `axis' around which a new social hierarchy would be organised. In the 
`post-industrial society', Bell admits, battles over knowledge and wealth would be 
fought. These, however, would be nothing of the type and scale of capital-labour class 
struggle envisaged by Marx (see below). In fact, there would be no need for such 
struggles. Indeed, this new society, according to Bell, would be more prosperous and 
more equal, not least because technology becomes the engine of rising living 
standards and reducing inequalities (ibid, p. 188). Rising living standards would 
further encourage the rise of service employment first in transportation and public 
utilities, and then in personal services such as restaurants, hotels, auto services, travel, 
entertainment and sport, `as people's horizons expand and new wants and tastes 
develop' (ibid, p. 128). Subsequently, a `new consciousness begins to intervene', 
argues Bell, and the `claims to the good life' would be met by improvements in `two 
areas that are fundamental to that life - health and education' (ibid, p. 128). This 
would include the `elimination of disease' so that the increasing numbers of people 
`can live out a full life', and efforts to `expand the span of life'. Another `crucial 
feature' of the `post-industrial society would be education, because `the growth of 
technical requirements and professional skills makes education, and access to higher 
education, the condition of entry into the post-industrial society itself' (ibid, p. 128). 
Finally, Bell argues, `the claims for more services and the inadequacy of the market in 
meeting people's need for a decent environment as well as better health and education 
lead to the growth of government, particularly at the state and local level, where such 
needs have to be met' (ibid, p. 128). 
Thus, for Bell, the `post-industrial society' is an unmistakably better and more 
humane society, it is a `communal' society, where `the social unit is the community 
rather than individual' (ibid, p. 128) and where a balance is achieved between 
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`economizing' and `sociologizing' (ibid, p. 269-298). Despite the strong emphasis on 
community spirit, however, Bell is far away from the idea of the communist society. 
In fact, his book The Coming of Post-Industrial Society can be read as an anti-Marxist 
manifesto. Bell disputes Marx in several important points. First, he explicitly 
challenges Marx's idea of the increasing alienation of the working class and 
subsequent growing contradictions within a capitalist society. For Bell, the `labour 
issue' would be less important (ibid, p. 163-164) as the (industrial) working class 
would shrink if not disappear altogether in the `post-industrial society' (see ibid, p. 40, 
p. 148-154). As a consequence there will be no proletariat to trigger the socialist 
revolution and the whole society will become less prone to social conflict. Indeed, as 
Bell observes, a century after Marx's death, capitalism is `still dominant in the 
Western world' (ibid, p. 372). 
Bell then moves on to discuss countries where the socialist revolution did occur. He 
starts by observing that these are not the most advanced industrial countries as 
predicted by Marx. Instead, `paradoxically, communist movements had come to 
power almost entirely in agrarian and pre-industrial societies, where "socialist 
planning" was largely an alternative route to industrialisation, rather than the 
succession to capitalism' (Bell, 1973, p. 372). Drawing mainly on the teamwork of the 
Czecho-Slovak Academy of Science led by Radovan Richta (1968), Bell then goes on 
to weight the chances of the (then) existing socialist countries. He supports the view 
that in the light of a `post-industrial' era, these countries will face increasing 
challenges, not least because of the imperatives of the scientific-technological 
revolution, the increasingly ambiguous role of the working class and the conflicting 
interests of the emerging technical intelligentsia (ibid, p. 106-112). This argument 
provides a crucial link between the concept of the `post-industrial' or `knowledge 
economy' in the West and the eventual fall of state-socialism in the East and will be 
revisited in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
Meanwhile it has to be acknowledged that while the picture of `post-industrial 
society' drawn by Daniel Bell was clearly idealistic (see section 2.4) it proved highly 
influential in forming views on socio-economic transformation of advanced capitalist 
countries. In particular, the overriding idea of a succession from an `agricultural 
society' to an `industrial' to `post-industrial' or `knowledge' society has become 
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widely accepted (see also the concept of the `Third Wave' by Toffler, 1980). Thus, as 
David Lyon (1988, p. 2) noted, `post-industrial' ideas have been `recycled' in later 
concepts. 
Information society 
One such concept is represented by the `information society' (IS) thesis. It replicates 
some main arguments of the `post-industrial society' and there is no surprise that the 
two terms have been used interchangeably (see Webster, 1995; Duff, 2000). In 
particular, it shares the view that advanced industrial societies are undergoing a 
dramatic shift towards a new kind of society. IS theorists also agree in respect to the 
underlying cause of such a shift, what is the growing importance of knowledge and 
information in social and economic processes. To use a definition by William J. 
Martin, the `information society' is 
`... a society in which the quality of life, as well as prospects for social change 
and economic development, depend increasingly upon information and its 
exploitation. In such a society, living standards, patterns of work and leisure, 
the education system and the marketplace are all influenced markedly by 
advances in information and knowledge' (W. J. Martin, 1995, p. 3). 
What could be said to distinguish the IS thesis from the PIS is that it focuses primarily 
on one aspect of the emerging society, the increasing importance of information. 
Consequently, central attention is given to technologies, especially those that assist 
the production, processing and exchange of information - information technology. In 
accordance with Bell, technology is seen as a source of rising living standards and 
reduced social inequalities. In contrast to Bell, however, who believed that 
Schumpeter's `uncharted sea of technology' should be effectively controlled by 
society (Bell, 1973, p. 167), in most versions of the IS it is technology that impacts on 
society. This impact, however, is considered rather benign and bold claims have been 
made about how technology in general and ICT in particular will improve the world 
we live in. A vast amount of literature has been devoted to the topic, including 
seminal contributions by Masuda (1968,1981,1985), Machlup (1962,1980), Porat 
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(1977) and Miles (1988). It seems that even IS theorists themselves seem to have 
problems coping with this expanding literature (see Duff, 2000). 
Probably the best way to approach the IS thesis is through the work of Manuel 
Castells (1996,1997,1998) who offers perhaps the single most influential, and 
somewhat more critical, account of the IS. In broad terms Castells replicates the idea 
that society is undergoing a transformation from the industrial society to a new, as he 
terms it, `information age'. At the core of this transformation, according to Castells 
(1996) is a succession of `modes of development', from an industrial to informational. 
Castells admits that `knowledge and information are critical elements in all modes of 
development, since the process of production is always based on some level of 
knowledge and in the processing of information' (ibid, p. 17). However, he maintains 
that 
`... specific to the informational mode of development is the action of 
knowledge upon knowledge itself as the main source of productivity' (ibid, 
p. 17). 
Castells further makes clear that this new source of productivity, the action of 
knowledge upon knowledge itself, has been enabled by the new information 
technology. Defined rather broadly to encompass all technologies handling or 
manipulating information (including also genetic engineering; ibid, p. 30) this 
technology is implicated 
`... in a virtuous circle of interaction between the knowledge sources of 
technology and the application of technology to improve knowledge 
generation and information processing' (ibid, p. 17). 
According to Castells, the emergence of the `informational mode' does represent a 
clear departure from the previous industrial era, thus reproducing the overall 
framework set by Bell - the shift from an `agrarian' to `industrial' to `post-industrial' 
or `informational' economy. What distinguishes Castells is that he does not fully share 
Bell's optimism for the emerging society. Indeed, Castells is careful to emphasise that 
the `informational mode' of development emerging in the West is distinctively 
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capitalist. For Castells believes that Western societies do not experience a shift 
beyond capitalism, but a shift from `industrial capitalism' to a different form of 
capitalism - `informational capitalism'. Consequently, some problems associated with 
capitalist society are likely to persist, if not even be aggravated, through the ongoing 
transformation. In particular, Castells (1997) is deeply concerned with the likelihood 
of growing social fragmentation. This critical point will be revisited in section 2.5. 
Another interesting feature of Castells's account is his attempt to deal with the 
perceived globalisation of economic and social life. After advancing the idea of the 
`newest international division of labour' (Castells, 1996, p. 106-147; see also Castells, 
1993), he goes on to argue that the central economic logic of `informational 
capitalism' revolves around the emergence of the `network enterprise', and more 
broadly `network society', underpinned by ever-spreading ICTs. For Castells, 
`informational capitalism' is `characterized by its specific culture and institutions' 
(1996, p. 151) and drawing on various sources he comes to the conclusion that 
`[for the first time in history, the basic unit of economic organization is not a 
subject, be it individual... or collective (such as the capitalist class, the 
corporation, the state). As I have tried to show, the unit is the network, made 
up of variety of subjects and organizations, relentlessly modified as networks 
adapt to supportive environments and market structures' (ibid, p. 198; 
emphasis orig. ) 
In his own words, the `network enterprise' as the organisational form of the 
informational/global economy (ibid, p. 171) can be characterised by an ability `to 
generate knowledge and process information efficiently, to adapt to the variable 
geometry of the global economy; to be flexible enough to change its means as rapidly 
as goals change, under the impact of fast cultural, technological, and institutional 
change; and to innovate, as innovation becomes the key competitive weapon' (ibid, 
p. 171-172). He adds that `network enterprise' transforms `signals into commodities 
by processing knowledge' (ibid, p. 172) and that the glue that keeps the network 
together is to do with a `cultural dimension' (ibid, p. 199). 
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Another remarkable feature of Castells' work is an attempt to deal with the dramatic 
collapse of state-socialism in Eastern Europe. In the End of Millennium2, Castells 
(1998) develops a powerful idea that the collapse of `industrial statism' (as he calls 
state-socialism) has to be seen in the context of the `informational economy'. This 
strongly echoes Bell's suggestions about the difficulties that state-socialist regimes 
may face vis-ä-vis an emerging `post-industrial society'. While Bell (1973) based his 
views on forecasting material, Castells was writing in the 1990s and has been able to 
provide detailed evidence of the Soviet Union's inability to cope with the rise of the 
`informational mode' of development, leading to a growing technological lag with the 
West. He goes on to argue that while `industrial capitalism' in the West has managed 
its successful transition to `informational capitalism', `industrial statism' in the East 
collapsed. Castells thus offers another important contribution (within the `knowledge 
economy' rubric) to the debate over the demise of state-socialist regimes in Central 
and Eastern Europe and will be critically examined in Chapter 4. 
Beyond Castells' work, it is important to note that the IS approach chimes well with 
different strands of economics that have placed technological change at the heart of 
their analysis. One such approach is the 'flexible specialisation' thesis by Piore and 
Sabel (1984), in which technology is at the core of a promise of more efficient 
production techniques combined with more humane working conditions. According to 
Piore and Sabel (1984), new software-powered computer-based technology raises the 
prospect that producers will be able to `flexibly specialise' and swiftly respond to 
market demand without changing machinery, thus reducing the likelihood of 
structural economic crisis. In addition to this, and in contrast to mass production, 
`flexible specialisation' will allow workers to regain control over machinery and 
ultimately to improve working conditions. In broader terms, Piore and Sabel see the 
emergence of `flexile specialisation' as the `second industrial divide' in which much- 
vaunted technology can overcome certain structural constraints to capitalist 
development3. From a theoretical point of view, Piore and Sabel's work represented 
an important contribution to the post-Fordist debate4. Moreover, by suggesting that 
2 Volume III of his trilogy 
3 In contrast, the other strategy proposed by Piore and Sabel (1984, p. 252) in this context - the idea of 
`Multinational Keynesianism' - is receiving hardly any interest in the recent debates. 
4 We do not have space to discuss Post-Fordism in any detail here. See Amin (1994b) and Tomaney 
(1991,1994) in particular for informed reviews of this rich body of literature. 
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`flexible specialisation' work involves a particular spatial form (that of small, artisan- 
like districts) Piore and Sabel impacted directly on debates in economic geography 
(see Chapter 3). 
Another influential account that considers technology as central to economic 
development is associated with the work of neo-Schumpeterians (Freeman, 1982; 
Freeman et al., 1982; Dosi et al., 1988; Freeman and Perez, 1988; Freeman and Soete, 
1997). Building on Schumpeter's original thesis of the `creative destruction' of 
technological innovation to account for changes in the economy, neo-Schumpeterians 
see ongoing economic transformations as shifts towards new 'techno-economic 
paradigms'. The current shift, it is argued, represents the rise of the (knowledge- 
intensive) `Fifth Kondratieff wave's based on distinctive technologies such as 
microelectronics, digital telecommunications, biotechnology, robotics, and 
information systems. Interestingly, these technologies are precisely those identified by 
Castells (1996, p. 30) as central to the `Information Age'. What makes neo- 
Schumpeterians distinctive though, is their inclination to conceptualise the economy 
within a wider institutional environment and their argument that the shift towards the 
new paradigm has to be encouraged by appropriate institutional adjustments. This 
view strongly resonates with the concept of the `knowledge economy' and `learning 
economy' reviewed below. 
Knowledge economy 
The `knowledge economy' (KE) and `learning economy' (LE) concepts go beyond the 
IS thesis in several important aspects. First, they shift emphasis from information to 
much broadly defined knowledge, and second, they move their analytical focus from 
technology itself in favour of people, their knowledge and wider social contexts. In a 
sense the KE and LE concepts go back to the original PIS thesis but without Bell's 
bias towards the service sector. Instead, they usually emphasise the growing role of 
knowledge and learning through all sectors of the economy. Relatedly, some versions 
of the KE or LE are more inclined to go beyond codified technical knowledge as 
highlighted by Bell to include non-codified, tacit or informal forms of knowledge. 
See Dicken, 1998, p. 146-151; Knox and Agnew, 1998, p. 12-13; for useful overviews. 
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Nevertheless, the overall framework remains the same; KE celebrants reassert (as Bell 
did nearly a quarter of century ago) that industrial capitalism is undergoing a 
fundamental shift towards a `knowledge-based' economy where knowledge is the 
most important resource. 
A good example of such a conceptualisation of the KE can be found in the work of 
Alan Burton-Jones (1999). He starts by defining knowledge as `the cumulative stock 
of information' (ibid, p. 5) and urges one to go `beyond the limited concept of an 
information-based economy to the broader and more powerful concept of a 
knowledge-based economy' (ibid, p. 6). The following lines from his Knowledge 
Capitalism summarises rather well the basic beliefs on which such a KE concept is 
built: 
`Since ancient times, wealth and power have been associated with the 
ownership of physical resources. The traditional factors of production, 
materials, labour, and money, have been largely physical in nature. 
Historically the need for knowledge has been limited, and access to it largely 
controlled by those owning the means of production. Steam power, physical 
labour, and money capital largely facilitated the Industrial Revolution ... 
In contrast, future wealth and power will be derived mainly from intangible, 
intellectual resources: knowledge capital. This transformation from a world 
largely dominated by physical resources, to a world dominated by knowledge, 
implies a shift in the locus of economic power as profound as that which 
occurred at the time of the Industrial Revolution. We are in the early stages of 
a "Knowledge Revolution"' (ibid, p. 3) 
He then goes on to argue that the `world's stock of knowledge is today growing faster 
than ever before' and that in parallel to this our reliance on traditional physical forms 
of capital is declining (ibid, p. 6) as knowledge becomes a central factor of production 
(ibid, p. 3). However, for Burton-Jones, the `Knowledge Revolution' falls short of 
challenging fundamental tenets of capitalism (ibid, p. 20) not least because `[s]ince the 
overthrow of communism (i. e. state-controlled capitalism) free market capitalism is 
the only game in town' (ibid, p. 20). Central to the emerging `knowledge capitalism' is 
the `knowledge firm', whose primary role is the protection and integration of 
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specialised knowledge (ibid, p. 30), that is, beyond capital accumulation (see ibid, 
p. 20). For the `knowledge firm', knowledge is the key productive resource, 
knowledge is acquired by and, in the case of tacit knowledge, stored by individuals 
(ibid, p. 30). Indeed, Burton-Jones insists that the `firm's most valuable knowledge 
capital tends to reside in the brains of its key workers' but adds that `ownership of 
people went out with the abolition of slavery' (ibid, p. 22). Without realising an 
apparent contradiction, he then goes on to discuss how the `key productive resource' 
(knowledge) is to be efficiently used and, importantly, protected by firms. This, of 
course, as Burton-Jones points out, involves the question of legal protection such as 
copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets (ibid, p. 30) - an issue that will be revisited 
later in the Chapter. 
In comparison, Charles Leadbeater (2000) has offered a more intriguing version of the 
KE implying a much more radical vision of society. Indeed, while Burton-Jones 
believes that the goal of `knowledge capitalism' is, at the end of the day, profit, 
Leadbeater (2000) evokes a vision of a society that would transcend such a profit- 
motive. Instead, society should be organised around knowledge itself and society's 
ultimate goal should be the creation and spread of knowledge (ibid, p. 17, p. 222). The 
spread of knowledge, representing both `economic opportunity and political 
empowerment' (ibid, p. 222), lies at the heart of his utopian vision of a more 
democratic and meritocratic society and constitutes the core of the emerging 
`knowledge economy' or `new economy' (terms used interchangeably). In such an 
economy, knowledge is a `dynamo' of economic progress (ibid, p. 235) and the 
`generation, application and exploitation of knowledge is driving modern economic 
growth' (ibid, p. ix). Thus despite a self-proclaimed radicalism (see below), 
Leadbeater seems to borrow several key ideas from Bell (1973). Indeed, strongly 
echoing Bell, Leadbeater (2000) suggests that `new ideas and technologies ... are the 
well-springs of higher productivity and improved well-being' (ibid, p. 4), knowledge 
`has become a commodity' (ibid, p. 31), while `knowledge workers' become a 
dominant (and empowered) form of work. For Leadbeater, as for Bell a quarter of 
century ago, it is scientific and/or codified knowledge that is central to economic 
development (Leadbeater, 2000, p. 31,35); knowledge is not just one among many 
resources, knowledge `is the critical factor in how modern economies compete and 
how they generate wealth and well-being' (ibid, p. 36; emphasis orig. ). 
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Leadbeater also echoes Bell's ideas on the balance between `economizing' and 
`sociologizing' (see above) when he claims that for the above fundamental goal, the 
creation and spread of knowledge, it is necessary to harness the power of both 
`markets' and `community' (ibid, p. 19). In other words, `financial capital' and `social 
capital' must work in harmony (ibid, p. 231), and to achieve this harmony, institutions 
have to be re-designed to reconcile their respective competing demands. It is for this 
reason that Leadbeater sees a need to undertake a `radical modernising project' (ibid, 
p. xii) or even `institutional revolution' (ibid, p. xi). Such `institutional revolution' is 
necessary, because `... we are on the verge of the global [21st century] knowledge 
economy, yet we rely on national institutions in [19th century] industrial economy' 
(ibid, p. x). Thus, allegedly outdated `old' institutions such as governments, trade 
unions and companies, but also banks, schools, universities and public services have 
to undergo a radical shake-up to meet the challenges of the emerging new economy. 
What emerges from this transformation is a `third way' between financial capitalism 
and social capitalism (sic), where finance capital, knowledge capital and social capital 
will be combined in a `virtuous circle of innovation, growth and social progress' (ibid, 
p. 14). Thus the picture of society that Leadbeater is trying to paint is very similar to 
that evoked by Bell. It is a picture of society that will be both more prosperous and 
more equal and a society that should be both innovative and inclusive (Leadbeater, 
2000, p. 236), it is in fact a `post-capitalist' society (see ibid, p. 167-168). 
As society becomes more dependent upon knowledge creation, Leadbeater argues, so 
`trust and mutuality' become `stronger organising principles' (ibid, p. 167). The 
challenge is to create `open rather then closed, forms of trust' (ibid, p. 167). For 
Leadbeater, the Soviet Union was `a good example of a closed, low-trust society, 
dominated by a corrupt hierarchy' (ibid, p. 197), while Silicon Valley `is perhaps the 
closest to an economy which is both innovative and open while being capable of 
generating high degrees of co-operation and trust' (ibid, p. 167). 
Leadbeater acknowledges that so far the rise of the `knowledge economy' has been 
accompanied by increasing social and spatial inequalities (ibid, p. 11-12). He 
nevertheless believes that these should be addressed by `organising our lives and our 
societies around self-improvement and learning' (ibid, p. 223). Furthermore, people 
26 
and nations should open themselves to globalisation, because `[i]f we turn our backs 
on the global economy, we turn our backs on the most vital force in modern societies: 
the accelerating spread of knowledge and ideas' (ibid, p. xi). Indeed, it is `[t]hrough 
global trade in products and services people learn and exchange the ideas that in turn 
drive economic growth' (ibid, p. xi). Meanwhile, it is salutary to acknowledge that the 
`third way' language that Leadbeater uses in support of his vision of innovative and 
inclusive society, resonates with the `learning economy' concept inspired by 
evolutionary economics. 
Learning economy 
The `learning economy' concept is strongly associated with a seminal contribution by 
Lundvall and Johnson (1994). In an interesting contrast to the utopian proposals of 
Leadbeater (2000), Lundvall and Johnson (1994, p. 23) are claiming to focus on `what 
is' rather than `what should be'. The starting point of the `learning economy' (LE) is 
the argument that if knowledge is the most fundamental resource in our contemporary 
economy, then learning is `the most important process' (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994, 
p. 23). Although Lundvall and Johnson admit that knowledge always has been a 
`crucial resource' for the economy, and was in the past `layered in traditions and 
routines', they argue that knowledge and learning have more recently become much 
more fundamental resources than before (ibid, p. 24). In particular, post-Fordism `has 
brought into being new constellations of knowledge and learning in the economy' 
(ibid, p. 24) mainly through the development of ICTs, flexible specialisation and, 
finally, changes in the process of innovation (ibid, p. 24-25). These changes are 
bringing challenges that firms have responded to by changing organisational forms 
and by building alliances in order to gain access to a more diversified knowledge base 
(ibid, p. 25). This implies `broader participation in learning processes' to include all 
layers within the firm, the development of `multi-skilling and networking skills' and 
enhancing `capacity to learn and to apply learning to the processes of production and 
sales' (ibid, p. 25-26). This is why Lundvall and Johnson `regard... capitalist 
economies not only as knowledge-based economies but also as "learning economies"' 
(ibid, p. 26). They offer the following definition of the `learning economy': 
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`The learning economy is a dynamic concept; it involves the capacity to learn 
and to expand the knowledge base. It refers not only to the importance of the 
science and technology systems - universities, research organisations, in- 
house R&D departments and so on - but also to the learning implications of 
the economic structure, the organisational forms and the institutional set-up' 
(ibid, p. 26). 
At the core of the `learning economy' are apparently firms that `start to learn how to 
learn' (ibid, p. 26) and that are able to handle various types of knowledge. Lundvall 
and Johnson distinguish at least four categories of knowledge: know-what, know-why, 
know-who (when and where) and know-how (ibid, p. 27). The first category, know- 
what, represents knowledge about `facts'. The meaning of this is probably close to 
that of `information'. The, second category, know-why, refers to scientific knowledge 
of principles and laws of motion in nature and in society. This category, therefore, 
seems to correspond well with the term `theoretical knowledge' used in Bell's vision 
of `post-industrial society'. This kind of knowledge, Lundvall and Johnson argue, is 
extremely important for technological development (ibid, p. 27). The third term, know- 
who, (together with know-when and know-where) is already a more complex 
construction that reaches a sphere of specific social relations and time-space 
dimension. A simple example of know-who can be a situation when for a successful 
innovation it is more important to know key persons than to know basic scientific 
principles (ibid, p. 28). An example of know-when and know-where can be an 
economically useful knowledge about markets with its spatial and temporary 
dimension. Finally, know-how refers to practical skills in production or other spheres 
of economic activity (ibid, p. 28). 
Lundvall and Johnson (1994) then address different aspects of learning. Importantly, 
they do not understand learning as a simple absorption of science and technical 
knowledge. Rather, they define it more broadly as learning (about) changes in 
economic structures, organisational and institutional forms. Learning is presented as a 
dynamic and interactive process aimed at the accumulation of knowledge at the level 
of the firm and the economy as a whole. Learning is present in both production and 
consumption processes and is expressed through `learning by doing' and `learning by 
using'. From the point of view of permanent renewal (learning) and adaptation of 
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economic and organisational structures, Lundvall and Johnson have also introduced 
an innovative term `forgetting' (ibid, p. 40). They argue that the `learning economy' 
should not only preserve and store its pool of knowledge, but also be able to `forget'. 
`Forgetting' at the level of individual workers refers to their ability to abandon 
obsolete skills and professional expertise. An example of `forgetting' at the level of 
firm or economy includes closing down ailing branches or whole sectors. Thus, the 
`learning economy' is supposed to intelligently manage continuous self-organised 
learning (and forgetting). 
Finally, Lundvall and Johnson make a point that the successful `learning economy' is 
`neither a pure market economy nor a pure planned economy' (ibid, p. 41). The 
`learning economy', they claim, is and has to be a mixed economy in a `very 
fundamental sense', with important roles for the public sector and for different kinds 
of policy. They argue that neither pure market nor pure hierarchy (understood as the 
planned economy) provide favourable conditions for innovation (p. 34-35). They go 
on to suggest that the kind of favourable institutional environment needed for 
interactive learning and innovation exist within user-producer relationships, where a 
government can be in the position of `user'. They note that within the successful 
economies, 
`... [n]ot only does the private sector coexist with a large public sector; the 
relative success of the market economies in terms of technical progress 
reflects, not the purity of the markets, but rather their impurities' (Lundvall 
and Johnson, 1994, p. 35; emphasis added). 
The idea of a `middle way' between pure (private) markets and a public-dominated 
economy is akin to the version of the `knowledge economy' portrayed by Charles 
Leadbeater (2000) to an extent resonates with the views of the most prominent `third 
way' thinker Anthony Giddens (1994,1998,2000,2001). `Learning economy' thus 
conspicuously projects itself as a part of a `third way' strategy, that emerges as a 
strong (although not clearly defined) practical and theoretical alternative to both the 
planned economy and market capitalism. More broadly, such `third' or `middle way' 
conceptualisations also have support in heterodox and evolutionary/institutional 
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economics approaches (Williamson, 1975; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hodgson, 1988, 
1993,1998a, 1999,2001). 
While internally heterogeneous, this group of approaches converges on the issue of 
institutions as having a crucial co-ordinating function for economic development (as 
opposed to unfettered competition between atomistic agents/firms). Importantly, 
evolutionary economists also see institutions as being reservoirs of knowledge. As 
Hodgson (1999, p. 60) puts it, `institutions store and support both tacit and explicit 
knowledge'. Interestingly, Hodgson (1999) himself offers definitions of both the 
`knowledge-intensive economy' and `learning economy' that allegedly emerge as two 
out of many possible scenarios6 after `the end of history'. For Hodgson, the 
`knowledge-intensive economy' would still be a capitalist one (see ibid, p. 214-215), 
but it would be an economy in which `enlightened group of business leaders' is 
`aware of the kind of democratic culture and participatory industrial relations that 
facilitate productivity'. Alongside `collaborative and co-operative relationships 
between firms... against the neo-liberal insistence on fierce, price driven, market 
competition' (ibid, p. 211), Hodgson suggests that `[s]uch a progressive movement of 
business people could find valuable allies among trade unionists and the population as 
a whole' (ibid, p. 21 1). The `learning economy' or `market cognitism' (ibid, p. 213), in 
contrast, is a scenario clearly `beyond capitalism' (ibid, p. 211-215) where the `degree 
of control by the employer over the employee is minimal' (ibid, p. 212). Hodgson 
argues that such an economy, `would not be socialist, in any common sense of the 
word', but nevertheless, `it is not capitalism' (ibid, p. 213). 
Hodgson's views thus expediently close the circle of contributions that herald the rise 
of the `knowledge era' of one sort or other. Differing in important details, these 
contributions nevertheless seem to univocally support the idea that in the emerging 
`new era' the economy is being driven by knowledge. But are we really witnessing a 
transformation towards a `knowledge-driven economy'? Such a proposition will now 
be subjected to critical scrutiny. 
6 Hodgson (1999, p. 214) portrays seven possible scenarios, three of which are capitalist, one state 
socialist, one market socialist and two go beyond capitalism, including that of `learning economy' 
(market cognitism). 
30 
2.3 Transformation to the `knowledge-driven economy'? 
The approaches presented in the previous section all perpetuate a widely shared belief 
that industrial capitalism is undergoing a profound transition towards a new era 
organised around knowledge, information and technology. Most of the approaches 
suggest that while such a transformation is inevitable, it is nevertheless desirable, 
because it holds a promise of greater prosperity combined with reduced inequalities 
and the simultaneous dissolution of the contradictions of old industrial capitalism. 
Such an outcome could be seen as desirable, and there is no surprise that these 
approaches have gained a very prominent place in policy and strategy documents (see 
DTI, 1998a, 1998b; EC, 1996,1997a, 1997b; EU, 2000; OECD, 1996a; inter alia). 
Yet, such desirable outcomes may prove to be largely illusionary while the nature of 
the allegedly emerging `knowledge era' may be misunderstood. Indeed, as 
demonstrated below, various versions of the `knowledge-driven economy' have been 
subjected to a critique that raises serious doubts as to whether or not we really are 
witnessing a transformation towards the `knowledge economy'. 
A critique of the `post-industrial society' 
The critique of the `post-industrial' thesis has concentrated on the alleged shift from a 
goods-producing industrial economy to a service-based post-industrial economy. An 
important challenge to the idea of such shift has been raised by Cohen and Zysman 
(1987). Focusing on the production side of the economy, they maintain that not only it 
is the case that `manufacturing matters'; manufacturing is, in fact, central to 
competitiveness. Furthermore, services and manufacturing are `tightly linked' and 
subsequently the succession of manufacturing by services is doubtful. Fundamentally, 
`[t]here is no such a thing as post-industrial economy' (ibid, p. 261) insist Cohen and 
Zysman. Writing specifically in the US context, they further argue that losing 
manufacturing would mean losing high-wage services (ibid, p. 3) and that if the 
economy is to remain competitive, `manufacturing must automate, not emigrate' (ibid, 
p. 3). 
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The latter point about the `emigration' of manufacturing is an important one, because 
the shift of industrial production towards lower factor-cost countries has indeed 
represented a salient feature of economic restructuring of Western economies at least 
since 1970s (see Dicken, 1998; Harvey, 1989, p. 165). Indeed, the process of de- 
industrialisation and tertiarization of the advanced capitalist economies should be seen 
in conjunction with this `emigration' of manufacturing to `newly industrialised 
countries'. Thus taking into consideration a wider global scale, the idea of a universal 
drive towards a `post-industrial society' seems less compelling (Sokol, 2002, p. 92). 
Instead, it draws our attention to the processes re-drawing the map of global divisions 
of labour (see below). 
Another major problem of the Bell's account of the `post-industrial society' is his 
failure to consider that people might satisfy their service requirements by investing in 
goods rather than in employing service workers (Webster, 1995, p. 44). Indeed, 
following a detailed analysis of consumption patterns, Gershuny (1978) argued that 
`[i]nstead of buying services, households seem increasingly to be buying... durable 
goods which allow final consumers to produce services for themselves' (Gershuny, 
1978, p. 8; cited in Webster, 1995, p. 45). Such a `self-service economy' amounts to an 
antithesis of Bell's `post-industrial service society' (see Webster, 1995, p. 45). 
Meanwhile, contrary to the expectations of the `post-industrial society' enthusiasts, 
service employment that has been created in the advanced capitalist countries in 
recent decades is not necessarily of a high-wage, knowledge-intensive, business 
services or R&D nature (Cohen and Zysman, 1987, p. 10; Webster, 1985; Sassen, 
1994). Quite the opposite, many new service jobs use unqualified/unskilled labour 
earning poorer wages than those associated with the skilled labour of the old industrial 
economy (Sassen, 1994). This signals that the rising living standards posited by Bell 
(1973) may not be shared across society and that the expected reduction in social 
inequalities may prove chimerical (see also Castells, 1996,1997). 
Further flaws in the `post-industrial society' thesis have been highlighted by Webster 
(1995) who, after a detailed review, has launched an uncompromising attack on Bell's 
version of such a society. He argues that the rejection of the post-industrial society 
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`must be quite sweeping, dismissing everything from Bell's anti-holistic 
mantra (societies are not radically disjuncted, but intricately connected) to his 
general account of social change as an evolution through stages towards a 
"service economy". His explanation of the emergence of the [post-industrial 
society] is misconceived, his description of an emergent "caring" society 
unconvincing, and his insistence that it is possible to identify separate 
employment sectors (which are yet causally connected, with services being 
dependent on the goods-producing level) is incorrect' (ibid, p. 46). 
Various attempts to reincarnate the idea of the `post-industrial society' - for instance, 
in the form of the `information society' - have also faced severe criticisms. 
Shortcomings of the `information society' thesis 
As pointed out earlier in the Chapter, `information society' theorists have tried to 
move beyond the service sector approach typical for writers of the `post-industrial 
society' thesis and focused instead on information and technology that supports the 
creation, processing and distribution of knowledge. This move, however, has proved 
to be the source of a major problem, most notably in the form of technological 
determinism (Webster and Robins, 1986; Webster, 1995,1997; May, 2000). Castells's 
opus on the `Information Age' is a case in point. Indeed, despite being `a marvellous 
work of synthesis' (Webster, 1997, p. 106) it also contains several fundamental 
problematic points. Importantly, Webster notes that the `Information Age' was 
constructed `without a really clear idea of what the author means by information, so 
much so that quite varied information activities and processes were being conflated 
and confused' (ibid, p. 120). The second major objection Webster highlights is that 
Castells `shares totally the view that it is changes in the technological system that 
provide the basis of social advance' (ibid, p. 109) which makes him `committed to a 
technocratic view of development, just as much as is Daniel Bell and, indeed, all other 
theorists of the "information age"'(ibid, p. 109). The central belief of such a 
`technocratic view' is that `certain technological foundation is the prerequisite and 
determinant of all social and political life' (ibid, p. 109) which in turn `subverts all 
ambitions to bring about profound social and economic change, since always, but 
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always, there must be acknowledged a decisive, if imprecise, level of technological 
foundationalism to any dreamed of social system' (ibid, p. 109). 
Such technological determinism, where social change is presented as technology- 
driven, is however, shared across the `information society' camp and beyond. 
Abandoning it would mean to acknowledge that the analysis of information 
technology has to start from the analysis of the wider social, economic and political 
context in which it is born. Instead of accepting a thesis that the `Information 
Revolution' is dramatically reshaping economy and society, one can observe that at 
best we witness an `informatisation' (Webster, 1995, p. 219) of existing social 
relations. But this process has to be seen on the background of strong historical 
continuities of a system that is still distinctively capitalist? (Webster, 1995; Webster 
and Robins, 1986). 
Consequently, technology has to be seen in the context of vested interests firmly 
entrenched in capitalist social relations. In turn, rather than considering the categories 
of capital and state as being dissolved by the `Information Age' and replaced by a 
`networking logic' (as suggested by Castells, 1996) one has to pay attention to the 
interests of corporations (capital), governments (state) and workers (labour) in 
developing, using and promoting technology in general, and ICT in particular 
(Webster and Robins, 1986; Webster, 1995; May, 2000; see also Schiller, 1999; 
McChesney et al, 1998; in particular Hill, 1998; Meiksins, 1998; McChesney, 1998). 
Indeed, both states and businesses playing an active role in promoting the 
`Information Revolution' (Webster and Robins, 1986) reflect support which is related 
to powerful political, business, military and ideological interests (Lyon, 1988). 
Subsequently, it is hard to see technology as `neutral' and the allegedly emerging 
`information age' as being a `natural' or `inevitable' process. In addition, the above 
revelations weaken the prospects of benefits that ICTs are claimed to bring to workers 
and wider society. Indeed, instead of having liberating effects on society, information 
technology can also function as a tool of control and oppression (Lyon, 1988) while 
the expected positive implications for industrial relations may not materialise. 
Workplace practises may be shaped by technology, but this occurs within the context 
7The point that even Castells (1996) does not dispute. 
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of historical conflict and compromise between capital and labour (Tomaney, 1991, 
1994). Meanwhile, the ICT-producing sector (producing technology that is supposed 
to have benign social impact) is, ironically, itself characterised by a sharp division of 
labour (Henderson, 1989; Massey, 1984,1995), thus perpetuating rather than 
mitigating social fragmentation. 
Finally, it has to be highlighted that technologies that are allegedly leading the 
`information revolution' and supposedly opening the horizons of a `new age' (be it in 
the form of `information age', `flexible specialisation' or `Fifth Kondratieff) were 
born, directly or indirectly, out of the military effort of the Cold War era, mainly 
through generously funded US defence programmes (Lyon, 1988). This fact further 
undermines the emergence of the `information society' as `natural' and has important 
bearing on the discussion about the rise of the `informational capitalism' in the West 
and the fall of `industrial statism' in the East (see Chapter 4). Various different 
versions of the `information society' have aimed to overcome these shortcomings 
(including the obvious technological determinism) by embracing wider social 
contexts. These attempts, however, have their own problems, as the subsequent 
critique of the `knowledge economy' and `learning economy' will demonstrate. 
Limits to the `knowledge economy' and `learning economy' 
A sound critique of the `knowledge economy' has been offered by Christopher May 
(2000,2002). May disputes Leadbeater's `tone of inevitability' that `denies human 
agency to do anything but react to change' (May, 2000, p. 147). He also challenges the 
invocation that the `knowledge economy' is a `post-capitalist' one (ibid, p. 147) and 
provides convincing arguments that the `logic' of capitalism has not been disrupted by 
the emerging `new economy'. For May, new modes of economic activity exhibit 
`significant continuities' (May, 2002, p. 1037) with the previous modes of capitalism, 
primarily because property rights remain a central element of the society's legal 
structure (ibid, p. 1037). Indeed, May argues, the main problem with Leadbeater's 
account is its failure to recognise that `a key element of the knowledge economy has 
been the largely successful project to render knowledge as property' (May, 2000, 
p. 146), not least through internationally enforced Intellectual Property Rights (ibid, 
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p. 147-148). Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) allow commercial exploitation of 
knowledge, while ensuring that in the `knowledge economy' (contra Leadbeater) 
knowledge is not freely spread between people, firms, regions or nations. May 
provides the following comparison to support his point: 
`In a way similar to that which the land-owning aristocracy, during the growth 
of intensive farming, sought to enclose what was previously common land, 
intellectual property is predicated on the remaking of knowledge and 
information as property despite its potential for free availability. The rendering 
of knowledge as property through patents, copyrights, trademarks and other 
instruments, transforms knowledge that might be regarded as commonly 
available to everyone into property owned by the few... To enable a price to 
be taken by capitalists, knowledge must be rendered formally scarce and this is 
achieved by the legalised limitations of use owners can mandate by utilising 
IPRs over knowledge of information they wish to control' (May, 2002, 
p. 1041-42). 
For May, this represents a `continuing commodification' (ibid, p. 1042) through which 
`capitalism has progressively deepened its penetration into previously non- 
commodified social relations inside and outside the workplace' (ibid, p. 1043). The 
latter process includes `continuing moves to bring information and knowledge to the 
market as commodities' (ibid, p. 1043). Following this critique, May moves on to 
discuss contradictions at the very heart of the `knowledge economy' by examining the 
much-vaunted claims (typical for `knowledge economy' optimists) that `knowledge 
workers' represent a new dramatically different and empowered form of work. 
Offering some vivid examples, May convincingly demonstrates that far from 
becoming an `axial principle' in the `knowledge economy' (as posited by Bell for 
instance), individual `knowledge workers' may face `considerable barriers [in] 
profiting from the ideas and knowledge they originate' (ibid, p. 1047). Consequently, 
more often than not, inventors, creators or performers `need to be assigned to a large 
company, who then control those rights for exploitation' (ibid, p. 1045). Alternatively, 
the may become `brains for hire' (ibid, p. 1045), but in both cases, `knowledge- 
worker's output belongs not to them but to their employers' (ibid, p. 1046). In fact, 
IPRs can ensure that `even ideas you have outside the workplace may be owned by 
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your employer' (ibid, p. 1046). Typical knowledge workers thus cannot wrench 
themselves free of capitalist social relations. Even the small minority of high-profile 
knowledge workers with potentially generous contracts, `seldom retain control of the 
rights to their intellectual output' (ibid, p. 1045). This is so, because the `underlying 
property relations - those between labour owning and capital owning groups - remain 
largely unaltered' (ibid, p. 1044). In this context, the knowledge-related workplace 
represents a significant continuity in labour relations (ibid, p. 1047-1048). 
Consequently, the new economy's world of work is `remarkably familiar'8 (ibid, 
p. 1048). 
These points have been echoed by Ray Hudson (1999) in his critique of the `learning 
economy' (LE). Hudson starts his critique by asserting that the emphasis on 
knowledge, learning and innovation is `hardly novel' (ibid, p. 59) because `the 
creation of knowledge has been integral to the competitive dynamic of capitalist 
economies since they were first constituted as capitalist' (ibid, p. 60). Importantly 
then, current economic transformations should be seen in `the context of continuities 
and changes within capitalism' (ibid, p. 59; emphasis added). Consequently, 
contradictions of capitalist social relations, the class relations between capital and 
labour, `can be refashioned but not abolished' (ibid, p. 66). In turn, these 
contradictions of capitalism can impose formidable limits to `learning' that LE 
theorists fail to appreciate. Likewise, the role of power in shaping production and the 
appropriation of knowledge is overlooked by the `learning economy' literature. Thus, 
Hudson has doubts as to what extent the expected benign effects of the LE can be 
realised as far as `the economy remains a capitalist one' (ibid, p. 66). Instead he argues 
that some recent changes in production are in fact `reproducing in enhanced form the 
asymmetries of power between capital and labour' (ibid, p. 66). Hudson (1999) then 
moves on to demonstrate that the concept of the networked `learning firm', one of the 
basic building blocks of the `learning economy' concept, seems problematic. Indeed, 
it fails to take into account `sharp asymmetries of power' (ibid, p. 67) in inter-firm 
networks that are increasingly dominated by `massive transnational corporations' 
emerging as `movers and shakers' of the global economy (ibid, p. 67). 
8 Indeed, one could argue that the reality of work in the `knowledge economy' does not represent a 
dramatic shift away from the `real subordination of labour', identified by the Marxian school of thought 
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Critical points have also been raised by Jessop (2000) who assesses the globalising 
`knowledge-driven economy' from Regulation School positions. Importantly, he does 
not see the rise of such an economy as a shift beyond capitalism, but rather as a search 
for `spatio-temporal fixes' of capitalist contradictions in the post-Fordist era. Jessop 
argues that far from overcoming old contradictions of capitalist accumulation, the 
emergence of the `knowledge economy' means that `some contradictions have 
increased in importance and/or acquired new forms' (ibid, p. 68). He then goes on to 
argue that `[k]nowledge has always been important economically' (ibid, p. 65) but that 
what is novel is `the increased importance of knowledge as fictitious commodity' 
(ibid, p. 65). Transformation of knowledge into such a commodity lies at the very 
heart of the `knowledge economy' and can take a form of intellectual property (e. g. 
patent, copyright), of wage-labour producing knowledge for the market, or third, of 
`the real subsumption of intellectual labour and its products under capitalist control 
through their commoditisation and integration into a networked, digitised production- 
consumption process that is controlled by capital' (ibid, p. 65). A `fundamental 
contradiction' arising from such commodification is between the knowledge as 
intellectual commons (collectively produced) and knowledge as intellectual property 
(privately appropriated) (see ibid, p. 65). 
Further contradiction, according to Jessop, arises in the globalising `knowledge-driven 
economy' from the conflict between `hypermobile financial capital' (operating in an 
abstract space of flows) and `industrial capital' (still needing to be valorised in place) 
(ibid, p. 69). There is also a contradiction between `short-term economic calculation' 
(especially in financial flows) and the long-term dynamic of `real competition' rooted 
in resources that may take years to create, stabilise and reproduce (ibid, p. 69). One 
could add that in consequence, a happy and spontaneous reconciliation between 
`financial markets' and `community' as posited by Leadbeater (2000) may be 
unrealistic. According to Jessop, a new `site of problems' also arises from the 
interaction between `time-space compression' and `time-space distantiation'. The 
latter `stretches social relations over time and space' the spatial side of which is 
`reflected in the growing spatial reach of divisions of labour' (ibid, p. 70). We will 
as being an important feature of the industrial capitalism (I am thankful to John Tomaney for this 
insight). 
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return to this issue later. The important point to reiterate here is that the allegedly 
emerging `knowledge economy' does not seem to bring a new kind of more 
harmonious society as posited by Bell or Leadbeater. Instead, we may be experiencing 
the continuing salience of the social relations of capitalism and its contradictions. In 
fact, several observers agree that we may be witnessing the deepening of the capitalist 
logic (Castells, 1996, p. 19; Harvey, 1989, p. 188; May, 2000, p. 147). 
Following this critique we can return to the question whether we are really 
experiencing a transition towards a `knowledge-driven economy'. On the basis of the 
arguments presented above, it could be concluded that there is no compelling 
evidence that (even the most advanced) economies have actually moved beyond the 
capitalist market economy. Therefore, it remains debatable whether contemporary 
economies can be meaningfully seen as knowledge-driven. Rather it should be 
admitted that the market economy remains profit-driven (cf. Sokol and Tomaney, 
2001). Within such an economy, the final goal is not knowledge but profit. In fact, the 
importance of the market imperative for profit is likely to increase with the advances 
of neo-liberal globalisation (see Harvey, 1989; Castells, 1998, p. 338, p. 342). This is 
not to say that knowledge does not play an important role, indeed, knowledge can be a 
part of a profit-seeking process (and probably always was). But knowledge is neither 
the only, nor necessarily the most important part of such process. The central 
argument of the `knowledge economy' about the key role that knowledge now plays 
in the economy is assumed but not proven. Indeed, the crucial evidence of the 
growing importance of knowledge (let alone knowledge being the only or the most 
important factor of in economic and social development) is still missing9 and the 
notion that we are witnessing a transition towards a `knowledge-driven' economy 
crumbles. The following section will try to further support such an argument by 
pointing to the fundamental flaw in the `knowledge-driven economy' concept through 
a critical examination of the relationships between knowledge and wealth. 
9 It remains debated as to how the role of knowledge within the economy should be measured (cf. 
OECD, 1996a; inter alia). However, using R&D expenditure as an indicator, OECD's (1996a, p. 22) 
report on the `knowledge economy' has suggested that `overall growth in R&D spending is declining. 
In the OECD countries, growth in national R&D spending has been on a downward trend since the late 
1980s, and it fell in absolute terms in the early 1990s'. 
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2.4 Can an economy be `knowledge-driven'? 
The critique presented in the previous section undermines the notion that the 
advanced capitalist countries are experiencing a transition to the `knowledge 
economy'. However, it is argued here, that the underlying economic logic of the 
`knowledge economy' concept remained unchallenged. This logic is built on the 
assumption that knowledge is a `dynamo' of economic growth, i. e. that there is a firm 
causal relation between knowledge and wealth in a direction that knowledge creates 
wealth. It is this logic, however, that needs to be scrutinised by opening a question 
whether an economy can be knowledge-driven at all. This section aims to address this 
question by examining the knowledge-wealth relationship from a critical perspective. 
Such a perspective requires careful attention given the widespread proliferation of an 
unproblematic and uncritical use of the concept of knowledge as being central to 
economic development (as the most important if not the only factor) in virtually all 
versions of the `knowledge economy' regardless of their theoretical backgroundlo 
Various approaches may have fundamentally different views on what form of 
knowledge is important for economic development; either tacit (Lundvall and 
Johnson, 1994; Burton-Jones, 1999) or codified/scientific (Bell, 1973; Leadbeater, 
2000), embodied in technology (Castells, 1996) or institutions (Hodgson, 1998a, 
1999). Various authors may have also different views on how and where knowledge is 
produced; in R&D departments and universities (Bell, 1973; Leadbeater, 2000), in 
and between knowledge firms or knowledge corporations (Burton-Jones, 1999; Bell, 
1973), through networks (Castells, 1996) or global trade (Leadbeater, 2000); via 
market competition (cf. Schumpeter, 1939,1943) or via `organised markets' and 
government intervention (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994). However, regardless of these 
differences, the underlying argument firmly enshrined in them is unequivocally clear: 
in the `knowledge-driven economy', it is knowledge that drives economic 
development (see Appendix - Figure 2.1). 
Lundvall and Johnson (1994, p. 23, note 1) have for instance argued that `knowledge, energy and 
materials are the basic resources in production rather than labour and capital; knowledge may be 
regarded as the key resource'. 
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Even critics that question the alleged benign effects of the `knowledge' or `learning 
economy' seem to admit that it `would of course be futile to deny the significance of 
knowledge, innovation and learning to economic performance' (Hudson, 1999, p. 59). 
Far from disputing this latter statement, it is nevertheless suggested here that the 
knowledge-wealth relationship needs to be examined in a critical light. The purpose is 
to problematise, at an abstract level, the dictum that an economy can be `knowledge- 
driven' because it is knowledge that creates wealth, to argue that such a simple and 
one-directional causal link (knowledge creates wealth) is wanting at least in two 
aspects. First, it overlooks the possibility of a reversed causality (wealth creates 
knowledge) and, second, it does not take into account the influence of another crucial 
factor, i. e. power (Sokol and Tomaney, 2001). These two simple but fundamental 
`omissions' render the logic of the `knowledge-driven economy' questionable and 
have profound ramifications. They thus deserve closer examination. 
Taking the knowledge-wealth relationship first, it is striking that various versions of 
the `knowledge-driven economy', by and large, fail to properly accommodate the 
possibility of a reverse causality between knowledge and wealth. Indeed, the cost of 
`knowledge creation' or `learning' is neglected by the literature. In other words, the 
important fact that wealth (let alone time and effort) is needed to `produce' 
knowledge, is usually omitted. Consequently, the reversed causal link (i. e. that wealth 
creates knowledge) is often conveniently denied. This is disturbing but not surprising. 
The acknowledgement of the existence of the reversed wealth-knowledge causality, of 
course, turns the logic of the `knowledge economy' upside down and opens a 
fundamental dilemma: are successful economies prosperous because they are 
knowledge-intensive, or are they knowledge-intensive because they are prosperous? 
In other words; is the economy driven by knowledge or is knowledge creation driven 
by the economy? 
The answer to this question is far from clear. Jacob Schmookler (1966) for instance 
studied the relationship between economic development and technological innovation, 
to conclude that the rates of innovation (considered by many as a vehicle for 
economic development) may in fact be positively linked to the demand of a given 
economy, i. e. dependent on the economic growth itself. In a similar way, Patterson 
(1999) challenges a conventional view regarding the relationship between education 
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and economic development. He argues, building on Ashton and Green (1996), that 
`there is no convincing research evidence that higher overall levels of education and 
training really are the cause of more rapid economic growth' (Patterson, 1999, p. 5). 
Subsequently, the critical question arises `whether education is a cause or an effect of 
national economic success' (ibid, p. 5; emphasis added). 
One way to resolve the above dilemma would be to argue that instead of a simple 
unidirectional relationship, knowledge and wealth are engaged in a mutual circular 
relationship in a sense that knowledge can create wealth, but also wealth is needed to 
produce knowledge (be it scientific discovery, technological innovation, or educated 
individual). Moreover, the relationship between knowledge and wealth may be 
mutually reinforcing and resulting in a `virtuous circle' in which investment in 
knowledge may yield economic benefits that can -be reinvested back into the 
knowledge-base generating further wealth. In other words, a possibility of increasing 
returns to investment in knowledge should be acknowledged (cf. Solow, 1956; 1957, 
Kaldor, 1970; Markusen, 1985; Romer, 1986,1990; Krugman, 1991a, 1991b; cf. 
Sala-I-Martin, 2002). Thus, knowledge should be in fact seen as an integral part of 
wealth (capital) accumulation. This puts the proposition that an economy is, or could 
be, knowledge-driven in a very different light. 
The second problem with the knowledge-wealth formula that features at the heart of 
the `knowledge-driven economy' concept is its silence over power relations. This is 
rather disturbing because as Susan Strange puts it `[i]t is impossible to study political 
economy... without giving close attention to the role of power in economic life' 
(Strange, 1994, p. 23). The absence of power in the knowledge-wealth equation thus 
represents the second fundamental `omission' of the `knowledge economy' concept. 
Indeed, by inserting power into the equation, the picture of a simple, one-directional 
relation between `knowledge' and `wealth' disintegrates, a more complex (but also 
more accurate) matrix emerges. This emerging matrix sees `knowledge', `wealth' and 
`power' as being mutually linked through a web of complex, multidirectional, direct 
and indirect relations (see Appendix - Figure 2.2). It is useful to acknowledge that the 
task of thoroughly defining knowledge, wealth and power and conceptualising their 
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relationship would be welcome here, but is beyond the scope of this thesis". What is 
important, however, is that the new emerging matrix (abstract and simplistic as it is) 
allow us to depart from a misleading notion of the economy as being `knowledge- 
driven' and open more realistic ways of looking at economic and social processes. 
Such insights may be necessary when considering inequalities within and between 
socio-economic systems. 
Indeed, one of the central claims that `knowledge economy' enthusiasts make is that 
the emerging `knowledge economy' opens chances to eradicate deep inequalities 
wrought by the (outgoing) industrial capitalism. Leadbeater (2000) goes as far as to 
claim that the `global knowledge economy' can improve changes to resolve global 
inequalities. However, in the light of the above arguments, such chances look slim. 
Indeed, at the very abstract level, the interplay between knowledge, wealth and power 
is unlikely to result in a sort of equilibrium distribution within and between socio- 
economic systems. On the contrary, there are good reasons to expect that this 
interplay may be patterned by cumulative effects, leading to virtuous/vicious circles 
from which highly uneven patterns of `distribution' of knowledge, wealth and power 
may emerge. On the `virtuous circle' side, it is not difficult to imagine, for instance, 
how wealth (economic resources), power (political influence) and knowledge 
(education, skills, etc. ), can reinforce each other to enhance success of individuals or 
whole social groups. On the adverse side of the process, a `vicious circle' can 
develop, where people and social groups can find it difficult to break from poverty, 
lack of knowledge (education) and the absence of political voice. The likelihood of 
the virtuous/vicious scenarios resonates with the suggestions by Ferreira (2001) who 
has argued that initial educational, wealth and political inequalities within society tend 
to reinforce themselves. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Gunnar Myrdal 
(1957) a half century ago, advancing the idea of circular and cumulative causation 12. 
More broadly, such an approach resonates with the disequilibrium economics theories 
including Keynesianism (cf. Kaldor, 1970). 
11 See Bourdieu (1977,1984) and his concept of `economic capital', `political capital' and `cultural 
capital' as a possible way forward. 
12 Myrdal (1957) originally introduced the idea of circular and cumulative causation when studying 
processes of social exclusion (see ibid, p. 13-20). Subsequently he applied the principle of such 
causation into the space-economic context (see Chapter 3). It is useful to note that Myrdal has argued 
that the negative effects of the processes of circular and cumulative causation can be overcome only 
when tackled on several or all fronts by intervention from outside. 
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The possible negative effects of the circular and cumulative causation process can be 
enhanced in the profit-driven economy, in which the differences in power and wealth 
are further highlighted. Indeed, in the capitalist economy, the ownership of the means 
of production is in itself a source of considerable power. As seen in the previous 
section, this logic (typical for industrial capitalism) has not been disrupted in the 
emerging knowledge-intensive production, courtesy of continuing institution of 
property rights. Indeed, as May (2002) has demonstrated, even knowledge workers 
may find that their intellectual output still belongs to the owners of the Intellectual 
Property Rights. Thus knowledge, far from dramatically transforming the landscapes 
of capitalism, is itself subjected to the capitalist logic. Thus knowledge, in a variety of 
its forms, is likely to partake in the process of reproducing existing inequalities. 
Within such process, contra `knowledge economy' optimists, knowledge distribution 
`remains patterned by wealth and ownership' (May, 2000, p. 146). This in turn means 
that we have to abandon uncritical notion of the `knowledge-driven economy', and 
move on towards an alternative conceptualisation of socio-economic systems. 
2.5 Towards an alternative framework 
The disintegration of the `knowledge economy' concept opens the way for alternative 
conceptual frameworks to be put in place. This section will only attempt to sketch-out 
some elements on which an alternative framework could be based. Building on the 
strengths of institutional/evolutionary and more radical approaches the section will 
start with a discussion of how an economy could be conceptualised and then move to 
argue that current socio-economic transformations are occurring within the context of 
the capitalist profit-driven economy. In doing so, it will highlight the role of, what 
could be termed `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial value 
chains/networks' in the workings of current political economy thus opening an 
alternative way of understanding what some see as the rise of the `knowledge 
economy'. 
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The starting point of an alternative conceptualisation is a suggestion that an 
`economy' should be seen as an institutionalised social process13 (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Granovetter, 1985; Samuels, 1988; North, 1991a, 1991b; Witt, 1993; Hodgson, 
1988,1993,1998a, 1999,2001; Hodgson et al., 1993). Consequently, institutions 
rather than individual actors or firms become the primary analytical focus. Indeed, 
borrowing from institutional/evolutionary economics, it could be argued that `[s]ocio- 
economic systems are essentially and unavoidably built up of historically layered and 
densely entangled institutions and routines' (Hodgson, 1999, p. 60). It is important to 
recognise that institutionalist approaches cannot be used unproblematicaly, as they 
themselves faced significant critique (see Ankarloo, 2002; P. Clarke, 2000; see also 
Martin, 2000). Hodgson himself has admitted, `the detailed development and 
explication of a theory of institutional evolution ... still remains incomplete' (2001, p. 
252). Indeed, the crucial shortcoming of institutional/evolutionary economics is that 
the institutions from which socio-economic systems are built are not clearly defined14 
and that there is a continuing ambiguity about how institutions emerge and evolve. 
A possible way forward in conceptualising institutions would be to use an 
evolutionary metaphor of the `struggle for survival', while recognising that the rules 
of biological survival cannot be easily transposed on social systems (cf. Hodgson, 
1993,2001, p. 252). Unfortunately, the social sciences lack a great deal of 
understanding how such `survival' works within a social system (but see Elias 
Canetti, 1962 for an inspirational work). Linking back to the debate in the previous 
section, however, it is suggested that social struggles for survival can be seen as 
individual and collective struggles over wealth, power and knowledge. It is these 
struggles that may be critical for understanding institutions, because, as argued here, it 
is through such social struggles that institutions of conflict and/or co-operation are 
born. A tentative definition of institutions offered here is that institutions are probably 
best understood as being at the same time objects, subjects and outcomes of social 
13 Therefore terms such as `socio-economy' or `political economy' are probably more appropriate to 
describe it. It is in this context the term `political economy' is used through the thesis. 
14 Sometimes, institutions are presented as organisations (such as government body, agency or firm), 
but more often as a set of formal or informal rules, habits, customs, etc. that shape behaviour of 
members within a given society or social group. However, for Hodgson, (1988,1999) `market' itself 
and even `money' can be seen as institutions. 
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struggles. In the light of this, it is now possible to move on to conceptualisation of the 
current socio-economic system and its institutional characteristics. 
Three critical institutions that emerged from social struggles in the era of industrial 
capitalism, were capital, labour and state (see Harvey, 1999), and given the strong 
continuities the `new era' displays with the past (see section 2.3) it would be too early 
to dismiss these institutions as obsolete. This is not to argue that capital (productive 
and financial), labour and state (local, regional, national, supra-national) have not 
been undergoing significant transformations in the past three decades or so. During 
these decades, for instance, the rise of global `finance capital' has been remarkable 
(Strange, 1986; Harvey, 1989; Michie and Grieve Smith, 1995; Dicken, 1998; Weeks, 
1998) `achieving a degree of autonomy from real production unprecedented in 
capitalism's history' (Harvey, 1989, p. 194) while assuming growing hegemony over 
`productive capital' (Weeks, 1998). `Productive capital', meanwhile, has been 
undergoing its own dramatic restructuring (Peet, 1987; Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995) 
that included a locational `re-shuffle of the world's industrial production' (Harvey, 
1989, p. 165; see also Henderson, 1989; Dicken, 1998). The nature and composition of 
the global working class also changed, as have the conditions of consciousness 
formation and political action (ibid, p. 192). `Dual' labour markets were reshaped 
according to the imperatives of `flexible accumulation' (ibid, p. 152). Simultaneously, 
there has been continuing restructuring of the state (Jessop, 2000; inter alia) that 
included the rolling-back of the Keynesian social welfare state. Alongside these 
developments, there has been a (re)emergence of global institutions, as `the IMF and 
the World Bank were designated [in 1982] as the central authority for exercising the 
collective power of capitalist nation states over international financial institutions' 
(Harvey, 1989, p. 170). 
Importantly, these transformations instituted changes in the nature of the relations and 
power balance between capital, labour and state. As Castells (1996, p. 20) has noted, 
economic restructuring has proceeded on the basis of the `political defeat' of 
organised labour, and `dismantling of the social contract between capital and labour' 
(ibid, p. 19) in the environment of a `common economic discipline' adopted by OECD 
countries (ibid, p. 20). The point has been echoed by Harvey when noting the 
`declining significance of union power' (Harvey, 1989, p. 152) and the `erosion of the 
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social compromise between big labour and big government' (ibid, p. 168). Meanwhile 
individual nation states, have found themselves `at the mercy of financial disciplining' 
(ibid, p. 165) and being `more strictly circumscribed' (ibid, p. 168) in the conditions of 
`heightened international competition' (ibid, p. 168) and vis-a-vis the empowerment 
of finance capital (ibid, p. 165). The state is now, as Harvey notes, `in a much more 
problematic position' (ibid, p. 170) while arenas of conflict between the nation state 
and trans-national capital have opened up. But simultaneously and paradoxically the 
role of the state as a lender or `operator of last resort' has become more rather than 
less crucial (ibid, p. 196). 
As a result of these transformations, capitalism may have been significantly 
refashioned, but not abolished. Consequently, institutions of capital, labour and state 
(in their various forms) represent a salient feature of the socio-economic system. With 
the advances of a neo-liberal profit-driven economic order that deepens the `logic' of 
capitalism (Castells, 1996; Harvey, 1989; May, 2000) it seems that it is global capital 
(both `productive' and `financial') that is gaining momentum and emerges as a 
dominant force in shaping economic processes. Two concepts are proposed here as 
potentially offering a useful prism through which to approach these economic 
processes, namely `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial value chains' 
(or value networks). `Socio-spatial divisions of labour' can be seen as part of the 
stretching social relations of capitalism over space (see Harvey, 1999; Jessop, 2000) 
and tentatively defined as the way production is organised between and within 
capital, labour and the state15. In simple terms, the concept tries to capture the ever- 
growing complexity of the division of labour within the global socio-economic 
system. The crucial point of the profit-driven economy, however, is not only who 
produces and where, but also who and where reaps economic benefits of such 
production16. Thus the notion of `socio-spatial value chains' (or value networks'7) is 
proposed to capture the ways value is appropriated and distributed between and 
Is `Production' is used here in the broadest possible sense to include `pre-production' and `post- 
production' economic activities associated with the production, circulation and consumption of 
physical things, services and their combinations. 
6A good example on the huge gulf that can separate 'production' and `value' is offered by May (2000, 
p. 148) when pointing with irony at the fact that `[in 1999] Michael Jordan earned more from his 
endorsement of Nike shoes than was paid to Nike's entire developing world workforce. They may have 
Produced the shoes, but Jordan added the value! '. 
7 See Smith et al. (2002) for a discussion on a difference between `value chain' and 'value network'. 
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within capital, labour and the state18. The appropriation of value within the global 
political economy has indeed been highly uneven and social and spatial inequalities 
have been growing apace. These inequalities have been manifested at the global 
levelt9 (see Castells, 1996,1997; Harvey, 2000, p. 41-45; Ellwood, 2001; inter alia), 
between countries and regions (see Chapter 4 for uneven development in Europe) and 
within countries and regions (see Chapters 6 and 7 for the cases of Scotland and 
Slovakia). It is in this context of inequality that the emergence of high-value, 
knowledge-intensive economic hot-spots (mostly) within the advanced capitalist 
economies has to be evaluated. 
Indeed, as part of the intensified search for profit, knowledge has been increasingly 
commodified (see section 2.3). The commodification of knowledge in turn has 
allowed for the emergence of what could be seen as a `knowledge-intensive sub- 
economy', but this has to be seen in conjunction with the growing socio-spatial 
division of labour at the global level20 and within the overall profit-driven economy 
framework. In other words, knowledge production has to be seen in the context of 
intensified struggles between and within capital, labour and the state over value 
appropriation. Consequently, instead of a widespread knowledge-sharing process 
posited by `knowledge economy' enthusiasts, we may witness a process of knowledge 
accumulation as part of a wider circular and cumulative causation mechanism, in 
which knowledge, power and wealth reinforce each. In turn, such a cumulative 
process may have significant social and spatial effects. This theme will be further 
developed in Chapter 3 where it will be argued that the economic prosperity of 
regions depends to a large degree on the way they are inserted into (global) `socio- 
spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial value chains/networks'. Meanwhile, 
conclusions from this Chapter may be summarised as follows. 
18 See Harvey (1999, p. 5-24) for a discussion on, and definition of, `value'. 
" Harvey (2000, p. 42-43) cites from a recent UN Development Report that `between 1960 and 1991 
the share of the richest 20% rose from 70% of global income to 85% - while that of the poorest 
declined from 2.3% to 1.4%'. By 1991, more than 85% of the world's population received only 15% of 
its income and the net worth of the 358 richest people, the dollar billionaires, is equal to the combined 
income of the poorest 45% of the world population - 2.3 billion people. 
20 Cf. the concept of the `newest international division of labour' of Castells (1996, p. 106-147). 
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2.6 Conclusions 
This Chapter examined the highly influential concept of the `knowledge-driven 
economy'. It has been argued the concept appears in the literature under various 
names and versions. Four such versions have been reviewed in more detail. The `post- 
industrial society' thesis could be seen as an attempt to conceptualise the decline of 
manufacturing and the perceived growing weight of services in society and economy. 
It represents an `original' version of the `knowledge society' in which knowledge is 
the `axial' principle (Bell, 1973). Under the heading of the `information society', the 
main attention has been given to Castells' (1996) concept of the `Information Age' 
that places emphasis on the perceived importance of information and information 
technology. Further arguments on the `knowledge economy', in particular those of 
Leadbeater (2000), have been presented. Here, the `knowledge economy' concept is 
seen to go beyond the preoccupation with `information' and narrow technological 
concerns in favour of emphasising the importance of wider social contexts and more 
broadly defined `knowledge'. As such, it nevertheless seems to `recycle' many of the 
original `post-industrialist' ideas. Finally, the `learning economy' concept has been 
revisited. Associated mainly with the work of Lundvall and Johnson (1994) it 
represents an attempt to conceptualise the knowledge-intensive economy from the 
perspective of evolutionary economics. The above concepts could be seen as just the 
`tip of the iceberg' of a much larger and diverse body of literature, however, they 
encapsulate well the main arguments this literature offers in its various streams. 
Besides, the reviewed concepts have also offered some arguments for the debate on 
the fall of state-socialism in Central and Eastern Europe. These arguments will be 
revisited in Chapter 4. 
What has become clear from the brief reviews of these concepts is that, despite 
important differences between them, they also display considerable overlaps. In 
particular they all seem to share the powerful view that the advanced capitalist 
economies are undergoing a dramatic transformation towards a new era organised 
around knowledge, information, innovation and technology, supported by particular 
institutional arrangements. For many observers this transformation is inevitable, but 
nonetheless desirable, because it brings the hope that the old socio-spatial divisions 
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and contradictions of industrial capitalism will give way to a more harmonious 
development as the emerging new `knowledge age' sets in. Such outcomes would 
indeed be seen as desirable, but the Chapter suggests that they may prove to be largely 
illusionary, while the nature of the allegedly emerging `knowledge economy' is often 
misunderstood. Indeed, the concept of the `knowledge economy' itself suffers from 
serious theoretical shortcomings. 
A critique of the `knowledge economy' was started by addressing two fundamental 
questions. First, `are we really experiencing a transition to a knowledge-driven 
economy', and second, `can an economy be knowledge-driven at all'? With regard to 
the latter, the Chapter supports the view that there is no convincing evidence that 
(even the most advanced) economies have actually moved beyond the capitalist 
market economy. Therefore, it remains debatable whether contemporary economies 
can be seen as knowledge-driven. Rather it should be admitted that the market 
economy is, and always was, profit-driven. Within such an economy, the final goal is 
not knowledge but profit. In fact, the importance of the market imperative for profit is 
likely to increase with the advances of neo-liberal globalisation. This is not to say that 
knowledge does not play an important role in the economy. Indeed, knowledge can be 
(and probably always was) a part of a profit-seeking process. But it is neither the only 
factor nor necessarily the most important part of the process. Therefore, the notion 
that we are witnessing a transition towards a `knowledge economy' should be 
questioned. 
Subsequently, the very assumption that knowledge creates wealth (central to the 
`knowledge-driven economy' thesis) has been subjected to a critical analysis. At best 
it is an oversimplification that does not take into account the influence of other factors 
(power). Moreover, it overlooks the possibility of a reversed causality (i. e. that wealth 
creates knowledge). Indeed, the cost of `learning' or `knowledge creation' is virtually 
ignored by the literature. Acknowledging the existence of the reversed causality, of 
course, means turning the logic of the `knowledge economy' upside down. As the 
picture of a simple, one-directional relation between `knowledge' and `wealth' 
disintegrates, a more complex (but also more accurate) matrix emerges. This sees 
`knowledge', `wealth' and `power' as being mutually linked through a web of 
complex, multidirectional, direct and indirect relations. The above fundamental 
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`omissions' render the logic of the `knowledge-driven economy' doubtful and open 
the way for an alternative conceptualisation of the current political economy. 
Building partly on `radical' and `institutional' approaches, this alternative starts by 
acknowledging that the economy should be conceptualised as an `institutionalised 
social process'. As such, the economy (or rather `socio-economy' or `political 
economy') is shaped by institutions, which can be simultaneously seen as the objects, 
subjects and outcomes of social struggles over knowledge, wealth and power. The 
Chapter then went on to support the view that there are important continuities with the 
past in these struggles and that current socio-economic transformations in the most 
advanced market economies are unfolding within the framework of the capitalist 
political economy. Consequently, the institutions of labour, state (local, regional, 
national, supranational) and capital (productive and financial), seem to have 
continuing salience in shaping socio-economic transformations where contradictions 
and conflict remain pertinent features. However, in what appears to be an increasingly 
neo-liberal profit-driven economy, it is global capital that is gaining momentum, 
supported by institutions of global economic governance (emerging as a category of 
institution of its own right). Indeed, global capital seems to play a pivotal role in 
shaping the emerging global `socio-spatial divisions of labour' accompanied by global 
`socio-spatial value chains' - two concepts that seem to be better placed to capture the 
transformations of the global political economy than the concept of a `knowledge 
economy'. 
Within such a political economy, the role of knowledge is indeed changing in that it is 
increasingly commodified. Thus, rather than dramatically transforming the economic 
and social landscapes of capitalism, knowledge itself seems to be increasingly 
subordinated to the `logic' of the capitalist economy. The commodification of 
knowledge in turn allows for the emergence of what could be seen as a `knowledge- 
intensive sub-economy', but this has to be seen in conjunction with the growing 
socio-spatial division of labour within the overall profit-driven economy framework. 
Therefore, instead of a widespread knowledge-sharing process, we may witness a 
process of knowledge accumulation as part of a wider circular and cumulative 
causation mechanism, in which knowledge, power and wealth reinforce each other 
with significant social and spatial effects. This in turn casts shadows of doubt over the 
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expected desirable effects that the alleged emergence of the `knowledge era' is 
supposed to bring about. These doubts, together with the question marks over the 
logic and the very existence of the `knowledge economy' carry some crucial 
inferences for concepts in economic geography that take the emergence of the 
`knowledge economy' for granted and uncritically embrace the idea that knowledge 
and learning are the most important factors of economic development. These 
economic geography concepts will be now critically examined in the following 
Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: 
The `learning region' as the 
regional dimension of the 
`knowledge economy' 
3.1 Introduction 
While Chapter 2 provided a discussion on the `knowledge economy' itself, the present 
Chapter aims to explore specifically the regional dimensions of the `knowledge 
economy'. In doing so, the Chapter will engage critically with recent concepts within 
and outside economic geography that borrow their key postulates from the 
`knowledge economy' discourse and consider knowledge and learning the key 
explanatory factors of regional development (see Malecki, 2000, MacKinnon et al., 
2002; for recent reviews). These concepts see regions as basic organisational units of 
today's `knowledge-based capitalism' (Ohmae, 1993; Florida, 1995a), that function as 
`repositories and collectors' of knowledge, supported by regionally-based 
`entrepreneurial cultures', `untraded interdependencies' and `institutional thickness' 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994a; Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 1995a, 1997a, 1999; inter alia). 
Such regions, we are told, are best described as `learning regions' (Florida, 1995a, 
1995b; Asheim, 1996; Morgan, 1997; Boekema et al. 2000a). Their learning capacity 
and ability to disseminate knowledge and innovation ensures their economic success. 
In this way, the `learning region' paradigm `fits into the wider context of the 
knowledge-based economy' (Rutten et al., 2000, p. 249) and opens the way for 
conceptualising the `knowledge economy' and `learning economy' as a collection of 
`learning regions'. To push such conceptualisation further, `learning regions' can be 
seen as central to ongoing socio-economic changes and considered as motors of the 
`global knowledge economy' (cf. Florida, 1995a). Consequently, to cite from Rutten, 
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Bakkers and Boekema again, `understanding the dynamics that shape our global , 
[knowledge] economy must start with an analysis of the dynamics of our regional 
world' (Rutten et al., 2000, p. 257). 
This thesis rejects the latter proposition and instead supports the view that the 
understanding of contemporary regional development must start with an 
understanding of the wider socio-economic context. In this respect, question marks 
over the logic and the very existence of the `knowledge economy' that have arisen 
from the discussion in Chapter 2 have profound implications for the above economic 
geography concepts also. In fact, on the basis of the critique of the `knowledge 
economy' undertaken in the previous Chapter, it would be easy to dismiss the 
`learning region' concept as inadequate and misconceived. However, given the 
centrality that many scholars ascribe to regions in current socio-economic 
transformations and the alleged rise of the `knowledge economy', and given that their 
propositions dominate theoretical discussions within and outside economic 
geography, and taking into account the enormous influence that these voices have 
gained in policy-making process in recent years, it is appropriate to examine the 
`learning region' concept thoroughly. This Chapter will attempt to do so in the 
following steps. 
Initially, section 3.2 will try to answer the question of what a `learning region' 
actually is and how it is conceptualised in the literature. In doing so, the section will 
first place the `learning region' in the context of a longer-term search on the part of 
economic geography for the regional dimensions of the `post-industrial society', 
`information society' or `knowledge economy'. It will then move on to review the 
`learning region' paradigm itself and its various versions. The section will 
subsequently argue that alongside the influential theoretical discourses which assign 
the region the prominent role as a unit of analysis, regions have recently also been 
celebrated as focal points of a policy intervention. Indeed, the `learning region' 
concept has become debated as the best stratagem for less favoured regions (LFRs) to 
reach `higher roads' of development (Cooke, 1995a, Morgan, 1997; inter alia). This 
will be highlighted in section 3.3 while presenting influential views within economic 
geography that see the `learning region' as a vehicle for regional renewal of LFRs 
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built around particular regional institutional structures. These institutional structures 
include regional development agencies (RDAs) that, in the absence of `institutional 
thickness', are supposed to act as animateurs for their respective regional economies 
by promoting localised learning and ultimately fostering prosperity. Such propositions 
are particularly attractive for former industrial regions on the European economic 
periphery that are keen to `learn' new `post-industrial' or `knowledge-intensive' 
development paths. 
The basis on which the `learning region' concept has been constructed however and 
the extent to which it is relevant for LFRs has been subject to important critique. This 
critique will be presented in section 3.4, pointing to the limits of the `learning region' 
concept including the vagueness of definition of its basic building blocks, its `fuzzy' 
conceptualisation, `thin empirics' and problematic applicability for LFRs. It will be 
argued, however, that the central assumption on which the `learning region' is built 
(i. e. that regional learning will bring about regional prosperity) remains unchallenged 
by the existing critique. This theoretical lacuna will thus be addressed in section 3.5 . 
The section will argue that by assuming an unproblematic unidirectional causation 
between `knowledge' and `wealth', the `learning region' concept basically replicates 
the central flaw of the `knowledge economy' concept (see Chapter 2). Translated into 
the spatial context, it discounts the effects of possible circular and cumulative 
causation in which knowledge, wealth and power may reinforce each other in 
`virtuous circles'. This fundamental `omission' has crucial implications for 
understanding less favoured regions and opens the way for an alternative 
conceptualisation of the regional problem that will be discussed in section 3.6 . 
Building on the theoretical foundations developed in Chapter 2, section 3.6 will put 
forward elements for such an alternative framework. It will be suggested that the 
concepts of `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial value chains' (or 
`value networks') are probably better placed to grasp socio-economic processes in the 
contemporary political economy and its implications for regional economic 
development. Finally, section 3.7 will summarise the findings and point to the 
implications these may have for the remainder of the thesis. 
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3.2 What is the learning region? 
The primary goal of this section is to establish what the `learning region' actually is. 
This is not an easy task given that `[t]here is no simple definition of the learning 
region' (Boekema et al., 2000b, p. 3), as it is `too complex an issue' (ibid, p. 3) 
encompassing a `wealth and diversity of insights' (ibid, p. 4). However, despite having 
foundations `in a multiplicity of theories' (ibid, p. 4), it has been made clear by 
Boekema, Morgan, Bakkers and Rutten that one of the leading rationales behind the 
`learning region' paradigm 
`... is rooted in the conviction that the nature of economy has shifted from a 
labour and capital-based economy to a knowledge-based one, where 
knowledge is the most important resource and learning the most important 
process' (ibid, p. 4). 
The above `conviction' places the `learning region' firmly in the context of the 
`knowledge economy' or `learning economy' and a longer-term search for the 
regional dimension of the `great transformation' (cf. Chapter 2). Indeed, the `learning 
region' is not the only paradigm trying to grapple with the spatial implications of 
wider socio-economic changes, rather its emergence should be seen as part of an on- 
going process as the theories, concepts and visions reviewed in Chapter 2 have all 
become reflected in economic geography debates. These debates have given birth to a 
plethora of approaches that would deserve thorough examination. It is, however, 
practically impossible to examine the wealth of literature composed of a rich mosaic 
of overlapping, competing or even contradictory accounts in the given limited space. 
What follows, therefore, does not aspire to offer a comprehensive review of all 
concepts related to the regional dimensions of the `great transformation'. Rather it 
aims to provide a simple overview of the main lines of inquiry in the field and to 
establish a context for subsequent more detailed elaboration on the `learning region' 
theme. Reflecting the broad structure used in Chapter 2, these lines of inquiry will be 
presented in three (in many ways overlapping and complimentary) groups as follows. 
The first group comprises economic geography concepts that have engaged with the 
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`post-industrial society' thesis and its spatial implications. The second group is 
formed by approaches associated with the notion of the `information society' broadly 
defined. Finally, the third group includes approaches anchored in debates on the 
`knowledge/learning economy' (and from which the `learning region' paradigm was 
born). These will be presented before turning to a more detailed examination of the 
`learning region' paradigm itself. 
Regional dimensions of the post-industrial society' 
The first group is composed of economic geography approaches that have engaged 
with the `post-industrial society' thesis and its spatial manifestations. Within it, at 
least three overlapping research strands are discernible. First, there are approaches 
that examine particular geographies arising from the alleged decline of the importance 
of physical goods and the rising importance of information flows in the economy and 
society (Hepworth, 1989; Castells, 1989; Lash and Urry, 1994). These overlap, to a 
large degree, with those approaches reflecting the `information society' theme (see 
below). Second, there is a considerable body of literature that critically examines the 
geography of de-industrialisation (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Martin and 
Rowthorn, 1986; Allen and Massey, 1988; Massey and Meegan, 1982; inter alia) and 
the uneven spatial implications of the growth of services in the `post-industrial 
economy' (Allen, 1988; Marshall, 1992). The third strand focuses on a particular 
segment of the service sector regarded by Bell (1973) as the motors of `post- 
industrial' or `information economy' - universities and R&D establishments 
(Goddard and Chatterton, 1999; Chatterton and Goddard, 2000; Malecki, 1985; 
Howells, 1992; Keeble, 1992; inter alia; see also Henry et al., 1995; Andersen et al., 
2000; see also below). 
In geographical terms, the analytical effort has tended to concentrate on cities that 
have been considered as being at the forefront of the `post-industrial revolution'. 
Cities thus have been conceptualised as `information cities' (Castells, 1989,1996; 
Hepworth, 1989) functioning as the `backbones' of the information economy 
(Hepworth, 1989, p. 208) or the hubs of information networks (Goddard, 1992) 
accommodating growing flows of information. Alternatively, they are seen as service- 
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sector dominated `post-industrial cities' (Savitch, 1988), `global cities' (Sassen, 1994, 
2001) or more recently `innovative cities' (Simmie, 2001). Within such cities or city- 
regions, special attention has been paid to innovation supporting `technopoles' 
(Malecki, 1991,1997; Castells and Hall, 1994; Benko, 1991; inter alia). Based around 
the concept of localised synergies between innovative firms, research institutes and 
universities, `technopoles' are considered `mines and foundries of the [post-industrial] 
informational economy' (Castells and Hall, 1994). Meanwhile, some commentators 
have highlighted one of the technopole's components - the university - as being 
central to regional development in the `knowledge economy' (Goddard, 1999; 
Goddard and Chatterton, 1999; Chatterton and Goddard 2000), while others have 
focused on the university-business nexus (Thrift, 1998), or emphasised the importance 
of university-business-government `triad' (Etzkowitz, 2001a, 2001b). Meanwhile, 
some geographers concerned with the `anatomy of industrial capitalism' have 
`explicitly reject[ed] the widespread idea that the contemporary world has now 
entered into a "post-industrial" phase' (Scott and Storper, 1986, p. vii) to argue that 
`apparent manifestations of "post-industrialism" ... are in reality no more than 
imbricated moments within the complex structure of modern industrial capitalism' 
(ibid, p. vii). 
Regional dimensions of the `information society' 
The economic geography approaches engaging with the `post-industrial society' thesis 
cannot be easily separated from those that take a broadly defined `information 
society' or `information economy' as the main point of reference. After all, it could be 
argued that `the information economy ... 
is the economy of ... "post-industrial 
society"' (Hepworth, 1989, p. 7). Within this uneasily defined and rather diverse 
`information society' group, those approaches that take technology as their starting 
point have been prevalent. At least four distinctive lines of inquiry are discernible, 
each approaching technology from a different angle. The first strand discusses 
regional development in the light of overall `technical change' (Malecki, 1997; but 
see also Gillespie, 1983; Thwaites and Oakey, 1985a). The second strand focuses on 
arguably the most important part of this `technical change', namely on the crucial role 
of information and communication technology (ICT) and its implications for the 
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economic prospects of localities, cities and regions (Goddard et al., 1985; Gillespie 
and Williams, 1988;. Hepworth, 1989; Gillespie, 1991; Goddard, 1992; Graham and 
Marvin, 1996,2001; Wilson and Corey, 2000; Richardson and Gillespie, 2000; 
Comford et al., 2000; Gillespie et al., 2001; inter alia). This literature has offered a 
critical evaluation of claims that ICT will inevitably lead to the `end of geography' 
(O'Brien, 1992) and automatically reduce the spatial and economic peripherality of 
regions and communities (see also discussion below) and has placed ICT applications 
in the wider context of capitalist development (see Gillespie, 1991; inter alia). The 
third strand of literature has concentrated on places where `high-technology' 
(including ICT) is designed and produced. Consequently, the emphasis has been on 
`science parks' (see Massey et al., 1992; Henry et al., 1995), `technopoles' (see 
above), `sunbelt regions' and `silicon landscapes' (Hall and Markusen, 1985), 
geographies of innovation (Hall and Preston, 1988), geographies of the `Fifth 
Kondratieff (Hall, 1985), `new industrial spaces' (Scott, 1988), clusters of innovative 
firms, high-technology districts and the like (Keeble, 1989,1992; Keeble et al., 1991; 
Henry and Pinch, 2000; Simmie, 2002a; inter alia). 
In geographical terms, particular attention has been given to places like Silicon Valley 
in the USA, Cambridgeshire and the M4 corridor in the UK or Grenoble in France 
(see Hall and Markusen, 1985; Scott, 1988; Benko, 1991; Castells and Hall, 1994; 
Saxenian, 1994; inter alia). These spaces have been often perceived as sites of 
strategic economic development importance and `hotspots' of economic growth in the 
`information society'. From a critical standpoint, however, some of the above 
accounts of the third strand `fail to come to grips with the key dynamics in 
contemporary economic restructuring' (Goddard, 1989, p. xvi). It is `as if the 
fundamental economic development issue in the 19th century had related to the 
location of steam engine production rather than the spread of steam power into a wide 
range of products and production processes ... and the rapid improvements 
in 
communications that steam power made possible' (ibid, p. xvi). 
Finally, the fourth literature strand takes a broader socio-economic view and discusses 
the spatial implications of what could be seen as an emergent `new economic 
paradigm' underpinned by the technological change. Here, a variety of concepts have 
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been proposed, ranging from the aforementioned `new industrial spaces' (Scott, 1988) 
seen as spatial manifestations of Post-Fordist `flexible accumulation', through 
`flexible specialisation districts' (Piore and Sabel, 1984) arising from the `second 
industrial divide', to particular geographies of `disorganised capitalism' (Lash and 
Urry, 1994) or the `network society' (Castells, 1996,1997,1998) based on the 
`informational mode' of development. The concepts of the `new industrial spaces' and 
`flexible specialisation districts' in particular have became extremely influential in 
economic geography and have been consequently reflected in the growing body of 
literature associated with the regional dimensions of the `knowledge-driven' or 
`learning economy'. This literature constitutes a third group of concepts that will be 
examined in turn. 
Regional dimensions of the `knowledge/learning economy' 
Most recently, the theoretical focus for economic geographers has shifted away from 
preoccupation with `high-technology' to innovation broadly defined, and from 
implications of technological change towards much wider social contexts and 
processes. This has reflected a broader shift in debate from the `information society' 
to the `knowledge-based' or `learning economy' (cf. Chapter 2) and opened new 
directions in economic geography research. Indeed, even Storper who has previously 
explicitly rejected the idea of the `post-industrial economy' (see above) has fully 
embraced the concept of the `learning economy' (see Storper, 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 
1997b, 1999) and in fact himself became one of the most prominent writers of the 
emerging `new' economic geography wave. Emerging new approaches, however, 
have had to cope with two fundamental questions. The first one relates to the 
spectacular resilience or even `resurgence' of economic agglomeration as a form of 
economic organisation. Indeed, as Storper observes, `agglomerations seem to have 
"reappeared" on the landscape of advanced capitalism in association with the new 
learning economy' (Storper, 1995b, p. 403). The second issue is how to account for the 
perceived economic success of these `resurgent' agglomerations or clusters. While 
addressing these two (as it turns out interrelated) issues, a growing consensus has 
arisen among economic geographers that `distance still matters' (Storper and Scott, 
1995, p. 506). Why and how geographical `distance matters' is, however, a matter of 
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debate. There seem to be two main sets of arguments - the first one is predominantly 
based on the economic viewpoint, while the other one places emphasis on explanatory 
factors that are socio-cultural in nature. Both will be examined in turn. 
Economic approaches to agglomeration and clustering 
A major contribution to the first set of arguments has been provided by what Ron 
Martin (1999a) calls `new geographical economics', signalling the rediscovery of 
geography by economists. Indeed, `geographical economists' and `new growth 
theorists' such as Paul Krugman (1991a, 1991b) have championed approaches that are 
firmly rooted in mainstream economics, yet thoroughly incorporate geographical 
space into their mathematical apparatus. Their findings confirm that there is a 
continuing advantage derived from firms' spatial clustering by reaping `agglomeration 
economies' or `local external economies of scale'. These advantages often outweigh 
potential `agglomeration diseconomies' (see Fujita et al., 2001). Albeit extending 
frontiers of economics in relation to space, the `new geographical economics' 
probably represents too narrow a view of socio-economic reality (cf. Martin, 1999a; 
Martin and Sunley, 2001a). 
Another influential, and perhaps more open contribution has come from the 
management guru Michael Porter (1990,1998). Porter maintains that the economic 
success of nations is derived from their `competitive advantage' based on high 
productivity (as opposed to comparative advantage based on factor costs). 
Productivity, Porter claims, is best achieved and maintained through specialised 
`clusters' of interrelated industries and suppliers. This is because competitive 
advantage `emerges from close working relationship between world-class suppliers 
and industry' (Porter, 1998, p. 103) through which `the pace of innovation accelerates 
within the entire national industry' (ibid, p. 103). Interrelated industries and suppliers 
in turn form a part of a `diamond' structure, alongside other `competitive advantage' 
determinants such as `factor conditions' (human resources, knowledge resources, 
capital resources, physical resources and infrastructure), `demand conditions' (size 
and structure of domestic demand) and `firm strategy, structure and rivalry' (including 
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corporate strategies and domestic competition; Porter, 1998, chap. 3). As Porter 
suggests, `[a]dvantages throughout the "diamond" are necessary for achieving and 
sustaining competitive success in the knowledge-intensive industries that form the 
backbone of advanced economies' (Porter, 1998, p. 73). Importantly, the government 
is not directly involved in the `diamond' structure, and is assigned only a limited role 
of maintaining a suitable `environment' for national competitiveness (Porter, 1990, 
1998). 
Although developed clearly as a concept for national competitiveness (arguably with 
strong allusions on the spatial dimension of clusters'), Porter's approach has been 
quickly embraced by economic geographers (see Cooke, 1995c; Cooke, 1998; inter 
alia), translated onto the regional scale and used in the context of regional 
competitiveness. Indeed, within economic geography debates, `clusters' of 
interrelated industries have been `spatialised' and routinely conceptualised as regional 
clusters. Such moves, albeit problematic (see Martin and Sunley, 2001b), seem logical 
in the light of propositions that economic geographers themselves have put forward. 
Indeed, the notion of `regional clusters' is not foreign to the concept of the `new 
industrial spaces' developed by Allen Scott (1988). Following a sophisticated 
analysis, Scott (1988) concludes that `new industrial spaces' emerge as `tight 
functional clusters' (ibid, p. 32) where agglomeration economies or `external 
economies of scale' (ibid, p. 29) are achieved through `vertical disintegration' of the 
production process. This in turn increases `flexibility' while reducing `transaction 
costs' within the emerging network of firms tied together by `traded dependencies', 
shared infrastructure and local labour market. For Scott, such clusters could be seen as 
representing a (spatialised) economic organisation form `between markets and 
hierarchies' (cf. Williamson, 1975) where firms both compete and co-operate. Cases 
cited as examples of these `new industrial spaces' famously include the successful 
regional economies of Silicon Valley and `Third Italy' (see Scott, 1988). 
Despite significant differences in their approach, it could be said that Krugman 
(1991b), Porter (1990,1998) and Scott (1988) have based their explanation of 
agglomeration and clusters (and their success) on the economic relations between 
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firms or `hard externalities' (input-output factors). Thus while acknowledging the 
existence of other externalities, their emphasis has been on `traded 
interdependencies'. More recent approaches, however, have moved away from these 
economic explanations to give way to more socio-cultural accounts. 
Socio-cultural accounts of clustering 
The hallmark of these new approaches is the concept of `untraded interdependencies' 
(Storper, 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 1997b, 1999) that refers to `sofft' externalities - i. e. a 
complex network of interdependencies which go well beyond market transactions and 
formal relationships within a regional economy. The emphasis on `untraded 
interdependencies' between firms and institutions signals a decisive move away from 
`economic' explanations of agglomeration in favour of more `social' and `cultural' 
factors. Consequently, clusters are redefined along socio-cultural lines rather than 
purely economic ones. Meanwhile, the very distinction between the `economic' and 
`non-economic' becomes blurred and re-conceptualised (see Amin and Thrift, 1995, 
p. 63; 1999, p. 311). Indeed, building on the work of Granovetter (1985) and Grabher 
(1993a) economic action is considered as being `embedded' in social relations and 
regional economic processes as `embedded' in regional social relations. 
Thus, drawing mainly on the insights of institutional and evolutionary heterodox 
economics2 (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hodgson, 1988,1993,1999; inter alia) and 
reflecting a wider `cultural turn' in the social sciences (see Lee and Wills, 1997), 
economic geographers have became pre-occupied with place-specific rules of action, 
customs, habits, conventions, reflexivity, culture, social capital, social networks and 
institutions of various forms (Amin, 1999; Amin and Thrift, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 
1999; Camagni, 1991a, 1991b; Cooke, 1998; Henry and Pinch, 2000; Storper, 1995a, 
1997a, 1999; Storper and Scott, 1995; inter alia) marking the emergence of the 
`institutional turn' in regional development studies3 (Amin, 1999). Consequently, 
economically successful regions such as Silicon Valley or the `Third Italy' are 
Porter maintains that the `process of clustering... works best when the industries involved are 
geographically concentrated' (1998, p. 157). 
See Amin and Thrift (1995,1999) for a good overview of these influences. 
3 Institutions assume a central role in this new wave of economic geography thinking despite problems 
of definition (see below). 
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conceptualised as regions with dense collaborative networks, a good `entrepreneurial 
culture' (Saxenian, 1994), rich `relational assets' (Storper, 1997b), high levels of 
`social capital' and overall `institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift, 1994b) that is 
conducive to the co-ordination of economic action and continuous innovation. Such 
regions have also been described in terms of `innovative milieus' (Aydalot and 
Keeble, 1988; Camagni, 1991a; Maillat and Perrin, 1992), `innovation networks' 
(Camagni, 1991b), `regional networks' (Cooke, 1996) or `regional innovation 
systems' (Braczyk et al., 1998). The above `new' concepts, however, resemble the 
`old' industrial districts as portrayed by Marshall a century ago, or more recent 
`flexible specialisation districts' proposed by Piore and Sabel (1984). Both depict 
localised clusters of specialised industries (small firms) tied together, inter alia, by 
interpersonal linkages, shared rules of conducts and an overall `industrial 
atmosphere'. Unsurprisingly then, emerging `new industrial districts' have been 
dubbed `neo-Marshallian nodes' of the global economy (Amin and Thrift, 1992). As 
Storper has observed, `we came "full circle" to rejoin the initial authors of the flexible 
specialisation thesis (and the Marshallian theme of "atmosphere"), albeit with a 
somewhat different point of entry and without quite the same perspective on the role 
of institutions in development as a whole' (Storper, 1999, p. 30). It is from these 
theoretical vibrations that the `intelligent region' (Cooke and Morgan, 1994) or 
`learning region' paradigm has eventually been born. 
Towards the `learning region' 
The `learning region' can in fact be seen as a model of this `institutional' (Amin, 
1999) or `new regionalist' turn (Lovering, 1999). A striking characteristic of the 
`learning region' is that its conceptualisation seems to invariably revolve around the 
notions of region, learning, knowledge and institutions. Indeed, the region is usually 
considered as the most important unit of the `learning/knowledge economy', its 
competitive ability is believed to be based on its learning and knowledge creation 
capacity, while this capacity is in turn supported by appropriate regional institutions. 
Several different accounts of the `learning region' have mushroomed (Florida, 1995a; 
Asheim, 1996; Morgan, 1997; inter alia) and these will be examined in turn. 
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Probably the most suggestive account of the `learning region' has come from Richard 
Florida (1995a). Florida asserts that instead of a shift towards a post-industrial service 
economy, we witness a `more fundamental change in the way goods are produced and 
the economy itself is organised', i. e. an epochal transformation `from mass production 
to a knowledge-based economy' (Florida, 1995a, p. 534). Within such a knowledge- 
based economy, `[k]nowledge and human intelligence will replace physical labour as 
the main source of value' (ibid, p. 535). Regions, in his view, represent `a key element 
of the new age of global, knowledge-based capitalism' (ibid, p. 528). In part, this is 
because, as Ohmae has observed: 
`[t]he nation state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional unit for 
organizing human activity and managing economic endeavor in a borderless 
world. It represents no genuine, shared community of economic interests; it 
defines no meaningful flows of economic activity. On the global economic 
map the lines that now matter are those defining what may be called region 
states' (Ohmae, 1993; cited in Florida, 1995a, p. 531). 
These region-states that `tend to have between five million and 20 million people' 
(Ohmae, 1993; cited in Florida, 1995a, p. 531) are thus for Florida `key economic 
units in the global economy' (Florida, 1995a, p. 531). Region-states, in turn, are 
`becoming focal points for knowledge creation and learning in the new age of global, 
knowledge-intensive capitalism, as they in effect become learning regions' (ibid, 
p. 257). These learning regions 
`... function as collectors and repositories of knowledge and ideas, and provide 
the underlying environment and infrastructure which facilitates the flow of 
knowledge, ideas and learning' (ibid, p. 257). 
Part of this environment or infrastructure of a `learning region' is, what Florida calls, 
`manufacturing infrastructure' (including networks of firms), `human infrastructure' 
(knowledge workers), good physical and communication infrastructure, a capital 
allocation system and financial market and effective `industrial governance'. The 
latter feature includes `formal rules, regulations and standards' as well as `informal 
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patterns of behaviour between and among firms, and between firms and government 
organizations' that are `attuned to the need of knowledge-intensive organizations' 
(ibid, p. 534). 
Indeed, `knowledge-intensive organisations' are at the very heart of the `learning 
region' as portrayed by Florida. A model of such a `knowledge-intensive 
organisation' is a transnational corporation implanted into the heart of the `learning 
region' through foreign direct investment (FDI). It is integrated with the global 
marketplace and able to `harness knowledge and intelligence at all points of the 
organization from the R&D laboratory to the factory floor' (ibid, p. 534). In the 
knowledge-intensive factory, teams of R&D scientists, engineers and factory workers 
are becoming `collective agents of innovation', while the lines between the factory 
and the laboratory `blur' (ibid, p. 259). Indeed, 
`[l]ike a laboratory, the knowledge-intensive factory is an increasingly clean, 
technologically advanced and information-rich environment [where] workers 
perform their tasks in clean room environments, alongside robots and 
machines which conduct the physical aspects of the work' (ibid, p. 529). 
Florida suggests that this `new age of capitalism' requires a `new kind of region', that 
would be modelled around the principles of the knowledge-intensive firms. These are 
likely `to blend the ability of "Silicon Valley" style high-technology companies to 
spur individual genius and creativity, with strategies and techniques for continuous 
improvement and the collective mobilization of knowledge' (ibid, p. 534). The 
`learning region' must therefore `develop governance structures which reflect and 
mimic those of knowledge-firms' (ibid, p. 534) and embrace principles of knowledge 
creation and continuous learning (ibid, p. 532). As a result, `learning regions' will 
become `focal points for economic, technological, political and social organisation' 
(ibid, p. 535), concludes Florida. 
A slightly different, and less dramatic, version of the `learning region' has been 
offered by Bjorn Asheim (1996). It differs from the Florida's account in several 
important details, while sharing many underlying concerns. Indeed, both authors 
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consider innovation as being central to economic success and both share the belief 
that the contemporary economy is undergoing fundamental transformation. However, 
instead of the idea of `knowledge-intensive capitalism' evoked by Florida, Asheim 
(1996) takes as his starting point a `post-Fordist "learning economy"' (ibid, p. 379). 
Consequently, instead of `knowledge-intensive organisations', Asheim employs a 
term `learning organisations'. Furthermore, unlike Florida's concept of knowledge as 
being `imported' by big transnational companies via FDI, Asheim focuses on the 
endogenous forms of learning within the network of local small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). In addition, the whole emphasis shifts from `knowledge-intensive 
production' towards concerns over `organisational innovations' and the overall 
`adaptation capacity' of the local or regional economy. 
The central concern of Asheim is `the future of industrial districts in the perspective 
of the "learning economy "'(ibid, p. 394). Industrial districts are seen as a `socially 
desirable paradigm' (ibid, p. 394) and defined as localised clusters of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) akin to the clusters described by Marshall and Piore 
and Sabel (1984). But can `industrial districts', such as those found in the `Third 
Italy', survive the imperatives of the `learning economy'? Following a lengthy 
theoretical discussion drawing a wide variety of insights from, among others, 
Camagni (1991a), Granovetter (1985), Grabher (1993a), through Porter (1990), 
Storper (1995a, 1995b) to Amin and Thrift (1994a) and Cooke and Morgan (1994), 
Asheim arrives at a conclusion that such survival is possible provided that `industrial 
districts' will manage their transformation into `learning regions' (Anheim, 1996, 
p. 395). To do this, the `industrial districts' in question have to acquire a `collective 
innovative capacity' that has to be `systematically developed and supported both at 
intra-firm, the inter-firm and the district or regional level' (ibid, p. 395). The vision of 
the `collective innovation capacity' is akin to the notion of `knowledge-intensive 
firms', `networks of firms' and `supporting environment' evoked by Florida. For 
Asheim, 
`... learning organisations must be based on strong involvement at the intra- 
firm level, on horizontal cooperation at the inter-firm level, and on the 
embeddedness of regional systems of innovation at the regional level. This 
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could, together with other necessary organizational and social innovations in 
the regional institutional set-up, contribute to turning industrial districts into 
"learning regions"' (Anheim, 1996, p. 395). 
Such `learning regions', asserts Asheim, `would be in a much better position than 
"traditional" industrial districts to avoid a "lock-in" of development caused by 
localized path-dependency' (ibid, p. 395) while `transcending the contradictions 
between functional and territorial integration through a new, regionalized integration 
of the traditional, "contextual" knowledge of industrial districts and the "codified" 
knowledge of the global economy within the framework of territorially embedded 
regional systems of innovation' (ibid, p. 395). 
A less abstract view of `local capabilities' and `learning regions' has been elaborated 
by Peter Maskell and his colleagues (Maskell et al., 1998). Discussing the 
competitiveness of small (Scandinavian) countries, they actually do not dwell on the 
term `learning region', but their argument is crucial to the debate4. Indeed, one of the 
main concerns that Maskell et al. (1998) bring to the fore is very similar to that 
examined by Asheim (1996). The specific question is: 
`How can high-cost regions in general and small industrialised countries in 
particular sustain competitiveness and prosperity in an increasingly globally 
integrated world economy? ' (Maskell et al., 1998, p. 3). 
The perception that prosperous regions and countries are somehow threatened by the 
internationalisation of the economy comes from the assumption that the 
`internationalisation process brings with it a process of ubiquitification, i. e. a process 
in which previously localised factors of production become more or less equally 
available in different parts of the world' (Maskell et al., 1998, p. 28; emphasis added). 
In the `knowledge-based economy' where knowledge itself becomes central to 
economic transactions (ibid, p. 24) it is the `ubiquitification' of knowledge, that 
undermines the competitiveness and ultimately the prosperity of advanced regions and 
4 Besides, Maskell et al., 1998 maintain that the distinction between countries and regions is 
`increasingly anachronistic' (ibid, p. 10) and that the difference is `increasingly in degree, rather than in 
kind' (ibid, p. 11). 
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countries (ibid, p. 19-24; see also Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). Indeed as soon as 
knowledge is codified, it is rendered accessible to competitors in lower-cost regions. 
Therefore, 
`in a knowledge based economy ... firms in high-cost areas must either shield 
some valuable pieces of knowledge from becoming globally accessible, or be 
able to create, acquire, accumulate and utilize codifiable knowledge a little 
faster than their cost-wise more favourably located competitors' (Maskell and 
Malmberg, 1999, p. 9). 
One way to `shield' knowledge is to keep it as tacit knowledge embedded within 
localised clusters and to support knowledge creation through specific `localised 
capabilities' such as resources, institutions, social and cultural structures5 (Maskell et 
al., 1998; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). 
The fourth, and probably the most influential, version of the `learning region' has 
been laid down by Kevin Morgan (1997). The theoretical apparatus he employs is in 
broad concurrence with the contributions presented above. Indeed, Morgan (1997) 
emphasizes what he sees as a growing `convergence' between the fields of innovation 
studies and economic geography, which `highlights the significance for regional 
development of the interactive model of innovation' (ibid, p. 491). Morgan draws on a 
wide range of theoretical impulses including `neo-Schumpeterian' and `evolutionary 
economics' approaches (Dosi, Freeman, Hodgson, Lundvall), `social capital' 
(Putnam), `knowledge-creating company' (Nonake and Takeuchi) and stresses the 
importance of the `intangible assets' such as knowledge, competence, skill and 
organisational culture (see Morgan, 1997, p. 492-494). He points to the recent 
development of arguments about interactive learning and innovation at the level of the 
individual firm, at the inter-firm level and at the national level (ibid, p. 494) and then 
goes on to explore the regional dimension of these processes. Here, the influence of 
Camagni, Cooke, Amin, Thrift, Maskell, Malmberg and others is acknowledged, but 
particular attention is given to the arguments of Michael Storper. Indeed, special 
5 An interesting feature of the above account is that it suggests that knowledge-based competitiveness 
does not have to be derived from `high-technology'. Instead, Maskell et al. (1998) argue, small open 
economies can maintain their competitive advantage through low-technology sectors including wooden 
furniture or fishing industry. 
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emphasis is given to the concept of a region as `a key, necessary element in the 
"supply architecture" for learning and innovation' (Storper, 1995a, cited in Morgan, 
1997, p. 495) and `untraded interdependencies' at the regional level as key facilitators 
of such learning. It could be argued then, that Morgan only replicates and reflects a 
growing consensus in economic geography in relation to learning, institutions and 
regions. The significance of Morgan's contribution, however, lies with the following 
two features. First, in contrast to all above approaches, Morgan has shifted the focus 
away from prosperous regions and discusses the `learning economy' in the context of 
the less favoured regions (LFRs) of Europe. Second, he gives the `learning region' 
paradigm a strong policy dimension. For these features, the work of Morgan deserves 
to be examined in a more detail and this will be undertaken in the following section 
3.3. 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that further to the above four approaches of Florida, 
Asheim, Maskell et al. and Morgan, other accounts of `learning regions' have 
appeared in recent years (Lagendijk, 2000; Hassink, 1997,1999; Landabaso and Reid, 
1999; Landabaso, 2000; Bellini, 2000; see also Boekema et al., 2000a; Cooke, 2002; 
inter alia). These contributions add to the diversity of views and consequently 
compound the difficulties of Boekema et al. (2000b, p. 3) in providing a `simple 
definition' of the `learning region' (see also below). However, it could be argued that 
none of these latter accounts depart dramatically from the overall framework outlined 
by Florida (1995a), Asheim (1996), Maskell et al. (1998) or Morgan (1997). Indeed, 
on the basis of the above literature overview, it could be said that `learning region' 
theorists build on several commonly held positions. For the sake of the further 
argumentation that will follow in subsequent sections, these positions could be 
tentatively summarised as follows. 
First of all, there is a commonly shared conviction that the role of knowledge in the 
economy and society is indeed growing (Florida, 1995a; Maskell et al., 1998, p. 3 and 
p. 24; Amin and Thrift, 1999, p. 293; see also Bryson et al., 1999; ) and that the current 
economy is best described as the `learning economy', `knowledge economy' or 
`knowledge-based economy' (Florida, 1995a; Storper, 1995b, 1997a; Maskell et al., 
1998, p. 3,24; Morgan, 1998, p. 230; Boekema et al., 2000b, p. 4; Cooke, 2002; inter 
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alia). Within such an economy (echoing Lundvall and Johnson, 1994), knowledge is 
considered as `the most important resource and learning the most important process' 
(Morgan, 1998, p. 230; Boekema et al., 2000b, p. 4; see also Florida, 1995a). 
Consequently, `[k]nowledge has become a central organising concept for those 
concerned with regional economic development' and `learning has become the best 
way to understand regional economic change' (Malecki, 2000, p. 119). In effect, the 
region has become conceptualised as a `nexus of learning processes' (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998). 
Second, it is maintained that learning is a collective process (Camagni, 1991b, p. 3; 
Asheim, 1996; see also Cooke, 1998 on various forms of learning). Therefore, it is not 
confined to individuals, or even individual firms, rather it is conceptualised as 
occurring between firms (producers, suppliers, competitors), between firms and 
consumers (users) and between firms and a plethora of local or regional institutions 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994a; Cooke, 1995b, 1995c; Storper, 1997a; Morgan, 1997,1998). 
Third, the result of this learning process, resulting knowledge, is however a rather 
`leaky phenomenon' (Storper and Scott, 1995, p. 510). Indeed, as soon as it is codified, 
the global knowledge economy renders knowledge ubiquitous and makes it open to 
competitors' appropriation and replication. Therefore, it is non-codified or tacit 
knowledge that is a crucial source of competitive advantage (Maskell et al., 1998; 
Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; see also Storper, 1995b, p. 397, p. 405). 
Fourth, tacit knowledge, requires regular face-to-face contacts of involved actors. It is 
assumed that in the absence of `magic carpets' (Storper and Scott, 1995, p. 506) these 
face-to-face relations are only sustainable within a certain spatial proximity (see also 
Cooke and Morgan, 1998, p. 34,80). Besides, fifth, what is needed for successful 
`collective learning' is a set of informal institutions such as habits, conventions, rules 
of conduct, lubricated by co-operative culture and trust (Storper, 1997a; Cooke, 1998; 
Maskell et al., 1998; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999, p. 16-17). These factors, it is 
believed, are place-specific and supported by regionally-based formal institutions (see 
below) that facilitate the exchange of knowledge and ideas between regional actors, 
guarantee continuous innovation and ensure co-ordination of regional action for the 
benefit of all participants (Amin, 1999; Amin and Thrift, 1994a, 1999; Cooke and 
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Morgan, 1998; Storper and Scott, 1995; Storper, 1997a, 1999; inter alia). Thanks to 
`localised learning' and `institutional endowments' (Maskell et al., 1998, p. 97), 
`learning regions' can thrive in the `global knowledge economy' (cf. Florida, 1995a), 
while becoming the basic organisational units of such an economy (Florida, 1995a; 
see also Storper and Scott, 1995, p. 509; Storper, 1997a, 1999, p. 23). 
To conclude, it could be said that in comparison to economics-based approaches, the 
above conceptualisation of `learning regions' brings very different answers to the 
questions of economic agglomeration and competitiveness. As Peter Maskell and his 
colleagues assert, `it has to do with knowledge creation and with the development of 
localised capabilities that promote learning process' (Maskell et al., 1998, p. 193). 
The themes of learning, knowledge creation and localised capabilities that are 
believed to lie behind the success of advanced regions have subsequently become 
central to the discussion on less-favoured regions to which we now turn. 
3.3 Less-favoured regions as `learning regions' 
Indeed, the above `new regionalist' or `institutional' turn in economic geography has 
had crucial implications for the debate on peripheral or less favoured regions. Several 
authors have expressed their optimism on the prospects of such regions in the 
`learning' or `knowledge economy' (Maskell et al., 1998; Rutten et al., 2000; Cooke, 
1995a; Storper, 1995b; Morgan, 1997; Porter, 1998; inter alia). In part this optimism 
has been derived from the very nature of the `knowledge economy' and factors that 
allegedly guarantee economic success (see above). Indeed, as Porter suggests 
`[c]ompetitiveness is no longer limited to those nations with a favourable inheritance' 
(Porter, 1998, p. xxii). This is because, as Malecki plainly put it, `[a] primary need for 
knowledge-based development for "learning regions" is simply knowledge and 
information' (Malecki, 2000, p. 116). In turn, knowledge and information, are 
considered as factors that are either (a) readily available to all regions (courtesy of 
ICT and `ubiquitification'), or (b) can be easily emulated locally by better self- 
organisation. Indeed, as Porter argues: 
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`In the modem global economy, prosperity is a nation's choice... Nations 
choose prosperity if they organize their policies, laws, and institutions based 
on productivity' (Porter, 1998, p. xxii; emphasis orig. ). 
Given that, according to Porter himself, productivity is best achieved in localised 
regional `clusters' (see above) it is not difficult to arrive at a conclusion that regional 
prosperity is a matter of regional choice. Indeed, seen through Porter's prism, regions 
and communities can be seen as having a choice between poverty and prosperity. 
Regions can achieve the latter by mobilising their own social capital, building 
institutions, forging co-operative networks and organising endogenous innovative 
clusters. The idea that regional economic development is somehow a `matter of 
choice' or `will' resonates through much of the `new regionalist' literature and carries 
important implications for the conceptualisation of regional development. 
Importantly, it implies that prosperity of regions is in their own hands, and that 
individual LFRs themselves can do much to change their economic fortunes, 
principally by unlocking `hidden local potentials' (Amin, 1999). Indeed, several 
further claims have been made on the subject in that direction. Maskell et al. (1998), 
for instance, contend that the 
`emerging knowledge-based economy represents genuinely new and profound 
opportunities for endogenous economic development, even for the until now 
less developed regions and countries' (Maskell et al., 1998, p. 188). 
And in a somewhat similar vein, Rutten, Bakkers and Boekema assert boldly that `all 
the world's regions have a chance of success in the global [knowledge] economy' 
(Rutten et al., 2000, p. 257; emphasis added). 
Turning 'rustbelt' regions into `learning regions' 
Such prospects of success would indeed be welcome, not least by old industrial or 
`rustbelt' regions that have suffered long-term industrial decline but are keen to 
`learn' new development trajectories in the `post-industrial' or `knowledge-based 
economy'. Observed from a somewhat more realistic viewpoint, however, `[r]ustbelt 
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regions are hard to turn round' (Cooke, 1995c, p. 243). Nonetheless, even Cooke 
himself remains optimistic that the task of `turning rustbelt regions round' is possible, 
while acknowledging that the challenge is that of `turning [r]ustbelt regions into 
learning regions' (ibid, p. 236), by which he means building co-operative innovation 
clusters and systems of regional innovation. The aim of such endeavour is to avoid the 
`low road' of development (low skills, low value added and low wages) and to fully 
embark on the `high-road strategy' (ibid, p. 236) delivering a high-skill, high-wage, 
high-value added regional economy. 
Several authors have contributed to the debate about how the above could be done 
(see Florida, 1995b; Morgan, 1997,1998; Morgan and Nauwelaers, 1999; Storper and 
Scott, 1995; Storper, 1995b; see also Halkier et al., 1998; Giunta et al., 2000; 
Lagendijk, 2000; inter alia). For Florida (1995b, p. 170), to become `learning' or 
`knowledge-creating regions', old industrial areas must adopt the principles of a 
`high-performance economic organisation' (see also above). This includes new ways 
of organising work, new relationships with suppliers and customers and a focus on 
continuous improvement (ibid, p. 164). Florida uses the example of the `Great Lakes 
Region' - an old industrial heartland of USA - to argue that behind its shift towards a 
`learning region' was international investment (especially from Japan) bringing best- 
practice technology and management, `organisational restructuring' of domestic 
companies (including powerful partnerships with suppliers) and the diffusion of high- 
performance organisation principles into the broader manufacturing supplier base 
(ibid, p. 168). 
Another success story from the American environment has been portrayed by Malecki 
(2000). The area of Boston, Massachusetts, once described as hopelessly inflexible 
and lacking enterprise culture (Saxenian, 1994) has now been turned, according to 
Malecki, into a `learning region'. For Malecki (2000) this achievement can be seen as 
a sign of a spectacular resilience of the region, the resilience primarily based on the 
`agglomeration of brains' (ibid, p. 117), i. e. the excellence of its educational 
institutions and diffusion of knowledge through its world-class research universities 
into the regional economy. 
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Similar strategy elements for `regional renewal' could be found in the aforementioned 
influential contribution by Morgan (1997). As already indicated in the previous 
section, the significance of his work lies with the fact that he offers a strong policy 
message and places the `learning region' paradigm firmly in the context of less 
favoured regions (LFRs) in Europe (see also Morgan and Nauwelaers, 1999). It could 
be argued that Morgan's work represents a dominant way of thinking in economic 
geography about LFRs. For these reasons, his work deserves closer examination. 
Several points should be highlighted. The first one concerns the conceptualisation of 
the regional problem. In Morgan's view, the `convergence' of innovation studies and 
economic geography results in uneven development being conceptualised as an 
outcome of differentiated levels of learning and innovatiop. In other words, less 
favoured regions are under-performing due to their inferior innovation (or learning) 
capability. For Morgan, improving the innovation/learning capability in LFRs is 
therefore an answer to uneven regional development in Europe. 
Morgan (1997) does not deny that the above constitutes a major challenge. However, 
employing `optimism of the will [and] pessimism of the intellect' (ibid, p. 498) he 
goes on to argue that the desired improvement in innovation capacity of LFRs can be 
achieved by `building a stock of social capital' and improving regional networking 
capacity (ibid, p. 497). `Networking' seems to be central to this stratagem, because as 
he argues elsewhere, `what matters most from a developmental standpoint is not 
institutions per se but the networking capacity of institutions' (Morgan, 1998, p. 231). 
This argument would seem to be supported by several other authors (see Cooke, 
1995c, 1998,2002; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Storper and Scott, 1995; Amin and 
Thrift, 1994b; inter alia). Indeed what apparently characterise economically successful 
regions is `institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift, 1994b). This latter term includes 
the `strong institutional presence' of a plethora of institutions of different kinds, 
ranging from firms, financial institutions, local chambers of commerce, training 
agencies, trade associations, local authorities, development agencies, innovation 
centres, clerical bodies, unions, government agencies, business service organisations, 
marketing boards, etc. (ibid, p. 14). But while such `institutional presence' is 
necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for regional success. Indeed, what is required 
are `high levels of interaction' among those institutions, `patterns of coalition' and 
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mutual awareness among participants in the set of institutions that they are involved in 
a `common enterprise' (ibid, p. 14). 
The challenge for LFRs is to mimic such associative institutional conditions. As 
Cooke has put it, it is `the reflexive, associative, learning regions that are highly likely 
to make the economic running in future, and the challenge is to emulate them' 
(Cooke, 1995c, p. 245). Similar points have been made by Storper and Scott (1995) 
who also put institutional endowments at the forefront of the regional competitiveness 
debate. Indeed, as they claim, `regional institutions will almost certainly play a central 
role in determining which regions move forwards and which will fall into decline' 
(Storper and Scott, 1995, p. 509). What they understand as relevant `regional 
institutions' are those able to overcome endemic market failures by appropriate 
`collective action' (ibid, p. 509). These `institutions' and `collective actions' include 
support for pre-competitive and enabling R&D, market stimulus programmes, 
regional technology centres, labour training institutions, industry service centres, 
regional development funds, but also actions to secure trust, confidence and co- 
operation and to build political coalitions. These political coalitions should aim to 
bring together the relevant actors - industry, labour, the community and government - 
and promote `projects in which all will win' (ibid, p. 517; emphasis added). In 
addition to these institutional arrangements, regions should build a `reflexive' 
capacity (Storper, 1997b) embodied in `institutions whose role is specifically to look 
forwards' (Storper and Scott, 1995, p. 516; see also Hudson et al., 1997). 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the above remarks of Storper and Scott about the 
`coalition' between industry, labour and government, is in line with the growing 
consensus among many economic geographers about a need of rapprochement 
between capital, labour, and the state, and the growing significance for regional 
development of institutions emerging at the interface between market and state or 
between public and private spheres (Cooke and Morgan, 1993; Amin and Thrift, 
1995; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Cooke, 2002; inter alia). But as Morgan (1998) has 
observed, in less favoured regions `private institutions are often thin on the ground', 
and therefore public sector agencies `invariably have to assume the leading role in 
animating economic development' (ibid, p. 229). According to Morgan (1997,1998), 
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such a leading role in animating the regional economy can be played by a regional 
development agency (RDA). 
RDA as an animateur of the 'learning economy' 
Morgan (1995,1997,1998) has demonstrated the case of animateur through the 
example of the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) which, with an annual budget of 
some £170 million and around 300 staff, is `one of the largest and most experienced 
regional development agencies in the EU' (Morgan, 1997, p. 498). The challenge for 
the WDA is to promote the Welsh economy that suffered a long-term industrial 
decline, and subsequently became dominated by foreign-owned branch-plants geared 
towards low-skill production activities (ibid, p. 498). However, Morgan argues, more 
recently there have been signs that `innovative' or `embedded' branch-plants (cf. 
Amin et al., 1994) have been emerging in Wales and that this change has been 
accompanied by an important shift in the WDA's policy approach. Indeed, partly in 
response to the new challenges such `embedded' plants may bring, partly in response 
to a dramatic downfall of its budget, the WDA has moved in the mid-1990s from 
`hard' infrastructure projects (land reclamation, advance factory building, inward 
investment attraction) to `soft' infrastructure provision (Morgan, 1997,1998). This 
`soft' infrastructure or even `info-structure' (Morgan, 1998, p. 230) is primarily 
concerned with business services, skills and social capital. In line with the view that 
`firms learn best from other firms - be they customers, suppliers or competitors' (ibid, 
p. 239), the WDA facilitated the creation of several associations targeted at 
endogenous SMEs. The hope is that these firms would engage in networking and thus 
facilitate the processes of trust-building and `collective learning'. In addition, this 
effort appears as an important part of the strategy to turn foreign investors' plants 
(many of them Japanese) into `embedded' plants by promoting their long-term 
partnerships with local suppliers (endogenous SMEs), not dissimilar to those praised 
by Florida (1995b) in the case of the `Great Lakes Region'. Besides these activities, 
the WDA has engaged in the creation of technology support programmes aimed at 
enhancing the capacity for product, process and organisational innovation in the SME 
sector (Morgan, 1997, p. 499). Delivered through `technical centres' largely based at 
Welsh universities, this programme could be seen as trying to emulate the `learning 
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region' experience of the Boston region described above by Malecki (2000). Further 
to this, the spectrum of `new' activities of the WDA also include more active 
intervention in the skills formation process, in particular through co-operation with 
the (now defunct) Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and further education 
colleges, and by encouraging `training consortia' (Morgan, 1997, p. 499-450). 
However, assessing the impact for the regional economy of all these interventions, has 
proved difficult so far, `not least because the [perceived] benefits are so intangible' 
(Morgan, 1998, p. 242). In evaluating the WDA's economic strategy, Morgan 
nevertheless argues that `the most charitable thing to say is that it has helped Wales to 
negotiate the transition from an economy dominated by declining coal and steel 
industries to a more buoyant manufacturing and services-based economy' (ibid, 
p. 242). Although Morgan (1997,1998) does not see the implementation of the above 
process as an unproblematic one, he nonetheless believes that the WDA as animateur 
is at least `engaging with the right targets, namely the institutional inertia' (Morgan, 
1997, p. 497). Similar appreciation of the role of regional development agencies for 
the regional economy has been given by several other authors (see Halkier and 
Danson 1997; Halkier et al., 1998; Moore, 1995; Danson, 1999; Danson et al., 2000a, 
2000b; Cameron and Danson, 2000; Kafkalas and Thoidou, 2000). 
Meanwhile, shifting the emphasis from regional quangos (such as RDAs) to 
democratically elected bodies, several authors have highlighted the role of regional 
government as animateurs for building the `learning region' (Bellini, 2000; 
Landabaso, 2000). Indeed, Landabaso (2000, p. 84) has suggested that `regional 
government can play the role of the "collective intelligence" necessary for a region to 
spark the process of becoming a "learning region"', while Bellini (2000, p. 95) has 
argued that `[r]egional governments are fundamental players in the construction and 
evolution of learning regions' (see also below). These differences apart, there is little 
doubt that various version of the `learning region' form part of a much wider shift in 
the policy paradigm. 
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Learning regions: policy paradigm shift 
Indeed, as Morgan has argued, policy paradigms of the Left (ranging from neo- 
Keynesian to Marxist) as well as those of the (neo-liberal) Right, `seem to have 
exhausted themselves' (Morgan, 1997, p. 491). Instead, in parallel with the emergence 
of the `learning economy', a more eclectic `third wave' is under way transcending the 
allegedly outdated dualism of `state versus market' or `public versus private' (see also 
Cooke and Morgan, 1998, p. 18-24). This view is strongly supported by Amin (1999) 
and Amin and Thrift (1995,1999) who see `associationist' networking based in (or 
even beyond) socio-economics as a `third way' in regional economic development, 
conspicuously reflecting the wider `third way' discourses (see Chapter 2 of the thesis). 
Amin and Thrift, however, see this move as more than just an economic issue. They 
contend: 
`In part, the third way is an attempt to set up networks of intermediate 
institutions in between market and state... But the third way is also an attempt 
to build networks of institutions democratically' (Amin and Thrift, 1999, 
p. 298) 
Thus, for Amin and Thrift (1999) the `learning region' and other `associationist' 
models represent a `radical democratic agenda' (ibid, p. 308) that would ensure that 
economic efficiency is combined with social equity (ibid, p. 306-308; see also Cooke 
and Morgan, 1998 for similar arguments). This agenda includes giving `voice' to 
previously excluded or marginalised groups and implies a boost of `active 
participation across economy, state and civil society (Amin and Thrift, 1999, p. 308). 
Such a stratagem envisages `political empowerment' at the regional level (ibid, p. 308, 
310) which links the `associationist' regional agenda with the voices that regional, 
democratically elected government should be built as part of the `learning region' 
(Landabaso, 2000; Bellini, 2000). Amin and Thrift argue that without such a 
democratic agenda, there is a danger that `an approach based in socioeconomics will 
simply slip back into a neo-liberal or liberal orthodoxy' (Amin and Thrift, 1999, 
p. 308). 
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Returning back to the economic side of the argument, it has been argued that the 
`learning region' is a part of a `revolution in thinking' (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000, 
p. 292) in regional policy. Truly, the `learning region' signals a decisive move away 
from old traditional regional policies that were not only `costly and inefficient' 
(Florida, 1995b, p. 173), but also comprised a `considerable obstacle to the emergence 
of the new [knowledge] economy' (ibid, p. 173). It is believed that in the `knowledge- 
based economy', `[s]ubsidies are unlikely to work, and a strong element of 
unbalanced regional development is likely to result' (Malecki, 2000, p. 116). Thus 
`new' public policy in the `knowledge economy' moves away from subsidies and 
grants provided for individual firms, and turns instead to the promotion of `learning 
capabilities' within clusters of firms. Simultaneously, it shifts emphasis away from 
building physical infrastructure (including business parks and science parks) in favour 
of promoting the `soft' institutional factors (building business 'networks, conventions, 
trust, social capital, etc. ). These latter factors are considered as being crucial for 
competitiveness in the `knowledge economy', yet their provision seems to be less 
costly. In the extreme, such `new' regional policy becomes a game of managing `talk' 
between regional actors (Storper, 1997a, p. 271-274) and talk, as everybody 
appreciates, does not cost anything6. In short, with a little bit of exaggeration, this new 
policy paradigm effectively promises better outcomes for less money7. 
It is therefore no surprise that `learning regions' have become the `best practice' in 
local and regional development (Malecki, 2000, p. 114) and quickly proliferated 
among academic and policy-making circles (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000). 
Interestingly, this `revolution in thinking' has been enthusiastically embraced by 
policy makers at all levels; from local, regional and national, to European and wider 
international policy-making arenas (Lagendijk, 1999; Charles and Benneworth, 2001; 
Benneworth and Charles, 2001; Raines, 2002; DTI, 1998a, 2001; Landabaso, 2000; 
Landabaso and Reid, 1999; OECD, 2001; inter alia). Within the `New Europe', 
various versions of `learning regions' and `clusters' have been influential in regional 
policy-making in the West (see Chapter 6 of this thesis for case of Scotland) and, 
'Unless it is commodified. 
7 Nauwelaers and Morgan (1999, p. 237), for instance, suggest that `the immaterial aspect of policy- 
building is relatively cheaper to implement than building unused facilities' and consequently, `[i]t 
might be the case in a number of regions that conducting more efficient innovation policies would lead 
to devoting less money to the system'. 
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more recently, similar policy models have been suggested as the best way forward for 
regions in the East (see Dyker, 1997; Nauwelaers and Morgan, 1999, p. 237; 
Radosevic, 1998,1999; Dyker and Radosevic, 1999; Mickiewicz and Radosevic, 
2001; inter alia; see also Hudson, 1998; Hudson et al., 1997; for a critique see Smith 
et al., 1999; Myant, 1999c). 
What is expected from these policies is nothing short of `stable jobs in the long term', 
`higher standards of living' and `sustainable development' (Landabaso and Reid, 
1999, p. 27; see Figure 3.1 in Appendix). Such outcomes would indeed be welcome. 
Considerable concerns, however, have been raised from various corners relating both 
to the way the `learning region' can be used as a concept for understanding regional 
development, and as an appropriate policy tool in delivering the above desired 
outcomes. To this critical literature we now turn. 
3.4 Limits to the `learning region' approach 
This section then aims to examine the `learning region' approach from a critical 
perspective. Such a perspective is needed given that the `learning region' (being a 
`very young concept') displays `many deficits and difficulties' (Hassink, 1999, 
p. 107). A substantial body of critique has already emerged pointing to the weaknesses 
of the `learning region' paradigm and `new regionalist' literature more broadly 
(Hudson, 1999; Lovering, 1998a, 1999; Markusen, 1999a; Martin and Sunley, 2001a; 
MacKinnon et al., 2002; inter alia). These weaknesses could be summarised under the 
following headings: (a) problems with basic definitions and use of terms, (b) 
conceptual problems and flaws, (c) poor empirical evidence, and finally, (d) the 
problematic applicability of the concept to less favoured regions which in turn casts 
shadows over its use as a policy tool to reduce inter-regional and intra-regional 
inequalities. These problematic areas will be now examined in more detail. 
Vague terms and definitions 
A first group of problems relates to the vagueness of terms and definitions used by the 
literature in question. Indeed, none of the terms used as basic building blocks of the 
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`learning region' are properly defined, including the crucial notions of region, 
institution, knowledge and learning. To take the region first, Lovering (1999, p. 383) 
has noticed that this `supposedly foundational concept of the "paradigm" is nowhere 
clearly defined'. Consequently, the term has been used rather loosely. Florida (1995a), 
for instance, when describing `learning regions', refers to regions of a population size 
between five to 20 million, with boundaries potentially spilling across the borders of 
nation-states (see section 3.2 ). Morgan (1997), in contrast, seems to be referring to a 
small nation having a form of an administrative regions, but of the population size 
much smaller than that evoked by Florida. Meanwhile, Maskell et al. (1998) admit 
that the definitions of concepts such as local or regional are `notoriously vague' (ibid, 
p. 197, note 13), while adding to the ambiguity by claiming that the distinction 
between regions and countries is `increasingly in degree, rather than in kind' (ibid, 
p. 11). Pointing at this widespread problem, Lovering (1999, p. 383) uses an example 
of a prominent `new regionalist' who `defines the region as "a geographic area of 
subnational extent" and then goes on to give examples, many of which are not 
subnational at all, while others are US regions larger than many European countries'. 
Such analytical imprecision is ironic, however, given the loud calls for greater 
sensitivity to geographical scale that `new regionalist' literature trumpets. Indeed, 
little effort has been committed to provide more rigorous conceptualisation of this key 
term9. The following `definition' of a region demonstrates well the unease with which 
`new regionalist' literature approaches the conceptualisation of region: 
`Conceptually, regions are often defined in terms of shared normative interests 
(culture areas), economic specificity (mono-industrial economies) and 
administrative homogeneity (governance areas). To these may be added such 
criteria as non-specific size [sic], except that of being subcentral in relation to 
its host state; identifiable homogeneity in terms of criteria such as geography, 
political allegiance and cultural or industrial mix; ability to be distinguished 
from other areas in terms of these criteria; and possession of some 
combination of internal cohesion characteristics. To some extent, the 
introduction of the "cluster" concept gives impetus to the possible 
differentiation of some regions, and that may tentatively be linked to some 
8 More recently, Wales has been `upgraded' to the form of `regional state' having acquired an elected 
assembly as part of the devolution process in the UK (cf. Chapter 6 for the case of Scotland). 
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common cultural characteristics... But increasingly, it is the perhaps slight 
variation in governance arrangements that is important in defining regions.... 
It is the institutional capacity ... that give regions a strong conceptual and real 
identity' (Cooke, 1998, p. 15). 
In short, the definition of the allegedly `basic unit' of knowledge-intensive capitalism 
remains largely unclear. The problem in defining region has in turn fundamental 
repercussions for the paradigm in question, because it renders problematic other 
foundational terms such as `regional institutions' that Storper and Scott (1995, p. 509) 
claim are so central to regional prosperity. In fact, the term institution itself seems to 
be used rather loosely in the `new regionalist' literature. As Martin and Sunley 
(2001 a, p. 154) have pointed out, there is no generally agreed definition of institutions 
even within heterodox institutional economics10 and `geographers often carry over 
problems inherent in [it] and then add their own distinctly ambiguous claims and 
concepts'. Martin and Sunley (2001 a) also single out the term `institutional thickness' 
as being a prime case of such ambiguous conceptualisation (see also Henry and Pinch, 
2001). Indeed, it is often not clear whether literature refers to institutions as 
organisations (such as firms, development agencies, universities, regional authorities, 
etc. ) or to a specific institutional arrangements between such organisations (e. g. 
various networks) or whether institution is used in a sense of customs, habits, 
conventions, rules of behaviour, etc. that may permeate (or not) through such 
organisations or networks (cf. Amin and Thrift, 1994b; Storper and Scott, 1995; 
Morgan, 1997,1998; inter alia). Storper himself contributes to this continuous 
confusion by arguing that `institutions are only the tip of the iceberg of un-traded 
interdependencies or conventions' (Storper, 1995b, p. 409) while defining `untraded 
interdependencies' as `labour markets, public institutions, and locally or nationally 
derived rules of action, customs, understandings, and values' (Storper, 1999, p. 37-38). 
Similar problems are encountered when defining learning and knowledge. It is 
claimed for instance that `[k]nowledge is a fundamental part of our human existence 
and being' (Howells, 2000, p. 50) and central for understanding regional economic 
processes (see section 3.2) but a thorough conceptualisation in the context of regional 
9 But see Tomaney and Ward (2000) and Allen et al. (1998) for a discussion. 
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development seems to be missing. Editors of a recent volume on the geographies of 
`the knowledge-space-economy' (Bryson et al., 2000b, p. 2) assert that `[k]nowledge 
really does matter' (Bryson et al., 2000c, p. 277) and contend that `[i]t is clear that 
advanced capitalism is knowledge intensive' (ibid, p. 278), but conclude that 
`knowledge is a difficult, slippery concept to define' (ibid, p. 278) and that the 
`definitional problem' implies that `knowledge can be everything and nothing' (ibid, 
p. 278). 
The difficulties in defining knowledge are complemented by an ambiguous 
conceptualisation of the process through which knowledge is created, i. e. learning. 
Indeed, the `new regionalist' literature puts learning at the forefront of its 
conceptualisation, but without properly defining the term. Thus, underneath the 
seemingly robust consensus about the central role of learning in regional economic 
development manifested through the entire `new regionalist' literature, there is a 
notable inconsistency in what is actually meant by learning. Storper (1997b, p. 252), 
for instance, conceptualises learning `as a form of reflexivity' and therefore 
`fundamentally a dynamic process, where the parameters of interaction must be 
unstable if learning is to take place'. Economic reflexivity, for Storper, is a central 
characteristic of contemporary capitalism, where the term `reflexive' 
`refers to the possibility for groups of actors in the various institutional spheres 
of modem capitalism - firms, markets, states, household and others - to 
influence the course of economic evolution as a result of their own critical 
distance from the traditional functions of these spheres... ' (ibid, p. 249). 
Elsewhere, Storper (1997a, 1999) defines learning with a strong technological bias, 
because, as he believes, technological change is `the principal vector of competition' 
(1997a, p. 287, note 4). Thus, central to the `learning economy' is technological 
learning (1999, p. 39) or `product-based technological learning' (1997a, p. 287, note 
4). The latter term, Storper suggests is, `analytically speaking', different from simple 
innovation (see ibid), while arguing in a different part of the same work that learning 
is one of the central elements of technological innovation (ibid, p. 107). Elsewhere 
10 cf. Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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Storper (1995a, p. 414-416) talks about the `technological learning trajectories' of 
countries in a `global learning economy' (ibid, p. 413). In contrast to such ambiguous, 
yet distinctively technologically-biased versions of learning, Amin and Cohendet 
(1999) have emphasised organisational learning. Seen as the most important element 
of competitiveness, such learning is about evolving and adapting organisational 
structures of firms and business networks (see also Asheim, 1996). Meanwhile, 
Morgan (1997) seems to combine the two approaches and define capitalism as an 
evolutionary process driven by `technical and organizational innovation' (ibid, p. 492, 
emphasis added). He then goes on to argue that innovation is an interactive process 
that `should be conceived as a process of interactive learning' (ibid, p. 493, emphasis 
orig. ). The fact that learning is a collective and interactive process seems to be shared 
across the `new regionalist literature', and in Morgan's (1997) terms occurs 
`between firms and the basic science infrastructure, between the different 
functions within the firm, between producers and users at the interfirm level 
and between firms and the wider institutional milieu' (ibid, p. 493; see also 
Florida, 1995a; Asheim, 1996). 
The list of variegated forms of learning, however, does not end here. Indeed, while 
learning is allegedly the central feature of economic processes within regions, it can 
supposedly also occur between regions (WDA, 1998; see also Hudson et al., 1997). 
Learning can have a form of learning from abroad (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994) 
while successful regions are also said to be able to `learn ahead' (see Storper and 
Scott, 1995; Amin and Cohendet, 1998; Hudson et al, 1997; Hudson, 1998). For 
Hudson et al (1997, p. 371) the latter term refers to the collective capability of regions 
`not so much to adapt to change as to anticipate it and change accordingly'. 
Elsewhere, learning has been used as a metaphor for regional `trajectory switching' 
(see Cooke and Morgan, 1998, p. 78). More recently, the significance of the concept of 
learning has been re-emphasised by Boekema et al. (2000b) by claiming that: 
`[k]nowledge, innovation and economic growth have been studied before... 
But the fact that they are now studied from the perspective of learning, which 
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makes their interconnectedness even clearer, is the merit of this new 
paradigm: the learning region' (Boekema et al., 2000b, p. 4; emphasis added). 
However, an alternative reading of the `new regionalist' literature could be that far 
from delivering a `clearer' picture, the `perspective of learning' may in fact contribute 
to the blurring of the picture of regional economic development. Indeed, one cannot 
escape the impression that in the context of `learning regions' the term learning is 
used to cover virtually everything, from rising a stock of knowledge in firms, to 
adaptability of networks, and from organisational evolution of enterprises to changing 
industrial trajectories of whole regions or even countries. Given such diverging and 
ambiguous definitions of learning itself, one could easily be tempted to echo the 
above verdict on knowledge by Bryson et al. (2000c, p. 227) to argue that `learning 
can be everything and nothing'. One way or another, the definition of allegedly the 
most important process in the contemporary economy - learning - remains open, and 
this only compounds the problems with conceptualisation of the `learning region' that 
will be examined in turn. 
Fuzzy conceptualisation 
Indeed, given the difficulties in defining its basic building blocks, it is perhaps not 
surprising that even for `learning region' enthusiasts, the conceptualisation of the 
`learning region' remains problematic (see Boekema et al., 2000b, p. 3). 
Consequently, lacking thorough conceptualisation, the `learning region' concept 
easily slips into the category of economic geography for which `vague theory' (Martin 
and Sunley, 2001a, p. 152-154) is a characteristic feature, carrying the danger of 
`reducing economic geography to superficial "storytelling" reliant on a trendy and 
fast-moving jargon that constantly evades any rigorous evaluation' (ibid, p. 149). 
`Learning region' theorists, meanwhile argue that the `learning region' is `a paradigm 
rather than a concept or a theory' (Boekema et al., 2000b, p. 4). But critics have 
pointed out that the `New Regionalism [of which learning region is a prime example] 
is not really a paradigm at all" (Lovering, 1999, p. 384) because `[w]e are not dealing 
here with the normal-science applications of a rigorously developed foundational 
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theoretical insight but rather with a loose bundle of ideas' (ibid, p. 384). Lovering 
(1999) maintains that this `loose bundle of ideas' might tell an attractive and 
persuasive story, but it is `largely a fiction' that `fails to explain contemporary 
regional economic development' (ibid, p. 380). Its central weakness, according to 
Lovering (1999, p. 385), is `bad abstraction' which produces `wordy summar[ies] of 
speculation about how regional development might occur in an imaginary world', but 
failing to account for regional development `on the planet we actually inhabit' (ibid, 
p. 385; see also Lovering, 1998a). The `learning region' thus seems to be a prime 
candidate to be labelled a `fuzzy concept', by which Markusen (1999a) means 
characterisations that lack conceptual clarity and are difficult to operationalize12 (ibid, 
p. 870). For Markusen (1999a, p. 871) there are only two main reasons why concepts 
can be `fuzzy': either they are new concepts in the stage of development (and this is 
what Hassink, 1999, implies is the case with the `learning region' concept), or they 
`might simply be bad concepts' (Markusen, 1999a, p. 871). Unfortunately, the 
`learning region' paradigm seems to suffer heuristic problems that are unlikely to be 
overcome as the concept `matures'. 
The first fundamental problem of the `learning region' concept is that it is built as an 
integral part of, or more precisely as the regional dimension of, the 
`knowledge/learning economy'. Indeed, it has been argued that the `learning region' 
as a concept `fits into the wider context of the knowledge-based economy' (Rutten et 
al., 2000, p. 250), and that the `learning region' is a `proponent of the knowledge- 
based economy' (ibid, p. 250). But as demonstrated in Chapter 2, the concept of the 
`knowledge economy' itself is problematic and obscures the nature of the emerging 
`new era'. The central arguments of the `knowledge economy' about knowledge as 
being a driving force of economy and learning as the most important process may be 
misleading. Unfortunately, the `learning region' literature has uncritically embraced 
the mantra of knowledge and learning, while compounding the problem by attempting 
to transpose the `knowledge economy' model on the regional scale. The issue has, of 
" Lovering (1999, p. 385) uses `intelligent region' as the prime example of the `new regionalist' sloppy 
`theorisation'. 
12 Markusen (1999a, p. 870) uses `learning region' as the first example of a `fuzzy concept' but, 
ironically, tells a story of a doctoral student who, with her help, was able to `pin down the concept of 
"learning region"' resulting in a `wonderful thesis with original conceptualisation'. 
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course, profound implications and these will be discussed in more detail in section 
3.5. 
Another fundamental problem of the `new orthodoxy' lies with its loud insistence that 
the region is now the basic unit of today's capitalism (see Florida, 1995a; Storper and 
Scott, 1995; Storper, 1997a, 1999; inter alia). By doing so, `new regionalism' tends to 
neglect powerful forces in the wider political economy that impinge upon regional 
fortunes. Importantly, this myopia involves a failure to recognise the power of the 
nation-state in shaping regional trajectories. The institution of the state might have 
undergone significant transformation (and this in some cases might have included the 
devolution of powers to regions) but nation-states have not been abolished (cf. 
Anderson, 1995; Chapter 2 of this thesis). Quite to the contrary, the nation-state 
continues to exercise some vital economic powers (Amin and Tomaney, 1995e; 
Hudson et al, 1997, p. 371; Hudson, 1998, p. 16-18; Dicken, 1998; Jessop, 2000; inter 
alia) and therefore cannot be abstracted away from the analysis of regional 
development (Lovering, 1998a, 1999; Markusen, 1999a, 1999b; Hassink, 1999; 
MacLeod, 2000; MacKinnon et al., 2002). In fact, in some instances the state may 
play a crucial role in the `success' of a regional economy (Markusen, 1999b; Hudson 
et al, 1997, p. 369). 
There is no better example of this myopia than is the case of the much-vaunted Silicon 
Valley - an `icon of success' (Markusen, 1999a, p. 880). Recently labelled without 
hesitation as a `learning region' (see Rutten et al., 2000, p. 246), Silicon Valley is held 
as a successful growth model based on a regional networked economic system of 
competing and collaborating companies learning from one another, dense social 
networks and a local entrepreneurial culture (Saxenian, 1994, p. 2-3). Rarely, however, 
is it mentioned that the success of the Valley is inextricably linked to US defence 
expenditure, as it is the fourth largest recipient of military spending contracts in USA 
(Markusen, 1999b, p. 118; see also Markusen, 1999a, p. 880) amounting to US$5 
billion annually even in the 1990s (Markusen, 1999a, p. 879). In the light of this, the 
argument that the spectacular rise of the Silicon Valley is a result of a networking 
culture of local innovators and open-minded risk-taking entrepreneurs looks 
unimpressive, while the picture of endogenously-driven regional growth disintegrates. 
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Instead, it is probably more appropriate to situate the emergence of a high-tech region 
such as Silicon Valley in the context of the military and technological build-up during 
the Cold War confrontation with the USSR (see also Chapter 4). More generally, the 
military spending of nation-states remains high even in the post-Cold War era - 
especially in the UK and USA (Lovering, 1998b; Markusen, 1999a, p. 880) - and in 
fact represents a form of `industrial policy' (cf. Sandler and Hartley, 1995). 
Importantly, such policy can have its spatial implications and the rise of the US 
`gunbelt', of which Silicon Valley is a part, (Markusen et al., 1991) is a cogent 
example of this (see Buswell et al., 1985 for a similar argument about the high-tech 
regions in the UK). 
Beyond defence spending, nation-states perform a plethora of other `hidden regional 
policies', i. e. `non-spatial' policies with spatial impacts13 (Mohan, 1999, p. 108-110) 
and hold a grip over a range of powers that are not adequately conceptualised in the 
literature on `learning regions'. The neglect of the role of the state is usually 
accompanied by a virtual absence of discussion of supra-national and international 
regulatory bodies (such as EU, WTO, OECD, IMF or World Bank). These institutions 
increasingly play an active role in shaping global economic processes that have 
important bearings for the fortunes of states and their regions that are not captured by 
this literature. 
The lack of attention to a wider political economy is also reflected in a limited 
understanding of corporate dynamics and the way it affects regions. Intra-regional 
business linkages are overemphasised at the expense of neglecting the role of 
`external linkages' (Markusen, 1999b; MacKinnon et al., 2002; Oinas, 2000; Smith et 
al., 1999; Simmie, 2002a; Simmie, 2002b; more recently also Amin and Thrift, 2002). 
When external forces are allowed to play a part in the `learning region', they come in 
a form of foreign direct investment (FDI) that is seen as a benign force (Florida, 
1995a, 1995b) potentially bringing jobs, skills and value-added directly or via local 
supply-chain networks (Morgan, 1997). The fact that, in an era of heightened 
competition, multinational corporations are not concerned with the development of 
regions but with reaping corporate profits, is underplayed in the analysis. Thus the 
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fact that the regional networks dominated by multinational corporations (MNCs) can 
be characterised by `sharp asymmetries of power' is overlooked (Hudson, 1999, p. 67; 
see also Amin and Tomaney, 1995a; Dicken, 1998; Pavlinek and Smith, 1998; Smith 
et al., 2002). 
A further weakness of the `learning region' concept is that it is pre-occupied with 
firms, while downplaying other forms of capital. Indeed, the whole `new regionalist' 
literature is conspicuously silent about the role of finance capital (Lovering, 1998a, 
1999). This is a problem because it is the rise of global finance that probably 
represents one of the most vital features of present capitalist activity (see Harvey, 
1989, p. 196; see also Chapter 2). The operation of finance capital, Wall Street/the 
City, global capital movements or currency exchanges and the way these may impact 
on regional fortunes is not grasped by the `new regionalist' literature (Lovering, 1999, 
p. 387). Another fundamental omission of the `learning region' concept is an inability 
to properly account for the role of labour in general, and organised labour in 
particular in economic processes. As Smith et al (1999, p. 17) noted, `workers as 
conscious active beings are almost entirely absent from the [new regionalist] 
analysis'. 
Having omitted from the analysis major institutional players and/or having obscured 
their underlying interests, it is perhaps not surprising that the `learning region' 
literature conveys a rather distorted account of the contemporary political economy. 
Advocates of the `new regionalism' usually acknowledge that the economy remains 
capitalist, nevertheless, they believe that the nature of capitalism has changed 
significantly. Subsequently, they maintain a particular vision of a region, where firms, 
workers and various regional institutions - supported by regional identity, culture and 
trust - engage in a `common enterprise' of networking, collective learning and 
knowledge sharing for the benefit of all (cf. Storper and Scott, 1995; Amin and Thrift, 
1994b; Amin and Thrift, 1999; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; inter alia). This is perhaps 
an attractive prospect, but such a vision of the economy seems to miss several 
fundamental points. First, it underscores contradictions inherent in the capitalist 
economy (see Chapter 2) including capital-labour relations and relations between 
13 See for instance Charles and Benneworth (2001) on the science policy in the UK and its regional 
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various forms of capital. Indeed, the picture of regional firms unproblematically 
learning together, sharing knowledge and expertise, developing relations of trust and 
co-operation in order to compete may be misleading (Markusen, 1999a; Gough, 1996) 
not least because the opportunities for inter-firm learning in the tough competition- 
driven environment are limited14 (Hudson, 1999). Unsurprisingly then, the concept of 
regional `clusters' (so central to much of the `new regionalist' literature) has been 
judged a `chaotic concept' -a `patchy constellation of ideas' failing to account for the 
main causes of regional economic growth (Martin and Sunley, 2001b, p. 48). 
Likewise, the view that in `learning regions', firms and workers can find a happy 
accommodation seems to overlook the harsh realities of corporate restructuring 
(Hudson, 1999) and to ignore the continuing salience of contradictory capital-labour 
relations (May, 2002; Jessop, 2000; see also Chapter 2). This does not mean that in 
certain places organised labour may not be able to achieve some sort of compromise 
with capitalists, but as Harvey (1985, p. 151) suggests, such places might only amount 
to `islands of privilege within a sea of exploitation'. 
The second problematic point is that the `new regionalist' literature takes the region 
for granted (Lovering, 1999), while failing to consider how regions have been 
historically institutionalised (see MacKinnon et al., 2002, p. 306). Furthermore, the 
`implicit claim that regions can somehow be regarded as distinct objects with causal 
powers of their own can be seen as a form of spatial fetishism that tends to elide 
intraregional divisions and tensions' (MacKinnon et al., 2002, p. 297; emphasis 
added). Indeed, in part resulting from the contradictory relations described above, 
sharp economic, political, cultural or social divisions can be found within regions (cf. 
case studies in the Part II of this thesis). Even the most successful regional economies 
often display striking levels of inequality (Castells and Hall, 1994; Castells, 1996; 
Sassen, 2001; Perrons, 2001; inter alia), despite the claims that social cohesion is `not 
simply a product of economic success but also a precondition for it' (Hudson et al, 
1997, p. 366). Indeed, as European policy makers have noticed, core regions or 
metropolitan areas embody `the paradox of being both leading centres of development 
and breeding grounds for social exclusion' (Inforegio Panorama, No. 5,2001, p. 4). 
implications. 
14 Hudson (1999, p. 69) points to the fact the most valuable forms of knowledge for competitive 
advantage are `guarded jealously' by successful firms (and regions). 
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`Learning region' theorists themselves have admitted that the social dimension of the 
paradigm has `so far received little attention in scientific analysis' (Rutten et al., 2000, 
'5 p. 256). 
Third, given the above heterogeneous and divisive characteristics of regions, the 
claims that regional culture or identity can provide a `glue' for regional actors to act 
together need to be critically scrutinised. Indeed, critics have noticed that the `new 
regionalist' literature uses culture in a narrow instrumentalist sense while neglecting 
the significance of power (Lovering, 1998a, 1999; see also Sayer, 1997) and have 
questioned the explanatory power of `soft factors' such as local conventions, trust or 
social capital in economic geography (Markusen, 1999a; see also Martin and Sunley, 
2001b; Mohan and Mohan, 2002). According to Rodrigues-Pose (2001) economic 
geography is simply being killed by a `cultural turn overdose'. Meanwhile Martin and 
Sunley (2001a) have accused the cultural turn in economic geography of `losing 
focus' and argued that culturally inspired `new regionalist' stratagem is `built on 
selective reconnaissance and suspect tactics' (ibid, p. 152). To support their point, they 
quote Sayer emphasising that `[t]o give the impression that economic logic has 
become subordinated to culture is to produce an idealised picture of an often brutal, 
economically dominated world' (Sayer, 1997, p. 25, cited in Martin and Sunley, 
2001a, p. 153). 
Finally, a fundamental issue remains unanswered regarding regional institutions and 
their role in promoting the regional economy. The literature in question seems to 
overlook formidable constraints and limits that institutions at the regional level may 
be facing (cf. Tomaney, 1996). Even regions with well-developed institutional 
structures or forms of regional government cannot be abstracted away from the power 
of the wider political economy, i. e. the power of the nation-state, supranational and 
international bodies, the power of capital and potentially that of labour (see above). In 
other words, too little of the `learning region' literature situates its account of regional 
change within the framework of the wider political economy and the constraints this 
imposes on action at the regional level (cf. Rodrigues-Pose and Tomaney, 1999; Pike 
and Tomaney, 1999). Furthermore, it needs to be recognised that regional institutions 
is Morgan (1997, p. 501) himself has argued that regional innovation stratagems alone, will not resolve 
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cannot escape the reality of their own historical legacies and the legacies of the region 
they operate within (see below). Consequently, the argument about the impacts of 
regional institutions on the regional economy needs to be looked at critically. One of 
the questions that is often overlooked is whether rich regional institutional structures 
are cause or outcome of regional economic success and how strong the link is 
between the two. This leads us to another problematic area, which is the empirical 
validation of the `new regionalist' claims. 
Missing empirical evidence? 
Beyond the weaknesses in definition of foundational terms and problematic 
conceptualisation, the third major deficit of the `learning region' paradigm is 
manifested through poor empirical evidence that `supports' it (Markusen, 1999a; 
Lovering, 1999; Hassink, 1999; MacKinnon et al., 2002; ). Perhaps this is not 
surprising given that `[i]ll-defined concepts are simply more difficult to demonstrate 
empirically' (Markusen, 1999a, p. 872). Indeed, the narrative style of the `new 
regionalist' work tends to avoid thorough secondary data analysis and is over-reliant 
on interviewing techniques, while interviews selectivity, informant veracity and 
interviewer neutrality is questionable (Markusen, 1999a, p. 878). Furthermore, such 
research is often confined within the border of a given region or district so that 
external actors and linkages are `inappropriately eliminated from the analysis' (ibid, 
p. 878). As a result of such narrow analytical focus, the causal inferences made are 
often misleading (ibid, p. 878). 
In a similar vein, Martin and Sunley (2001a, p. 154) have argued that intensive 
ethnography-based research typical for the `new regionalism' is often superficial, 
involving few and highly selective interviews, sloppy methodology, and little or no 
wider empirical contextualisation leading to `thin empirics'. Lovering (1999) has 
highlighted the danger of self-reporting `boosterist' agents, while MacKinnon et al. 
(2002) have argued that there have been limited empirical validations of `new 
regionalist' claims so far. They maintain that the key argument of the `learning 
region' school about localised learning as the main vehicle of regional economic 
the problems of those socially excluded and unemployed. 
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development remains unsubstantiated (ibid, p. 304; see also Oinas, 2000). MacKinnon 
et al. (2002, p. 305-306) thus call for more empirical studies that would employ a 
range of research methods16 and use `triangulation' by accessing a range of 
perspectives and by considering the position of different regionally based groups, 
within various regional and industry contexts. Hassink (1999, p. 111) shares the view 
that the concept of the `learning region' should be further tested with empirical case 
studies. Meanwhile, Smith et al (1999, p. 18) have argued that `new regionalism' 
confines itself to the putative `success stories' of regions and fails to account for the 
increasingly uneven map of regional economies in Europe. 
Meanwhile, the empirical evidence that has been emerging from outside of the `new 
regionalist' camp often does not seem to corroborate its key conceptual assumptions. 
Simmie (2002a), for instance, examining the reasons for clustering of innovative 
SMEs in the South East of England has concluded that international knowledge 
transfers may in fact be more important as a factor than local knowledge spillovers. 
For Simmie (2002a) the regional supply-side, i. e. local R&D infrastructure, higher 
education establishments, rich labour market, local suppliers, etc., is an important but 
`not a sufficient cause for observed concentration of innovation' (ibid, p. 899). He 
argues that it is access to markets, i. e. the demand-side of the equation that is decisive. 
The access to sophisticated customers and users (often located in other advanced 
economies), however, is easier around large metropolitan regions (Greater London) 
with world-class transport and communication infrastructure enabling national and 
international face-to-face interactions and knowledge transfers (see also Simmie, 
2002b; Hart, 1999, p. 12). Similar conclusions are drawn from various other studies, 
confirming the agglomeration of innovative businesses in certain location (usually 
large metropolitan areas), but somewhat undermining the mantra of localised linkages 
and local networks of co-operation (see Simmie, 1997; Coe and Townsend, 1998). 
Elsewhere, an attempt to empirically test the role of culture and `social capital' for 
regional growth does not seem to validate `new regionalist' claims. Using a sample of 
58 European regions, Schneider et al. (2000, p. 315) have concluded that the 
16 Ironically, in contrast to Markusen (1999a), however, MacKinnon et al. (2002, p. 305) call for less 
secondary data evidence and for more corporate interviews, surveys and ethnographic approaches to 
examine the links between `localised capabilities' and `learning'. 
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`relationship between culture and growth is subtle' and that `economic rather than 
cultural factors are the most forceful determinants of growth in the European regions' 
(ibid, p. 307). Meanwhile, an alternative account of the Silicon Valley phenomenon 
has emerged in which, instead of the much-celebrated mutuality and collaborative 
culture (Saxenian, 1994), a culture of `extreme individualism' and `aggressive 
competition', between both companies and individuals, has been found (Castells and 
Hall, 1994, p. 22). Furthermore, countering widespread views that regional prosperity 
is automatically shared by all, Castells and Hall (1994) have pointed at the striking 
features of discrimination, exploitation, urban segregation and poverty underneath the 
Valley's high-tech gilt. Hudson (1994) has meanwhile argued that building 
institutional infrastructure, as suggested by parts of the literature, may simply not be 
enough to rejuvenate less favoured regions. Finally, the evidence presented by 
Rodrigues-Pose (2002) focusing on Spanish regions, seem to go against the 
assumption that rich regional institutional structure automatically translates into 
regional prosperity (cf. Keating, 2001). Such empirical findings not only undermine 
the theoretical validity of the `learning region' concept but also raise fundamental 
questions about its value as a suitable policy guide. 
A problematic policy message for less favoured regions 
Policy implications constitute the fourth major problematic area or weakness of the 
`learning region' paradigm. It is a significant weakness though, because as shown in 
previous sections, the paradigm has harboured so many hopes for peripheral and less 
favoured regions. However, it seems that the `new regionalist' literature is not only 
offering poor understanding of uneven regional development but also providing 
limited (if not misleading) strategy guidance as to what to do about it (Lovering, 
1999; Amin and Tomaney, 1995b; Smith et al., 1999). It is thus not clear if less 
favoured regions can really `learn' new development trajectories as suggested by that 
literature. `New regionalists' themselves seem to play into the hands of the critique by 
providing controversial and sometimes mutually exclusive messages. On the surface, 
everything appears to be clear. Prosperous regions are considered successful thanks to 
their ability to learn faster and better (see section 3.2), thus the stratagem for lagging 
regions is to overcome the `failure to learn' and create conditions for improving 
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learning capability, knowledge creation and innovation in order to catch-up 
economically (see section 3.3). In the `new regionalist' view, the global knowledge 
economy provides a rather favourable environment for such a catch-up process 
because, given the new rules, `all the world's regions have a chance of success' 
(Rutten et al., 2000, p. 257), even `the until now less developed regions and countries' 
(Maskell et al., 1998, p. 188) and regional prosperity becomes a `matter of choice' 
(Porter, 1998). Such a scenario would be seen as welcome, but even `new 
regionalists' themselves do not believe it will come true as they themselves argue that 
not all regions can become successful `learning regions' (Storper and Scott, 1995, 
p. 523; Malecki, 2000, p. 1 19). They can hardly be blamed for holding such a view. 
Indeed, it is peculiar to suggest that less developed regions have a chance to succeed 
(Maskell et al., 1998, p. 188) while at the same time insisting that developed regions 
can maintain their competitive position (Maskell et al., 1998; Maskell and Malmberg, 
1999). It is confusing to advise less favoured regions to adopt `best practice' and learn 
from their more successful competitors (Amin and Thrift, 1994a; Saxenian, 1994; 
WDA, 1998) while acknowledging that inter-territorial transferability of success is 
`quite limited' (Storper, 1995b, p. 400) because its core elements are `not easily 
duplicated' (ibid, p. 405; Storper, 1997b, p. 257; see also Hospers and Beugelsdijk, 
2000). It is unpromising to encourage lagging regions to emulate and mimic 
successful `learning regions' (Cooke, 1995c, p. 245; see also Hudson et al, 1997; 
Hudson, 1998), while admitting that `mimicking only reproduces the lag' (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998, p. 68). It is problematic to encourage peripheral regions to build their 
competitiveness around the `institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift, 1994b) while it 
is clear that institutional elements around which to organise such strategy are largely 
missing (Malecki, 2000, p. 115; Hudson et al., 1997, p. 370; see also Amin and 
Tomaney, 1995b, p. 32). 
It is inauspicious to advise `rustbelt' areas to become more flexible and to develop 
entrepreneurial culture while knowing that old industrial regions inherited institutional 
structures and `socio-cultural and political mentalites' are often an obstacle to change 
(Grabher, 1993b; Hudson, 1994; Cooke, 1995c, p. 232). It is daunting to promise 
bright futures based on prosperity and social equality (Cooke and Morgan, 1998, p. 82) 
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while admitting that seriously devastated heavy-industry economies can be 
rejuvenated only slowly and unevenly (Cooke, 1995c, p. 232). It is unconvincing to 
base regional renewal strategy on innovation programmes (Morgan, 1997) while 
knowing that less favoured regions suffer from the low absorption capacity of such 
programmes as manifested through `regional innovation paradox' (Landabaso, 2000, 
p. 80; Oughton et al., 2002). It is problematic to promote the renewal of a region 
(Morgan, 1997) while implementing strategies that seem to favour development in the 
region as opposed to the development of the region (Lovering, 1999). It is ambiguous 
to claim that underperforming regions need state help while trying to prove that such 
regions can do much more for themselves (Cooke, 1995a; Morgan, 1997; Storper and 
Scott, 1995; Florida, 1995a; Amin and Thrift, 1994a, 1994b). It is dubious to demand 
that strategies at the regional level should be accompanied by actions on other levels 
in particular by a supportive central state (Storper and Scott, 1995, p. 523; Morgan, 
1995, p. 38,1997, p. 501) while admitting that such regional strategies are in fact a 
response to the withdrawal of much state support (Morgan, 1995, p. 27; Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998, p. 82; cf. MacLeod, 2000). Finally, it is rather ill-fated to urge regions 
to embark on a project of building their own competitive advantages (Porter, 1998; 
Storper, 1997a; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Cooke, 2002; Amin and Thrift, 1994a) 
while it is clear that the competitive battle will have its `winners and losers' (Hudson, 
1999, p. 69; Hudson et al., 1997; see also Dunford, 1994). 
On the basis of such discrepancies and the weaknesses discussed earlier in this 
section, it is hard to disagree with the critics that the `learning region' provides 
inadequate theoretical understanding of uneven development (Lovering, 1999; Smith 
et al., 1999) and offers doubtful strategem to overcome it (Lovering, 1999; Hudson, 
1999; Amin and Tomaney, 1995b). In fact, the lack of theoretical rigour and clarity 
and the holes in its conceptualisation attract the calls that the `new regionalist' theory 
is in fact policy-led (Lovering, 1999) or used as `political distraction' or an 
`ideological smokescreen' (Vigor, 2000). Meanwhile, Martin and Sunley (2001b, 
p. 48) have argued that the `cluster' concept, central to the `new regionalist' literature, 
has been marketed as a brand rather than an intellectual product, aiming at enhancing 
a consultancy profile of one of its main proponents. These disappointing conclusions 
then only highlight the need to start a search for a more thorough conceptualisation of 
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regional economic processes in the age of the `knowledge economy'. Such a search, 
however, must start by deconstructing the way the `knowledge economy' has been 
transposed onto the regional scale, this task that will be addressed in the following 
section. 
3.5 Debunking the `learning region' 
The search for an alternative concept of regional development should start by 
debunking the central argument of the `learning region' paradigm, namely that 
regional learning (in whatever form) will bring about regional prosperity (see Figure 
3.1 and 3.2 in Appendix). The arguments presented in the previous section pointed to 
the limits of such a process but the thrust of the argument has remained largely 
unchallenged by the critique so far. This section wishes to explore that lacuna to argue 
that the assumption on which the `learning region' is built is wanting. Indeed the 
assumption that regional learning creates regional prosperity, only replicates the 
central flaw of the `knowledge economy' concept (knowledge creates wealth). In 
particular such a formula ignores the cost of learning, thus denying the possibility of 
the reversed causality between knowledge and wealth. It also neglects the role of 
power in the equation and discounts the possibility that knowledge, wealth and power 
may be engaged in a circular and cumulative causation process (see Chapter 2). 
Moreover, by re-scaling the `knowledge-driven prosperity' formula down onto the 
regional level, the `new regionalist' literature further obscures the sources of 
economic success by abstracting the `learning region' away from the inter-regional 
interconnectedness and the workings of the wider political economy more broadly. 
Such basic omissions have fundamental implications for the conceptualisation of 
regional development (Sokol and Tomaney, 2001). Indeed, the acknowledgement of 
the reversed causality turns the logic of the `learning region' concept upside down and 
opens the following dilemma: are regions economically successful because they are 
knowledge-intensive, or are they knowledge-intensive thanks to the fact that they are 
economically successful? Such a dilemma can be resolved at least at an abstract level 
by acknowledging the possibility of the mutually reinforcing process between 
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knowledge and wealth, i. e. through increasing returns from investment in the 
knowledge-base (see Chapter 2). However, a much more complicated picture emerges 
when such the possibility is considered at the regional level. Indeed, placing the 
region back into the context of the wider political economy results in a much more 
complex picture of flows of knowledge and wealth with ambivalent implications for 
regional prosperity (see Figure 3.3 in Appendix). The acknowledgement of the 
circular and cumulative causation process between knowledge, wealth and power in a 
socio-economic system and its introduction into a spatial context, have further 
implications for an alternative conceptualisation of the space-economy. The principles 
of the circular and cumulative causation process in the spatial context are well known 
(Myrdal, 1957; Kaldor, 1970). Complemented by inserting the categories of 
knowledge and power into the equation, the following picture of polarising space- 
economic processes could emerge. 
On the one side of the process, one would find economically successful regions that 
have resources to invest in quality education and costly research and development 
(R&D) activities. Innovations emerging from such investment can be turned into 
profits and these re-invested back into the regional `knowledge-base' and its 
infrastructure, resulting in `cumulative learning' (cf. Maskell et al., 1998, p. 184; 
Landabaso, 2000, p. 83) attracting further investment and skilled workers and creating 
a possible `virtuous circle' scenario (see also Malecki, 2002, p. 931; Thwaites and 
Oakey, 1985b, p. 6). Indeed, such regions are often described as `magnets' (Malecki, 
2000, p. 119, Castells and Hall, 1994, p. 26) or `sticky places' (Markusen, 1999b) for 
both capital and labour and can be considered as regional `winners' (Dunford, 1994; 
see also Hudson et al., 1997). `Winners' are usually close to international transport 
hubs (Simmie, 2002a) and well endowed by information and communication 
infrastructure (Graham and Marvin, 1996,2001) benefiting the most from the 
`information revolution' (see also Thwaites and Oakey, 1985b, p. 2-3; Goddard et 
al. 1985). However, building on previous rounds of long-term investment, such 
agglomerations of high-value `knowledge-sub-economies' (seen by some as `learning 
regions') tend be found in the most-advanced countries (cf. Benko, 1991), often 
within or close to established economic `hotspots' such as large metropolitan areas 
(Castells and Hall, 1994; Castells, 1996, p. 390; see also Simmie, 2001; Simmie, 
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2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Simmie et al., 2002). Such economic `hotspots' represent 
vibrant markets further stimulating demand for innovation (cf. Schmookler, 1966). 
Economic prosperity resulting from their `cumulative advantage' creates potential for 
more equitable distribution of income (although this is by no means an automatic 
process - see Sassen, 2001; inter alia). Meanwhile, the rise of an economic power 
may be accompanied by a build-up of the institutional/power base and political 
influence of a given region (cf. Markusen, 1999a, p. 877). 
On the adverse side of the circular and cumulative causation process, however, are 
less favoured regions that can be trapped in a `vicious circle', stripped of both 
investment and talented `knowledge workers'. Due to the adverse side of the `cherry 
picking', such regions are usually less endowed by the modem communication 
infrastructure (Graham and Marvin, 1996; 2001) or emerge as `off-line' (Robins and 
Gillespie, 1992) or `switched-off territories (Castells, 1996; see also Gillespie, 1991; 
Richardson and Gillespie, 2000; Gillespie et al., 2001). Such regions seem to lack 
both `hard' and `sofft' networks for competitiveness (cf. Malecki, 2002) and their 
innovation effort risks to be `like trying to fertilise a small field when the wind is 
blowing' (Maskell et al., 1998, p. 87) as the benefits of such an exercise are absorbed 
by more prosperous competitors (see also Thwaites and Oakey, 1985b, p. 3). Amid a 
disintegrating economic and social structure, these regions usually suffer from above- 
average levels of unemployment and below-average wages, attracting low value- 
added production only, thus pushing a region further away from a `high-road' 
development path. Development trajectories of such regions are thus curbed by their 
own historical legacies (see below) as well as the current wider political economy 
(Amin and Tomaney, 1995b). Indeed, less favoured regions face competition from 
other regions, while being affected by the power and mobility of global capital, the 
constraints of national, supra-national and global regulatory bodies, and 
power(lessness) and (im)mobility of labour (Sokol and Tomaney, 2001). In addition 
to economic subordination, LFRs may find their institutional structures being eroded 
and their influence on power fading away, compounding their `cumulative 
disadvantage'. 
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The above picture of regional development is inevitably a caricature, a rough sketch 
and gross oversimplification of processes occurring in the real space-economy. For 
instance, it portrays less favoured regions merely as victims of market forces and the 
wider political economy, while overlooking the possibility that the nation-state or 
wider political economy may provide development incentives for such regions 17. it 
also discounts the possibility that regions themselves through their institutions may 
actively seek to counter their deteriorating economic situation and to reassert their 
position on the terrain of power. Finally it implies a dualism of `successful' and 
`unsuccessful' regions and creates an impression of a `black and white' picture, while 
overlooking a colourful mosaic of uneven development between regions and 
neglecting socio-economic divisions within regions (both advanced and less favoured 
ones). 
Nevertheless, the picture firmly situates regional economies within the context of 
processes in which the logic of the `learning region' concept disintegrates (see also 
Amin and Tomaney, 1995b, p. 31-32). Within such a context, regions are seen as 
being part of wider underlying economic processes and particular historical legacies, 
which in turn raises several important issues especially in relation to less favoured 
regions and their chances to create sustainable economic trajectories. Indeed, it is 
doubtful whether in such context it is possible to consider regional prosperity as a 
matter of regional choice. It is questionable whether less favoured regions can `learn' 
new `high road' development trajectories within the given underlying flows of capital, 
labour and knowledge. Subsequently the relative significance of action on the regional 
level vis-ä-vis constraints of the wider political economy needs to be questioned. 
Finally, and more specifically, the room for manoeuvre of regional institutions such as 
regional development agencies (animateurs) needs to be critically scrutinised. The 
significance of these issues is further highlighted when regions are placed in the 
context of `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial value chains' that will 
emerge as important elements of an alternative conceptualisation discussed below. 
17 Myrdal (1957) himself argued that `spread' effects may provide a (limited) counterbalance to 
`backwash' effects. 
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3.6 Towards an alternative conceptualisation 
The purpose of this section is to sketch out elements on which an alternative 
conceptualisation of regional development could be based. Such an alternative, it is 
argued here, has to go back to `big questions' of inequality, polarisation and uneven 
development, as recently emphasised by Martin and Sunley (2001a, p. 156) and 
Perrons (2000, p. 2). In doing so, the section will point to the role of the `socio-spatial 
divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial flows of value' (introduced in Chapter 2) and 
highlight their potential in accounting for uneven forms of economic development, 
both social and spatial. As already argued in Chapter 2, there is mounting evidence 
that social and spatial inequalities are growing at the global scale and these are 
accompanied by inequalities at national and regional levels (see also Chapters 4,6 and 
7 of this thesis). However, as demonstrated in this Chapter, `new regionalist' literature 
offers only a limited grasp of current economic processes and of emerging inequalities 
that accompany the alleged rise of the `knowledge-driven economy'. Thus, there is an 
urgent need to provide an alternative framework for understanding these inequalities. 
This section will outline such a framework, building on the strengths of 
evolutionary/institutional insights and more radical approaches in economic 
geography. The section will first, briefly, revisit the question of a definition of the 
region and regional institutions, and subsequently argue for a need to situate the 
region within the context of a wider profit-driven political economy and long-term 
historical legacies. Finally, building on the notions introduced in Chapter 2, it will 
emphasise the usefulness of the `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial 
value chains' (or value networks) in the analysis of uneven regional development. 
The process of building elements for an alternative framework has to start by 
addressing the basic definitional deficiencies shown by the `new regionalist' 
literature. In particular, there is a need to define more thoroughly the concept of the 
region. Echoing the arguments developed in Chapter 2, the starting point of such 
conceptualisation is the acknowledgement that the economy is an institutionalised 
social process, in which institutions are at the same time object, subjects and 
outcomes of social struggles over wealth, power and knowledge. A step further in 
such a conceptualisation would be to argue that region is an institution emerging 
102 
from, and being part of, economic, cultural and political struggles at certain 
geographical scales. Thus, extending a recent `evolutionary' definition of a region as 
being a `negotiated outcome of a process' which produces a particular collective 
social order (Cooke and Morgan, 1998, p. 64, emphasis added), the definition 
proposed here see the region as both outcome, object and subject of social struggles in 
a given territorial context (cf. Allen et al., 1998). The notion of the `territorial context' 
deserves further examination, but we limit ourselves here to an understanding of the 
regional territorial context as relating to the sub-national scale, while recognising the 
ambiguity and fluidity of such a description18. Subsequently, regional institutions 
could be defined as being constituent parts of a region, themselves emerging from 
particular social struggles and embedded in wider institutional contexts. 
Defining the region (and its institutions) as being an outcome as much as an object 
and subject of social struggles creates room for thinking of region (or regional state) 
as a potentially active participant of the institutionalised social process here referred 
to as socio-economy or political economy. At the same time, however, such 
conceptualisation recognises the need to situate the region within wider processes that 
impinge upon its fortunes and place constraints on local action. Moreover, there is a 
need to situate the region not only with respect to its own `internal' struggles, but also 
within the context of `external' struggles, that a region and/or its institutions may 
engage in vis-ä-vis various other levels of the state (local, national or supranational), 
different fractions of capital and/or labour. Besides, regions or region-states may be 
engaged in competition with other regions. In the profit-driven economy, it seems that 
the major battle is being waged around wealth or profit (see Chapter 2). It is argued 
here, that the two major factors that influence the success of the region in the profit- 
driven struggles relates to its own historical legacies and its position within the wider 
political economy. The historical legacies refer to both `hard' legacies - economic and 
political structures inherited from previous phases of development (or decline), as 
well as `sot' socio-cultural and institutional legacies. It is of critical importance how 
these historical legacies, sedimented through centuries, interact with the imperatives 
of the current wider political economy and to what extent the region-state can impact 
18 For instance, as demonstrated by the case studies in this thesis (Chapters 6 and 7), regions may 
become region-states or even nation-states (or vice-versa) through the social struggles they are part of. 
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on such processes. The underlying determinant of economic success is the way the 
region and its institutions, including capital and labour, are inserted into wider 
divisions of labour and flows of value to which we now turn. 
The division of labour is judged `a universal characteristic of human social life' 
(Rueschemeyer, 1986, p. 2) as a process underlying a shift towards more complex 
social structures. In the capitalist economy, the division of labour is a necessary 
condition for commodity production and the operation of the market, while being a 
product of particular economic and social relations (Bottomore, 1991, p. 153-156). 
Such a division of labour within society encompasses two dimensions; the division of 
labour within production under the direct control of capital, and divisions of labour 
within wider society and between different fractions of capital or private producers 
(ibid, p. 154). However, as the world does not exist `on the head of a pin' (Massey, 
1995, p. 51) the social division of labour always involves the spatial dimension. Such 
`spatial divisions of labour' have been examined in the national (Massey, 1984,1995) 
as well as international contexts19 (Henderson, 1989; Lipietz, 1986; see also Johnston, 
1986; Castells, 1993,1996; Dicken, 1998). The acknowledgement of both social and 
spatial aspects of such divisions of labour, however, lead us to consider the use of the 
notion of the `socio-spatial divisions of labour' as being more appropriate. In Chapter 
2 such `socio-spatial divisions of labour' have been tentatively defined as the way 
production is organised between and within capital, labour and the state, while seen as 
part of a stretching the social relations of capitalism over space (Harvey, 1999; 
Massey, 1984,1995; see also Sayer and Walker, 1992; Jessop, 2000). 
The crucial feature of such relations, however, is not the divisions of labour of labour 
per se, but the way value is appropriated and distributed between and within 
institutional actors of the political economy on the back of such `divisions of labour'. 
In other words, it is the flow of value, both within society and between territories that 
underpins uneven economic development. A significant recent contribution on the 
topic has been offered by Smith, Rainnie, Dunford, Hardy, Hudson and Sadler (2002). 
Besides, it could be argued that the territorial extent of regions is in itself can be a matter of struggles 
and contestation as much as it is in the case of nation-states (see Storey, 2001). 
19 It is worth noting that the concept of `spatial divisions of labour' itself has been subject to debates 
(cf. Warde, 1985, and Massey, 1995, chap. 8). 
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Starting with a critical evaluation of the concept of `global commodity chains' 
(Gerefft and Korzeniewicz, 1994) defined as `sets of interorganizational networks 
clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and 
states to one another within the world-economy' (Gereffi et al., 1994, p. 2), Smith et 
al. (2002) have proposed the following way of looking at economic relations within 
the global economy. First, they argue that it is not the `commodity' per se, but the 
value the commodity embodies that should provide a central focus of economic 
geography analysis. Second, they contend that instead of a linear notion of `chains', it 
is more appropriate to see commodity and value production as being organised in 
`networks'. Third, subsequently, they suggest that the dualistic distinction between 
`producer-driven' and `buyer-driven' chains implied in the `global commodity chain' 
literature (Gereffi, 1994) should be abandoned in favour of conceptualisation that 
would emphasise dynamics and fluidity of economic processes. Fourth, Smith et al. 
(2002) adopt a much more sophisticated theorisation of the spatial dimension of the 
economic processes of value creation and distribution, while recognising a dialectical 
relationship between the flows of value and their national, regional and local contexts 
(ibid, p. 50). Last, but not least, in contrast to the `global commodity chain' school, 
Smith et al. put the state and labour firmly on the analytical agenda and call for `more 
systematic analysis of the relations between capital, the state and labour in the 
production, circulation and realisation of commodities' (ibid, p. 47-48). They conclude 
that it is 
`the organization of the production, appropriation and realization of value 
flows and the various forces that impinge upon this process - state 
governance, labour organization, corporate practices and so on - that are 
fundamental to understanding the (re)configuration of economic activity in 
increasingly integrated macro-regional economies' (Smith et al., 2002, p. 42- 
43). 
Adrian Smith and his colleagues also offer cogent empirical evidence through which 
they `operationalise' their theoretical construction. The cases evoked include 
examples of emerging value networks within the `New Europe' (see also Chapter 4) 
highlighting differentials of power and value between economic actors situated in 
particular sectors in particular places (ibid, p. 58). Consequently, it is the prism of 
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uneven governance of flows of value that `potentially allows for an understanding of 
which actors and which places benefit from or lose out from such flows' (ibid, p. 54, 
emphasis orig. ). Thus, the conceptualisation involving the `flows of value' or `value 
networks' perspective seems to provide a solid basis on which an alternative 
framework for an understanding of uneven regional development could be built. The 
following points, however, could be considered in addition to those raised by Smith et 
al. (2002). 
First, there is a need to more readily integrate knowledge into the analysis of the 
process of value creation and distribution, alongside power and wealth (cf. Chapter 2). 
It is important to recognise that beyond knowledge needed for the commodity 
production (cf. Smith et al., 2002, p. 57-58), knowledge itself can take a form of a 
commodity and thus directly partake in the flows of value. Social and/or spatial 
transfer of value in the form of knowledge can be a significant element of uneven 
economic processes. It can take various forms, starting with a `simple' appropriation 
of the fruits of intellectual work via Intellectual Property Rights (see Chapter 2) 
ending with inter-regional and international migration processes of `knowledge 
workers', `brain draining' certain regions while contributing to the success of the 
others. Second, it is important to recognise the potentially cumulative nature of flows 
of value, and that a mutual reinforcement of power, wealth and knowledge of certain 
economic actors and places (regions) may compound social and spatial inequalities. 
Knowledge (in a variety of its forms) can partake in this process contributing to the 
emergence of `knowledge-intensive agglomerations'. Such `knowledge-intensive 
agglomerations' (seen by some as learning regions) thus can be seen as manifesting 
growing `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and uneven distribution of value through 
`socio-spatial value chains/networks' (cf. Chapter 2). Third, besides uneven 
appropriation of value through the commodity production process, attention should 
also be given to transfers of value through commodity exchange. Indeed, under 
capitalist social relations, despite the appearance of equal exchange, market exchange 
of commodities can in itself be source of unequal distribution of value. 
Fourth, it would be useful to extend the analysis of value chains/networks within and 
between parts of `production' and `post-production' capital to one that would take 
into account the value f ows between `productive capital' and `financial capital'. In 
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addition, such analysis should also include the relations of power and flows of value 
between the financial capital and the state, while examining the implications these 
relations might have for regions (such as availability of credit, squeeze on public 
expenditure, reduced investment in education, industrial or regional policy, etc. ) and 
labour (intensification of labour process, pressure on wages in the public sector) (cf. 
Johnston, 1986; Fisher, 2001). Furthermore, such analysis should show more detailed 
appreciation of emerging organisations of global governance (WTO, IMF, WB, etc. ) 
that seem to have appeared as an institutional category in their own right (alongside 
various forms of capital, labour and state). Finally, it would be useful to extend the 
theorisation of `value chains/networks' to include the dimension of time. Indeed, there 
would seem to be a basis for consideration of social relations of value that do not 
stretch only over space but also over time20 (Harvey, 1985,1999; Jessop, 2000). This 
would open up the possibility for consideration of `socio-spatial-temporal flows of 
value', to capture the way value is produced, appropriated, transferred or destroyed 
within society, and over space and time. 
However, even without these additional points, the approach taken by Smith et al. 
(2002) seems to be the best suited for understanding uneven regional development 
and economic geography processes more widely. Importantly, it recognises the fact 
that regions are, directly or indirectly, interconnected with each other through wider 
relations of value and divisions of labour, with fundamental implications for people 
and places, producing a mosaic of inequality between and within regions. With this 
insight in mind, we now approach the conclusions for this Chapter. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this Chapter was to critically examine the recent concepts found in 
economic geography associated with the `new regionalism' (Lovering, 1999). In 
particular the Chapter focused on the `learning region' paradigm that is seen by many 
as the regional dimension of the allegedly emerging `knowledge economy'. The 
Chapter first situated the `learning region' in the context of longer-term search on the 
part of economic geography to conceptualise the spatial implications of the `new era' 
20 In this context, if would probably be appropriate to talk about `socio-spatial-temporal divisions of 
labour'. 
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of knowledge, learning and innovation. It then moved on to a detailed examination of 
the `learning region' itself. The Chapter argued that despite the lack of a clear 
definition, it seems that various versions of the `learning region' concept invariably 
revolve around the notions of region, learning, knowledge and institutions, echoing a 
wider cultural and institutional turn in the social sciences. Consequently, successful 
regions are conceptualised as `repositories and collectors' of knowledge with 
significant `learning' capacity, supported by regionally-based `entrepreneurial 
culture', `social capital', `untraded interdependencies', collaborative networks and 
overall `institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift, 1994a; Saxenian, 1994; Florida, 
1995a; Storper and Scott, 1995; Storper, 1995a, 1997a; Asheim, 1996; Morgan, 1997; 
Boekema et al., 2000a; inter alia). Less-favoured regions, meanwhile, are encouraged 
to emulate successful `learning regions' by mimicking their `institutional thickness'. 
Building regional `animateurs' (Morgan, 1995,1997,1998) is considered as part of 
the process in which economic prosperity becomes a `matter of choice' (Porter, 1998). 
Moreover, economic prosperity is expected to be shared by all within the given region 
(cf. Storper and Scott, 1995; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Such propositions certainly 
have their appeal, not least for former industrial regions, where they raise hopes for 
economic and social `renewal' and enhance the impression that such regions can 
themselves `learn' new economic trajectories and promote their own `high road' 
development. 
The detailed analysis undertaken in this Chapter points to a much more complicated 
picture of the regional problem. Indeed, the `learning region' concept itself and `new 
regionalism' more widely has been subjected to serious criticisms (Hudson, 1999; 
Lovering, 1999; Markusen, 1999a; Smith et al., 1999; Martin and Sunley, 2001a; 
MacKinnon et al., 2002; inter alia). These criticisms highlight problems with the basic 
terms and definitions (including the notions of region, knowledge, learning and 
institution), overall fuzzy conceptualisation, the lack of empirical evidence and, 
finally, limited policy relevance, especially with respect to less favoured regions. 
The Chapter moved on to address the lacuna unexplored by the critique so far and 
examined the central argument of the `learning region' concept, which is that regional 
learning brings about regional prosperity. Such an assumption was found wanting, 
not least because it only replicates the central flaw of the `knowledge economy' 
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concept (see Chapter 2). The attempt to transpose a `knowledge-driven economy' 
formula on to the regional scale, meanwhile, produces additional conceptual problems 
that render the `learning region' paradigm inadequate. A fundamental question that 
arises whether or not regions are economically successful because they are 
knowledge-intensive, or whether they are knowledge-intensive thanks to the fact that 
they are economically successful; and to what extent their success depend on 
conditions found in the wider political economy. 
The Chapter argued that an attempt to answer these question has to start with the 
acknowledgement of growing `divisions of labour', accompanying `value chains' (or 
`value networks') and their spatial implications. Building on the conceptualisation of 
the current political economy presented earlier in Chapter 2, this Chapter supported 
the view that pockets of high-value knowledge-sub-economies can indeed be 
observed (seen by some as `learning regions'). These, however, can only be found in 
the most-advanced. countries, often within established economic `hotspots'. Here, 
knowledge (and power) seems to function as yet another factor behind the circular and 
cumulative causation process. The striking feature of this process is that, with a 
handful of exceptions, it reinforces existing patterns of inequality. The effects of the 
`circular and cumulative causation' process are well known (Myrdal, 1957; Kaldor, 
1970). Extended to cover the circulation and accumulation of knowledge in a spatial 
context, this means that economically successful regions have resources to invest in 
quality education, training and costly research and development activities. The 
resulting innovations can be turned into profits and these re-invested back into the 
regional `knowledge-base', attracting further investment and skilled workers and 
creating a possible `virtuous circle' scenario. This can be accompanied by a build-up 
of their power base or political influence. Regional economic success potentially 
opens the way for a more socially cohesive pattern of development, although sharing 
regional prosperity is by no means automatic21. 
On the adverse side of the process, however, less-favoured regions (LFRs) can be 
trapped in a `vicious circle', stripped of both investment and `knowledge workers'. 
Their development trajectories are curbed by their own historical legacies ('soft' 
21 Indeed, many economic leaders, be it regions or cities, display striking patterns of social inequality 
(Castells and Hall, 1994; Castells, 1996; Sassen, 2001; inter alia). 
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cultural, but also `hard' structural), as well as the current wider political economy. 
Indeed, LFRs simultaneously face competition from other regions, while being 
affected by the power and mobility of global capital, the constraints of national, supra- 
national and global bodies, and the power(lessness) and (im)mobility of labour. As a 
combined effect of these forces, LFRs are being integrated into the wider political 
economy through particular `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `value 
chains/networks'. In addition to economic subordination, such regions may find their 
power influence being eroded. 
It could be argued that such a conceptualisation is itself a simplification. It 
nevertheless raises the question of how much room for manoeuvre there remains for 
less favoured regions to actively change their position within underlying flows of 
knowledge, value and power. It is clear that regional actors do not necessarily sit idle 
vis-ä-vis the economic challenges their respective regions face. However, the issue is 
how significant their actions are at the regional level, and what importance can be 
ascribed to the role of specialised economic development agencies operating within 
regions. Answers to these questions must begin by acknowledging that regions 
themselves are institutions and thus they are subjects, objects and outcomes of wider 
socio-economic struggles. This is also true for specific economic development 
institutions like regional development agencies, which are expected to act as 
`animateurs' for their respective regional economies. Furthermore, the institutional 
power of these agencies has to be measured against the power of the wider political 
economy and the weight of the historical legacies of the regions in question. Thus, it 
could be argued that the room for manoeuvre of such regional institutions is limited. 
This issue is further highlighted when considered in the light of the `socio-spatial 
divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial value chains/networks' through which 
economic actors and regions are structurally interconnected. In particular, the Chapter 
emphasised the usefulness of the concept of the `value chains' or `value networks' 
(Smith et al., 2002) as a platform on which an alternative conceptualisation of uneven 
regional development can built. The pattern of uneven development and the 
constraints that regions are facing will be now examined in the following Chapter 4, 
focusing on regional economic trajectories in the `New Europe', with particular 
reference to its `Eastern' half. 
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Chapter 4: 
The regional dimensions of post- 
socialist transformations in the 
`New Europe' 
4.1 Introduction 
As emphasised in the introductory Chapter 1, this thesis is concerned with the 
prospects for less favoured regions in Europe, in the context of the allegedly rising 
`knowledge economy' and following the collapse of state-socialism. So far, the thesis 
has examined the concepts postulating the rise of the `knowledge economy' (Chapter 
2) and their regional dimensions (Chapter 3) in the context of the advanced Western 
capitalist countries. The present Chapter 4 moves the analytical focus towards the fall 
of state-socialism and its regional dimensions in the context of the `New Europe', 
while giving a particular emphasis to regional processes in its Eastern hale. Arguably, 
the sudden collapse of state-socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 
1990s had profound implications for the whole continent, granting the term `New 
Europe' (previously used in association with the deepening integration processes in 
Western Europe) a new meaning. In particular, the dramatic change in Eastern Europe 
raised hopes that following the decades of the Cold War confrontation between two 
irreconcilable political, economic, military and ideological blocks, Europe could be 
turned into a zone of co-operation, peace, stability and prosperity, creating an 
opportunity for the unification of the divided continent. Such prospects were 
especially welcomed by the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe itself, embarking 
on the `transition' from state-socialism to liberal-capitalist democracy and the market 
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economy. The political side of `transition' was fuelled by ideals of liberal democracy, 
freedom and `civic society', while `economic transition' was accompanied by a 
widespread popular belief that the introduction of a market economy via neo-liberal 
`shock therapy' would lead to a quick and smooth closure of the wealth gap with the 
West. 
A decade later, however, the dreams are over as rather different picture has emerged. 
Indeed, underneath the slogans of integration and unification, the emerging `New 
Europe' (Pinder, 1998) seems to be marked by growing economic, political and social 
fragmentation (Hudson and Williams, 1999; Dunford and Smith, 2000; Hadjimichalis 
and Sadler, 1995; Bachtler et al., 2000a; inter alia; see also Gorzelak and Jalowiecki, 
2002). The decade following the fall of the Iron Curtain in Europe has been 
characterised by a disturbing divergence of economic fortunes between its Western 
and Eastern halves and spectacular social and regional fragmentation within the East 
itself. Clearly, many regions in Eastern Europe have emerged as the `least-favoured 
regions' (Smith and Swain, 1998, p. 47) of the continent. Such disappointing patterns 
on the space-economic landscape of the `New Europe', that seems to be continuously 
committed to the ideals of social and regional cohesion, call for a thorough 
examination of the processes involved. This Chapter will try to approach the task in 
the following steps. 
Initially, section 4.2 will re-open the debate about the causes of the collapse to the 
state-socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. In doing so, the section will point to the fact 
that profound disagreements can be found in the literature on the subject. Although it 
continues to be debated there seems to be a growing consensus among heterodox 
economists (Stiglitz, 1994; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Hodgson, 1999) and social 
scientists (Castells, 1996,1998; but see also Bell, 1973) that the causes of the collapse 
of state-socialism should be seen in conjunction with the rise of the `knowledge 
economy'. Indeed, as already indicated in Chapter 2, the literature seems to be 
pointing to the difficulties state-socialism has in coping with the allegedly emergent 
`knowledge economy' or `post-industrial society'. One of the clearest statements on 
the subject has come from Castells (1996,1998) who sees the demise of `industrial 
Parts of this Chapter were previously published in volume 35 of Regional Studies (see Sokol, 2001). 
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statism' in the USSR as a consequence of its inability to embrace the `informational 
mode' of production. Building on the conceptual tools developed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
section 4.2 will subject such a proposition to critical examination, from which an 
alternative hypothesis will emerge. 
The Chapter will then shift attention from theoretical hypothesising to the reality of 
policy discourse in post-socialist Eastern Europe. Strongly associated with neo-liberal 
orthodoxy, the dominant discourses attempt to explain the fall of state-socialism in the 
light of the inability of the state to provide effective allocation of economic resources. 
Consequently, by promoting a `transitional' agenda, neo-liberals have invariably 
advocated the dissociation of the state and economy, and the introduction of free 
market forces as a vehicle for economic rejuvenation in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Section 4.3 will briefly revisit the neo-liberal `transitional' project and point to its 
devastating social and economic outcomes. Subsequently, the economic geography of 
these outcomes will be highlighted in section 4.4 . It will be argued that divergence 
rather than convergence can be observed on the socio-economic landscape of the 
`New Europe'. The scope of uneven development is increasingly recognised by 
policy-makers and academics alike, but the understanding of its causes seems often to 
be clouded by confusion. Section 4.5 will thus present competing accounts of uneven 
development in post-socialist Europe, ranging from neo-liberal to institutional and 
more radical insights. The section will argue that the dominant neo-liberal approach 
falls short of explaining emerging (macro)regional divisions and that an alternative 
conceptualization of uneven development in Central and Eastern Europe could be 
constructed on the strengths of institutional and radical approaches. Section 4.6 will 
then move on in the direction of outlining such an alternative. Building on the insights 
developed earlier in Chapters 2 and 3, it will be argued that the alternative approach 
should place at the heart of its analysis historical legacies and the way they interact 
with, and are exposed to, the international political economy. Seen through such an 
alternative prism, Central and Eastern Europe is emerging as the `super-periphery' of 
the `New Europe' amid struggles over `socio-spatial value chains/networks' and the 
reworking of old `socio-spatial divisions of labour'. Within such a framework, the 
opportunity for regions to `choose' their economic trajectories seems to be rather 
limited. Finally, section 4.7 will distil conclusions and point to the implications these 
may have for the rest of the thesis. 
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4.2 The `knowledge economy' and the collapse of state-socialism 
The fall of state-socialism was, arguably, one of the most significant events at the end 
of the twentieth century2 (cf. Fukuyama, 1992; Castells, 1998, p. 338). Despite its 
widely accepted significance, however, the understanding of the causes of the demise 
of state-socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe seems to be somewhat 
limited. The literature on the topic displays profound disagreements on very 
fundamental points. Thus for Marxist writers, the fall of state-socialism was by and 
large inflicted from within due to its internal contradictions of social relations (see 
Clarke, 1993a, 1993b); in other words, state-socialism was not socialist enough. 
Conversely, for liberals, state-socialism collapsed because of the very opposite reason 
- it was too socialist, with strong in-built rigidities and inefficiencies and a lack of 
dynamic market forces (see Kornai, 1992; Sachs, 1990). Indeed, for Fukuyama (1992) 
the demise of the Soviet block represents the ultimate victory of liberal capitalism 
over socialism. However, an alternative hypothesis is that the fall of state-socialism is 
less to do with the crisis of socialism as such and more to do with the crisis of the 
state (Clarke, 1990). 
Several heterodox economists (Stiglitz, 1994; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Hodgson, 
1999) and social scientists (Castells, 1996,1998; but see also Bell, 1973) seem to 
approach the issue from yet a different angle. Although displaying important 
differences in detail, they all seem to converge on the key role of knowledge and 
information in economic systems and emphasise the inability of state-socialism to 
cope with the apparently increasing importance of knowledge and information (in its 
various forms). Thus for Bell (1973), state-socialist countries would face increasing 
pressures when emerging from the challenges of the `post-industrial' or `knowledge 
society'. In fact, as suggested by Bell (1973), basic postulates on which socialism is 
based, such as the leading role of working industrial class, seem to be disintegrating 
with the rise of the post-industrial society, as knowledge and science are claimed as 
becoming the leading factors of production (cf. Chapter 2). More recently, economists 
2 Following Smith (1998, p. 36, note 4) the use of term `state-socialism' is preferred in this thesis to 
alternative terms such as `socialism', `communist system', 'Soviet communism', `state capitalism', 
`totalitarian system', `Stalinist system', etc. 
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(Stiglitz, 1994; Hodgson, 1999; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994) have been pointing at 
fundamental weaknesses of state-socialism in terms of knowledge distribution, 
knowledge creation, learning and/or innovation. Stiglitz (1994) has argued that the 
socialist planning mechanism hampers an efficient distribution of information and 
knowledge through the economic system. In a similar vein, Hodgson (1999) has 
suggested that socialism based on central planning has a poor chance of survival 
because it eliminates diversity and lacks the ability to learn and innovate (ibid, p. 15- 
61; see also Hodgson, 1998b). For Hodgson, `no complex socio-economic system can 
survive and develop without structural economic variety and genuine markets' 
(Hodgson, 1999, p. 16-17). Hodgson thus contends that the theoretical arguments of 
socialists in favour of a collectively planned economy are `deeply flawed' (ibid, p. 16) 
and that "if socialism is to be rescued from its theoretical and practical failures, then 
it has to be both a mixed economy and "market socialism" in some genuine sense' 
(ibid, p. 17). Echoing this view, Lundvall and Johnson (1994) have suggested that the 
successful `learning economy' is a `mixed economy, in the fundamental sense of the 
term' (ibid, p. 33). Indeed, as shown in Chapter 2, Lundvall and Johnson (1994) 
maintain that learning, the critical economic process, is an interactive process affected 
by the institutional set-up of the economy. In their view, both pure markets and pure 
hierarchies represent institutional arrangements that are hostile to innovation (ibid, 
p. 34-35). They argue that `pure hierarchy is too restricted and simple to constitute the 
main substance in complicated interactive learning processes' (ibid, p. 35) and that 
subsequently, hierarchical organisational forms can be `effective innovation brakes' 
(ibid, p. 35). Lundvall and Johnson make it clear that the centrally planned economy 
`can be thought of as a hierarchy of hierarchies' (ibid, p. 35), implying the strong 
inability of state-socialist economies to innovate (see also Gomulka, 1986). 
This theme has been further developed by Castells (1996,1998) while considering the 
case of the USSR that was arguably at the epicentre of the state-socialist collapse. He 
places the demise of `industrial statism' in the Soviet Union into the context of the 
emergent `information society' (cf. Chapter 2). In doing so, Castells provides us with 
perhaps the strongest statements on the interconnectedness between the rise of the 
`knowledge economy' in the West and the fall of state-socialism in the East, 
deserving a closer examination. The central thesis of Castells (1998) is that the crisis 
of the Soviet economy from the mid-1970s onwards, eventually leading to the 
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collapse in the early 1990s, `was the expression of the structural inability of statism 
and the Soviet variant of industrialism to ensure the transition towards the information 
society' (ibid, p. 7). In a way this inability represents a certain paradox, because as 
Castells (1998) himself admits, the Soviet Union dedicated `vast resources' to science 
and research and development (R&D) (ibid, p. 19; see also EC, 1997a) and had a 
`higher proportion of scientists and engineers in the working population than any 
other major country in the world' (Castells, 1998, p. 19; see also Nove, 1969). But for 
Castells (1998) it was the very character of the Soviet `industrial statism' and its 
structural incompatibility with the rising informationalism that were decisive. By 
statism Castells means a social system oriented towards `power-maximizing', as 
opposed to capitalism, oriented towards `profit-maximizing' (ibid, p. 7). By 
industrialism, he means `a mode of development in which the main sources of 
productivity are the quantitative increase of the factors of production (labour, capital, 
and natural resources), together with the use of new sources of energy' (ibid, p. 7). 
Conversely, informationalism is `a mode of development in which the main source of 
productivity is the qualitative capacity to optimize the combination and use of the 
factors of production on the basis of knowledge and information' (ibid, p. 7; see also 
Castells, 1996, p. 13-18). Somewhat echoing Bell (1973), Castells (1998) contends 
that the Soviet economic system proved to be a useful tool for rapid (extensive) 
industrialisation (cf ibid, p. 9-10) but hopelessly inefficient in embracing more 
sophisticated informational modes of development. Castells argues that the reasons 
for such inability lie not so much with the state per se, but with a particular form of 
statism as a power-maximizing social system. 
To support his thesis Castells provides rich empirical material to argue that the Soviet 
economy was heavily biased towards `military industrial production, since military 
might was the ultimate purpose of the regime and the cornerstone of statism' (ibid, 
p. 14). Thus, `perhaps the most devastating weakness of the Soviet economy was 
precisely what was the strength of the Soviet state: an overextended military-industrial 
complex and an unsustainable defence budget' (ibid, p. 21). In the 1980s, the defence 
budget was apparently reaching 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) 
with some estimates putting it at an even higher level, at about 20-25 percent of GNP 
(ibid, p. 21-22; see also Nove, 1969, p. 319). About 40 percent of industrial production 
was defence related, and the production of enterprises that were engaged in the 
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military-industrial complex reached about 70 of all industrial production (Castells, 
1998, p. 22). Enterprises participating in this gigantic military industry 
`concentrated the best talent in scientists, engineers, and skilled workers, and 
were also provided with the best machinery, and access to technological 
resources. They had their own research centres, the most technologically 
advanced in the country, and they had priority in the allocation of import 
quotas. Thus, they absorbed the best of Soviet industrial, human, and 
technological potential' (ibid, p. 22; see also ibid, p. 28). 
Unfortunately, the technological achievements of the military-industrial complex, in 
part because of security reasons (ibid, p. 28), never reached the civilian economy. This 
was accompanied by an overall poor ability to link an excellent scientific base with 
innovation in production3 (ibid, p. 32). For the latter failure, Castells (1998) points the 
finger of blame at the bureaucratic decision-making machinery, the overall rigidity of 
the planning mechanism and ideological barriers in the USSR. In particular, strict 
vertical institutional separation between scientific institutes and enterprises imposed 
by the logic of the command economy, `forbade the process of "learning by doing" 
that was critical in fostering technological innovation in the West' (ibid, p. 32). Thus 
neither Zelenograd ('Soviet Silicon Valley' near Moscow; ibid, p. 26), nor the science 
city of Akademgorodok near Novosibirsk in Siberia (ibid, p. 33-34) seem to have 
made a major impact on the economy and stand as examples of the `fundamental 
inability of the centrally planned economy to accommodate processes of rapid 
technological innovation' (ibid, p. 33). Castells argues that due to the combination of 
the above factors, the Soviet Union `missed the revolution in information 
technologies' (ibid, p. 26), `provoking technological retardation precisely at the 
critical moment of a major paradigm shift in the rest of the world' (ibid, p. 27). For 
Castells, the retardation in the diffusion of information technology had critical 
ramifications and negative cumulative effects, because it prevented `the process of 
spontaneous innovation by use and networked interaction which characterizes the 
information technology paradigm' (ibid, p. 36). Castells concludes that 
3 The link between science and innovation is elsewhere identified by Castells as a critical process for 
economic development (see Castells and Hall, 1994). 
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`at the core of the technological crisis of the Soviet Union lies the fundamental 
logic of the statist system: overwhelming priority given to military power; 
political-ideological control of information by the state; the bureaucratic 
principles of the centrally planned economy; isolation from the rest of the 
world; and an inability to modernize some segments of the economy and 
society technologically without modifying the whole system in which such 
elements interact with each other' (ibid, p. 36). 
For Castells (1998) the Soviet Union proved `incapable of assimilating 
informationalism, thus stalling economic growth and decisively weakening its 
military machine, the ultimate source of power in a statist regime' (ibid, p. 337). 
Castells further argues that Gorbachev's last minute reform aimed at economic 
restructuring and technological modernisation (ibid, p. 37; see also Clarke, 1993b, 
p. 37) was `so radical that it ultimately led to the disintegration of the Soviet state' 
4 
(Castells, 1998, p. 5). The above account of the Soviet experiment debacle appears 
plausible, but nevertheless seems to overlook several fundamental points. The 
consideration of these points opens-up a way for an alternative hypothesis of the fall 
of state-socialism, for which Castells himself provides valuable ammunition. 
First, the argument that the `Soviet power was not seriously challenged either 
internationally or domestically' (ibid, p. 6) and therefore it is the perverse logic of the 
Soviet statism itself that is to blame for its own collapse, seems unconvincing. In 
particular, it belies the reality of the Cold War, and intense political, economic, 
ideological and military confrontation between the Soviet block (lead by the USSR) 
and the Western capitalist world (especially the USA). Indeed, Castells himself notes 
en passant that the Soviet Union has been developing in `a hostile world environment' 
(ibid, p. 18) but he fails to appreciate fully the implications this might have had for its 
economy. Indeed, one significant dimension of this `hostile world environment' was 
that the Soviet economy as a whole did not cease to be subjected to the law of value 
(Clarke, 1993a, 1993b) within the capitalism-dominated international political 
economy. Unable to compete on international markets with sophisticated products, the 
4 Interestingly, after making a strong case for `industrial statism' collapsing under the weight of the 
`informational mode of development', Castells later on suggests that it was the resurgence of national 
identities in the multicultural USSR, that 'ultimately destroyed the Soviet state' (1998, p. 38). 
118 
Soviet Union seems to display structural dependence on exports of raw materials in 
exchange for `hard currency' (see Castells, 1998; Clarke, 1993b, p. 35) and imports of 
crucial technology from the West (Castells, 1998, p. 31; Clarke, 1993b, p. 37). 
Unfavourable terms of trade with the world economy that emerged in the 1980s (see 
Clarke, 1993b) precipitated the deepening economic crisis of the Soviet economy. 
This was further exacerbated by the debt crises of its Third World and CMEA trading 
partners for whom the Soviet Union was a net creditor. As Clarke (1993b, p. 43) has 
put it, the USSR was `a victim of the debt crisis at second hand'. 
The second dimension of this hostile environment was that since its conception, the 
Soviet Union had to face immense political, ideological and military pressures (cf. 
Nove, 1969) from leading capitalist countries. The actions of these countries further 
hardened the terms of the economic relations described above. Thus, the isolation 
from the outside world, highlighted by Castells (1998) cannot be seen solely as a 
result of `siege mentality' (ibid, p. 18) but also as a result of a real siege imposed from 
the outside world5. A further significant element of `the game' was the military 
circumscription of the USSR during the Cold War that followed a devastating Second 
World War6. In the light of this, it is difficult to see the Soviet military build-up 
purely as a matter of the choice, or even the `ultimate purpose', of Soviet statism 
(Castells, 1998, p. 14). Instead, it could be looked at as a response to the hostile 
international political situation, a response that was not a `purpose', but rather an 
immense burden for the economically fragile Soviet state. Castells is right to point out 
that the military build-up `had necessarily to take its toll on the Soviet civilian 
economy and on its citizens' everyday life' (Castells, 1998, p. 22) to argue that the 
Soviet economy was a victim of the cascading hierarchy of iron priorities: 
`Agriculture had to be squeezed of its products to subsidize industry and feed 
cities, and emptied of its labor to provide industrial workers. Consumption 
goods, housing, and services had to concede priority to capital goods, and to 
the extraction of raw materials, so that socialism could rapidly be made self- 
5A good example of this is the embargo on imports of the most advanced Western technology (see 
Clarke, 1993b, p. 37). 
6 See Nove (1969) for an account of the devastating impact of the Second World War on the Soviet 
economy. 
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sufficient in all indispensable production lines. Heavy industry itself was put 
at the service of military industrial production... ' ' (ibid, p. 14) 
In short, a military complex was `absorbing most of the creative energy of society' 
(ibid, p. 22). However, Castells fails to imagine that this burden has been largely 
externally induced. He rightly emphasises that the Soviet defence budget was 
unsustainable (ibid, p. 21) but seems to overlook the possibility that the enforced 
involvement in the arms race with the USA could have been a part of a strategy to 
bring communism down economically. The war in Afghanistan is a case in point. 
Castells (1998) acknowledges that the war `was taking its toll in human suffering, in 
political image, and in military pride' (ibid, p. 6), but fails to put it in the context of the 
wider geo-political and military confrontation with the USA that had its significant 
economic costs. Indeed, Gorbachev himself has admitted (BBC, 1999) that one of the 
central motives behind perestroika, was to ease the international tension to allow the 
diversion of resources from the military machine to the ailing civilian Soviet 
economy8. Thus, rather than being hit by the impacts of informationalism, it seems 
more likely that by the 1980s the Soviet economy was stretched to the limits by a 
combination of the worsening terms of international economic relations and the 
escalating costs of its arms-race with the USA. 
The second fundamental problematic point made by Castells' (1996,1998) account 
lies with his use of the concept of `informationalism' to argue that while `industrial 
capitalism' adapted well to the allegedly emerging `informational' mode of 
development, `industrial statism' did not manage the transformation and collapsed. 
This side of Castells's argument is problematic in several ways. First, as seen in 
Chapter 2, there are serious doubts whether advanced capitalist economies are really 
entering a new phase of socio-economic relations, be it `informationalism', `post- 
industrial society' or `knowledge economy'. Consequently, the use of the 
`information society' thesis as one of the key explanatory tools for explaining the fall 
of state-socialism seems debatable. 
7 Alec Nove noted somewhere that the paradox of the USSR was that it was able to master nuclear 
bombs, but unable to supply eggs to shops. In the light of the above Castells' argument, the connection 
between the two phenomena seems clear. 
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The rejection of the `information society' (representing a radically new socio- 
economic system as portrayed by Castells), however, does not mean to deny 
technological change, but to argue that the change has to be seen in the context, of 
social relations within which technology is conceived and used (cf. Chapter 2). In 
other words, the emergence of new technologies, let alone new `modes of production' 
is not a `naturally' emerging process, but a process that is subjected to social 
struggles. Castells himself admits that the rise of informationalism has been 
associated with the hardening logic of capitalism (1996, p. 19; 1998, p. 338). 
Elsewhere, he acknowledges that technological acceleration in the West was in part 
provoked by `Sputnik shock' (1996, p. 51) after the USSR demonstrated its own 
technological capability (1998, p. 14). However, Castells fails to integrate these 
elements into a comprehensive picture. Indeed, an alternative reading of the situation 
would have to start with the acknowledgement that technological build-up in both the 
West and East were integral parts of geo-political confrontation between the two 
superpowers. Indeed, it is a well-known fact that the ICTs on which Castells bases his 
`new era' are largely (by-)products of the US military R&D (cf. Chapter 2). 
The reason why this technological development led to the `expansion and 
rejuvenation of capitalism' (Castells, 1996, p. 19) in the West, while the parallel 
attempt caused the collapse of socialism in the East, needs further elaboration, going 
beyond the argumentation offered by Castells. Two alternative lines of argument can 
be proposed. The first one points at the fact that the playing field for this 
technological competition was uneven from the outset. As Bell (1973) and Castells 
(1998) have both noticed, socialist revolutions did not occur in the most advanced 
capitalist countries as predicted by Marx, but in rather backward and mostly agrarian 
countries (see also section 4.6 below). Indeed, the Soviet Union itself was described 
by Castells (1998, p. 14) as `by and large a poor country', whose population at the 
time of the 1917 Revolution was 84 percent rural. Such a country was up against the 
most economically advanced industrial capitalist economies of the world. It seems 
that even the vast natural resources of the USSR could not compensate for the 
country's overall industrial and technological backwardness in this competition. Thus 
the amount of resources that the Soviet Union had to commit to defence purposes 
8 Significantly, one of Gorbachev's first steps was to pull out from Afghanistan. 
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and/or technological development were disproportionately higher than the parallel 
effort displayed by its enemies, the USA in particular9. In other words, in trying to 
simply keep pace with the armament and technological advances of the USA, the 
USSR had to dig much deeper into its resources, even at the cost of crippling the 
civilian economy. 
The relative backwardness of the Soviet economy would also go some way to 
explaining why its excellent scientific knowledge-base built under state-socialism 
rarely reached civilian production. Castells (1998) is right to point at the bureaucratic 
decision-making, the rigidities of the planning system that indeed, in certain instances, 
can act as `innovation breaks' (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994) compounded by 
ideological hurdles. However, Castells seems to ignore the immense deficit on the 
demand side of the Soviet economy. Indeed, following Schmookler (1966), it could be 
argued that the rate of technological innovation is positively related to demand in the 
economic system (see Chapter 2). The USSR was apparently able to produce world- 
class research (cf. Castells, 1998; Nove, 1969), i. e. to secure the supply-side of the 
equation, but the backward economy was apparently unable to absorb its fruits. Thus, 
it seems that behind the observed inability to establish synergistic linkages between 
production and research (Castells, 1998, p. 5,20), are not only perceived ossified 
institutional arrangements, but also significant structural economic deficits. Castells 
himself has noticed that `it was impossible to modernize the technology of one 
segment of the economy without revamping the entire system' (1998, p. 35). Such 
`revamping', however, was probably beyond the reach of the USSR, especially in the 
hostile international conditions as described above, which only further drained the 
economy. This structural economic deficit of the Soviet economy has thus to be added 
to the list of contributing economic factors behind the fall of the regime. 
What this alternative reading of the process of the collapse of state-socialism points to 
is a link back to the discussion about the circular and cumulative nature of knowledge, 
power and wealth (cf. Chapter 2) on a macro-economic scale. It appears that the 
9 Castells (1998, p. 22) himself argues that 15 percent of Soviet GNP was committed to defence, which 
was `more than twice the equivalent proportion in the US at the peak of Reagan's defence build up'. 
Castells, however, fails to compare these respective commitments in real terms. He also fails to take 
into account the initial lower level of Soviet military and technological capabilities, requiring 
disproportionate effort and upgrading simply by attempting to achieve parity with the USA. 
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second half of the 20th century was marked by a confrontation between two systems, 
each attempting to maximise knowledge, power and wealth. On the one hand, the 
USSR and its satellites, starting from a much lower level of economic development, 
apparently failed to initiate a `virtuous circle', in part due to the external pressure 
placed upon them. On the other hand, leading capitalist countries, with a much 
stronger economic and technological base, withstanding the challenge of the Soviet 
block, were seemingly able to diffuse technological knowledge from their military 
and space programmes to their more vibrant economic baselo. 
To conclude, the fall of state-socialism can hardly be seen simply as its inability to 
adapt to informationalism as suggested by Castells (1996,1998). Even less so the 
event could be seen as a victory of free market capitalism over socialism (cf. 
Fukuyama, 1992). Rather, there is a need to consider a hypothesis that would 
highlight a struggle between two competing socio-economic systems, which ended, 
rather predictably, with the victory of the stronger and better resourced onell 
Importantly, the case of `military Keynesianism' as instituted by the USA, seems to 
suggest that the state can play an important role in fostering innovation and 
technological development, thus potentially contributing to economic growth more 
generally (cf. Archibugi, et al., 1999; Sandler and Hartley, 1995) and fostering what 
some observers see as the rise of the `knowledge economy' or `learning economy' 12 
(cf. Chapter 2). Ironically, following the dissolution of the Soviet block, the recipe 
given by neo-liberals to the post-socialist countries to rejuvenate their economies went 
in the very opposite direction - the elimination of the state from the economy and the 
promotion of unfettered market forces became cornerstones of the `transitional' 
agenda to which we now turn. 
1° Although as noted in Chapter 2, the process can hardly be seen as unproblematic or as a move 
towards a more humane or harmonious society. 
1 From this point of view, it is actually surprising how long the Soviet experiment lasted. 
12 Indeed, one could argue that military procurement fits the criteria of interaction between a public 
user (the state) and private producer (defence company) as a model for the `learning economy' (cf. 
Lundvall and Johnson, 1994). 
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4.3 `Transition' and its outcomes 
Following the collapse of state-socialism Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) embarked on a path of `transition' from state-socialism to capitalism (see 
Pickles and Smith, 1998; Csaba, 1995; Kolodko, 2000). A `transitional' project was 
led by a formula illustrated in Figure 4.1 (see Appendix). In this model scenario a 
political transition (political liberalization, free elections and general democratization) 
was launched in order to replace the single-party polity and (re)install liberal 
democracy and civic society. The economic transition launched in parallel - and 
fuelled by a neo-liberal approach (Gowan, 1995) - aimed (through economic 
liberalization, privatization and marketization) to quickly turn a centrally planned 
economy into a functioning market economy. The two `transitions', political and 
economic, were expected to underpin each other and their implementation was seen as 
a pre-condition for catch-up and reintegration with a prosperous Western Europe 
(Figure 4.1). The discourse of `transition' has become the dominant discourse 
through which processes in CEECs are described and understood (Smith, 2002). 
The basics of the economic transition for CEECs were most readily laid down by 
Sachs, 1990. His `shock therapy' seems to be perfectly in line with the Washington 
consensus `policy mix', already in operation in many Latin American countries, with 
mixed outcomes (see Williamson, 1990). Sachs's `therapy package' for Eastern 
Europe invariably advocated simultaneous price liberalization, trade liberalization, the 
convertibility of currency, free market competition, the promotion of private 
enterprise, the restriction of state enterprise, privatization and tight monetary and 
fiscal policies (Sachs, 1990; see also Blanchard et al., 1991). Sachs also advocated 
substantial financial aid to CEECs. Significantly, this part of the `therapy' never fully 
materialized (with the notable exceptions of East Germany and Poland). 
For CEECs, the speed of `shock therapy' was thought to be essential as, in addition, it 
was supposed to fulfil a very important political goal: to prevent political opposition 
that might reverse the direction of reform (Sachs, 1990, p. 25). These tactics appeared 
to be working; even if the former communists later returned to power on a wave of 
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popular discontent (Poland, Hungary), they were unable to challenge the general 
course of reform'3 (Thirkell et al., 1998, pp. 39-40). It is, therefore, fair to admit that 
neo-liberalism, in one form or another, has become dominant if not `hegemonic' 
(ibid., p. 43, p. 161) in CEECs during the course of the 1990s (see also Smith, 2002). 
However, the outcomes of the neo-liberal `therapy' in Eastern Europe have been truly 
shocking. The model scenario of `transition' to `capitalist paradise' (Csaba, 1995, p. 
3) never materialized. Clearly, a decade later, the initial dreams are over. First, the 
political transition has been problematic. Political fragmentation and instability, 
problems with the establishment of democratic institutions, the rise of nationalist and 
extremist movements and threats to minority and human rights, are some of the 
political problems that have been encountered (Brown, 1994). In addition, parts of the 
former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union have experienced the reality of open 
military conflict or civil war (Brogan, 1992). Second, the economic transition has 
proved more difficult than expected. The deep `transitional recession' surprised even 
pro-market commentators (Kornai, 1994). The painful change from a command 
economy to a market one reflected the collapse of eastern markets and economic 
decline, high unemployment, inflation, the doubtful results of privatization, a general 
decline in the standard of living and social polarization. The hardest hit sections of the 
population included not only ethnic minorities, disabled and elderly people, but also 
young couples and women in general. It is estimated that thousands of children in 
Eastern Europe are now born into extreme poverty, while the quality of health 
provision has been in rapid decline and excess mortality is increasing (see Gowan, 
1995; Pickles and Smith, 1998; Pinder, 1998; Hudson and Williams, 1999; Bradshaw 
and Stenning, 2000; inter alia). Furthermore, it seems that `shock therapy' eroded the 
knowledge-base on which the long-term economic growth of these countries could 
have been built (Myant, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; see also Chapter 7 for the case of 
Slovakia). Third, related to this political and economic disarray in CEECs, rapid 
integration with Europe never materialized. In fact, quite the opposite has happened: 
new political borders and economic divisions have appeared (see Dunford and Smith, 
2000; Hudson and Williams, 1999; Agnew, 2000). These uneven geographies of 
economic `transition' will now be examined in turn. 
" See also Chapter 7 of the thesis for a discussion on the political struggles over the implementation of 
the neo-liberal model of `transition' in Slovakia. 
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4.4 The economic geography of `transition' 
The last decade has seen two main processes at work. First, all the former state- 
socialist countries have experienced serious economic downturn. Second, this 
downturn was felt with different intensity in different parts of Eastern Europe. As a 
result of both these factors, a spectacular fragmentation of the European space- 
economy has occurred (Sokol, 1999,2001; Dunford and Smith, 2000; Agnew, 2000). 
Indeed, a number of `fault lines' have been (re)appearing within the economic 
landscape of the New Europe (see Figure 4.2 in Appendix). The most disturbing has 
been developing in place of the former `Iron Curtain'. In terms of GDP per capita, it 
was estimated (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 1998, 
p. 50) that the average level of real GDP in the Eastern half of Europe (including all 
the former USSR republics) in 1997 was down to 73% when compared with the 1989 
level (100%). Meanwhile, the GDP in Western Europe recorded a steady growth (see 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), 1999, p. 196). Therefore, instead of 
catching up, the wealth gap between the two halves of Europe has actually grown. 
The last decade has also seen significant divergence within Eastern Europe itself (see 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 in Appendix). There appears to be a significant `fault line' 
between East-Central European Countries (including the Baltic states) on one side 
(this will later be referred to as Super- Periphery A), and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (the former USSR minus the Baltic states) on the other (Super- 
Periphery B). As shown in Table 4.1, the weighted average of GDP in the first group 
in 1997 was 96% of the GDP in 1989. In contrast, the same ratio for the second group 
was estimated as 57% (EBRD, 1998). 
Economic differences within these two groups are equally spectacular. Within the first 
group, for instance, a small number of Central European economies (Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) appear to be performing much better 
than others. However, a closer examination of the figures (Table 4.1) reveals that 
even these countries have been struggling to recover their 1989 GDP levels, let alone 
converge with the EU average. Comparing 1999 and 1989 GDP levels, the Czech 
figure was down by 4.7% and the Hungarian by 0.6%. After 10 years of painful 
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`transition' Slovakia has surpassed its 1989 GDP level only marginally by 1.7% and 
Slovenia by not more than 5.3 % (ECE, 2000, p. 225). 
The Polish figure was surprisingly up by 21.8%, which, however, looks less 
impressive when the particular Polish circumstances are considered. Indeed, several 
points should be made about the Polish economic `miracle'. First, it is generally 
accepted that in the 1980s Poland went through a deep recession (ECE, 2000, p. 156). 
Therefore, even a partial economic revival in the 1990s seems substantial vis-ä-vis the 
1989 recessional figure. Secondly, the Polish recovery has been greatly helped by 
writing-off the country's substantial debt burdens. This way, Poland in fact has 
become the biggest recipient of exceptional Western aid, unseen elsewhere in Central 
and Eastern Europe (Gowan, 1995; Kolodko, 2000, pp. 300-01). Thirdly, the 
`impressive' Polish figure should be seen in relation to the EU GDP per capita 
average, where it translates to an improvement of only 31.3% to 39.9% (ECE, 2000, 
p. 175). Thus, Poland still lags considerably behind even its Central European 
neighbours, let alone the poorest EU countries. Finally, it has to be noted that more 
recently Poland experienced serious economic difficulties, marking the definite end of 
the `miracle'. 
Meanwhile, even the former East Germany, the richest former state-socialist country, 
does not seem to be catching up (ECE, 2000, p. 175), despite massive financial 
injections (Prange, 2000). These figures, of course, mask vast regional inequalities 
within each of these countries. Indeed, over the last decade, regional disparities within 
each of the `transition' countries have also been increasing (Gorzelak, 1996; Pinder, 
1998; Smith, 1997; Dunford and Smith, 2000; Bachtler et al., 2000a; Gorzelak et al., 
2001; inter alia; see also Chapter 7 of this thesis for the case of Slovakia). Clearly 
then, instead of the intended economic equalisation, we are confronted with an 
increasingly complex picture of uneven development in the `New Europe'. The 
growing inequalities work against the commitment to social and regional cohesion of 
the enlarging EU and could in turn undermine the European integration project itself. 
The understanding of the dynamics of this uneven development, which have 
consequently become crucial for the future of the continent, will be discussed in the 
following section. 
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4.5 Theorising uneven economic development in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
It could be argued that policy-makers and academics alike have increasingly 
recognised the broad patterns of uneven development outlined in the previous section. 
However, the understanding of its causes appears to be clouded by confusion (see 
Dyker, 1999). Several competing theoretical streams have been attempting to account 
for the divergent economic paths of countries and regions in post-socialist Europe, 
including neo-liberal, institutional and radical approaches. These will be examined in 
turn. 
The dominant stream of literature `explaining' uneven development in the CEECs is 
associated with neo-liberal orthodoxy. This is somewhat ironic given that the above 
empirical evidence from `transition' countries clearly goes against the neo-classical 
assumption (such as Sachs's) of economic convergence under market conditions (cf. 
Dunford and Smith, 2000). However, instead of accepting the fact that the market 
economy is an inherently uneven process (Massey, 1984,1995; N. Smith, 1984; 
Harvey, 1999; inter alia), neo-liberals are trying to convince us that if convergence 
has not occurred, this is primarily because there has not been enough market. For neo- 
liberals, quick and full implementation of the `transition to market' equals good 
economic performance. According to Lloyd, 1996, p. 125, `those countries which 
have instituted some or other brand of [shock therapy] have done, and are doing, 
best'. By implication, those countries which failed to implement free-market reforms, 
are facing increasing economic problems. Furthermore, there is the argument about 
the importance of the timing or early start of the reforms. A recent report of the 
European Commission considering EU candidate countries, for instance, claims that, 
`in general, the countries which started to implement economic reforms earliest have 
tended to experience less of a reduction in GDP (Poland and the Czech Republic). 
Where economic restructuring was delayed ... the fall 
in GDP has been more severe' 
(European Commission (EC), 1999, p. 172; emphasis added). 
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The time dimension also emerges when it comes to judging how long individual 
countries have been dominated by the Soviet system. Unsurprisingly, the state- 
socialist legacy is the only one neo-liberals are ready to consider. Their assumption is 
that the longer a country remained under socialism, the bigger the damage made to its 
economy, hence the difference between countries of the former USSR and its former 
satellites. Finally, neo-liberals point to the political dimension of the `transition'. 
According to Karatnycky, 1998, the reason for economic problems in many 
`transition' countries was their failure to establish liberal-democratic regimes, i. e. to 
implement the political half of the `transitional' agenda. 
One way to counter these arguments would be to name numerous examples of 
countries where the evidence simply does not conform to the above neo-liberal 
framework (e. g. Pickles and Smith, 1998) or to point at sub-national regional 
divergence (Sokol, 1999). A comprehensive critique of the neo-liberal approach, 
however, has to address the fact that at the macro-regional level, some general 
correlation between the progress of economic and political `transition' and the 
economic performance of CEECs can be observed (Karatnycky, 1998; EBRD, 1998). 
This thesis supports the view that the fallacy of the neo-liberal argument lies with 
establishing the direction of the causal relationship between the two variables. 
Pointing at this fundamental flaw, the alternative account of uneven development in 
Central and Eastern Europe should place different pre-socialist and state-socialist 
structural legacies and the way these interact with today's global capitalism in the 
heart of its analysis (see also Dunford and Smith, 2000, p. 172). 
The building blocks for such an alternative approach can be found from within radical 
(Clarke, 1993a; Gowan, 1995; Gowan, 1996; Thirkell et al., 1998; Pollert, 1999a) and 
broad institutionalist perspectives (Stark, 1992; Bryant and Mokrzycki, 1994; Hausner 
et al., 1995; Amin and Hausner, 1997; Grabher and Stark, 1997a, 1997b; Stark and 
Bruszt, 1998; Pickles and Smith, 1998; Smith and Pickles, 1998; Kolodko, 2000). The 
starting point of the institutionalist stream is the salience of evolving institutions in 
shaping social and economic action and a recognition that new institutions are 
inevitably embedded in the old ones. Thus in post-socialist Eastern Europe, the new 
system is built not only on the ruins, but from the ruins of the former (Stark, 1992). 
Therefore, instead of transition (from one to another identifiable point), we are 
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witnessing transformation (see also Bryant and Mokrzycki , 1994; Stark and Bruszt, 
1998, p. 83). Transformation is seen as both a path-dependent and path-shaping 
process, where history and legacies matter but where new trajectories are possible too 
(Hausner et al., 1995). As these trajectories are shaped by societal struggles, the 
outcome of transformation cannot be guaranteed (Clarke, 1993a; Eyal et al., 1998). 
Indeed, as argued below, instead of a model scenario of `transition' to capitalism, 
various `vicious circles' can develop (see section 4.6). Importantly, it will be argued 
that historical legacies deserve attention as one of the important factors shaping these 
developmental trajectories in post-socialist Eastern Europe. The historical legacies, 
however, should not be understood solely as `soft', narrowly defined `social 
networks' (see critique by Poliert, 1999a; Smith et al., 1999) but also as the `hard' 
legacies of political (Pollert, 1999a) and economic structures (Smith, 1998). 
Furthermore, the search for legacies should not be limited to the state-socialist period. 
If we accept that `capitalist revolution' (Csaba, 1995) is not immune from state- 
socialist ruins, than we have to accept that `socialist revolutions' in Central and 
Eastern Europe were not immune from whatever preceded them. This `whatever' 
preceding state-socialism seems to be actually quite important (see Dunford and 
Smith, 2000) and will be subsequently elaborated upon in section 4.6.. 
Meanwhile, it should be underlined that it is of critical importance how these pre- 
socialist and state-socialist legacies interact with the imperatives of today's global 
economy. This interaction is mediated through well-defined institutions: capital, state 
and labour (Poliert, 1999a; Smith et al., 2002). The role of labour is invariably 
stressed by the radical camp (Clarke et al., 1993; Thirkell et al., 1995,1998; Pollert, 
1999a); however, there is also a recognition of the disorientation and weakening of 
`organized labour' (Pollert, 1999b; Vickerstaff and Thirkell, 2000). It seems, 
therefore, that it is this `unorganized labour' in Central and Eastern Europe which 
unwillingly partakes in reshaping the economic architecture of the New Europe 
(Smith et al., 2002). The role of the state and its policies are also rightly emphasized 
(Kolodko, 2000) and some would suggest (Hausner et al., 1995) that there are 
strategic choices available to them. It is important, however, to realize constraints and 
pressures under which nation-states, let alone regions, have been operating. The 
critical external pressure comes from the intertwined virtue of foreign capital and 
international institutions (Gowan, 1995; Thirkell et al., 1998). Indeed, in Gowan's 
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view, `transition' to capitalism, and especially its `shock therapy' form, has been 
designed to allow Western capital to conquer East European markets, to capture cheap 
production lines there and to create `hub-and-spoke' West-East economic relations 
(Gowan, 1995). In this radical opposition to neo-liberal views, the `transitional' 
project is not seen as a part of the solution, but rather as a part of the problem (see 
also Smith and Swain, 1998, p. 47), and the growing economic divergence between 
East and West is seen in the context of a broader international political economy. 
The imbalance in East-West economic relations has been recently echoed in the work 
of Smith et al., (2002). Seen through the prism of `value chains' or `value networks' 
(discussed in more detail in Chapter 3), Smith et al. (2002) see emerging uneven 
geographies in the `New Europe' in the light of the reworking of divisions of labour 
and value flows across the continent. This approach, as argued in Chapter 3, provides 
a valuable tool in analysing processes underpinning the space-economy, and thus need 
to be integrated into an emerging alternative framework for understanding uneven 
development in post-socialist Europe. The outlines of such an alternative approach 
will be now discussed in more detail in the following section, while focusing on the 
issue of historical legacies, and the interaction of these legacies with the constraints of 
today's international political economy. 
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4.6 Towards an alternative approach 
Historical legacies and the uneven transition to capitalism 
The starting point of the alternative to the neo-liberal account rests with the 
acknowledgement that dramatic disparities existed in Europe before state-socialism 
dominated its Eastern half (see Smith, 1998, pp. 41- 44; Good, 1994). This section 
argues that, on a macro-scale, at least four tiers can be identified. First, there were 
nations and regions that took part in the industrial revolution and were well integrated 
into Europe's industrial and urbanized centre (such as today's Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic; see Figure 4.2). The second tier consisted of areas where industrialization 
occurred belatedly and was less pronounced than in the first group (e. g. today's 
Slovakia, Hungary and Poland). Third, there were vast rural areas of the Eastern 
European periphery that were pre-dominantly agricultural (e. g. Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine). Fourth, at the very bottom of the league, there were the backward 
underdeveloped regions of Central Asia. These too were incorporated into the Soviet 
Bloc. Of course, this typology itself is a generalization as divisions within these tiers 
and individual countries were themselves pronounced. 
Nevertheless, the tiers represented very different economic and political structures. 
The first tier can be seen as representing well-established liberal-capitalist industrial 
society, with the second tier moving slowly in that direction. The third tier, in 
contrast, could be seen at best as weak pre-capitalist society, with the fourth tier being 
deadlocked by mostly feudal-type social and economic relations. In terms of GDP per 
capita, for the countries and regions of the first tier this was just above or close to the 
European average at that time (Austria, Denmark). The areas of the second tier 
probably enjoyed GDP per capita similar to Spain, Portugal or Greece at that time. 
Meanwhile, the countries and regions of the third and fourth tier fell well below any 
European standards. The above features constituted major structural legacies that 
cannot be ignored in the analysis of the uneven development in Eastern Europe. These 
structural legacies, however, were those that the arrival of state-socialism attempted to 
overcome. 
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Undoubtedly, state-socialism for its part has left several distinctive marks on socio- 
economic structures of regions and nations of Eastern Europe. Arguably, state- 
socialism was committed (at least in theory) to social justice as well as spatial equity. 
Partial regional convergence was achieved (Dunford and Smith, 2000, p. 172) but 
often at the expense of creating inefficient and unsustainable economic structures (see 
Smith, 1998). Furthermore, as seen in section 4.2, the Soviet economic system has 
largely been distorted by its political and military `irrationalities' (Clarke, 1993b; 
Smith A. H., 1994; Castells, 1998) and was not profit-oriented (Clarke, 1993a; Poliert, 
1999a, p. 52). All this became critical at the time of the transformation to capitalism. 
If the Soviet system and its enterprises were not designed to operate for profit and to 
sustain market pressures, it is hardly surprising then that marketization would have 
had catastrophic consequences. Indeed, reflecting this handicap, in the decade 
following the collapse of state-socialism, the wealth gap between the West and the 
East has grown. Simultaneously, reflecting the differentiated ability of countries and 
regions to compete on the global marketplace, a significant divergence has occurred 
within the East itself. As a result of the two processes, a map of space-economic 
inequalities in Europe has been (re)produced. 
Eastern Europe as `super periphery' 
If we imagine the space-economic map of Europe in terms of a centre-periphery 
model, with Western Europe seen in terms of a `core' (blue banana) and `centre', 
surrounded by a `periphery' (Objective 1 areas) (Dunford and Perrons, 1994, pp. 165- 
66; Knox and Agnew, 1998, pp. 157-58), then the Eastern half of the New Europe can 
be seen as an emerging `super-periphery' (Figure 4.2). The `super-periphery' itself 
could be divided into super periphery A (East-Central European Countries including 
the Baltic states) and super periphery B (former Soviet Union minus the Baltic states). 
During the last decade of `transition', economic differences between the two super- 
peripheries have grown (Table 4.1). 
On this macro-regional level a certain correlation between the progress of political 
and economic `transition' and economic performance can indeed be observed. 
However, an alternative explanation can lie with different historical legacies. In fact, 
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in super-periphery B, the liberal-capitalist economic and political structures were 
relatively underdeveloped or non-existent prior to state-socialism. The economic base 
built under the central planning system collapsed under `transitional' shocks and there 
are weak foundations for a functioning liberal democracy project. Rather, political 
turmoil and instability were experienced and further fuelled by the catastrophic 
economic situation, social polarization, ethnic and regional fragmentation. These are 
the foundations of the `vicious circle' scenario (see below), where effectively the 
implementation of `transition' could be halted. In comparison, the countries of super- 
periphery A are doing better as they are returning to capitalism. They have a more 
solid economic structure and more experience with both the market and parliamentary 
democracy (see Berglund et al., 1998). The economic impact of `transition' was less 
devastating. Also there has been greater political courage to undertake necessary 
reforms, as the political elites there could rely more on the necessary support of the 
population. The prospect of converging economically and politically to Europe 
seemed to be closer. Indeed, some of these countries were likely to start the 
`transition' sooner than the others - as rightly observed, but misinterpreted by neo- 
liberals (cf section 4.5). 
Echoing the legacies of the old development tiers described above, a further sub- 
division may be created within each of the super-peripheries (Figure 4.2). Super- 
periphery A thus includes zones `a+' (Slovenia, the Czech Republic; western Poland, 
western Slovakia, western Hungary) and `a' (the rest of the East-Central Europe; 
Rumania, Bulgaria), while allowing for an emerging depressed zone `a-' (the former 
Yugoslavia14). Meanwhile, super-periphery B can be sub-divided into zone `b' 
(Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova) and zone `b-' (the Caucasus and Central Asia). 
These sub-zones display diverging economic fortunes (Table 4.1). 
Clearly, it could be argued that the above model represented by Figure 4.2 is a 
simplification of a real space-economy, in that it lacks micro-regional detail and 
therefore fails to capture the important disparities within the above mentioned space- 
la The zone `a-' includes parts of the former Yugoslavia that have been trapped in a `vicious circle' of 
devastating ethnic conflict and whose GDP has been rapidly sinking. Estimates available for the whole 
former Yugoslavia suggest a drop from 45.2% in 1989 to 23.8% in 2000 of the EU average of per 
capita GDP (see ECE, 2000, p. 175). The biggest economy of the zone used to be that of Serbia which 
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economic zones and individual countries. Capital cities and major urban centres, for 
instance, are important elements in shifting the balance (Downes, 1996; Gorzelak, 
1996; Surazska et al., 1997). Nevertheless, the model seems to be useful in 
understanding macro-regional disparities within the `New Europe'. Indeed, a gradient 
from `a+' to `b-' in the super-periphery represents significant differences in economic 
performance and the general standard of living. However, even the most economically 
advanced countries of super-periphery A (perhaps with the exception of tiny Slovenia) 
are lagging behind Portugal and Greece, the two worst-off cases of Western Europe 
(see EC, 1997, p. 137; Dunford and Smith, 2000; EC, 2000). The fact that even these 
countries (a+/a) have failed to show a tendency to catch up is an embarrassment for 
neo-liberal theory and calls for a closer examination of the international political 
economy and market forces that were supposed to trigger convergence effects. 
Power of international political economy 
The power of international political economy seems to be channelled through clearly 
distinguishable but closely interrelated mechanisms: foreign direct investment, trade, 
financial capital flows and the strategies of international institutions. All are 
trumpeted by neo-liberal rhetoric as vehicles for prosperity and catching-up processes 
between East and West. However, their closer examination reveals that they actually 
often work in opposing directions, reinforcing East-West divergence and 
exacerbating disparities within the East. 
To commence with foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign capital was supposed to 
be an engine of `transition' bringing badly needed capital, new technology, efficient 
management, up-skilling, value-added production, jobs and economic growth to 
Eastern Europe. However, the overall level of FDI inflow into CEECs has been 
disappointingly low (Poliert, 1999a, p. 112) as well as very unevenly distributed 
(Table 4.1). Profit-seeking foreign investors have clearly preferred the politically 
more stable and economically richer countries and regions of super-periphery A, 
among others suffered years of international sanctions and whose economy and infrastructure has been 
further decimated by NATO's operations in 1999. 
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leaving in limbo areas that probably need the investment the most15. However, even 
for more advanced regions, FDI does not necessarily provide the kind of vehicle for 
regional development expected by neo-liberal orthodoxy and uncritical economic 
geography (see Gowan, 1995; Hardy, 1998; Pavlinek and Smith, 1998). Above all, 
appropriated surplus value seems to flow in an East-West direction, underlying the 
emerging `value chains/networks' in the `New Europe' (Smith et al., 2002). 
East-West trade patterns display similar symptoms. Following the liberalization of the 
trade regime, Eastern European markets have become flooded with western products 
(Gowan, 1995). Only a few Central European countries have shown some capacity to 
compete in Western markets; however, their export ability has been curbed by the de 
facto protective measures of the EU, especially in those sectors critical to CEECs 
recovery (Smith A. H., 1994; Gibb and Michalak, 1994; Gowan, 1995; Williams et 
al., 1998). Trade liberalization thus produced substantial market pressures that only 
the most advanced and diversified regions seem to sustain, aided further by incoming 
FDI. 
The third mechanism through which the power of international political economy 
manifests itself is financial capital flows. Volatile private financial flows seem to have 
an important impact on the fortunes of transitional economies (see EBRD, 1998; 
Kolodko, 2000, pp. 315-16), while the significance of the money lending process has 
also been highlighted (Gowan, 1995; Altvater, 1998; Thirkell et al., 1998). Among the 
criticized features of the latter is its `conditionality' as well as the `full repayment' 
rule (ibid., Chapter 3) which shifts the economic power balance between West and 
East further in favour of the West, (Gowan, 1995, p. 58). Also it seems to enhance 
economic differences within Eastern Europe, as the more advanced and successful 
transition countries are likely to be able to negotiate better deals with Western 
creditors than their more troubled counterparts elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 
Undoubtedly, that financial capital flows in a variety of forms should be included as 
an important element of the `value network' approach. 
Is The exceptions are the oil and gas economies of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (see 
EBRD, 1998, p. 81). 
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Finally, the strategies of financial, economic, political and military international 
institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD, G7, OECD, EU, NATO) deserve attention as 
they exercise a considerable influence on all three of the above-mentioned 
mechanisms. They have been acting as powerful promoters of free-market ideology, 
and their strategies vis-ä-vis Eastern Europe can be seen as a set of incentives and 
constraints (Gowan, 1995,1996; see Chapter 7 for the case of Slovakia). The space- 
economic implications of these strategies match with the patterns described so far. 
One dimension of these strategies is reflected in differentiated access to financial 
incentives. Simply put, the economically most advanced CEECs have been receiving 
more funding than their poorer East European neighbours (see Sokol, 2000,2003 for a 
discussion on EU PHARE funding; and Smith, 2002, p. 655-656 for the case of EBRD 
financing). Another dimension of the same pattern is related to what could be termed 
the `geo-politics of memberships'. For instance, it is impossible to overlook the fact 
that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the three countries with the highest 
FDI stock, have been accepted as the first East European NATO members, making 
them even safer places for investment and reinforcing their economic as well as 
political rating. Another important contributing factor to this privileged position was 
that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (together with the two smallest 
candidate countries, Slovenia and Estonia) have been officially named as favoured 
candidates for the EU membership16. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland also 
secured OECD membership (recently joined by Slovakia). Importantly, the 
membership of these powerful and prestigious international organizations can also be 
seen as a reward for their support and commitment to Western neo-liberalism, as 
much as being an example for others to follow. 
Vicious circle? 
Many other `transition' countries would like to follow the same path. However, they 
often seem to be caught between the imperatives of the world economy and their own 
historical legacies. For them, the kind of model scenario promised a decade ago 
16 More recently, the EU seems to be more inclined to go ahead with the `big bang' enlargement 
involving all candidate countries, except Rumania and Bulgaria. If such an enlargement goes ahead in 
2004 as planned, it will dramatically widen the geo-political gap between super-periphery A and super- 
periphery B, while enhancing division lines within super-periphery A. 
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(Figure 4.1) never materialized. Instead, they face increasingly complicated political, 
economic and social situations, as the `transition to capitalism' unleashed unexpected 
processes that they are unable to cope with. Economic hardship, political instability, 
social polarization, ethnic and religious fragmentation, growing regional disparities, to 
mention just a few, seem to interlock with each other in the web of a `vicious circle' 
scenario (Figure 4.3, Appendix; cf. Chapter 3). 
A `vicious circle' scenario shows that, contrary to neo-liberal expectations, political 
and economic transformations do not necessarily support each other (cf. Eser, 2000). 
Instead, they can undermine each other and cause serious deadlock of `transition'. 
Within the `vicious circle' scenario, the way back to state-socialism is impossible, 
while prosperous liberal-capitalism seems to be beyond reach. Varied outcomes of 
`transition' (see Pickles and Smith, 1998) thus can include `bandit capitalism' 
(Handelman, 1998) or some sort of `hybrid capitalism' (Csaba, 1995; Altvater, 1998), 
perhaps with neither capitalists (Eyal et al., 1998) nor capital (Poliert, 1999a). 
Ironically, troubled countries and regions, as we have seen, are often abandoned by 
private investors, bankers and international institutions. They are often left to 
themselves in their struggle to overcome their structural legacies - this in a context of 
increasing global competition and mounting debts. The prospects for these regions 
and countries seem increasingly grim and their participation in the European or indeed 
global division of labour seem to be, at best, limited to low-wage, low-value 
production. Such a picture raises serious questions over the ability of `least-favoured 
regions' or even whole countries in Central and Eastern Europe, to `choose' their 
economic trajectories and to embrace a `higher road' of development. These questions 
will now be considered in the concluding section. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this Chapter was to explore the regional dimensions of post-socialist 
transformations in the `New Europe'. The Chapter started by discussing a hypothesis 
of the collapse of state-socialism. In particular it examined the claims of heterodox 
economists and social scientists that the fall of state-socialism has to be seen in the 
context of the rise of the `knowledge economy'. The strongest statement on the topic 
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has been offered by Castells (1996,1998) who conceptualised the demise of the 
Soviet Union as the inability of `industrial statism' to adapt to `informational modes 
of development'. Such a proposition has been critically evaluated and an alternative 
hypothesis has been suggested. This sees the failure of state-socialist regimes in the 
light of confrontation between two socio-economic systems, their differentiated 
economic levels and ability to induce a `virtuous circle' between knowledge, power 
and wealth. 
Subsequently, the Chapter then focused on the discussion of dominant policy 
discourse in post-socialist Europe. Fuelled by the neo-liberal approach, the dominant 
stratagem invariably advocated the dissociation of the state and economy, and the 
introduction of unfettered market forces as a vehicle for the rejuvenation of post- 
socialist economies. However, the Chapter has argued that a decade after neo-liberal 
`transition' was introduced in Central and Eastern Europe, the catch-up with Western 
Europe has not materialized. Instead, Eastern Europe has emerged as a `super- 
periphery' of the continent17. This super-periphery itself is marked by profound 
fragmentation of the economic landscape, the dynamics of which have not been 
adequately understood by the neo-liberal approach. 
The Chapter then progressed to an alternative account of uneven development in post- 
socialist Eastern Europe. Building on the strengths of radical and institutionalist 
theoretical streams, the discussion focused on the role of different historical politico- 
economic legacies and their interaction with the current imperatives of the 
international political economy. This interaction provides a framework for 
understanding divergent transformational trajectories, characterised by two significant 
processes at work. On the one hand, the wealth gap between the West and the East has 
grown, due to the state-socialist legacies of Central and Eastern Europe, emerging as 
the super-periphery of the `New Europe'. On the other hand, there has been growing 
divergence within the super-periphery itself, echoing old pre-socialist legacies. Many 
countries and regions (especially those in super-periphery B) seem to be trapped in a 
`vicious circle' scenario and emerge as the `least-favoured' areas in Europe. 
17 As a corollary to this process, there was an erosion of the knowledge-base on which the long-term 
economic growth of former state-socialist countries could have been built (Myant, 1999a; see also 
Chapter 7 of the thesis). 
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Meanwhile, a group of countries within super-periphery A has shown better ability to 
engage with today's European and global economy, as they are on a return journey to 
capitalism. However, even for these most advanced CEECs, the reintegration with the 
world and (Western) European economy has been a painful process (see Chapter 7 for 
the case of Slovakia). Indeed, the reintegration is taking place in the context of 
accelerated technological change and intensified competition within the international 
political economy. Therefore, a simple introduction of market rules is probably 
insufficient to ensure economic success. 
Indeed, former state-socialist economies are increasingly integrated with the European 
and global political economy, through complex networks of commodity production 
(Smith et al., 2002). Importantly, however, this `integration' is accompanied by 
uneven patterns of value production, distribution and appropriation within the socio- 
economic system and between territories. In other words, regions and countries are 
being subjected to global and European `divisions of labour' and accompanying 
`value chains/networks'. Echoing arguments developed earlier in this thesis, these 
`socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial flows of value' may be seen as 
emerging from social struggles within and between capital, labour and the state. In 
addition, an important role in these struggles seems to be performed by international 
organisations in the context of an increasingly profit-driven economy (cf. Chapters 2 
and 3). 
The fate of `less-favoured' and `least-favoured' regions in such a context is a matter 
of concern. What the discussion in this Chapter has shown is that caught between the 
imperatives of global capitalism, together with their own state-socialist and pre- 
socialist legacies, countries and regions in `transition' seem to have limited room for 
manoeuvre. Their ability to `choose' their prosperity and to emulate the `high road' of 
development seems to be highly circumscribed. The suggestion that these regions 
have the power to change their own position on the European map of inequality needs 
to be critically scrutinised. Action at the regional level is no doubt possible, but it has 
to be seen in the context of the wider political economy and underlying social 
struggles. Consequently, such action is both historically and locationally contingent 
(cf. Massey, 1995) and its concrete shape and outcomes can only be explored through 
a set of empirical analyses of `real' regions. Part II of the thesis thus moves into 
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empirical territory and offers a detailed study of two regional states, one in the 
periphery of Western Europe (Scotland - Chapter 6) and the other in the Eastern 
super-periphery (Slovakia - Chapter 7). The presentation of the two case studies will 
be preceded by a description of an analytical framework and methodology in Chapter 
5, to which we now turn. 
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PART II 
Chapter 5: 
Analytical framework and 
methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
Part I of this thesis focused on the conceptual issues. Initially, Chapter 2 provided a 
critical discussion of the concepts associated with the `post-industrial' transformations 
and the rise of the `knowledge economy'. Chapter 3 then examined the literature 
dealing with the regional dimension of the `knowledge economy' or `learning 
economy'. In particular, the Chapter focused on the `learning region' paradigm in the 
context of advanced capitalist countries. Chapter 4 then shifted attention to the 
regional processes in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe and to the uneven 
economic geography of the `New Europe'. Critical examination pointed at a limited 
value of the `knowledge economy' and `learning region' concepts in accounting for 
patterns of current socio-economic change and their regional dimensions. In 
particular, the claims that regions themselves can choose their prosperity and their 
development trajectories were questioned. The disintegration of the `knowledge 
economy' and `learning region' paradigms and the inability of the neo-liberal 
approach to account for recent divergent regional trajectories, opened room for an 
alternative conceptualisation of regional development in the `New Europe'. Part I 
attempted to provide elements of a possible alternative framework, pointing at the 
significant constraints regions are facing in constructing sustainable development 
trajectories vis-ä-vis historical legacies and the constraints of the wider political 
economy. 
The aim of Part II of this thesis is to examine the above conceptual issues in the light 
of empirical evidence. Two regions (regional states) of the `New Europe' have been 
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selected for such empirical study. One is located in the periphery of Western Europe 
(Scotland), the other is in the Eastern `super-periphery' (Slovakia; cf. Figure 1.1 in 
Appendix). Both regions appear to be valuable cases for such research. Indeed, both 
seem to have undergone significant transformation from an industrial to a `post- 
industrial' economy. Both seem to have attempted to build institutions akin to those 
advocated by the `new regionalist' literature. Both are keen to emerge as competitive 
economies within the `global knowledge economy'. Scotland represents a case in 
which the `knowledge economy' and `learning' or `smart region' was placed at the 
forefront of the economic strategy and economic development institutions of Scotland 
have been actively involved in the implementation of such strategy. Slovakia, 
emerging from post-socialist transformations, is characterised by a less clear 
stratagem, but nevertheless displays attempts to move in that direction and to build its 
institutions accordingly. From this point of view, both Scotland and Slovakia exhibit 
features that resonate with those highlighted by the `learning region' literature (see 
below). Both Scotland and Slovakia, however, also seem to face considerable 
challenges in constructing their economic trajectories. The consideration of these 
challenges raises fundamental questions about their respective ability to `choose' 
prosperity and promote a `high road' of development. The way Scotland and Slovakia 
are coping with this task represents an underlying theme of the empirical part of the 
thesis. 
Part II is structured as follows. The present Chapter 5 will first briefly recapture the 
theoretical arguments from Part I, highlight research questions and attempt to outline 
a single analytical framework through which the two case studies can be approached 
(section 5.2). The second part of the Chapter will then provide a justification for the 
selection of the two regional cases, followed by a more detailed description of the 
research methods employed (section 5.3). Chapter 6 will then present empirical 
evidence from Scotland and its attempts to build a `knowledge economy'. The case of 
Slovakia will be presented in Chapter 7, highlighting the problematic nature of post- 
socialist transformations and simultaneous efforts to lay foundations for competitive 
development strategies. The two case studies are structured in a way that allows for a 
comparison to be undertaken. This will be provided in Part III of the thesis within a 
concluding Chapter 8. 
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5.2 Analytical framework 
The aim of this section is to outline an analytical framework through which the two 
case studies can be approached. The section will thus first briefly recapture the 
theoretical arguments reviewed in Chapters 2,3 and 4, alongside their critique. 
Subsequently, the research questions will be highlighted, followed by an outline of the 
analytical structure for the empirical research. 
This thesis has engaged with several key arguments that seem to pervade the literature 
in contemporary economic geography. First, there is the widely shared argument that 
economically advanced countries have been entering a new phase of development 
described as `post-industrial society', `information society', `knowledge economy' or 
`learning economy'. The emergence of such a `new era' has been associated with 
hopes that the contradictions of industrial capitalism will be overcome, to give way to 
more harmonious patterns of development, both socially and spatially (cf. Chapter 2). 
As a corollary to these claims, concepts dealing with the regional dimensions of such 
a `new era' have emerged (cf. Chapter 3). These concepts have emphasised the key 
role of knowledge, learning and innovation in regional economic processes and 
highlighted the positive contribution of regional institutions in fostering these, 
allegedly the most important, factors of success. Importantly, this `new regionalist' 
literature has supported arguments that less favoured regions can reach a `high road' 
of development by becoming `learning regions'. Such a process, it has been claimed, 
can be greatly assisted by appropriate institutional structures. In particular, the role of 
regional development agencies has been highlighted as providing the function of an 
animateur for the economic renewal of such regions. The underlying theme within 
such a conceptualisation is the belief that regions in fact can `choose' their prosperity 
by emulating successful economic trajectories (cf. Chapter 3). These claims had 
massive policy influence and `less favoured' regions in the West, as well as `least 
favoured' regions in the East of the `New Europe', have been advised to follow 
`learning region' or `learning economy' strategies. 
However, the critique undertaken in Part I of the thesis has pointed to the fundamental 
weaknesses of the above approaches. The claim that advanced capitalist economies 
are becoming `knowledge economies' seems unsubstantiated (cf. Chapter 2). 
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Similarly, the hypothesis that state-socialist regimes collapsed due to their inability to 
embrace the `knowledge economy' is doubtful (cf. Chapter 4). Meanwhile the 
theorisation at the regional level related to the allegedly emerging `knowledge 
economy' seem to be misconceived. The concept of the `learning region' is not 
properly defined, and neither are the building blocks from which it is constructed. It 
appears that the conceptualisation offered by `new regionalist' literature is in many 
respects flawed and lacks the backing of cogent empirical evidence. In addition, the 
`learning region' paradigm seems to deliver rather confusing messages for less 
favoured regions and their prospects in the contemporary political economy (cf. 
Chapter 3). 
Following the critique, Part I of the thesis attempted to provide the elements on which 
an alternative conceptualisation of regional development in the `New Europe' could 
be built. It has been argued that such an alternative would start by acknowledging that 
the economy is an institutionalised social process and that institutions are at the same 
time objects, subjects and outcomes of social struggles over power, knowledge and 
wealth. The thesis has supported the view that far from being knowledge-driven, the 
contemporary economy is distinctively capitalist and profit-driven. Consequently, 
knowledge should be seen in the light of profit imperatives and through the prism of a 
complex matrix of a mutual relationship between knowledge, power and wealth. 
At the regional level of the analysis, it has been suggested that regions cannot be 
taken for granted as objects of analysis. Instead, regions themselves could be seen as 
institutions - i. e. as objects, subjects and outcomes of particular social struggles 
(economic, political, cultural) at a specific spatial scale. It follows then that regional 
institutions (e. g. institutions of the regional state) can provide a platform for active 
participation in the economic development processes. However, their actions need to 
be seen in the context of the wider political economy as well as historical legacies (cf. 
Chapters 3 and 4). In particular, the processes of circular and cumulative causation, as 
applied at the regional level, point to the spatially disequilibrating dynamics of the 
interaction between knowledge, wealth and power. Thus regions could be better 
described as participating in wider `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio- 
spatial value chains/networks' that underpin the uneven distribution of the commodity 
production process within the wider (global/European) political economy and 
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accompanying uneven flows of value. It is through such a prism that diverging 
regional trajectories in the `New Europe' could be conceptualised and understood. 
Such an alternative conceptualisation, however, raises several fundamental issues that 
require empirical examination. These issues then translate into research questions that 
the case studies in this thesis will attempt to address. They may be distilled as follows. 
The underlying issue is to what extent regional prosperity can be seen as a `matter of 
choice'. The subsequent question arises as to how important the role of regional 
institutions is in securing such prosperity. More specifically, the question can be 
asked whether specialised regional development agencies can function as animateurs 
for promoting the transformation of regional economies and whether they can provide 
a springboard for less favoured regions to reach the `high road' of development. 
Beyond these fundamental questions related directly to regional institutional set-ups, 
one should ask what other factors play a role in the economic performance of regions. 
As argued previously, historical legacies and the wider political economy impinge 
upon, and can provide powerful constraints for, regional development trajectories. 
Empirical research thus should try to evaluate the respective weight of such factors in 
determining regional fortunes. Finally, there is a need to validate empirically to what 
extent regional fortunes are shared within regions, and to what extent these are 
marked by intra-regional social and spatial divides. 
These research questions will be examined in the context of the two selected regional 
cases (see below), structuring the analytical framework around the following points. 
First, it is vital that each of the cases is placed in a long-term historical perspective. 
Such a perspective should depict significant historical legacies, both `sot' 
institutional and cultural legacies, and `hard' legacies of economic-political structures. 
These historical legacies then provide important elements for an understanding of the 
region's integration with the current wider political economy. The wider political 
economy itself then constitutes the second point that needs to be reflected in the 
analysis. In particular, it should point at the ways the regional economy is being 
integrated into wider `divisions of labour' and `value chains/networks'. In turn, such 
analysis helps to provide a framework for the understanding of the current economic 
performance of a given region. The economic performance represents a third focal 
point for the analysis. Fourth, institutional contexts are to be explored in each of the 
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cases, providing us with much needed insights into the role of regional institutions in 
affecting a region's integration with the wider political economy and its economic 
performance. Fifth, a specific focus is required in the empirical examination of the 
role of specialised regional development agencies considered as animateurs for 
regional renewal. Finally, analysis needs to provide insights into intra-regional 
dimensions of socio-economic change in an attempt to elucidate the extent to which 
regional prosperity is shared (or not shared) within a given region. The above 
analytical framework has been used when examining the two case studies and is 
reflected in the structure of Chapters 6 (Scotland) and 7 (Slovakia) respectively. The 
justification of the choice of these two cases is provided below and will be followed 
by a description of the research methods used. 
5.3 Methodology 
Choice of case studies: justification 
As already indicated in the introductory section of this Chapter, Scotland and Slovakia 
were considered suitable cases for the empirical examination of the issues highlighted 
above. Indeed, each of the two regions offers valuable material for empirically 
validating the ability of regions to construct their development, trajectories in the 
`New Europe'. In addition, however, Scotland and Slovakia also offered an excellent 
opportunity for a comparison. Indeed, as shown below, broad similarities can be 
found in terms of their economically peripheral position, population size, emerging 
institutions, economic structure and development strategies, providing a good basis 
for a comparative study. These broad similarities will now be briefly outlined, while 
various fundamental differences will be indicated at the same timer. 
In terms of economic structure, both region-states had in the past a robust industrial 
base. Although occurring within different socio-economic contexts, both Scotland and 
Slovakia, also share experience of the process of industrial restructuring, de- 
industrialisation and the growing relative importance of services in their respective 
economies. Their transformation experiences could thus be related to claims about the 
1 For a detailed comparison see Chapter 8 of the thesis. 
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alleged rise of the `post-industrial', `service' or `knowledge economy' and its regional 
dimensions (cf. Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis). Importantly, both Scotland and 
Slovakia also represent cases of `less favoured' regions within the European space- 
economy. As revealed in subsequent Chapters, their relative economic positions differ 
considerably; however, both could be seen as economically peripheral regional 
economies of the `New Europe'. Scotland occupies a somewhat privileged position 
within the periphery of Western Europe, while Slovakia is one of the most advanced 
economies of the Eastern `super-periphery', attempting to build market capitalism and 
to join the EU. 
Similar population sizes make the two cases easily comparable, with Scotland's 
population at 5.1 million and Slovakia's at 5.4 million. Interestingly, both cases fall 
within the population limit of 5 to 15 million, thus fitting into the category of region- 
states, promoted by Florida (1995a) as basic organisational units of the `global 
knowledge capitalism' (see Chapter 3). In addition, both region-states have rich 
institutional structures and do not seem to lack the `institutional thickness' (cf. 
Amin and Thrift, 1994b) regarded as essential for the functioning of `learning regions' 
(Morgan, 1997). Indeed, both cases may be assumed to be endowed with a significant 
amount of `social capital' and discernible `identity', given that they both in fact 
represent nations. Another interesting similarity between Scotland and Slovakia is the 
fact that they both spent a significant part of their history as `stateless nations', being 
integrated as `regions' into wider nation-states. However, both Scotland and Slovakia 
have also shown a strong tendency for reconstructing their institutions as part of the 
wider process of `nation-building'. Indeed, more recently, Scotland emerged as a 
region-state following devolution in the United Kingdom, thus recreating, to a limited 
extent, its autonomy and institutions of governance. Similarly, Slovakia, after building 
its governing structures in late 1960s, emerged as an independent nation after the 
defederation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1993. Thus both Scotland and Slovakia have 
democratically accountable governance structures that have been highlighted as 
important elements of the economic and democratic regional regeneration agenda (cf. 
Chapter 3). 
Furthermore, what makes Scotland and Slovakia particularly relevant to the themes 
central to this thesis are their respective attempts to build regional `knowledge 
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economies' and to create relevant institutions that would support them. Indeed, both 
Scotland and Slovakia have attempted (with varying success) to construct institutional 
structures, such as development agencies, that would promote a regional economic 
transformation towards more knowledge-intensive forms of production. Scottish 
Enterprise, Scotland's main economic development agency, has been actively 
involved in the implementation of such a goal. In Slovakia, the picture is more 
complicated, but there have also been attempts to initiate such a process. In both 
Scotland and Slovakia, these existing and/or emerging development bodies are akin to 
animateurs promoted by `learning region' theorists as essential for regional renewal 
(cf. Chapter 3). Besides, both regions seem to be involved in creating institutional 
capacities whose role is specifically to `look forwards' (cf. Storper and Scott, 1995; 
Hudson et al., 1997). Thus, both Scotland and Slovakia seem to display efforts to 
`learn' and `adapt' and to promote their respective competitiveness within the global 
political economy and integrating European economic space. In Scotland, the aims of 
`learning' and `adapting' in the `global knowledge economy' are explicitly expressed 
through stratagems such as `smart Scotland' and manifested through the support of 
the `Silicon Glen' (see Chapter 6). In Slovakia, similar policy initiatives have been 
initiated, most notably expressed through an attempt to lay the foundations for the 
Central European `Silicon Valley' (see Chapter 7). In light of the above, the choice of 
the two regional case studies can easily be justified. The way research was carried out 
in Scotland and Slovakia will be now described in more detail. 
Research methodology 
The analytical framework described in the previous section has been applied to both 
Scottish and Slovak case studies. The research methods used were thus similar in both 
cases and included extensive desk research and substantial interviewing based on 
semi-structured interviews. In addition, in the Slovak case, information gathered 
through participant observation has been used in the thesis2, while in the Scottish case 
two study visits were undertaken 
3. Only marginal differences appeared in the research 
strategy in Scotland and Slovakia, largely reflecting the different realities of the two 
2 Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic (1994) and the Office for the Strategy of 
Development of Society, Science and Technology of the Slovak Republic (1995-1998). 
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regional cases and conditions under which the research was carried out (see below). 
Overall a balance between primary and secondary sources has been sought. 
In line with the main objectives of the research, the effort focused on regional 
institutions and empirical validation of the claims related to their role in promoting 
economic development. Of prime interest were `formal' institutions, mainly regional 
development agencies or animatcurs claimed to be central to the regional renewal of 
less favoured regions (cf. Chapter 3). However, there was a conscious attempt to 
situate `development agencies' in wider institutional contexts. Thus the first phase of 
research included the `mapping' of the institutional environment in both Scotland and 
Slovakia, aiming not only at the identification of an animatcur but also of other major 
institutional players. The process involved both web-based search and interviews with 
key informants, judged to be more important in the case of Scotland, where my initial 
knowledge of the region was limited. In the Slovak case, familiarity with the 
institutional environment was much higher and the initial mapping and identification 
of institutions was much easier given my previous work in the Slovak central 
administration. The identification process in Slovakia, nevertheless, proved to be 
challenging given the continuous institutional changes that were occurring throughout 
the research pcriod4. 
On the basis of the 'mapping' exercise, a list of institutions and potential informants 
was compiled for each case study, comprising regional development agencies and 
their various branchcs/forms, government organisations, business leaders, trade 
unions, think-tanks and academics. A subsequent phase of research then included the 
extensive interviewing of representatives in the listed institutionss. In total, more than 
90 interviews were undertaken in Slovakia, Scotland and England during the period 
1999-2001 (sec a List of lntcn'lcwws in Appendix). Most interviews were undertaken 
in the form of semi-structured interviews, following a general format (sec 
Questionnaire in Appendix), while allowing for minor adaptations reflecting the type 
s NEC semiconductor facility near Livingston in Central Scotland and CADENCE software centre in 
Alba Campus, Livingston (both in April 2000). 
4 In comparison, the Scottish institutional cnvironment proved to be more stable. I lowever, it should be 
noted that some significant institutional dcvclopmcnu have been initiated in Scotland during and after 
the interview period that could not be fully reflected in the case study. 5 In Scotland, in addition, two journalists were interviewed. 
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of institution and with respect to the position of the interviewees (area of competency, 
level of seniority, time available for interview, etc. ). 
The interviewing phase was organised as follows. Initially, a pilot study was 
undertaken in the North-East of England between January and March 2000, providing 
useful insights into challenges facing less-favoured regions in the UK context. It also 
proved useful practice in testing and developing interviewing techniques. In Scotland 
several initial interviews were undertaken in late February followed by a substantial 
interviewing period between late March to June 2000. In Slovakia the first set of 
interviews was undertaken in December 1999 and January 2000, followed by an 
intensive interviewing period in July 2000, revisited in January 2001 and completed in 
July 2001. This allowed for the re-interviewing of several key informants in an 
attempt to maintain pace with the rapidly changing institutional landscape in the 
country. 
Despite applying similar methods in both the Scottish and Slovak case studies, slight 
differences between interviewing in Scotland and Slovakia should be acknowledged. 
Indeed, in Slovakia, I was usually considered an 'insider', being a former civil servant 
myself and having substantial formal and tacit knowledge of the country. Partly 
thanks to this, and partly due to the way the Slovak administration works, it was 
usually rather easy to set-up interviews with Slovak officials, often at very short 
notice. Interviews in Slovakia were also less formal and I was able to gain access to a 
considerable amount of information, some of which was of a sensitive nature6. 
Interviews were not tape-recorded. In comparison, most Scottish interviews were 
much more formal, interviewees agreed to be tape-recorded, but interviews usually 
took more time to organise (with longer notice). Overall, however, the response in 
both case studies from the interviewees was very positive and most interviews 
provided much valued empirical material for the thesis. 
Information gathered through these interviews was complemented by various other 
sources. Wherever possible, formal presentations, public lectures, seminars and 
Reflecting this, in the ttujority of cases. the idcntity of the source will remain undisclosed in the text 
and instead referred to as 'interview with a Slovak official'. wherever possible, the informant's 
organization is identified. 
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conferences by important policy-makers or academics were attended. In addition, 
continuous press monitoring of Scotland and Slovakia was undertaken and, wherever 
possible, Internet sources were exploited. It is believed that regardless of the usual 
limitations of research of this kind (cf. Massey and Nieegan, 1985; see also discussion 
in Chapter 3 of the thesis) the information gathered through the study provides 
valuable empirical material which seems to corroborate the theoretical arguments 
developed in Part I of the thesis. This empirical material will now be presented in 
Chapters 6 (Scotland) and 7 (Slovakia). 
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Chapter 6: 
Case study: Scotland 
'So the challenge for the new Scotland is to create a virtuous circle for 
business development and economic success by linking education, innovation 
and enterprise. ' 
Gordon Brown, Chancellor the Exchequer 
(G. Brown, 1999, p. ix) 
6.1 Introduction 
Scotland is the first of the two regional case studies examined in this thesis. It 
represents a less favoured region at the economic and geographical periphery of 
'Western' Europe. Having an economy dominated by coal mining, steel production 
and a shipbuilding industry, it was once a part of the British 'workshop of the world'. 
Throughout the 20" century, however, Scotland experienced the erosion of its 
traditional industrial base. This erosion dramatically accelerated in the late 1970s and 
1980s through the process of dc-industrialisation, which left Scotland in economic 
decline associated with high unemployment. For such a region, it would not be 
surprising if the arrival of the 'post-industrial' or 'knowledge-intensive' economy 
were accompanied by heightened expectations of regional economic reinvigoration. 
Importantly, since the late 1980s, the economic situation has indeed been improving 
to the extent that by the late 1990s Scotland could be seen as one of the best 
performing regions in the EU periphery. In part, Scotland seems to have achieved this 
by attracting a large share of foreign direct investment (FDI) within the UK and 
indeed the EU, especially in 'new economy' sectors such as electronics. The 
emergence of the 'Silicon Glen' phenomenon, representing 'one of the largest 
concentrations of high-technology industry outside the USA' (Devine, 1999, p. 596), 
is seen by some as a sign of a transition from industrial to 'post-industrial' or 
'knowledge economy' and such a transition is indeed regarded by Scottish policy 
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makers as highly desirable. Believed to be the best method of achieving prosperity for 
Scottish people, the transformation to the competitive `knowledge economy' has 
recently been explicitly defined by the Scottish administration as the ultimate strategic 
economic goal for Scotland. Meanwhile, Scottish Enterprise, the main economic 
development agency in (Lowland) Scotland, has been actively promoting such 
transformation, not least through its cluster-based programmes, very much akin to 
those promoted by the `new regionalist' literature (cf. Chapter 3). Taken together, the 
above developments prompted speculations that Scotland could in fact be seen as a 
`learning region' (cf. MacLeod, 1996,2000) able to negotiate its economic trajectory 
within the emerging `reflexive capitalism' (cf. Chapter 3). 
This Chapter aims to examine such claims in the light of research questions 
formulated within the analytical framework as defined in the previous Chapter 5. The 
fundamental question to be addressed is whether Scotland can be seen as a region that 
can `choose' its regional prosperity. In particular, attention will be focused on the 
issues related to Scottish institutions and their role in securing economic fortune for 
Scotland. More specifically, the role of Scottish Enterprise in promoting 'high road' 
development will be scrutinised. In addition, the significance of other factors 
determining the economic trajectories of Scotland need to be examined, in particular 
the historical legacies and the wider political economy. Finally, the question to what 
extent regional prosperity is shared within Scotland requires attention. In order to 
examine these questions, the Chapter is organised as follows. 
Initially, section 6.2 will put Scotland into a longterm historical perspective. The 
section will emphasise the point that the region and its economy should be understood 
in the light of long-term social struggles. Sccn from the Scottish perspective, some of 
these struggles were won, some lost. The significant, if contradictory, part of these 
struggles was the integration of Scotland into Britain three centuries ago. The section 
will argue that the Scottish economy (and Scotland more generally) both benefited 
and suffered as a result of these historical developments, which highlights the fact that 
historical legacies arc significant for our understanding of its economic and political 
trajectories. Indeed, historical legacies (both structural economic and 'soft' 
institutional) determine to a large degree the current position of Scotland within the 
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wider political economy. The role of the political economy in determining Scottish 
economic fortunes will then be examined in section 6.3 . The section will analyse 
Scotland's engagement with the UK state, Europe and the wider international political 
economy, pointing at both `positive' (incentives) and `negative' (constraints) aspects 
of such engagement. These aspects will then be found to be reflected in recent 
economic performance that will be reviewed in section 6.4. 
The section will also argue that as a result of the eroding position within 'socio-spatial 
divisions of labour' and 'socio-spatial flows of value', Scotland was transformed from 
being one of the 'hubs' of the world economy into a peripheral economy, increasingly 
dependent on the investment decisions of current global players. However, following 
devastating de-industrialisation in the late 1970s and 1980s, Scotland has seen signs 
of recovery with a relatively strong economic performance and historically low levels 
of unemployment. The factors behind this change will then be discussed. Particular 
attention will be given to Scottish institutions in an attempt to assess their impact 
(sections 6.5 and 6.6). It will be argued that although the power of Scotland's 
institutions is constrained by the wider political economy (cf section 6.3), their 
influence on Scottish economic fortunes is not negligible. In particular, it could be 
argued that these institutions played an important role in securing a rather privileged 
fiscal position within the UK state. One of the areas where both the availability of 
resources and a strong institutional capacity is manifest may be seen in the example of 
Scottish Enterprise. Section 6.6 will be specifically devoted to this economic 
development agency, its strategy and its implementation efforts. The case of the 'Alba 
Centre' will be highlighted as a rather impressive example of Scottish Enterprise's 
engagement with the strategic objective of turning Scotland into a 'knowledge 
economy'. However, the above policy effort will subsequently be placed into the 
context of growing social and spatial inequalities within Scotland (section 6.7). 
Section 6.8 will summarise findings and formulate conclusions. 
6.2 Historical legacies 
As suggcstcd in carlicr Chapters of this thesis, history dots matter in regional 
devclopmcnt, and this is clearly sccn in the ca sc of Scotland. The section aims to 
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capture the most important economic, political and cultural factors that played a 
crucial role in Scottish history and that continue to have an important bearing on 
current Scottish economic development trajectories. In doing so it will also point at 
the close interlocking of political, economic and cultural processes (cf. Chapter 2) and 
the importance of the wider political economy dimensions in affecting regional 
trajectories (cf. Chapter 3). Putting historical accidents and contingencies aside, 
Scottish historic trajectories may be seen as a story of political, economic and cultural 
struggles, some of which were won, some lost and some remain unresolved. 
he search for historical legacies has to go back to the 17th and the beginning of the 
18'x' century when Scotland, then an independent kingdom, failed to establish itself as 
a colonial power. Eventually (and reluctantly) it had to accept the offer of a 'marriage 
of convenience' from its 'auld enemy' and stronger neighbour, England (Devine, 
1999). From then on, the fate of Scotland was inextricably linked to that of England. 
Indeed, the Act of Union (1707) that united the two parliaments had far-reaching 
political, economic and cultural consequences for Scotland. Politically, Scotland lost 
its independence and sovereignty as the Parliament in Edinburgh was dissolved in 
return for Scottish participation in the Westminster Parliament, which from then on 
would determine the fate of the new country: Great Britain. Importantly, however, 
Scotland retained limited (but long-lasting) autonomy over its legal system, church 
and education (Paterson, 1994; Devine, 1999; Bogdanor, 1999). These institutions 
continued to play a significant role in terms of cultural legacies. Indeed, despite 
attempts to forge 'I3ritishncss' these institutions helped to maintain the Scottish 
national identity (D. McCrone, 1992) and were part of a base around which the 
autonomy of modern Scotland has been constructed (Paterson, 1994). It is the 
economic aspect of the Act of Union, though, which had crucial implications for 
Scotland. Importantly, Scotland gained free access to the markets of England, the 
richest emerging industrial nation. and its growing colonial holdings (Bogdanor, 1999, 
p. 9; Devine, 1999). This proved critical for Scotland's own industrialisation. Indeed, 
the first phase of the Industrial Revolution in Scotland (1750-1850; based on textiles) 
and the second phase (since 1830; iron, steel and shipbuilding) were both inextricably 
linked with export opportunities and the needs of a growing empire (Devine, 1999) 
and both dramatically transformed Scottish fortunes. 
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Scotland experienced an unprecedented rate of growth and emerged as an important 
part of the British `workshop of the world'. Within two centuries, from a small and 
economically peripheral nation, Scotland had become a `key player' in the global 
economy (Devine, 1999, p. 252). It managed to position itself as one of the `hubs' of 
the contemporary international division of labour and developed dominance in several 
key sectors including engineering (railway locomotives) and shipbuilding. The 
shipbuilding industry on the Clyde alone produced at its peak one-third of British 
output but almost a fifth of the world's tonnage (Devine, 1999, p. 250). 
The factors behind this tremendous economic success are usually attributed to the 
favourable geographical disposition of Lowland Scotland (unrivalled sea access to 
both Europe and Americas), the availability of capital and skills accumulated from 
previous rounds of accumulation (trade and merchants), the mobility and cost of 
labour and the favourable cntrcprcncurial atmosphere' that managed to capitalise on 
growing export market opportunities (Devine, 1999). These were complemented by 
important domestic technological innovations (famously, James Watt's steam power 
combined with spinning technology gave Scottish textile manufacturers an important 
competitive edge) but also by 'technology transfer' from England. Last but not least, 
the Scottish advance would have been impossible without critical natural endowments 
- large deposits of coal and ironstone in Lowland Scotland, which had the additional 
bonus of being close to ports, sources of labour in the towns and water transport 
(Devine, 1999, p. 113). This combination of factors ensured that by the end of the 19`h 
century Scotland had become an important industrial power, in some respects more 
industrialised than England. Its economy and society were transformed, and its 
population nearly doubled between 1851 and 1911, to reach af gurr close to 5 million 
(Lee, 1995, p. 24-26). At the centre of this population explosion were Glasgow and 
Edinburgh, which emerged as important European cities. 
However, not everything went in Scotland's favour. First, despite the enormous 
population growth, the size of the domestic Scottish market was, and remains today, 
1 Some would argue that Calvinist culture was a critical factor in this (cf. Whatley, 1997; but see 
Cumbers, 1999, fora critique). 
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relatively small, thus limiting the potential for endogenous growth (interview 
Ashcroft, 2000; interview Hassan, 2000). Indeed, Scottish economic development was 
heavily based on a pro-cxport industrial structure sensitive to external markets. The 
second point is that although the periods of economic growth slowed-down 
somewhat, the historical trend of emigration from Scotland did not halt. Scots 
(including those of commerce, finance, insurance, professional occupations and 
students) were leaving their homeland in large numbers, mostly attracted by better 
opportunities elsewhere (England, America, Australia, etc. ). With them, their skills, 
talents, knowledge and capital left too and subsequently nurtured countries that are 
today's Scottish competitors. It is unsurprising that this process was described as 
'drawing away the life-blood of the nation' (cited in Devine, 1999, p. 472). Third, 
despite unprecedented economic growth, Scotland was still lagging behind England, a 
feature that persists today, despite the subsequent relative decline of England as a 
superior industrial world power. Besides, the fruits of the relative economic success of 
Scotland did not spread to all members of society. The wages and standards of living 
of ordinary Scottish people remained lower than in England and urban poverty was 
widespread (Devine, 1999). The poor conditions of the working class of that time no 
doubt gave birth to the modem labour movement, which remains an important part of 
the Scottish polity even today (cf interview White, STUC, 2000). From the economic 
point of view, however, the overall problem was that Scottish 'success' was based on 
a particular labour-intensive, pro-export heavy industry structure. While this structure 
was a source of success through the 18`' and 19"' centuries, it was severely tested in 
the 20`h. 
Indeed the 20`'' century brought new dramatic shifts in Scottish fortunes. Changing 
markets and growing competition from other industrialised nations, combined with 
the progressive depletion of coal and iron ore, left Scotland with a declining industry 
and growing economic problems (Lee, 1995). Defence orders during the First and 
Second World Wars only compounded the fate of the Scottish industrial structure, 
which was based on a small number of large, heavy industry outlets whose fortunes 
were dependent on sensitive markets. Ader the Second World War and with the 
retreat of the British Empire, those markets were rapidly shrinking. Post-war 
reconstruction probably in part compensated for the losses and sheltered 
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(nationalised) Scottish industry from growing international competition (Lee, 1995; 
Devine, 1999). Indeed, Scotland took part in the prolonged post-war boom with a high 
rate of growth and low unemployment that accompanied the post-war compromise. 
Scotland benefited from the strong `welfare state' to which both Labour and Tory 
governments were committed and enjoyed a good proportion of state investment (cf. 
Dunford, 1995). Standards of living were quickly rising as areas like education, health 
and other public services experienced sustained financial injections (Devine, 1999; 
Payne, 1996; Lee, 1995). Overall, the period after the Second World War saw the 
reduction of social as well as regional differences in the UK (Dunford, 1995). 
However, important economic cracks in this rosy picture started to appear in the late 
1960s and had dramatic consequences for Scotland. 
Meanwhile, it is useful to note that, due in part to the bargaining skills of subsequent 
Scottish Secretaries of State, Scotland usually secured funding on top of generous 
welfare state allocations (Devine, 1999), while often using the potential threat of 
Scottish nationalism as a prc-text (ilogdanor, 1999; sec below). This threat, however, 
began to be realised in the late 1960s and 1970s when the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) advocated Scottish independence and showed its political muscle (13ogdanor, 
1999, p. 120.122,126). The SNP gained momentum when rich oil and gas deposits 
were founds off Scottish shores, making the idea of an independent Scotland seem 
like an economically viable option in the context of rocketing oil prices and the 
growing economic difficulties of the British state (cf. i3ogdanor, 1999, p. 125-126). To 
stave off the separatist threat, the Labour governments of the 1970s were forced to 
consider dcivlution, but the project was buried after an unsuccessful referendum in 
1979 amid both economic and political crises (Devine, 1999; Bogdanor, 1999; inter 
alia). 
The general election of 1979 was a watershed for Scotland's (and the UK's) future not 
only economically but also politically and culturally. In economic terms, the incoming 
Thatcher government introduced a 'free market revolution' which included 
widespread privatisation, the dc-regulation of capital, attacks on organised labour, 
pressure on labour flexibility. emphasis on supply-side and 'market failure' measures 
and the general withdrawal of the state from the economy. It may be argued that a dc- 
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regulated form of market economy and its accompanying pattern of economic 
restructuring largely favoured London and the South-East of England (Brown et al., 
1998, p. 76; sec also Tomaney, 2000a), while having disproportionately negative 
effects on British industrial regions, including Scotland (Keaney and Hutton, 2000). 
Indeed, in the subsequent de-industrialisation (Martin and Rowthorn, 1986), whole 
economic sectors were wiped-out leaving the backbone of the Scottish economy in 
ruins. Meanwhile public services came under threat as Thatcher sought to eradicate 
`dependency culture'. Ironically, this move made the Scots more than ever before 
directly dependent on the state as record sums of money had go to social security 
payments for the growing army of unemployed in the early 1980s (Devine, 1999). 
Since then, Scotland's economy has slowly recovered (see section 6.4); nevertheless, 
de-industrialisation represented a major economic trauma that also had important 
implications for Scottish cultural and political life. Politically, Thatcher's market 
fundamentalism and perceived disrespect for Scotland as a 'partner' provoked 
widespread Scottish opposition (interview Hassan, 2000). There was also a growing 
realisation of the 'democratic deficit' as people in Scotland, increasingly voting for 
labour, were subjected to a right-wing British government (sec Paterson, 1994). This 
brought a renewed appeal for detiolution and different parts of Scottish civil society 
started to coalesce around the issue (see section 6.5 ). Thatcher thus could be said to 
have played an important, if unintentional, role in Scottish nation building (cf. 
Devine, 1999). This set in motion processes which continue to have important 
implications for Scotland's political trajectory and prompted the 'comeback' of the 
Scottish nation (Nairn, 1981,2000). Indeed, after the eventual fall of the Conservative 
government and the victory of New labour in 1997, the window of opportunity for 
Scotland opened as labour adopted a policy of devolution, including the creation of 
the Scottish Parliament (13ogdanor, 1999). Scottish aspirations have thus been 
fulfilled, at least for the time being, within a wider process of constitutional reform 
initiated since 1997, providing Scotland with new institutional and political power 
(see below). It also created room for the cultural 'reconstitution' of the Scottish nation 
(Nairn, 2000, p. 13). 
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Economically, though, the process of dramatic de-industrialisation in the 1980s 
represented a final cut to the declining Scottish industrial pre-eminence. It signalled a 
decisive change in the position of Scotland's economy within the global division of 
labour and within the British and international political economy. This position within 
the wider political economy will be now explored in more detail in section 6.3 . 
6.3 The wider political economy 
The wider political economy is another important factor that, alongside historical 
legacies, has an important bearing on regional economic development. In line with the 
argument that has been developed in earlier Chapters, it may be argued that the wider 
political economy can represent both a challenge and an incentive for a given region. 
This section will try to disentangle the implications of the wider political economy for 
Scotland's economy. This is not an easy task, given that what is understood by the 
wider political economy entails the intermeshing of the institutions of capital, labour 
and state on various scales (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). In other words, Scotland is part of a 
multilevel and overlapping institutional landscape within which struggles over power, 
wealth and knowledge (cultural dominance) are being fought. Within this limited 
space only the most important of these wider political economy factors can be 
considered. These include the governing role of the state (the UK and EU in 
particular) and the power of capital and market forces within the broader national and 
international economy. These will now be examined in turn. 
Scotland and the UK 
First, it is important to establish Scotland's position within the context of the UK. As 
argued in the previous section, the 1707 Act of Union, after which Scotland became 
part of a much wider state, represents one of the most crucial 
historical legacies. 
Indeed, as argued in Chapter 3, the nation-state remains a significant factor in 
determining the fortune of regions. In the Scottish case, a closer look reveals just how 
much the fate of Scotland 
is interconnected with the British state as a whole. Indeed, 
despite the process of `administrative devolution' and eventual `political devolution' 
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(see more in section 6.5 ), the UK state continues to shape conditions for Scottish 
development. `Reserved matters' (i. e. areas of control retained by Westminster) 
include macro-economic management, social security, foreign affairs, defence, 
immigration and nationality, and business regulation (Bogdanor, 1999; Myles, 1999, 
p. 39). Under the headings of macro-economic management and business regulation, 
all principal economically relevant policy decisions are taken by the central UK 
authorities in London. Thus regulation and de-regulation, nationalisation and 
privatisation, industrial relations and the entire financial system are still within the 
remit of the UK state. Both fiscal (taxation and expenditure) and monetary policies 
(interest rates) are set at the UK national level and are beyond the formal influence of 
Scotland. These areas, however, continue to have crucial implications for Scottish 
fortunes (interview Campbell, 2000; interview Ashcroft, 2000). 
For instance, interest rates are set by the Bank of England with respect to the situation 
in the financial markets and the UK economy as a whole, although this may have 
uneven implications for regional development. Indeed, Scottish economists perceive 
UK macro-economic policy as being biased towards the South-East of England, 
where the bulk of the UK economy is concentrated (cf. interview Ashcroft, 2000). 
High interest rates, for instance, were thought to hurt the Scottish export-oriented 
manufacturing base (interview Hassan, 2000). A similar situation exists with fiscal 
policy. There are those who argue that the Scottish economy would be better off with 
taxation being more tailored (i. e. reduced) with regard to its competitors, such as 
Ireland (interview Ashcroft, 2000). Others believe that Scotland should be more 
proactive on the public expenditure side 
(Danson, and Gilmore, 2000; interview 
Paterson, 2000). None of this, however, can happen as the central UK government 
retains key powers 
in both areas. Devolution in 1999 changed little in this respect - 
the tax varying powers of the Scottish Parliament are very modest and their economic 
impact, if used at all, can be expected to be small (McCrone, 1999; Midwinter, 2000). 
Meanwhile, Scotland continues to be dependent on grants from the central UK 
government (Mair and McCould, 
1999; Midwinter, 2000; see more below). 
The power of the UK state is also clearly apparent in the case of oil and gas deposits 
off Scottish shores. Revenues 
from the North Sea shelf are collected directly by the 
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UK state and are usually not even included in Scottish GDP statistics (Peat and Boyle, 
1999a). This, of course, continues to provide a strong argument for Scottish fiscal 
autonomy, if not political independence, despite the declining oil revenues 
experienced in recent years (see Midwinter, 2000, for a discussion). Another area 
where Scotland seems to have no formal power is the allocation of the government 
R&D and defence expenditure. These are usually driven by `national' UK priorities, 
but, incidentally, they usually seem to be biased towards the more prosperous regions 
of the UK compounding their existing strengths in the `knowledge-intensive' sectors 
at the expense of more peripheral regions. It is important to notice, however, that 
Scotland does not always emerge from these policies as a loser, and indeed it does 
benefit from some of this `hidden form of regional subsidy' (see Gripaios, 2002, 
p. 688; cf. discussion in Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
More generally, the fortunes of the Scottish economy are strongly dependent on the 
fortunes of the UK economy as a whole (interview Hassan, 2000) and this is clearly 
visible when comparing the dynamics of GDP growth and unemployment (see section 
6.4 ; cf. Peat and Boyle, 1999b, p. 9). Besides, Scotland continues to be part of a broad 
`core-periphery' geometry, or `north-south' divide, that characterises the UK space- 
economy (Lewis and Townsend, 1989; Dunford, 1995; Mohan, 1999) underpinned, 
from the point of view of less favoured regions, by both capital-drain and brain-drain 
processes (cf. Chapter 3). To a 
limited extent, however, it could be argued that 
Scotland defies this economic gravity (see below). 
Indeed, it is important to notice that the position of Scotland within the UK does not 
automatically represent a 
disadvantage. In fact, on a number of fronts this position has 
proven beneficial to Scotland. 
Importantly, being part of the UK also means sharing 
positive aspects such as overall political stability, market potential and, more recently, 
the economic dynamism that characterised the 1990s (see section 6.4 ; cf. interview 
Hassan, 2000). The UK national regulatory framework could also be said to have had 
positive impacts on areas 
like FDI, of which Scotland attracted an important share. In 
part, FDI was aided 
by UK regional policy incentives such as Regional Selective 
Assistance (RSA), from which Scotland benefits (interview Triquart, LIS, 2000). In 
addition, the already mentioned ability of 
Scotland to attract an important share of UK 
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government expenditure represents an area where the Scottish engagement with the 
wider UK political economy could be seen as successful (see below). In fact, many 
observers would argue that Scotland enjoys somewhat preferential treatment within 
the UK at the expense of other regions (McLean, 2001a; Morgan, 2001; cf. 
Midwinter, 2002). 
Indeed, historically Scotland has, through institutions such as the Scottish Office 
(headed by a Secretary of State), managed to negotiate a favourable deal with the 
central government (see section 6.5 ). A key part of the `deal' is related to the size of 
UK government expenditure in Scotland. Much of this expenditure comes in the form 
of a grant determined by a `block and formula' system2 (Midwinter, 2000), which 
seems to put Scotland into a favourable fiscal position. For this reason, the size of the 
Scottish grant in general, and the `formula' side of it (known as the Barnett formula) 
in particular, continues to provide a subject for speculation and heated debate 
(McCrone, 1999; Bogdanor, 1999; McLean, 2001a; Morgan, 2001; Midwinter, 2000, 
2002; inter alia). Ironically, the controversial Barnett formula was introduced in the 
1970s to bring more transparency into the process and in the long run to reduce 
Scotland's spending advantage (Midwinter, 2000, p. 233; Mair and McCloud, 1999), 
however, it failed to do so (Mair and McCloud, 1999, p. 78; Bogdanor, 1999, p. 245- 
247). The Barnett formula is instead often considered as a key element of the Scottish 
funding advantage (cf. McLean, 2001 a). Currently, the Scottish per capita expenditure 
advantage remains about 20% above the UK average (Mair and McCloud, 1999; 
Midwinter, 2002) and this has been the position `for a great many years' (McCrone, 
1999, p. 117). Few observers disagree that Scotland, in part due to its particular 
geography and needs, 
deserves preferential treatment (McCrone, 1999, p. 118-119). 
But neither opponents nor supporters of the current status quo are able to quantify 
these needs and associated costs (see Midwinter, 2002). Some call for a new fair 
`needs assessment' across the UK (McCrone, 1999), but such a review seems to be 
too sensitive an issue politically (interview Watson, 2000; interview Jones, 2000). 
Thus, the current funding arrangements could be interpreted as the continuing 
successful engagement of 
Scotland within the wider UK political economy, envied by 
2 Additional resources flow into Scotland via pensions, social security payments and agriculture 
programmes (see McCrone, 
1999). 
164 
many less favoured regions in the UK (Morgan, 2001; The Scotsman, 12/11/2001). 
Clearly, this favourable fiscal position needs to be recognised as an important factor 
in explaining Scottish economic performance (see below). In any case, there is the 
clear realisation that Scotland receives more resources from the UK than it contributes 
(oil revenues included) to its budget3 (McCrone, 1999; interview Ashcroft, 2000; 
interview Hassan, 2000). 
This positive engagement of Scotland with the UK also has a political dimension. 
Throughout history, since the 1707 `marriage of convenience' with England, 
Scotland, accounting for only about 10% of the UK population, enjoyed the position 
of being a `partner' within the British state. This translated into somewhat 
disproportionate political power, especially when compared to other UK regions. One 
of the visible manifestations of this power is what is often perceived as the over- 
representation of Scotland in the UK's House of Commons (see Bogdanor, 1999; 
Mitchell, 1999; inter alia). This paradox has become even more visible with the 
emergence of the autonomous Scottish Parliament, which arguably gives Scotland an 
additional power base (again, unrivalled by any other UK region). In fact, devolution 
itself can be seen as part of this successful `negotiation', perhaps aided by the threat 
of nationalism. Indeed, the possibility of Scottish succession is a matter of concern for 
British political elites (see Rifkind, 1998); devolution as a form of concession may be 
seen as a means of countering that threat 
(cf. Bogdanor, 1999). Some would argue that 
there is also a narrower, party-political dimension in the effort of barring Scottish 
separatism. It has been claimed that the Labour Party 
in particular is keen to keep 
Scotland in the UK because it could not afford to lose the support of Scottish (mostly 
Labour) seats in Westminster (see Paterson, 1994 for a discussion). Coincidentally, 
with the arrival of New Labour, Scotland also enjoyed the `largest group of Scottish 
MPs ever to sit in a British Cabinet' (Devine, 1999, p. 602), which importantly include 
Gordon Brown, the Chancellor the Exchequer. Therefore, one could argue that 
Scottish interests at the UK level are currently well provisioned. Commentators agree, 
for instance, that the current favourable financial arrangements for Scotland are 
unlikely to be touched under the present political circumstances 
(The Scotsman, 
16/7/2002). Indeed, Helen Liddell, the current Scotland Secretary, expressed her 
3 Scottish nationalists would probably dispute this point. 
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feelings rather well by asking, `Do you honestly believe a Scottish chancellor would 
be enthusiastic about changing the Barnett Formula? ' (cited in The Scotsman, 
16/7/2002, p. 1). 
Scotland and Europe 
Through its privileged position within the UK, Scotland also secured somewhat 
advantageous access to European policy-making. Even before devolution, the Scottish 
voice was heard through its 8 MEPs, dedicated organisations like Scotland Europa in 
Brussels or indeed through the UK delegations to EU negotiations that Scottish 
Secretaries were usually part of (see Burrows, 1999). With the creation of the Scottish 
parliament and the Scottish Executive, however, the legitimate ability and power of 
Scotland to influence European affairs is likely to be boosted (cf. Rifkind, 1998; 
Burrows, 1999; ). Scotland's role within the Council of Regions, for instance, is likely 
to be strengthened, while official representation in Brussels can be enhanced (cf. A. J. 
McLeod, 1999). The effects of such endeavour will probably be limited but not 
insignificant - especially when compared with the options available to other less- 
favoured regions in the UK. 
Despite this effort, it is unrealistic to expect that Scotland would be able to exercise a 
major influence on the EU agenda. From the economic point of view, this agenda is 
centred round the project of neo-liberal market 
integration, which in turn has major 
implications for less-favoured regions, including Scotland (cf. Amin and Tomaney, 
1995a). Indeed the European regulatory framework includes competition policy and 
trade policy, with both having a strong regional impact (Wishlade, 2001; Peters, 
1995). The EU also regulates government deficits and thus constrains government 
spending in its member states, therefore ultimately 
limiting the size of regional policy 
countries such as the UK can offer to 
its less-favoured regions. Further constraints 
may arise on the monetary side should the UK choose to join the Euro, thus 
completing its market 
integration with Europe. Neo-liberal market integration, 
however, seems to favour the most advanced European regions, a pattern that is 
compounded by EU programmes 
biased towards `core' regions at the further expense 
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of less-favoured regions; as a result, a powerful cumulative causation process arises 
(Amin and Tomaney, 1995b). 
On the other hand, Europe offers some opportunities and incentives for less-favoured 
regions (LFRs). Importantly for Scotland, access to the European market has been a 
critical factor for the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). Europe now 
accounts for a major part of all Scottish manufacturing exports (cf. Peat and Boyle, 
1999a) and the situation of European markets (especially France and Germany) thus 
has impact on Scottish export performance (Scottish Economic Report, June, 2002, 
p. 5). The EU also offers direct financial incentives for its less-favoured regions and 
countries, most notably through CAP and the Structural Funds. Scotland was a net 
beneficiary of these EU policies (interview Hassan, 2000). In terms of Structural 
Funds, Objective 1 (Highlands and Islands), Objective 2 (Central Belt), and 5b (rural 
areas) were all available in Scotland to compensate for increased market pressures and 
to cope with the economic transformation (see Danson et al., 1999; Lever and Moore, 
1986). However, as Amin and Tomaney have argued (1995b, p. 20), the total 
expenditure of European Structural Funds is very small compared to the EU's GDP 
and it cannot be expected that it will dramatically change the fortunes of less-favoured 
regions, or to off set centripetal market forces (see discussion in Chapter 8 of this 
thesis). 
Furthermore, with the advent of Eastern enlargement, EU regional policy is under 
increased pressure (Bachtler and Downes, 2001). Scotland will be one of the regions 
which will lose part of its share of Structural Funds in favour of regions in Central and 
Eastern Europe (interview Hassan, 2000; see Chapter 8). This may potentially have 
negative consequences for some areas of Scotland that very much depend on such aid. 
Besides these immediate financial implications, the collapse of state-socialism in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the opening of the EU to the East have created a new 
set of challenges and opportunities. These include the widening of market 
opportunities but also increased competition from the `East'. In particular, the cheap 
but well educated tlabour 
force in former state-socialist countries is a matter of 
concern for Scotland, as inter-regional competition for inward investment intensifies 
(cf. interview Hassan, 2000). There is the clear realisation of the fact that Scottish 
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workers are part of the international competition, resulting in lower labour standards 
(interview White, STUC, 2000). More broadly, Scotland may partake on the re- 
drawing of the map of European divisions of labour and value networks (cf. Smith et 
al., 2002; see also Chapter 4). In this process, however, international capital will play 
a key role, with Scotland having only limited possibilities to put it into effect. 
International capital and the wider international political economy thus represents 
another critical dimension of the wider political economy that needs to be taken into 
consideration. 
Scotland, international capital and wider international political economy 
Indeed, the role of international capital and the wider international political economy 
in which Scotland is anchored has to be readily acknowledged. Throughout history 
(see section 6.2 ) Scotland was, and until now is, `a small, open economy' (Scottish 
Economic Report, June, 2002, p. 2) whose fortunes critically depend on successful 
engagement within the wider international political economy. The imperatives of the 
global political economy, however, are completely beyond the control or influence of 
Scotland (Keaney and Hutton, 2000). Indeed, it has to be acknowledged that Scotland 
is but a small part of a complex global production system. In recent decades, the 
position of the Scottish economy within the international division of labour has 
changed dramatically, determined by the rounds of capital investment and divestment 
(cf. Hood and Young, 1982; McDermott, 1989), while Scottish firms have faced a 
series of mergers and acquisitions (Ashcroft and Love, 1993). This latter process 
accelerated in the late 1980s, rendering the Scottish economy more and more 
dependent on outside control (see also Boyle et al., 1989), representing a particular 
mode of integration within the new international division of labour. Within this 
division of labour Scotland emerges at best as a semi-peripheral economy (cf. 
Henderson, 1989) characterised by particular (largely branch-plant) investment and 
trade patterns typical of less-favoured regions. This position may further be 
compounded by the EU and wider international regulatory environments (cf. Peters, 
1995; Amin and Tomaney, 1995a). 
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Beyond productive capital, one also has to acknowledge the role of international 
financial capital and its impact on regional economies like Scotland. One of the most 
visible examples of this impact was the fiscal crisis of the British state in the 1970s 
(Keaney and Hutton, 2000) and the imposition of IMF rules that heavily curtailed the 
ability of the state to intervene in problematic regions. The subsequent Thatcherite 
answer to this crisis and its consequences for Scotland are well known (see Keaney 
and Hutton, 2000; see also section 6.2 ). Today, the sense of crisis is over, but the UK 
(alongside any other nation-state) continues to be dependent on the imperatives of the 
international financial markets, which usually translate into tight monetary and fiscal 
policies. These in turn have an impact on less-favoured regions. The UK government, 
for instance, effectively controls the level of public expenditure in post-devolution 
Scotland (Midwinter, 2000) and may be seen as `transferring the fiscal squeeze to 
Scotland' (Keaney and Hutton, 2000, p. 467). This `fiscal squeeze', of course, has 
numerous implications for Scotland and a direct effect on public services (see also 
McCrone, 1999). Thus, directly or indirectly, Scotland is exposed to the workings of 
the wider international political economy and the imperatives of international capital. 
It would be inappropriate, however, to portray Scotland as a mere victim of 
international political economy. Indeed, on several fronts Scotland successfully 
engages with the international marketplace and this is reflected in the Scottish 
economic performance to which we now turn. 
6.4 Economic performance 
Scottish economic performance in recent decades can be seen in simple terms as that 
of economic decline and subsequent regeneration (Lee, 1995). Underneath such 
generalised terms, however, Scotland's economy has experienced important twists 
and turns and massive structural transformation (Payne, 1996), while changing its 
position within the UK and the international division of labour. This section will seek 
to trace the major dynamics and trends within the Scottish economy in the past 30 
years or so, and compare its recent performance with the rest of the UK and Europe. 
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After the crises of the 1970s and the economic trauma of the early 1980s that 
disproportionately hit old industrial regions, the economy of Scotland was severely 
affected. Following the UK-wide recession of the early 1980s, unemployment in 
Scotland stood at 15.4% in 1984 (Scottish Economic Bulletin, No. 58,1999, p. 67), 
little helped by the then booming oil industry. In fact, the oil industry itself provided 
Scotland with an unpleasant shock in 1985 when OPEC abandoned its quota system 
and the price of oil fell from $27 to $8 dollars per barrel (Lee, 1995, p. 104). This had 
further repercussions for the local economy (see Lee, 1995, p. 104-105) and curbed 
hopes that North Sea oil could produce lasting positive over spill effects for the 
Scottish economy as a whole. As Payne (1996, p. 33) suggested, `[t]he great North Sea 
oil bonanza has come and gone without making any significant impression on the 
structure of the Scottish economy'. 
The traditional structure of the Scottish economy, meanwhile, was faltering. De- 
industrialisation crippled Scottish manufacturing and sectors such as coalmining, steel 
making and shipbuilding, which were once the backbone of Scottish economic 
success and a source of pride, went into a deep crisis (Payne, 1996, p. 22; Devine, 
1999). This was reflected in the share of manufacturing employment as it fell from 
30.3% in 1971 to a mere 15.6% in 1996 (Wood, 1999). Meanwhile, as already 
mentioned, the patterns of ownership have changed as external control of the Scottish 
economy increased through a series of mergers and acquisitions (Ashcroft, 1988; 
Ashcroft and Love, 1993; Lee, 1995, p. 110,124-5), which affected Scotland's 
position within national and international divisions of labour and value chains. As a 
result, Scotland is far from being a `key' player within the global economy; rather, the 
situation has reversed, as the Scottish economy is increasingly dependent on the 
investment decisions of current global players. 
Against the background of this painful period in Scottish economic history, however, 
a recovery has been on the way. Indeed, since the mid-1980s unemployment has been 
steadily declining and was almost halved from nearly 15% to 7.6% in the decade 
between 1987 and 1998 (Scottish Economic Bulletin, No. 58,1999, p. 67). Since 
1998, unemployment in Scotland has declined further and in the spring of 2001 
reached a historically low level of less than 6% (Scottish Economic Report, June 
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2002, p. 60) in line with the overall UK trend4. Scottish GDP trends were also 
encouraging as its economy enjoyed periods of dynamic growth and in the early 
1990s in fact escaped the recession that hit the UK economy (Peat and Boyle, 1999b, 
p. 8; see also Scottish Economic Report, January 2000, p. 23, Chart 1.7b). 
Two main economic causes lay behind this remarkable recovery. One is associated 
with a rapid growth in the service sector, the other with the partial recovery of 
manufacturing5. Both aspects will now be examined in turn. First, it is important to 
notice that the service sector was the fastest growing and best job creating sector 
within the Scottish economy since the 1970s, as Scotland was effectively transformed 
into a `service economy'. In terms of GDP in 1996, agriculture, forestry and fishing 
contributed 3%, the construction industry 6%, mining, manufacturing and utilities 
sectors nearly 28% while services accounted for about 63% of the Scottish economy 
(Peat and Boyle, 1999b, p. 17). A similar pattern can be found regarding the 
employment structure, with 15 out of 20 Scottish workers employed in services. This 
massive switch in Scotland `from making things to providing services' (Wood, 1999, 
p. 120) may be said to be consistent with wider trends in advanced capitalist countries 
(Payne, 1996, p. 23; cf. Chapter 2 of this thesis), while making the structure of the 
Scottish economy much more similar to that of the rest of the UK (Payne, 1996, p. 24; 
Peat and Boyle, 1999a). 
There are some Scottish particularities, however, that to some extent explain 
Scotland's improvement in economic performance in comparison with other LFRs in 
the UK. One is that Scotland retained a higher share of public services, accounting for 
22% of Scottish GDP in 1996 (as compared to the UK average of 18% (Peat and 
Boyle, 1999b, p. 16), perhaps reflecting higher public expenditure levels in Scotland 
(see above). Education, health and social services alone account for about 15%, while 
public administration and defence contribute together about 7% to the Scottish GDP 
(Peat and Boyle, 1999b, p. 14-15). 
4 UK official unemployment (ILO methodology) stood at a historical low of less than 5% at that point 
(Scottish Economic Report, June 2002, p. 60). 
An additional significant factor was the recovery of the North Sea oil industry. The Scottish 
Executive estimated that the contribution of oil equals around 10% of Scottish GDP (GERS, 1999). 
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Another particularity of the Scottish economy, especially vis-a-vis other less-favoured 
regions in the UK, is the relative strength of its financial and business services. 
Indeed, business and financial services alone account for about 20% of Scottish GDP 
and 14% of all jobs, i. e. nearly as much as the whole manufacturing sector (Wood, 
1999, p. 118). Business and financial services recorded one of the biggest increases in 
their GDP share in Scotland in the decade from 1986 to 1996 (Peat and Boyle, 1999b, 
p. 14). Some of this increase could be attributed to the proliferation of rather low-value 
business services, in particular call centres, to the extent that Scotland is being 
presented as the `call centre capital of Europe' (interview Triquart, LIS, 2000). 
However, there are signs that more sophisticated services are emerging in the Scottish 
economy, including software companies (interview Ashcroft, 2000). 
Finally, financial services represent a real `jewel in the crown' of the Scottish service 
sector. Indeed, Edinburgh is said to be the second most important financial centre in 
the UK after London, while Edinburgh and Glasgow combined are claimed to rank as 
the 6th top fund management centre in Europe (SFE, n. d., p. 14-15). Several factors lie 
behind this strength in the Scottish financial sector. It seems that the sector has 
managed to successfully build upon a nineteenth-century legacy (interview Ashcroft, 
2000; SFE, n. d. ), exploiting opportunities arising from the de-regulation and 
internationalisation of business, as well as capitalising on the `coming of oil' and the 
increasing demand for financial services from manufacturing firms (Payne, 1996, 
p. 23). It is possible to assume that within increasing socio-spatial divisions of labour, 
Edinburgh has managed to create a certain `critical mass' or `agglomeration' in 
finance (Turok and Bailey, 2001), in part assisted by the intervention of Scottish 
Enterprise6. One way or another, financial services now form an important part of the 
Scottish economy and the Scottish economic success story of the 1990s (Peat and 
Boyle, 1999a) and could be seen as an example of beneficial integration with the 
wider political economy. 
The partial recovery of manufacturing was the second major factor behind the recent 
Scottish economic performance. In particular, the relative strength of the new, inward 
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investment-led electronics sector played a significant role. It is often heralded as an 
example of the successful attraction of the `new economy' or `knowledge economy', 
but perhaps more realistically it could be seen as a part of the `re-industrialisation' of 
Scotland (cf. interview Ashcroft, 2000). The central belt of Scotland where most of 
this investment is located is nevertheless being referred to as `Silicon Glen' (see 
Turok, 1993), evoking the image of a Scottish Silicon Valley7. Originally attracting 
several individual US multinational companies, such as IBM (Haug, 1986), Silicon 
Glen has subsequently grown into a major platform for the production of 
semiconductors, computers and electronic equipment in Europe and is being 
considered `one of the largest concentrations of high-technology industry outside 
USA' (Devine, 1999, p. 596). According to estimates of Scottish Enterprise, Silicon 
Glen produces over 35% of Europe's personal computers, 65% of automatic teller 
machines (SE, 1999a, p. 1 1). Much of this production is destined for the UK and 
European markets thus forming an important part of the Scottish export performances 
(cf. Hood, 1999, p. 40-41). The factors cited behind this success include access to EU 
markets combined with low factor costs (relatively cheap labour), the UK 
government's regional policy (including generous financial assistance), accompanied 
by the ready availability of production facilities and infrastructure (Payne, 1996, p. 26; 
Peters, 1995). EU regional incentives also played a role, while factors such as 
language and cultural similarities should not be underestimated either (cf. Peters, 
1995). On the top of this, the role of economic development agencies in facilitating 
the process of inward investment needs to be taken into account and this point will be 
elaborated upon later in section 6.6 . 
Meanwhile, it has to be acknowledged that Silicon Glen also represents a major 
economic policy dilemma for Scotland. Importantly, the extent to which this 
concentration of foreign-owned production facilities is embedded in local economic 
tissue is hotly debated (Turok, 1993; McCann, 1997; Turok, 1997; inter alia). The 
6 Scottish Enterprise was instrumental in the creation of Scottish Financial Enterprise, whose purpose 
was to bring together the major institutions and collectively promote Scotland as a key European 
financial centre (Moore, 1995, p. 237). 
7 Glen is a Scottish word for valley. 
s About 70% of total Scottish exports are manufactured goods. Within this category, the two main 
export articles were whisky, accounting for 12.4% of manufactured exports in 1996, and office 
machinery (including computers and computer-related products), accounting for 37.1% (Hood, 1999, 
p. 40-41). 
173 
danger is that the fortunes of such an economic structure are overly dependent on 
external decisions and on global marketplace conditions. Indeed, the volatile global 
economic environment in general, and the recent crash of the `new economy' stocks 
in particular, have already impacted on the Scottish economy, pushing it into a 
recession in 2002. Between 2000 and 2002, the electronics sector in Scotland 
experienced a series of closures and redundancies prompting doubts about the 
sustainability of the Silicon Glen (The Financial Times, 25/4/2001, The Scotsman, 
5/7/2002). The impact of the recent global economic slowdown on the Scottish 
economy probably should not be dramatised, but it cannot be underestimated either. 
Indeed, the concerns over the fragility of the lower-value end of the electronics 
industry that currently dominates Silicon Glen has prompted Scottish policy makers to 
intensify efforts to move Scotland up the value chains and to embrace `high road' 
development (see sections 6.5 and 6.6 below). 
However, these concerns aside, Scottish economic performance is observed with envy 
by other less-favoured regions in the UK. Indeed, measured in terms of regional GDP 
per capita, Scotland performs rather well, but this needs to be seen as part of longer- 
term development. In the period after the Second World War until the 1970s, Scotland 
recorded a strong convergence towards the UK average of GDP per capita as part of 
the post-war economic boom, and was probably aided in this by sustained higher 
levels of public expenditure. This tendency has subsequently been replaced by 
stagnation or even relative decline since the mid-1970s and during the 1980s. 
However, since the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Scottish GDP per 
capita showed a renewed tendency to catch up with the UK average (Lee, 1995, p. 56). 
In 1995 Scottish GDP reached parity with the UK average (Scottish Economic 
Bulletin, No 58,1999, p. 73) and since then it has remained close to that average. This, 
of course, still represents a considerable lag behind the richest part of the UK (the 
South-East of England), which historically is 10% to 20% above the UK average. 
Nevertheless, the Scottish position embodies an important advantage vis-a-vis other 
old industrial regions of the UK that seem to be falling behind (Lee, 1995, p. 56-57). 
Furthermore, the Scottish economy with its 98% of EU GDP per capita (at PPS) 
compares favourably with other regions of the European periphery (see also Regional 
Trends, 2001, p. 32-33). In fact, it could be argued that Scotland is probably one of the 
174 
best performing regions in the EU periphery. To what extent this success can be 
attributed to Scottish `institutional thickness' and its `learning region' strategies will 
now be discussed in the two subsequent sections. The first will examine the Scottish 
institutional landscape more broadly, while the second will focus on the activities of 
the regional `animateur' of (Lowland) Scotland - Scottish Enterprise. 
6.5 The institutional landscape 
This section aims to provide an insight into the Scottish institutional landscape in an 
attempt to assess its potential role in shaping the economic trajectory of Scotland. In 
line with the theoretical arguments developed in Part I of the thesis, the section will 
argue that the institutions of Scotland should be seen as the objects, subjects and 
outcomes of social struggles, operating within the limits of historical legacies and the 
wider political economy. The Scottish case nevertheless demonstrates that building on 
the strengths of the past and an active engagement with the wider political economy 
can bring limited, but not negligible, benefits. In the case of Scotland, this is probably 
best manifested in the example of the aforementioned successful lobbying of Scotland 
for a higher share of public expenditure within the UK. Indeed, it could be argued that 
Scottish `institutional thickness' operates on the basis of a `common agenda', whose 
purpose is to attain `the best deal for Scotland' (cf. MacLeod, 1997, p. 301). This 
section will first briefly review Scottish institutional development in the wider historic 
context, while also paying attention to the lobbying power of Scottish institutions and 
their impact on the economy of Scotland. The section will then discuss the post- 
devolution institutional landscape and more recent policies that aim to transform 
Scotland into a `knowledge economy'. 
Institutional development in context 
In line with the arguments made earlier, this enquiry into the Scottish institutional 
landscape will start by acknowledging the importance of the historical context in 
which they were shaped. Indeed, the story of Scottish institutions provides a good 
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example of how institutions can be seen as being objects, subjects and outcomes of 
social struggles over power, wealth and knowledge (or cultural dominance). In the 
Scottish case, institutional development can be seen as part of the struggle of the 
Scottish nation for survival and development, economically, politically and culturally. 
As already mentioned in a previous section (6.2 ), the Act of Union of 1707 left a 
heavy imprint on the institutional landscape of Scotland, when political sovereignty 
was exchanged for the economic benefits offered by a stronger neighbour. 
Nevertheless, Scotland retained autonomy in areas like law, education and the church 
(Paterson, 1994) and these no doubt played a role in maintaining the Scottish national 
identity despite the absence of a (Scottish) state (McCrone, 1992). As a result, the 
Scottish nation probably never lost its sense of belonging and formulating its own 
interests (see Paterson, 1994; Bogdanor, 1999). These national interests started to 
surface with increased intensity in the course of the 19`h century, a trend that had 
parallels in other small nations in Europe. However, as Paterson (1994, p. 62) 
observed, the key difference was that Scottish demands largely worked. Thus out of 
nationalist discontent with the alleged neglect of Scottish business, a `managerial 
solution' was found by the British state, and the modem Scottish Of ce was 
inaugurated in 1885, quickly becoming the focus of all Scottish campaigning 
(Paterson, 1994, p. 62; Bogdanor, 1999, p. 111). The Scottish Office subsequently 
played a crucial role in building Scottish institutional structures during the 20th 
century, especially after the position of the Scottish Secretary was upgraded to 
Secretary of State in 1926 (Paterson, 1994, p. 107) and new roles were attributed to it. 
The office itself moved from London to Edinburgh in 1939 (Paterson, 1994; 
MacLeod, 1997, p. 301; Bogdanor, 1999, p. 111) and subsequent Secretaries of State in 
effect turned it into `Scotland's government' (Paterson, 1994, p. 109) and the 
`mouthpiece of Scottish civil society' (ibid, p. 111). 
The critical question, however, is whether the Scottish Office could do something 
about the growing cracks in Scottish manufacturing, apparent since the beginning of 
the 20`h century. Formally, it did not have economic policy responsibilities, but in 
reality it had a great deal of influence over the Scottish economy. One vehicle for this 
was a regional policy that the Scottish Office helped to establish on the UK level and 
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influenced its shape through its policy networks back in the 1930s. The importance of 
this regional policy, however, fully emerged only after the Second World War. Under 
post-war `welfare state' arrangements, Scotland benefited from generous regional 
redistribution within the UK state (see Paterson, 1994). 
The Scottish Office meanwhile played an important role in further strengthening 
Scottish institutional tissue. Back in the 1930s the Scottish Office encouraged the 
creation of a cluster of several distinctively Scottish bodies. Among them was the 
Scottish National Development Council (SNDC), whose aim was to promote 
industrial renewal (ibid, p. 110) and which in turn formed a Scottish Economic 
Committee that became the focus for Scottish thinking on the economy. In 1946 the 
SNDC fused with the Industry Committee (part of the Council of State established by 
the agile Scottish Secretary of State Thomas Johnston during the war years) to form 
the Scottish Council for Development and Industry (see Paterson, 1994, p. 119). The 
Scottish Council for Development and Industry (SCDI; surviving under that name 
until today) subsequently became an institution through which a consensus on the 
issues of the Scottish economy has been sought among major societal players 
(interview Duff, SCDI, 2000). 
In the post-war period, the Scottish Office and SCDI worked together on a number of 
projects supporting the development of the Scottish infrastructure (see Paterson, 1994, 
p. 120) and inward investment attraction (interview Duff, SCDI, 2000). Moreover, 
they made lasting institutional changes. The Highlands and Islands Development 
Board (the first regional development agency in the UK) was established in 1965. The 
Board's role was to enable the sparsely populated Highlands and Islands of Scotland 
to `improve its economic and social conditions' (Grassie, 1983, p. 109) in recognition 
of particular challenges this part of Scotland and its people were facing (see Turnock, 
1974). Ten years later, the SCDI and the Scottish Office successfully lobbied for the 
establishment of the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) to support the faltering 
economy in Lowland Scotland (Young and Hood, 1984, p. 47-51; Paterson, 1994, 
p. 120; MacLeod, 2000, p. 226; Moore, 1995). Both agencies (under different names 
and in different forms) still survive today and form the backbone of the current 
economic development infrastructure in Scotland (see below). 
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Within the Scottish Office itself a new department, the Scottish Economic Planning 
Department, was formed in 1973 and was later to be renamed the Industry 
Department for Scotland (Young and Hood, 1984, p. 46). Meanwhile, 1975 has been 
described as a watershed in terms of the Scottish Secretary's powers in industrial 
matters, as the administration of the various schemes of regional assistance was 
transferred from the UK Department of Trade and Industry to the Scottish Secretary 
of State (Young and Hood, 1984). This could be seen as formal confirmation of the 
fact that between 1945 and the mid-1970s Scottish economic policy was in fact 
`indigenous', with the Scottish Office and its policy network influencing directly or 
indirectly important policy aspects from design to implementation (cf. Paterson, 1994, 
p. 122). The success of this institutional and policy reform effort, however, has to be 
measured against economic outcomes; Paterson made an appropriate comment when 
he observed that, the Scottish economy did continue to decline, relative to its main 
competitors, and in that sense these reformers could be said to have failed, although it 
probably did not decline as far as it would have done without their policies' (1994, p. 
122). 
A further important aspect of these policies is that Scotland managed to secure above- 
average public expenditure in the UK and Scottish institutions played an important 
role in this process. In particular, successive Scottish Secretaries of State were 
instrumental in negotiating deals with the British state. Perhaps the first Secretary of 
State to make full use of his lobbying position was Thomas Johnston (Bogdanor, 
1999, p. 112), who, according to one observer, 
`would impress on the [cabinet] committee that there was a strong nationalist 
movement in Scotland and it could be a potential danger if it grew through 
lack of attention to Scottish interests ... 
by dint of cajoling, persuasion, plus 
some slight exaggeration of the grievances fertilising the Scottish Nationalist 
movement, he got his schemes through after three or so committee meetings' 
(cited in Bogdanor, 1999, p. 112-113). 
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Johnston's successors continued to apply similar tactics and successfully lobbied for 
additional resources on top of generous welfare state redistribution in post-war 
Britain. As one commentator admitted, `nobody bullied better' (Nelson, 2002). Even 
under Conservative rule, Scottish Secretaries of State saw their role as `getting the 
best deal for Scotland' (MacLeod, 1997, p. 301). The introduction of the Barnett 
formula in the late 1970s was aimed at curbing Scottish financial demands and indeed 
it reduced the extent to which the Secretary of State could negotiate to Scotland's 
advantage (Bogdanor, 1999, p. 114). Nevertheless, this did not lead to either a 
convergence of public expenditure levels between Scotland and England (see section 
6.3 above), or eliminate instances resulting in `the formula occasionally being 
bypassed' (McCrone, 1999, p. 121). Again, according to McCrone (1999), it was the 
successful advocacy of the Secretaries of State which was the `major factor' in 
presenting `particularly compelling needs' (ibid, p. 121). It could be safely argued, 
then, that the persistence of Scottish institutional actors in pursuing Scottish interests 
led to tangible outcomes for Scotland in the form of extra financial resources. This 
favourable financial position further nurtured the expanding Scottish institutional 
edifice. By the beginning of the 1980s, Scottish `reformers' managed to create a dense 
institutional network and rich policy framework for economic development promotion 
(see Hood and Young, 1984) as part of evolving `administrative devolution' (Keating, 
1976) from the UK central state. 
However, much of this incrementally acquired autonomy in economic and other 
spheres of policy came under serious threat under Conservative rule as the `political 
conflict' between (social-democratic) Scotland and (right-wing) England ensued 
(Paterson, 1994, p. 168). As we have seen in the previous Chapters, this conflict also 
had an important economic dimension, and compounded the perception of a `threat' to 
Scotland (ibid, 169; D. McCrone, 1992; Man, 1992). This threat was far from 
symbolic for key Scottish institutions. In Thatcher's eyes, the Scottish Office was just 
an `added layer of bureaucracy' (cited in Tomaney, 2000a) but it was probably too 
risky to abolish it (see Paterson, 1994, p. 176). The SDA, the most important 
economic development arm of the Scottish Office, however, was nearly `simply 
abolished' (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995a, p. 61). Eventually it was transformed in 1991 
into Scottish Enterprise (SE) with Scottish Enterprise National (SEN) as a core and 
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fragmented network of 13 business-led Local Enterprise Councils (LECs). The 
priorities of these new bodies have been re-aligned with the government's market 
ethos9 (Danson et al., 1989; Moore, 1995; MacLeod, 1996,2000; Fairley and Lloyd, 
1995a, 1995b; see more in section 6.6). 
On the institutional front, however, the pressures from the centre were met with 
growing resistance in Scotland. The Scottish Trade Union Convention (STUC), for 
instance, led the Standing Commission on the Scottish Economy amid `stern 
resistance' to Thatcherite policies and early threats to dissolve the SDA (MacLeod, 
2000, p. 226). More importantly, however, the overall constitutional position of 
Scotland within the UK started to be debated. First, in 1988, `A Claim of Right for 
Scotland' was produced by the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, demanding the 
establishment of a Scottish Assembly (Edwards, 1989). Subsequently the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention was formed in 1989 (Paterson, 1994, p. 176-177), a body 
which brought together the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties in Scotland, Scottish 
trade unions, churches and community organisations among others in a remarkable 
demonstration of the growing consensus within Scotland on the need for such an 
assembly. In 1995 the Convention eventually produced Scotland's Parliament: 
Scotland's Right, demanding a powerful Scottish Parliament (Bogdanor, 1999, p. 196- 
197; Tomaney, 2000a). These proposals were subsequently firmly enshrined into New 
Labour's 1997 manifesto and, after its election, the party fulfilled its pledges. The 
Scotland Act was quickly drafted, following an endorsing referendum in Scotland in 
1997. According to Nairn (2000) the referendum was a `near-unanimous 
development' (ibid, p. 219) as `most of "the nation" was involved' (ibid, p. 218). The 
Scottish Parliament eventually came into being after founding elections in 1999, 
significantly changing the Scottish institutional landscape (cf. Hassan, 1999). 
Scotland's institutional and policy landscape after devolution 
That devolution was introduced by New Labour1° is regarded as the most important 
constitutional change since the 1707 Act of Union (cf. Bogdanor, 1999). Although its 
9 Part of this market-led approach was the attraction of foreign direct investment into Scotland, and a 
dedicated agency for this purpose was established - Locate in Scotland (see below). 
10 The creation of the Scottish Parliament was accompanied by the establishment of (less powerful) 
Assemblies in both Wales and Northern Ireland. 
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overall impact on the future of Scotland and the UK remains to be seen, there are 
immediate implications for the way Scottish institutions now operate. 
Since its inauguration in July 1999, the newly established Scottish Parliament stands 
at the heart of the new institutional landscape and policy-making in Scotland. The 129 
member-strong body, democratically accountable to the Scottish electorate, gained 
primary law-making powers within the scope of the devolved agenda. It ended the era 
of `technocratic government' (Paterson, 1994) in Scotland by taking democratic 
control over the budget, functions and administrative apparatus of the Scottish Office 
(see Hassan, 1999). The Scottish Office itself (renamed the Scotland Office), which 
was a key institution of Scottish autonomy until 1999, was given only a marginal (and 
unclear) role in the post-devolution settlement. Meanwhile, an executive arm of the 
Scottish Parliament was created, the Scottish Executive, which in effect acts as the 
Scottish government (see Hassan, 1999). 
An important feature of the Scottish Parliament is that it is intended to be a more 
democratic and inclusive institution, while placing emphasis on `consensual politics'. 
It could be argued that a historic consensus of key parts of Scottish society were 
sought and found on the matter of devolution, and this is reflected in the design of the 
Scottish Parliament (cf. Paterson, 1994, p. 176). Indeed, the Parliament was conceived 
not as a closed-door body but as an institution open to all members of Scottish civil 
society. One manifestation of this principle is the establishment of 16 parliamentary 
committees covering a wide-range of areas under parliamentary jurisdiction (Paterson 
et al., 2001), which are obliged to consult heavily with the relevant sections of 
Scottish society, including businesses, trade unions and voluntary organisations 
(interview Watson, MSP, 2000). At the same time, the composition of the Parliament 
itself could be said to be more representative, as a combination of majority and 
proportional voting systems was used. Indeed, the political composition of the 
Scottish Parliament is more colourful then its Westminster counterpart (Paterson et 
al., 2001; Tomaney, 2000a). This had immediate implications for the emerging 
Scottish polity. 
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Indeed, in the historic Scottish Parliamentary elections of 1999, SNP gains deprived 
the winning Labour Party of an outright majority, thus forcing it to form a coalition 
government with the Liberal Democrats (see Paterson et al., 2001 for a detailed 
analysis of election results). This in itself is an important development as a more 
diverse assembly (Paterson, 1998) opens room for a potentially more innovative and 
inclusive governance. In addition, it is expected that devolution will increase the 
scope for distinctive `Scottish' policies (cf. interview Ashcroft, 2000). It could be 
argued that signs of such policy distinctiveness have indeed been emerging as 
Scotland has already deviated from the policy framework implemented in the rest of 
the UK on several points. Importantly, a political compromise had to be sought in 
Scotland on the sensitive issue of university fees introduced in the rest of Britain, 
resulting in a specific Scottish solution to the problem" (interview Hassan, 2000). 
Scotland's policy also diverged from that implemented by New Labour in England 
and Wales on issues like free care for the elderly and salary increases for teachers, 
representing another specific Scottish policy dimension. Such policy specifics can be 
implemented because the Scottish Parliament has the freedom to decide the allocation 
of the grant received from the central UK government, according to its own spending 
priorities (interview Watson, MSP, 2000). However, it is expected that the real 
autonomy of the Scottish Parliament will only fully be tested when different political 
parties are in control in Edinburgh and Westminster (cf. Paterson, 1994; interview 
Paterson, 2000). Meanwhile, it remains to be seen if, in the longer term, the 
parliament will deliver a kind of `new politics' (Paterson et al., 2001) and the 
`different future' (Hassan and Warhurst, 1999) expected by Scottish voters. In fact, 
from a sceptical point of view it could be argued that the new Scottish Parliament 
will, in delivering such `futures', face considerable limitations. 
As already argued in section 6.3, post-devolution Scotland remains firmly constrained 
by the British state, the European Union and international capital. An important 
element of this situation is `fiscal dependency' (Midwinter, 2000). In other words, for 
the functioning of the Scottish Parliament the arrangements with the British state 
remain crucial. Indeed, the overall budget (grant) available to Scotland is effectively 
controlled by London, leaving the Scottish Parliament `only' with the aforementioned 
il Up-front fees were replaced by post-education graduate repayments. 
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power over the `spending mix' (Midwinter, 2000). The possibility of raising its own 
revenues is rather limited (Midwinter, 2000; McCrone, 1999). Tax varying powers 
were attributed to the Parliament after it was strongly argued that they were essential 
to its credibility. Without tax varying power the Parliament would have no much 
financial capacity, like the Scottish Office that was seen by some as simply another 
department of the UK government (Mair and McCloud, in Hassan, 1999, p. 77). This 
does not change the fact that both tax varying capacity and its possible economic 
impact are limited (Midwinter, 2000). Indeed, the Scottish Parliament has the power 
to vary the standard rate of income tax up or down by only three-pence-in-the-pound. 
It has been estimated that the full use of this power could bring £450 million, which is 
relatively little in comparison to the bloc grant of over £14 billion (Mair and 
McCloud, 1999, p. 77; McCrone, 1999). Moreover, the use of the tax varying power 
(known as the `tartan tax') is politically extremely sensitive and it could be expected 
that it will not be used for some time. To conclude, `financial devolution' remains 
`unfinished business' (Midwinter, 2000, p. 246) and the `weakest element' of the 
devolution settlement (Bogdanor, 1999, p. 254). 
Scotland: towards the `knowledge-driven economy'? 
Despite these limitations, the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive were 
keen to assume control over the powers made available to them. Importantly, the 
Scotland Act specified only `reserved matters' that remain under the control of 
Westminster (see section 6.3 ), leaving the Scottish authorities with a wide range of 
areas of intervention. In terms of economic management, however, these are 
exclusively supply-side (interview Paterson, 2000). Nevertheless it is the supply-side 
that is claimed by many to be critical for Scotland's competitiveness in today's global 
economy (Peat and Boyle, 1999a; interview Ashcroft, 2000), because `demand-side 
policy measures do not work anymore' (interview G. Gillespie, 2000). The delivery of 
better training, upgrading skills, and changing attitudes towards entrepreneurship and 
`risk-taking' are all factors highlighted by Scottish policy-makers and academics alike 
as key areas for intervention in the Scottish economy12 (interview Watson, MSP, 
2000; interview Campbell, 2000; interview Ashcroft, 2000; interview G. Gillespie, 
2000; see also Ashcroft, 1998). 
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The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive wasted no time in setting the 
agenda along these lines. In terms of economic development policy, important steps 
were undertaken to create a coherent platform for effective policy making and 
implementation in Scotland (interview Campbell, 2000). Thus, following a `big 
exercise' (interview Campbell, 2000) the Scottish Executive published in June 2000 
its first ever Framework for Economic Development in Scotland (Scottish Executive, 
2000a). The document sets out a vision for Scotland to `raise the quality of life of the 
Scottish people through increasing economic opportunities for all on a socially and 
environmentally sustainable basis' (Scottish Executive, 2000a, p. xii). To achieve this 
vision, four main `outcome objectives' have been identified: 
To secure growth through the integration of the Scottish economy with the global 
economy 
" To ensure that all the regions of Scotland enjoy the same economic opportunities 
" To ensure that all in society enjoy the same economic opportunities 
" To ensure that the development is sustainable economically, socially and 
environmentally (ibid, p. xii) 
The above objectives strongly resonate with the objectives declared by the advocates 
of `learning regions' and the `knowledge economy' (cf. Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
thesis). Indeed, Scottish authorities paid significant attention to the `knowledge 
economy' agenda, making it an explicit strategic goal for Scotland. Building on the 
previous work undertaken under the auspices of the pre-devolution Scottish Office 
13 
31 
the Knowledge Economy Task Force was set up and headed by the Minister for 
Enterprise and Lifelong Learning, Henry McLeish (interview Campbell, 2000). The 
Task Force, working from February to June 2000, included major figures from the 
Scottish higher education sector, business persons, representatives of the Scottish 
Enterprise and Charles Leadbeater, the `respected author on the knowledge economy' 
(cf. interview Hassan, 2000). The aim of the Task Force was to produce a report on 
the knowledge economy (interview Hassan, 2000). The thrust of the argument 
emerging from this work was summarised by Henry McLeish himself, from his later 
12 See Paterson (interview 2000) for a more critical point of view. 
13 Following the publication of the UK Competitiveness White Paper Our Competitive Future, Building 
the Knowledge Driven Economy in December 1998 (DTI, 1998) the Scottish Office produced a report 
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position as the First Minister of the Scottish Executive (i. e. `Scottish Prime Minister'). 
He wrote: 
`The new, knowledge-based economy is becoming a striking feature of life in 
all advanced economies. Increasingly, economic success and prosperity are 
coming to depend on learning, the creation of knowledge and its application, 
and businesses working smarter and not harder. The qualities that will produce 
success in this world are ones in which Scotland has traditionally excelled -a 
desire to learn, scientific excellence and a proud record of technological 
innovation. Our task today is to capitalise on these assets and secure a bright 
future for ourselves in the Knowledge Economy' (Scottish Executive, 2001a; 
Foreword). 
The above line of strategic thinking was further developed by the Scottish Executive's 
Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department under the leadership of Wendy 
Alexander. Its main emerging themes were encapsulated in the overarching strategy 
for Scotland entitled A Smart, Successful Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2001b). The 
document sets `direction' and a vision for a `smart, successful Scotland', where 
`creating, learning and connecting faster is the basis for sustained productivity growth, 
competitiveness and prosperity' (ibid, p. 7). In a remarkable way, the document 
reflects all the major themes advocated by the `new regionalist/learning region' 
literature (cf. Chapter 3 of this thesis). Indeed, the Scottish Executive emphasises that 
the vision for Scotland is a vision of a `high skill, high wage economy' where 
knowledge is a `key competitive weapon' (ibid, p. 7). It is claimed that Scotland has to 
be put on a `new, higher growth path' while being `agile and fast to learn' (ibid). The 
approach to globalisation `must not be to resist change, but to embrace it' (ibid). 
Indeed, the aim is to integrate Scotland with the global economy, enabling `the 
improved flow of products, technologies and ideas in and out of Scotland' (ibid, p. 7). 
The ambition for Scotland is to be `the most globally connected nation in Europe' 
(ibid, p. 2) and to become a `fast learning, high earning nation' (ibid, p. 7). 
entitled Scotland: Towards the Knowledge Economy (Scottish Office, 1999) reflecting all the major 
themes of the UK White Paper and applying them to the Scottish circumstances. 
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A Smart, Successful Scotland also indicates the main strategic priorities required to 
achieve the above vision 14. These priorities come under the three main headlines: 
`growing businesses', `global connections' and `learning and skills'. Under these 
headlines, several familiar themes emerge including entrepreneurial culture, 
commercialisation of research and innovation, clusters development, e-business, ICT 
infrastructure and skills development (cf. MacLeod, 1996,2000; inter alia). New areas 
of intervention outlined by the document include the promotion of Scotland as a 
globally attractive place to live and work and emphasis on promoting home grown 
global companies (see Scottish Executive, 2001b). 
Importantly, the Scottish Executive recognises that the vision of a smart, successful 
Scotland requires strategic partnerships `within the wider institutional landscape, 
working collaboratively ... both at national and local level' (Scottish Executive, 
2001b, p. 19). The partners explicitly referred to in this strategic document include 
organisations like Careers Scotland, the Scottish Tourist Board (recently renamed 
VisitScotland), and Scottish Homes (see ibid, p. 19). The Scottish Executive also 
expects the involvement of local authorities, the Scottish further and higher education 
sector, trade unions, employer bodies, voluntary organisations and public, private and 
social economy organisations 
15. However, it has been made clear by the Scottish 
Executive that the major responsibility for facilitating the transformation of Scotland 
into a `globally connected' and `fast learning, high earning nation' should be taken by 
the Scottish economic development agencies, collectively referred to as Enterprise 
Networks. The following section will provide a discussion on the crucial part of the 
Enterprise Network - the Scottish Enterprise - and its role in promoting the 
`knowledge economy' paradigm in Scotland. 
14 It is important to note that Smart Scotland economic vision needs to be seen in connection with 
strategies emerging in related policy areas, in particular skills strategy for Scotland, science strategy, 
business strategy, birth rate strategy, manufacturing strategy and tourism strategy and Digital Scotland 
strategy (interview Campbell, 2000). 
15 In addition, it could be expected that specialised input could be provided by think tanks including 
Scottish Council Foundation (SCF) or Centre for Scottish Public Policy (formerly John Wheatley 
Centre) whose purpose is to look into Scotland's current policy options and reflect on possible future 
trajectories (interview Duff, 2000; interview Herd, 2000), thus providing Scotland with a `learning 
ahead' capacity (cf. Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
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Before doing so, however, it is perhaps useful to summarise the evidence relating to 
the role of the Scottish institutional landscape in the economy. One suggested 
conclusion is that although Scottish institutions themselves cannot be taken for 
granted (as they are subjects, objects and outcomes of social struggles), they 
nevertheless seem to play a noticeable role in influencing Scottish economic 
trajectories. Probably their most remarkable achievement is mirrored in what could be 
termed a `refined imbalance' within the UK. The most visible element of this 
imbalance is the favourable fiscal position of Scotland, in particular in comparison to 
other less-favoured regions of the UK. Indeed, the long-term higher-than-UK-average 
public expenditure could be seen as a significant contribution that Scottish institutions 
have made to the economic fortunes of Scotland. The availability of resources is in 
turn reflected in its rich institutional tissue. Scottish Enterprise is part of this 
institutional tissue of considerable `thickness'. The role of Scottish Enterprise in 
promoting economic development will now be examined in more detail. 
6.6 Scottish Enterprise - `animateur' of the `knowledge economy'? 
This section seeks to examine the role of Scottish Enterprise as the animateur 
promoting Scotland's high-growth, high-value path to the `knowledge-driven 
economy' (cf. MacLeod, 1996,1997,2000). It will start by exploring the institutional 
framework of Scottish Enterprise (SE) and its satellite organisations, followed by a 
discussion on more recent developments in the agency's structure and policy 
emphasis. Finally, the section will focus on selected activities of Scottish Enterprise, 
namely its cluster development policy and the Alba Centre initiative, both of which 
aim to promote the `knowledge economy' in Scotland. 
From SDA to Scottish Enterprise (SE) 
As mentioned in the previous section, the origins of Scottish Enterprise (SE) go back 
to 1975 when, amid growing concerns over the weaknesses of the Scottish economy, 
the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) was established, funded by an annual grant 
from the Scottish Office. The SDA was given the responsibility for providing, 
maintaining and safeguarding employment and promoting industrial efficiency and 
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international competitiveness (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995a). Originally, the SDA acted 
as an investment bank to encourage technologically advanced establishments 
(Danson, 1980), but later focused more on area-specific projects, especially in 
Glasgow (see also Lever and Moore, 1986; Moore and Booth, 1986), where the 
problems associated with industrial restructuring were most pronounced. Over the 
years, the SDA's range of activity included property management, investment in 
individual businesses, advisory services, environmental improvements, marketing and 
the promotion of Scotland for inward investment, research on the Scottish economy 
and project planning (Moore, 1995). The Agency is also said to have played a `key 
role' in supporting important sectors such as oil and electronics (Fairley and Lloyd, 
1995a, p. 55-56). 
From 1975 through to the 1980s, the SDA emerged as a strategic player for 
supporting the regional economy, with an annual budget of £120 million and 
employing 680 staff in 1990 (Moore, 1995). Some of its activities, however, were 
clearly at odds with the dominant free-market approaches of the Conservative 
government and the Agency had to realign and adopt a `market failure' approach 
(Fairley and Lloyd, 1995a). Eventually, the SDA was dissolved in 1990 by legislation 
and in 1991 was replaced by Scottish Enterprise16 (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995a; Moore, 
1995; MacLeod, 2000, p. 226). This represented a major change in economic 
development support in Scotland. First, traditionally separate `economic 
development' and `training' agendas were merged together under the umbrella of 
Scottish Enterprise (SE). This in part reflected the imperative of supply-side 
economics and the emphasis on the flexible labour market, but the move was 
nevertheless welcome (see Fairley and Lloyd, 1995a). A second and more problematic 
change was that such support infrastructure was broken down into 13 Local 
Enterprise Councils (LECs) in order to `respond to local needs' 17. Finally, the most 
controversial change was that LECs were conceived as business-led private 
organisations. These changes were in line with overall private business interest 
emphasis that continued to pervade throughout the 1990s. In the process, the central 
16 Similarly, the Highlands and Islands Development Board was transformed into Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995a, p. 62). 
17 Overall, 22 LECs were created in Scotland, 13 in the Scottish Enterprise area and 10 in the 
Highlands and Islands Enterprise area (1 LEC is shared) (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995a, p. 62). 
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SE office was said to have lost its strategic planning capacity and most of its budget 
(some £449 million in 1992/93) was effectively being devolved to LECs through 
annual contracts (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995a). This institutional structure survived with 
minor modifications until the end of the 1990s18, when major new changes were 
instituted, reflecting the imperatives of post-devolution Scotland (see below). 
Meanwhile, it is important to notice that both the SDA and Scottish Enterprise 
contributed to the further strengthening of the institutional framework for economic 
development support. Importantly, the Locate in Scotland (LIS) was established in 
1981 as a joint venture between SDA and the Scottish Office, enhancing the capacity 
of Scotland to attract incoming foreign direct investment (see Hood and Young, 
1984). Locate in Scotland subsequently grew into a powerful agency in its own right, 
whose activities went beyond the attraction of investment to include complex after- 
care services (MacLeod, 1997, p. 303; Amin and Tomaney, 1995c; cf. Chapter 3). In 
the words of a senior Locate in Scotland official, the agency's ultimate goal is to 
encourage foreign companies `to come, to stay, to thrive' (interview Triquart, LIS, 
2000). For this aim, the agency had about 95 staff working around the world, 
including 50 to 60 employees in its Glasgow headquarters (ibid). The exact budget 
available to the agency has not been disclosed, allegedly being part of the agency's 
`competitive advantage', especially vis-ä-vis the rival `Welsh competition' (ibid). 
Likewise, information on the size of the financial incentives offered by LIS to 
potential investors has not been made public. Nevertheless, it was suggested that 
financial incentives `can be very sizeable' (ibid). Part of the services offered to inward 
investors are guided tours for helping them to choose the best possible location for 
their investment19. The agency promotes the whole of Scotland (including the 
Highlands and Islands), and uses Scotland as a `tight brand'. Employees of LIS see 
themselves as a part of `team Scotland', despite their two different paymasters (i. e. 
Scottish Enterprise and Scottish Executive at the time of the interview). In the year 
2000, the agency estimated that about 1,000 foreign companies operated in Scotland, 
ý$ The SE's overall budget in 1998/99 was £467million (£418m grant from the Scottish Office, £3m 
voted loans and £46m business receipts) with about 76% being 
devolved to LECs. The budgets of the 
three biggest LECs of Glasgow, Lothian-Edinburgh and Lanarkshire were £56m, £48m and £46m 
respectively (SE, 1999a, p. 3). 
19 Allegedly including helicopter trips over Scotland for important customers. 
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and took credit for assisting `some of them', thus contributing to an impressive record 
of FDI in Scotland (interview Triquart, LIS, 2000). 
Other institutions created in Scotland in support of the aim further included Scottish 
Trade International (STI). Established in 1991, the principal goal of this agency was 
to promote Scottish exports (MacLeod, 1997, p. 305-306). The institutional framework 
for economic development in Scotland was complemented by a network of Business 
Shops, whose objective was to assist business start-ups and support the indigenous 
SME sector (interview Gosden, 2000). Thus it could be argued that, taken together, 
Scottish Enterprise and its satellite organisations covered all aspects of economic 
development support, from skills and training to indigenous business start-ups and 
SMEs, to global companies, and from FDI attraction to export promotion (see below 
for recent developments). This could be said to be one of the strengths of the Scottish 
institutional framework. 
Recent developments 
As argued in the previous section, devolution brought several important changes for 
Scottish `institutional thickness'. These changes have important implications for the 
operation of SE. First, a clear line of democratic accountability has been established. 
SE remains an `arms-length' agency (interview SE, 2000), but is ultimately 
answerable to the Scottish Executive. Meanwhile the Scottish Executive is under the 
scrutiny of the Scottish Parliament. Second, a sense of clear strategic `direction' has 
been set up, with the Scottish Executive assuming a leadership role for the entire 
Enterprise Network (see Scottish Executive, 2001b). Third, under this leadership, new 
policy imperatives for the Enterprise Networks have emerged. Fourth, devolution 
brought a new impetus for `co-ordination', `coherence', `transparency' and `cost- 
efficiency' in policy delivery (cf. Scottish Executive, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b; 
interview Richmond, SE, 2000). Reflecting these imperatives, three major reviews of 
economic services delivery in Scotland were launched in parallel (interview Hassan, 
2000). First, SE instituted its own internal `organic reform' (Lloyd and McCarthy, 
2000). Second, Scottish Executive undertook a review of Enterprise Networks. 
Finally, the Scottish Parliament initiated an Inquiry into the Delivery of Local 
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Economic Services in Scotland, seeking to identify problems and areas of 
improvement for local delivery of economic development services20. 
These recent reviews have already impacted on the way economic development 
services are being delivered in Scotland. First, Scottish Enterprise's internal reform, 
launched in March 2000 under the banner of Scottish Enterprise Network (SEN) 2000, 
attempted to achieve greater coherence between Scottish Enterprise and the network 
of Local Enterprise Companies (cf. Scottish Executive, 2000b, p. 6). For this aim, the 
reform included the creation of SEN Executive Team to secure better integration of 
the entire organisation and its constituent parts. It also introduced a single brand name 
for the LECs network and attempted to provide greater consistency across the LECs in 
terms of service, quality and a focus on priorities. In addition, it made management of 
LECs more inclusive by including representative small businesses, chambers of 
commerce, local authorities and the education sector into their boards (Lloyd and 
McCarthy, 2000, p. 35). 
Second, reflecting the recommendations of the Scottish Parliament's Inquiry, steps 
were taken to `re-structure', `rationalise' and `streamline' local economic 
development services, and to make them both more accountable and cost-effective (cf. 
Scottish Executive, 2000b). The creation of new co-ordinating bodies was proposed 
with the aim of reducing `confusion, overlap, duplication and even active competition 
between the many agencies involved [in local economic development]' (cf. Scottish 
Executive, 2000b). Thus Local Economic Forums were introduced in 2001 in each 
LEC area, comprising representatives of the given LEC, local authorities, local tourist 
boards, chambers of commerce and the education sector, in order to address the 
overlap and to improve the delivery of local economic services21 (Cf. Scottish 
Executive, 2000b, 2001c Danson et al., 2000c). It remains to be seen how this change 
will eliminate the apparent `congestion' in delivering economic services or even 
`institutional overkill' MacLeod (1997, p. 308) in Scotland. 
20 The Inquiry was conducted by the Scottish Parliament's Enterprise and Lifelong Learning 
Committee. 
21 The Parliament's Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee also demanded that LECs be turned 
from private companies into public bodies. 
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Meanwhile, a Small Business Gateway was launched in July 2000 to replace the 
network of Business Shops and create a coherent SME support structure at the local 
level in the SE area (Scottish Executive, 2000b, p. 2,4). Following the successful 
launch of the measure, the Scottish Executive was reportedly considering the creation 
of Business Gateways (Scottish Economic Report, June 2002). Finally, the satellite 
organisations of SE also underwent major restructuring. Most importantly, SE's 
Globalisation Team, Scotland Europa and Scotland the Brand merged with Locate in 
Scotland (LIS) and Scottish Trade International (STI) to create Scottish Development 
International (SDI) with the aim `to support the fullest possible Scottish participation 
in the global economy' (see Brown, 2001, p. 17). The creation of the SDI signals new 
directions in the SE operations (see also Raines and Brown, 2001) in line with the 
Scottish Executive's objective to turn Scotland into a `globally connected nation' (see 
Scottish Executive, 2001b; 2001d). Part of this strategy is to `work closely with 
potential multinational players' (Scottish Executive, 2001b, p. 13), i. e. to support the 
creation of home-growth businesses and to help them to become `global' (see Raines 
and Brown, 2001). This effort is an integral part of the overall aim, which is 
prosperous `smart Scotland' within the `knowledge economy'. 
It remains to be seen what impact this aggressive restructuring of the Scottish 
economic development infrastructure will have on the economy. What is clear, 
however, is that Scottish Executive expects Enterprise Networks to `play critical roles 
in delivering change for the Scottish Executive' (Scottish Executive, 2001b). In other 
words, the task of transforming Scotland into a `knowledge economy' is largely down 
to Scottish Enterprise. The effort of Scottish Enterprise in this respect will now be 
examined in more detail, while focusing on two particular stratagems. One is 
associated more broadly with a cluster approach, while the other represents an attempt 
to create a `virtuous circle' of education, innovation and enterprise. Both strategies are 
seen by Scottish Enterprise as the means of delivering the `knowledge economy' in 
Scotland. 
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Cluster approach 
An important impetus for the cluster policy was provided in a study by Michael 
Porter's MONITOR consultancy, commissioned by SE at the beginning of the 1990s 
(MacLeod, 2000, p. 227; see also Peters, 1995; interview Ashcroft, 2000; interview 
G. Gillespie, 2000). The findings of the study were never fully accepted, but the 
impact on policy thinking was important, as `clusters' and `networks' became part of 
the mainstream SE strategy (interview, Pollock). Indeed, both recent SE Network 
Strategy (SE, 1999a) and the Cluster Approach (SE, 1998a) identify the `knowledge 
economy' as the principal strategic objective for Scotland while suggesting that the 
`cluster approach' is one of the key vehicles for delivering such a strategic aim (see 
also SE, 1999b). 
The Cluster Approach document begins by acknowledging that `information and ideas 
will be the most important commodity in the world's economic system' (SE, 1998a, 
p. 1; original emphasis). According to SE, networks or clusters are the best 
institutional forms for creating that commodity, because they create `more of the 
sparks that fuel innovation' and ultimately result in `greater competitiveness' (ibid. ). 
Clusters are defined as `synergies' between companies, customers, suppliers, utilities, 
research institutes and the education sector, formed around a core of `one or more 
exporting companies' (ibid, p. 2). The cluster approach, it is claimed, is `uniquely 
well-suited' (ibid, p. 3) to countering the threats, and making the most of the 
opportunities, of the `knowledge economy' in which the most valuable commodities 
are not material and assets, but information and innovation (ibid, p. 2). Indeed, SE 
suggests, the cluster approach is a `holistic strategy' to economic development that 
has a `proven track record' as the `root source of sustainable wealth creation and 
quality employment growth in dynamic economies from Singapore to the Silicon 
Valley' (ibid, p. 6). Therefore, there is a `common understanding' that partnerships 
developed within clusters `will make the difference in positioning Scotland as a key 
player in the global economy of the 2 1St century' (ibid, p. 1; original emphasis). 
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Fuelled by this `understanding', SE began to focus attention and effort in developing 
some of Scotland's most important value-creating clusters, such as oil and gas, 
electronics (semiconductors), food, biotechnology, software, optoelectronics and 
creative industries (multimedia) (ibid, p. 5; interview Pollock, SE, 2000; Raines, 
2002). In implementing such a strategy, SE relies on carefully prepared and budgeted 
`action plans' for each cluster (SE, 1999a; Raines, 2002; interview Togneri, SE, 
2000). Particular attention has been given to activities related to the electronics 
cluster, which receives a £46 million budget over five years (interview Togneri, SE, 
2000). 
The choice of electronics as one of the key areas of policy intervention is no accident, 
given that it is a crucial manufacturing export sector of Scotland (Peat and Boyle, 
1999a; Brown et al., 1999, p. 12; see also section 6.4 ), directly employing 40,000 
people and a further 30,000 jobs in supply (SE, 1999a, p. 11). The semiconductors 
sector alone is said to directly or indirectly employ about 8,000 people (Raines, 2002). 
The fragility of the sector, however, remains at the heart of policy makers concerns 
(interview Ashcroft, 2000). Two main factors are considered critical. First, the 
problematic level of local embeddedness (see Turok, 1993; McCann, 1997; Turok, 
1997; for a discussion), and second, its rather low-value, mostly assembly-based 
production (cf. Henderson, 1989), leaving Silicon Glen overexposed to the volatile 
global marketplace (Peters, 1995, p. 265). Scottish Enterprise has pursued two types of 
policy responses to this problem. First, it tried to address the issue of relatively low 
embeddedness by attempting to engage inward investors and local suppliers within 
localised clusters (cf. Peters, 1995; Raines, 2002). Part of this stratagem was the SE- 
assisted creation of the Scottish Electronics Forum in 1993, bringing together the 
leading electronics companies in Scotland, both overseas and indigenous, in order to 
address the industry's needs whilst building foundations for a more robust, more 
sustainable, and potentially more value-added competitive sector (Peters, 1995, p. 273- 
5; MacLeod, 1997, p. 304-305). This was followed by the creation of the Scottish 
Supply Base Forum (SE, 1999a, p. 33). However, SE is aware that such activities `pay 
gradual rather than dramatic returns' (SE, 1998a, p. 5). A more aggressive stratagem 
has been adopted in the case of the Alba Centre, where a key element was the direct 
attraction of a high-value-added investor into Scotland. 
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Alba Centre 
The Alba Centre22 seems to be the focal point of hopes for Scottish policy makers in 
their efforts to transform Scotland into a `knowledge economy' (interview Campbell, 
2000; interview Ashcroft, 2000; interview Togneri, SE, 2000; interview Triquart, LIS, 
2000; interview Edward, 2000). The aim of the Alba Centre is to create a virtuous 
circle by `linking education, innovation and enterprise', as evoked by Gordon Brown 
(1999) in the opening citation of this Chapter. Project Alba had already been praised 
by the Scottish Enterprise's Chief Executive as a `major success' of Scottish 
Enterprise in 1997 and a bright example of the agency's `cluster approach' strategy 
(SE, 1998b, p. 5). In 2002 the Scottish Executive highlighted the Alba Centre's 
`pioneering success' in terms of the commercialisation of research and innovation in 
Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2002, p. 12). Clearly then, Alba is a high profile policy 
initiative deserving closer attention. 
Established in 1997 in Livingston near Edinburgh, at the `heart of the Silicon Glen', 
this 96-acre campus forms part of the strategy to attract highly knowledge-intensive 
and high-value-added activity into Scotland. The focus is on the expected high-growth 
segment of electronics design, in particular on `system level integration' (SLI) or 
`system-on-chip' (SoC). There is a conscious effort to embed such activities locally, 
not least through synergising with local research and education establishments 
(interview Edward, 2000). Indeed, one of the important elements of this unique 
initiative is the creation of the Institute for System Level Integration (ISLI). The 
Institute, established in October 1998 and situated within the Alba Centre, is a joint 
venture between SE and four top Scottish universities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Herriott- 
Watt, Strathclyde) combining the research and teaching strengths of seven university 
departments of electrical/electronic engineering, computing science and informatics 
(The Alba Centre, 2002). The Institute offers the world's first MSc in System Level 
Integration (since October 1999) alongside PhD programmes (interview Edward, 
2000). The creation of the institute was praised by the then First Minister Donald 
u Alba is the ancient Gaelic term for Scotland. 
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Dewar as `a key component in developing the knowledge economy in Scotland' while 
keeping it `at the forefront of the electronics revolution' (see ISLI, 1999). 
The Alba Centre also accommodates Virtual Component Exchange (VCX), the 
world's first exchange for trading intellectual property (interview Edward, 2000). 
Launched in 1998, this industry organisation supported by SE focuses on the trading 
of the electronics-related intellectual property in the form of `virtual components' 
(VC), or pre-designed blocks that can be `plugged' into a complete system-on-chip 
design (The Alba Centre, 2002). The VCX was designed to shorten product design 
cycles, reduce risk and lower the overall transaction costs for participating companies 
in the expectation of an `exploding' intellectual property market (SE, 1999a, The Alba 
Centre, 2002). 
The support infrastructure at the Alba Centre was complemented by the creation in 
May 2001 of the Scottish Embedded Software Centre (SESC) intended as the hub for 
embedded software expertise for Scottish companies (The Alba Centre, 2002). One of 
its aims is to reduce costs and risks for smaller companies in developing embedded 
software systems by providing them with access to specialised software expertise 
(with links to local industry and academic institutions at the top of SESC's own 
expertise) and offering a comprehensive range of technical services and strategic 
counsel (The Alba Centre, 2002). Another initiative at the campus launched in May 
2001 is the European Test Technology Centre, offering expertise and training in the 
area of test electronics engineering (The Alba Centre, 2002). 
However, the ultimate test for the Alba Centre is whether this world-class support 
infrastructure will be able to attract and `embed' first-class inward investors. Here 
several successful implantations have been reported. The first investor was Cadence 
Design Systems, a US multinational company, supposedly the largest supplier of 
electronic design technologies, methodology services and design services, which are 
supposed to accelerate the design of semiconductors, computers systems, networking 
and telecommunications equipment, consumers electronics and other electronics- 
based products (interview Stephenson, Cadence, 2000). The attraction of Cadence in 
1997 was a crucial step in establishing the Alba Centre and SE involved personal 
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contacts of its Chief Executive and an undisclosed amount of financial assistance in 
bringing this important investment to fruition (interview Lewis, SE, 2000; interview 
Togneri, SE, 2000). Cadence, of course, is a very different player than the majority of 
electronics (mostly manufacturing) companies within Silicon Glen. It operates at the 
very top of the value-chain within the `new economy', employing well educated 
`knowledge workers' and may be seen as a model company of the emerging Scottish 
`knowledge sub-economy'. Ironically, the company says that one of its main reasons 
for locating in Scotland is the UK's intellectual property regime, acknowledging that 
the deal offered by SE also played a role (interview Stephenson, Cadence, 2000). 
Scottish Enterprise's expectations of Cadence have been significant. In particular 
Scottish policy makers hoped that within seven years the company would create up to 
1,900 first-class jobs in Livingston23 (SE, 1998b, p. 5; interview Togneri, SE, 2000). 
Meanwhile, it is important to notice that several other electronics company investors 
followed suit, including Motorola, Epson, Tality and Spektra Systems, bringing the 
occupancy rate to 12,000 sq metres. Overall, the Alba Campus is expected to offer 92 
900-sq-metre first-class office spaces and create 5,000 jobs (The Alba Campus, 2002). 
To conclude, it could be argued that the Alba Centre represents a tangible outcome of 
Scottish Enterprise's efforts to bring about a `knowledge economy' in Scotland. 
However, it is not clear if all the expectations of Scottish policy makers will 
materialise. In particular, it remains to be seen whether the desired synergy between 
investors and supporting local infrastructure will come to fruition, and to what extent 
it will contribute to the virtuous circle between `innovation, education and enterprise'. 
More broadly, one would have to wait to see how sustainable this initiative will be 
and what impact it will make on the Scottish Enterprise economy in the longer term. 
Furthermore, the question arises whether such `prime-site' knowledge (sub-)economy 
development will contribute to a `Smart, Successful Scotland', where prosperity will 
be `shared by all'. This latter issue becomes prominent in the context of the growing 
social and spatial inequalities, examined in the following section. 
23 However, in 2000 only about half of this number seemed realistic (interview Togneri, SE, 2000). 
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6.7 Social and spatial divides in Scotland 
In terms of social divides, Scotland has to be seen within the pattern of inequalities in 
the UK (Goodall et al., 2002). Here the overall trend is a matter of concern. Indeed, 
since the erosion of the `welfare state' in the mid-1970s (coinciding with the alleged 
rise of the `knowledge economy') until the late 1990s, British society showed an 
overall propensity for growing social inequality. In terms of disposable income, 
measured by the Gini Coefficient, there has been a general increase in inequality since 
1977 with the steepest rise occurring in the mid-to-late 1980s following the 
Conservatives' `free-market revolution'. During the 1990s income inequality showed 
a slight downturn but has begun to rise again in recent years (Goodall et al., 2002; see 
also Hudson and Williams, 1995; Mohan, 1999; Goodman, 2001). The most recent 
trend sets aside New Labour's commitment to social inclusion. Detailed analysis of 
the period since 1997 has shown that although low-income social groups experienced 
a rise in standards of living (in part thanks to Gordon Brown's redistributive policy), 
high-income groups experienced an even higher rise. As a consequence, the social 
divide has grown (Goodman, 2001). Interestingly, during most of the 1990s, the Gini 
Coefficient (and thus social inequality) in Scotland remained below the British 
average, albeit with a strong tendency to `catch up' since 1998 (Goodall et al., 2002). 
Comparatively, UK social inequality (Gini above 30) is one of the highest in Europe 
and is quite similar to that found in the USA (Goodall et al., 2002, p. 36). 
Meanwhile, regional inequalities in Scotland are also significant and rising. 
Historically, the greatest divide developed between Lowland Scotland and the 
Scottish Highlands and Islands, marking the lasting legacy of three centuries of 
industrial development in Lowland Scotland (see section 6.2). In particular, the urban 
agglomerations of Glasgow and Edinburgh have emerged as major economic 
`magnets' within Scotland, creating a huge contrast to the largely sparsely populated, 
emigration-ridden rest of the country. This divide is still rather pronounced even 
today, with the Central Belt of Scotland accommodating the bulk of the Scottish 
population and economy. Glasgow and Edinburgh continue to be engines of the 
Scottish economy, providing valuable agglomeration economies (Turok and Bailey, 
2001) and scoring high in terms of GDP per capita (cf. Scottish Economic Bulletin, 
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March 1999, p. 73). The new knowledge-intensive (sub)economy seems to cluster in 
the Central Belt within or around these urban centres (see also Lever, 2001; Turok and 
Bailey, 2001), showing no overall tendency to decentralise towards more peripheral 
regions. The only exception is perhaps Aberdeen, `oil capital of Europe' (Devine, 
1999, p. 596), where the oil and gas industry has brought in a limited amount of 
`knowledge-intensive' and `localised learning' activities (cf. Cumbers and Martin, 
2001) while making the Grampian region (and more recently also the Shetland 
Islands) in GDP per capita terms one of the richest places in Scotland (and indeed the 
UK) thus contributing to the country's growing regional imbalance (see Peat and 
Boyle, 1999c, p. 56-57; Dunford, 1995). 
Important differences may also be found within the Central Belt. The sub-regional 
imbalance was highlighted in the 1970s and 1980s, with de-industrialisation severely 
crippling the economy of Glasgow and turning it into one of the worst unemployment 
black spots of Europe at the time (cf. Lever and Moore, 1986). Edinburgh, 
meanwhile, continued to grow as a smaller but smarter urban centre, not least thanks 
to its administrative functions and burgeoning financial and business services, to 
become one of the most prosperous cities in Britain (Bailey et al., 1999; Turok and 
Bailey, 2001). Deep divides, however, may exist within Edinburgh itself. On the one 
hand it can be seen as a rich post-industrial, knowledge-intensive `intelligent city' 
(MacLeod, 2000, p. 232), but on the other, it is also an increasingly `dual city', with 
many citizens `living below "acceptable" levels of income' (ibid, p. 232). 
Thus one has to observe that even if Scotland has performed quite well in terms of 
converging towards the UK GDP per capita average in recent years (see section 6.4 ), 
this convergence was in part achieved at the expense of greater intra-Scottish social 
and spatial imbalances. The emerging picture is thus in stark contrast to the pattern of 
convergence achieved during the post-war `welfare state' period. The reversal of the 
trend points to a growing socio-spatial divide within Scottish society, underpinned by 
socio-spatial divisions of labour and the differentiated access of people and localities 
to `flows of value', exacerbated by the pre-dominantly neo-liberal economic 
environment. 
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6.8 Conclusion 
This Chapter has aimed to examine how Scotland, an old industrial region in the 
periphery of the EU, is managing its transformation into a `post-industrial' or 
`knowledge economy'. The Chapter focused on whether the prosperity of Scotland 
can be seen as a matter of `choice', and to what extent the region, through its 
institutions, can be said to influence its economic trajectory in the context of its own 
historical legacies and the wider political economy. The findings can be summarised 
as follows. 
First, the historical legacies examined in section 6.2 are a significant factor in 
understanding Scotland and its economic fortunes. In particular, the 1707 Act of 
Union with England made a lasting impact both in terms of `sofft' institutional and 
`hard' economic legacies, providing Scotland with both `incentives' and `constraints'. 
Importantly, following the Act of Union, Scotland lost its independence, but 
nevertheless maintained an important degree of autonomy that proved to provide a 
crucial base for subsequent institutional build-up. In addition, the Act of Union 
guaranteed Scotland a rather privileged position within Britain, which continues 
today. In economic terms, the legacy is rather mixed. Scotland benefited enormously 
from being part of the expanding empire; it also benefited under Keynesian `welfare- 
state' arrangements after the Second World War. However, Scotland also 
subsequently suffered in the UK-imposed `market revolution', of which dramatic de- 
industrialisation was a much-contested part. It could be argued that taken together 
these legacies play an important role in determining Scotland's position within the 
current wider political economy examined in section 6.3. The section highlighted the 
fact that the region both benefits from its engagement with, and is constrained by, the 
imperatives of the wider political economy environment as represented by the UK, 
Europe and the international political economy. One of the most significant aspects of 
this engagement, building on the more favourable legacies of the past, was Scotland's 
continuing privileged fiscal position within the UK (in comparison to other less- 
favoured regions in the country). Scotland also exercises what may be a 
disproportionately strong voice within the UK governing structure (particularly in 
comparison with other regions of the UK). However, despite these favourable aspects, 
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the wider political economy also imposes significant constraints on Scotland, which 
are levered from the UK, EU and international levels. Thus, even in the post- 
devolution era, the power of the Scottish administration remains rather limited, while 
the fortunes of the Scottish economy are increasingly dependent on the wider `socio- 
spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial flows of value', as embodied, inter alia, 
in the patterns of trade, investment, financial flows and (skilled) labour migration. 
All these aspects are subsequently reflected in the economic performance of Scotland 
reviewed in section 6.4. There it was argued that following the devastating de- 
industrialisation of the late 1970s and 1980s, the Scottish economy has more recently 
shown signs of recovery. Elements of this recovery and the reasons behind it have 
been subsequently discussed. Several factors may have played a role in this 
development, including the significant amount of FDI (especially in the `new 
economy' sectors); the advantage of a cheap labour pool and other available 
incentives; the impact of the oil industry and the surge in `domestic' financial and 
other business services, in part building on past legacies. Besides, Scotland has 
benefited from the aforementioned fiscal advantage, contributing to Scotland's 
position as one of the best performing peripheral economies of the EU. 
The Chapter then moved on to examine the role of Scottish institutions in securing 
this rather favourable position. For this purpose, the Scottish institutional landscape 
has been subjected to a detailed analysis in section 6.5. It was argued that Scotland 
has managed to develop an impressive `institutional thickness' through decades of 
gradual institutional build-up. The long-term process of incremental `administrative 
devolution' has recently been coined by `political devolution' settlement, furthering 
the institutional capacity of the region-state. This institutional development, however, 
cannot be taken for granted. Rather, the Chapter emphasised throughout that Scottish 
institutions may be seen as the objects, subjects and outcomes of social struggles. 
Importantly, it should be emphasised that the above institutional achievements, 
including the recent devolution deal, would have been unthinkable without a great 
deal of `coalition-building' within Scotland. It is in the light of this spectacular 
coalition-building process that Scottish institutions may be seen as making a 
noticeable impact on Scottish fortunes. Indeed, the `refined imbalance' that Scotland 
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has managed to `negotiate' within the UK (especially in terms of funding 
arrangements), could be seen as the single most important contribution Scottish 
institutions have achieved for the Scottish economy. 
The fruits of this effort can be found in the example of Scotland's main development 
agency examined in section 6.6. Indeed, Scottish Enterprise, a well-resourced and 
well-organised agency, has become a major player in supporting the Scottish 
economy. A central and explicit part of its agenda is to encourage the transformation 
of Scotland towards the `knowledge economy'. A marked example of this effort is the 
`Alba Centre' in whose establishment Scottish Enterprise could be said to have played 
a key role as animateur. This prestigious development may be seen as a tangible 
example of the successful attraction of high-value added economic activity into a 
`rustbelt' region. More broadly, it may be viewed as an attempt to emulate `high road' 
development in Scotland. Although highly attractive, this kind of stratagem has to be 
seen in a critical light. Importantly, it needs to be seen in the context of increasing 
social and spatial inequalities within Scotland (cf. section 6.7). Indeed, there is a 
danger that projects such as the `Alba Centre' will promote development in the 
region, as opposed to development of the region (cf. Chapter 3). In addition, it is not 
clear whether such development will have any wider, fundamental and longer-term 
impact on the Scottish economy. In other words, it remains to be seen whether 
initiatives like this will help Scotland to escape its peripheral position within the wider 
`socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `socio-spatial flows of value'. 
Besides these concerns, one has to pay attention to the changing landscape in which 
Scotland as a region-state operates. As highlighted by several authors (see McCrone, 
1999; inter alia), Scotland faces critical dilemmas (McLean, 2001b). Its current 
favourable fiscal position is perceived as being eroded in the longer-term and the 
question of how to compensate for this potential deficit in the Scottish budget will 
need to be addressed. Thus, the future fortunes of Scotland will to a large degree 
depend on the development of its constitutional and financial arrangements with the 
British state. Some would argue that fiscal autonomy may be the way forward (cf. 
Midwinter, 2000; see McCrone, 1999 for a sceptical view), while others do not rule 
out the full independence of Scotland (Nairn, 2000; inter alia). However, this thesis 
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supports the view that even with full political independence, it is questionable how 
much room Scotland would really have in terms of determining its economic 
prosperity. 
This argument will be further developed in the following Chapter, which examines an 
example of a region-state that followed the route to independence. The Chapter will 
present the case of Slovakia, which emerged as an independent nation following the 
dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia, while struggling to manage both its post-socialist 
transformation and its transformation to the competitive `knowledge economy' 
against the background of its uneasy historical legacies and largely hostile 
international political economy. 
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Chapter 7: 
Case study: Slovakia 
`Without a full appreciation of what a knowledge-based economy actually is, 
Slovakia cannot count on any long-term success or prosperity' 
(Ivanicka, 1996, p. 117). 
7.1 Introduction 
After examining Scotland, a region-state at the periphery of `Western' Europe in the 
previous Chapter, the focus of my enquiry will now shift to the eastern `half of the 
emerging `New Europe'. Following the collapse of state-socialism there, countries 
and regions of Central and Eastern Europe embarked on a `transition to capitalism'. 
Originally conceived as a vehicle for quick economic catch-up with the `West', 
`transition' turned-out to be a very problematic exercise (see Chapter 4). Economic, 
political and social problems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) 
are a matter of considerable concern for the unifying Europe. In particular, weak 
economic performance combined with growing social and regional polarisation in 
CEECs represents one of the main challenges for the social and regional cohesion of 
an enlarged European Union (EU) requiring due attention. 
This Chapter focuses on Slovakia, a small country in Central Europe (population 5.4 
million) undergoing dramatic socio-economic transformation. This transformation is 
multi-dimensional and includes the following simultaneous processes: firstly, the 
transformation from state-socialism to liberal capitalism, secondly, integration with 
the EU, thirdly, nation-building and the transformation from a `region' to an 
independent state, and finally, the attempted transformation from an industrial 
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economy to a `knowledge-based economy'. It can be said that socio-economic 
transformations in Slovakia display specific features reflecting unique Slovak 
conditions. However, it could be also argued that the Slovak transformation only 
mirrors and highlights wider processes and conditions found elsewhere in post- 
socialist Eastern Europe. Slovakia thus can be seen as a `laboratory' of change in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, Slovakia also offers a chance to examine the 
propositions of some economic geography literature on institutions and regional 
dimensions of the `knowledge economy' in the context of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Indeed, the country offers some valuable material for such an enquiry. Alongside the 
processes of `nation-building' and general institution-building, there were attempts to 
create an institutional base for particular economic development functions. As part of 
this effort, specific organisations were created whose functions were to `learn ahead' 
and to provide strategic policy directions. Simultaneously, conscious attempts were 
made to promote the `knowledge economy'. 
These efforts, however, have to be seen through the prism of the analytical approach 
developed earlier (in Chapter 5) and put into the perspective of historical legacies and 
the wider political economy. To allow subsequent comparison (in Chapter 8) between 
the two case studies, the structure of the present Chapter on Slovakia mirrors in broad 
terms the structure used when examining Scotland'. The Chapter thus begins (in 
section 7.2) by placing Slovakia into its historical context while highlighting several 
crucial economic, political, cultural and institutional legacies, both pre-socialist and 
state-socialist. These legacies, it will be argued, become critical when confronted with 
the current imperatives of the wider political economy. These imperatives, coming 
from the intertwined power of market forces and leverage exercised by international 
organisations, will be reviewed in section 7.3. It will be suggested that the interaction 
between them and Slovakia's own historical legacies to a large extent determines the 
country's position within international divisions of labour and value chains. These in 
turn impact on Slovakia's economic performance which will be detailed in section 
7.4. The role of Slovakia's institutions in influencing economic performance will then 
become a focus of attention. Initially, section 7.5 will try to sketch the institutional 
1 Major differences in the structure are to be found within sections on the wider political economy and 
institutional responses - for obvious reasons. 
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responses in Slovakia to the ongoing transformation. It will be argued, in line with the 
analytical framework developed earlier in the thesis, that institutions need to be seen 
in the context of wider socio-economic struggles. The emergence of an independent 
Slovak state from the `vicious circle' of Czecho-Slovak `transition' will serve as an 
example. Subsequently, the processes occurring in the post-independence Slovak 
Republic will be scrutinised. It will be argued that they offer a rather hostile 
environment for building a coherent economic strategy and for setting-up a relevant 
institutional base. This will be highlighted in section 7.6 with the example of 
specialised economic development institutions. Indeed, although attempts were made 
to create `animateur-like' organisations, these often struggle for their own survival 
within the turbulent socio-economic transformation. Thus, attempts to promote the 
`knowledge economy' in the capital city - seen as an important step in ensuring 
Slovakia's `passage to a knowledge-based society' (IvaniCka, 1996, p. 91) and in 
building the Central European `Silicon Valley' - proved to be rather challenging. 
These attempts will be seen in the context of Slovakia's growing social and regional 
differences as demonstrated in section 7.7. Finally, on the basis of the empirical 
evidence offered, section 7.8 will seek to formulate conclusions. 
7.2 Historical legacies 
In line with argumentation developed in previous Chapters, the first important factor 
that has to be taken into consideration when examining economic development of a 
given region or country is its historical legacy. For an understanding of Slovak 
historical legacies one has to go back to the 9th century when the relatively powerful 
Christian kingdom known as Great Moravia, uniting Czech (Moravian) and Slovak 
tribes, was established in Central Europe. The Great Moravian legacy survives until 
today and is the basis of Slovak identity as a nation. This identity, however, was 
subsequently tested to the limits. Following internal squabbles and the Magyar 
invasion into Central Europe in the 10`h century, the Great Moravian empire broke-up 
and the destinies and fortunes of the two nations, Czechs and Slovaks, diverged 
importantly (see Seton-Watson, 1943). 
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The Czechs enjoyed periods of considerable autonomy up until the 17th century 
through their historical statehood of the kingdom of Bohemia and emerged as one of 
the most developed nations of Europe economically, politically and culturally before 
being integrated into the expanding Habsburg Monarchy (Seton-Watson, 1943). 
Meanwhile, Slovak history took a very different route. After being absorbed into the 
emerging Hungarian kingdom, for 1000 years Slovakia disappeared from the map of 
Europe as Slovaks became a subjected `stateless nation' fighting for its economic, 
political and cultural `survival' (Kirschbaum, 1995). The negative effects of the 
Hungarian domination were exacerbated by the devastating raids of the Tatars in the 
13th century and Turks in 16th century (Seton-Watson, 1943, p. 257) and compounded 
after Hungary itself became subjected to the Habsburg throne. Unsurprisingly, the 
economic picture in Slovakia was also bleak. Minerals of the Slovak mountains 
offered a limited opportunity for economic development and contributed to the rise of 
mining and trading towns, but overall the country remained mostly agricultural and 
underdeveloped. When industrialisation eventually took place in the 19th century 
(Steiner, 1973, p. 14) it was rather light and nothing of the scale of the neighbouring 
Czech lands considered as being the `workshop of the Habsburg empire' (Brown, 
1994, p. 52). Politically, things were not much better. The Slovak national revival took 
place alongside other national movements in 19`h century Europe (see also Paterson, 
1994), but the efforts to establish a form of autonomy for Slovakia (including a 
rebellion in 1848) were suppressed and later followed by further political oppression 
and cultural assimilation ('Magyarisation') (see Seton-Watson, 1943, chap. 14). 
Owing to difficult social and economic conditions, emigration from Slovakia took 
place, driven by opportunities arising in industrial regions of Europe and America 
(Kirschbaum, 1995, p. 152). This further drained the lifeblood of the nation (Bosäk, 
1991, p. 69). 
The opportunity for change arrived with the outbreak of the First World War as 
neither Czechs nor Slovaks were interested in spilling blood for their Austro- 
Hungarian rulers. Instead they combined their forces to lobby for the establishment of 
a Czecho-Slovak state on the ruins of a decaying Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This 
solution suited the world powers as part of a post-war peace settlement and the 
Czecho-Slovak Republic was established on 28 October 1918. The new state could be 
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seen as a `marriage of convenience' (Bosäk, 1991, p. 65) but there is a little doubt that 
it was a last-minute lifeline for Slovak national survival. The `marriage' with the 
Czechs, however, was not an easy one (Bosäk, 1991). Czecho-Slovakia united two 
linguistically similar, but economically distinct regions (Pavlinek, 1995). In economic 
terms, Slovakia was estimated to lag by 80-100 years behind the Czech lands, the 
most developed industrial area of the former Austro-Hungarian empire (Bälekcited in 
Pavlinek, 1995, p. 352). The inter-war period changed little in this striking economic 
inequality. In fact, it could be said that the liberal market economy favoured the 
Czech industrial heartland, while many parts of Slovakia experienced `de- 
industrialisation' (Selucky, 1991; Steiner, 1973, p. 27). Mass unemployment and 
gloomy economic prospects fuelled further waves of emigration. Indeed, it could be 
argued that `human capital' was the main `export article' of Slovakia. With the waves 
of emigrants, Slovakia was losing much talent that instead enriched other industrial 
2 countries. 
The political balance within the first Czecho-Slovak Republic was not in Slovakia's 
favour either. The original plans for a federal arrangement never materialised and 
Czecho-Slovakia developed as a unitary state dominated by the Czechs. This state of 
affairs, of course, was fuelling Slovak discontent that culminated in 1938 when the 
Czecho-Slovak government was forced to grant Slovakia autonomous status3. 
Eventually Slovakia emerged as an `independent' state on the eve of Hitler's 
occupation of the Czech Lands in 1939, while southern parts of Slovakia were 
occupied by Hungary (see Baläi, 1995, p. 359; Kirschbaum, 1995, p. 181). One could 
speculate whether Slovaks had any real choice (cf. Steiner, 1973, p. 3) and how 
`independent' the war-time Slovak state really was since it was surrounded by Nazi 
Germany and Pro-Nazi Hungary. Observers agree, however, that in economic terms 
Slovakia did relatively well4 (Krej6 and Machonin, 1996, p. 100; Kirschbaum, 1995, 
2 Among Slovak emigrants or their descendants were people like Banid, inventor of the parachute, 
Murgas, pioneer in telegraphy, Stodola, inventor of modern turbines, but also Warhol, the famous pop 
artist. 
3 It is worth noting that the name of the country itself was contentious. Between 1918 and 1938 the 
term 'Czechoslovakia' was commonly used, but following the 1938 settlement, the name 
'Czecho-Slovakia' was adopted. The post-War period saw a return to the term 'Czechoslovakia' as 
standard, but the 'naming' issue arose again in 1968 (Prague Spring) and after 1989 (fall of state- 
socialism). This thesis uses the terms 'Czecho-Slovakia' and 'Czecho-Slovak Republic' throughout. 
4 See Pavlinek (1995, p. 354) for a critical analysis of the reasons of this positive economic growth. 
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p. 201; Pavlinek, 1995, p. 354) and Slovakia could have been described as an oasis in 
the sea of the war-time turmoil. This, however, did not last long. The authoritarian 
regime, had been fuelling opposition that eventually erupted in an August 1944 anti- 
fascist uprising. This was ruthlessly suppressed by the German troops that marched 
into Slovakia until eventually pushed away by the Soviet Army in 1945 (Steiner, 
1973, chap. 7). 
The end of the Second World War brought two major developments that had 
important ramifications for Slovakia. First, Czecho-Slovakia was quickly re- 
established and the fate of Slovakia was once again linked to the fate of a wider 
unitary `nation-state' (Steiner, 1973). Second, owing to the Yalta Agreements 
between the world powers, this `nation-state', after being liberated by the Soviet 
troops, was incorporated into the Soviet sphere of influence in the post-war Europe. 
This had critical ramifications for Czecho-Slovakia. Following the Communist coup 
in 1948 the country firmly `decided' to follow the road to socialism. This `decision' is 
particularly dubious for Slovakia, where in contrast to the Czech lands, the 
Communist Party never really won a majority of votes (see Steiner, 1973, p. 80). Thus 
what followed could be seen as the `imposition of communism' and `radical solution 
to industrialisation' (Kirschbaum, 1995, p. 231) in catholic and agrarian Slovakia. 
With or without its will, Slovakia became a part of the `socialist experiment' (Krejdi 
and Machonin, 1996, Chapter 8) based on state ownership and central economic 
planning (see also 
ýulc, 1998; Smith, 1998). This economic structure was supported 
by a particular polity. In theory, power was supposed to belong to the working class, 
but in reality the power was held by the Communist Party apparatus and this was 
ultimately dependent on decisions taken in Moscow, beyond any control of Slovakia. 
For some this represented `one of the greatest tragedies of its history' (Kirschbaum, 
1995, p. 231). 
However, as a matter of fact, not everything was happening against Slovakia's 
interests. Indeed, part of the `socialist experiment' was to achieve both social and 
regional equalisation. In the Czccho-Slovak context this meant not only bridging the 
social divide between rich and poor, but also closing the historic gap between the 
industrialised Czech lands and economically lagging Slovakia. In addition to this 
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commitment, several other factors justified the massive redistribution of resources that 
followed and which remained a `permanent factor' (Krejci and Machonin, 1996, 
p. 101) of the state-socialist era5. Firstly, the economic development of Slovakia was 
seen as an answer to the `Slovak question' - i. e. reducing the nationalist threat to state 
unity - (for which there was a historical precedence in 1930s). Secondly, 
industrialisation was seen as part of social engineering by building a `missing' 
working class - the backbone of socialism - which was lacking in backward agrarian 
Slovakia. Thirdly, a strong economic base (including armaments production) further 
away from western borders was considered desirable for geo-strategic military 
reasons in the context of the emerging Cold War (Smith, 1994, p. 410). 
Thus, sponsored by sustained capital transfers from the Czech lands (Krejci and 
Machonin, 1996, p. 100-104; Pavlinek, 1995) post-war Slovakia underwent `forced 
industrialisation' (Smith, 1998). There is little doubt that this massive redistributive 
policy made a major impact. Indeed, Slovakia experienced rapid economic growth6 
and a strong convergence tendency with the Czech lands? (Pavlinek, 1995; Krejci and 
Machonin, 1996; Smith, 1998). By 1970 the economic differences between the two 
parts of Czecho-Slovakia had nearly disappeared (Pavlinek, 1995, p. 358). However, 
the downside of this accelerated development of the Slovak economy was that it was 
firmly integrated within the economic system of the Soviet Block and the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). It relied on the extensive mode of 
accumulation (Smith, 1998) mostly based on energy and raw material dependent 
heavy industries like engineering, metallurgy and chemical industry (Smith, 1998, 
p. 128; Pavlinek, 1995, p. 354) with an important element of an armaments industry 
(Smith, 1994,1998). This economic structure represented an important `hard' state- 
socialist legacy (cf. Chapter 4) whose sustainability became tested at the moment of 
`transition' to the market economy (see below). Nevertheless, it has to be 
acknowledged that the post-war period brought an unprecedented improvement of 
standards of living in Slovakia and considerable progress was made in many other 
s Transfers accounted in average for 15.2 % in the period between 1950-1959,10.6% (1960-1969) and 
7% (1980-1989) of the annual Slovak `net material product' (see Krejci and Machonin, 1996, p. 103). 
6 Accompanied by rapid urbanisation (Pa3iak, 1990). 
7 This, however, on the background of Czecho-Slovakia loosing competitiveness vis-ä-vis other 
advanced countries (Pavlinek, 1995, p. 357). 
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areas including health care, education, science and culture. These could be considered 
as positive legacies of state-socialism. 
Meanwhile, it has to be admitted that this development did not solve the `national' 
question as expected. In fact, with the economic equalisation between the two parts of 
Czecho-Slovakia nearly achieved, the political imbalance between the two nations 
become more visible and constitutional change more pressing. The window of 
opportunity for Slovak aspirations arrived with the 1968 `Prague Spring', attempting 
to create `socialism with a human face' (see Steiner, 1973). Indeed, one of the 
measures intended within this wide-ranging democratisation project was the 
federalisation of Czecho-Slovakia. Following the Soviet military invasion in August 
1968 this was probably the only reform that actually survived. On the 50th anniversary 
of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic (28 October 1968) the Treaty of Federation was 
signed. This was a major constitutional change and an important step for Slovakia 
despite the fact that real autonomy remained limited (Steiner, 1973) under the 
following twenty years of neo-stalinist `normalisation' (Krejci and Machonin, 1996; 
Sulc, 1998). True democratic autonomy remained an unfinished business (Steiner, 
1973). 
`Normalisation' not only affected the political atmosphere, it also froze intended 
economic reforms 
Oulc, 1998) and cemented the extensive model of development 
(see Smith, 1998). Thus even the relatively successful Czecho-Slovak economy (Cox 
and Mason, 1999, p. 74) began to experience growth performance difficulties. The 
country slipped further behind its western competitors (Pavlinek, 1995, p. 357; 
Sulc, 
1998) as the 1970s and the 1980s saw economic growth rates declining dramatically 
(Smith, 1998) possibly also reflecting the increasing economic pressure under which 
the Soviet system as a whole operated (cf. Clarke, 1993b; inter alia; cf. Chapter 4 of 
this thesis). Indeed, the growing gap in standards of living with its western neighbours 
(Germany, Austria) was one of the reasons why the eventual fall of state-socialism in 
1989 was met with such widespread popular applause. The `velvet revolution' 
brought the first free democratic elections in 1990 in which the Communist Party lost 
power, clearing the way for all-embracing socio-economic change amid the end of the 
Cold War. Ironically, this new democratic beginning marked the end of Czecho- 
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Slovakia. Indeed, with the arrival of the new geo-political situation, the reasons for 
economically supporting Slovakia disappeared overnight. The only remaining factor 
was an emotional attachment to Czecho-Slovak unity amid emerging powerful 
centrifugal forces. But as Krejci and Machonin (1996, p. 104) noted, when `on the 
Czech side the pragmatists won the day, the Slovaks lost their bargaining chips'. 
In 1991, the political and economic `transition' was launched (Adam, 1995; Mertik, 
1995; Sulc, 1998) along the lines of the neo-liberal `model scenario' discussed in 
Chapter 4. Much has been expected by the peoples of Czecho-Slovakia from the 
`transition'. Democracy and freedom, the `return to Europe' and above all, economic 
catch-up with the West, were among the aspirations. In return, much has been 
expected from Czecho-Slovakia (Brown, 1994, p. 50). However, the country itself 
disappeared from the map of Europe (Brown, 1994, p. 50) amid economic problems, 
political polarisation and regional fragmentation (Pavlinek, 1995). The process of 
disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia represents a good example of a `vicious circle' 
scenario introduced in Chapter 4 and will be examined in a more detail in section 7.5 
of this Chapter. Meanwhile, it is important to notice that in contrast to `vicious 
circles' elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the disintegration process between Czechs and 
Slovaks was resolved by political means. Thus following the `velvet divorce', 
Czecho-Slovakia peacefully defederated into two independent republics on January 1st 
1993. For Slovakia a completely new Chapter of history opened. For the first time 
under democratic circumstances Slovakia gained full political and economic 
autonomy. However, despite winning independence, the country did not free itself 
from its own historical legacies described above nor from the power of the wider 
political economy, which will be examined in turn. 
7.3 The wider political economy 
Indeed, the case of Slovakia reveals just how much the fortunes of a small 
`independent' region-state depends on the wider political economy. After liberating 
itself from the constraints of the Czecho-Slovak `nation-state' (while losing federal 
subsidies) and itself becoming a `nation-state', Slovakia directly exposed itself to the 
power of wider international political economy. This international political economy 
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created a new set of opportunities and challenges that manifest themselves through the 
combination of market forces (trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and financial 
capital) and the workings of international institutions. Each deserves closer 
examination. 
Trade 
' In the neo-liberal view (Sachs, 1990) trade was suppose to be one of the mechanisms 
to achieve economic convergence between the East and West. The reality, however, 
proved to be more complex and trade could be seen as providing important incentives 
but also powerful constraints (cf. Chapter 4). The Slovak economy is a case in point. 
As already mentioned, Slovakia's economy was built under state-socialism as an 
integral part of the CMEA economic system. This meant that both imports and 
exports were inextricably linked with the economies of other state-socialist countries, 
especially the USSR. But by the end of 1980s, economic relations between the USSR 
and its satellites became severely perturbed (Smith A. H., 1994) and eventually broke- 
down in the early 1990s after the economic and political collapse of the USSR 
(Clarke, 1993b). For Slovak producers this created a difficult situation. On the one 
hand, imports of raw materials and fuels from the former USSR had to be paid in 
convertible currency in world prices, while on the other hand, Eastern European 
markets virtually collapsed. Meanwhile, the small domestic market was further 
depressed as a result of the `shock therapy' (Gowan, 1995). Such a situation could not 
have been resolved without dramatic changes to the country's trade regime. Indeed, 
alongside other CEECs (Smith A. H., 2000), Slovakia underwent a profound re- 
orientation of trade from Eastern markets towards `West Europeanization' (Smith, 
1998, p. 200). In 1999 the share of the EU on Slovak exports and imports reached 60.1 
per cent and 51.9 per cent respectively (Karasz et al., 2000) as the EU became the 
country's biggest trading partner. 
There is no doubt that such a dramatic change was aided by the Association 
Agreements8 that liberalised trade between the EU and the CEECs (including 
8 Later called Europe Agreements 
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Slovakia)9 (Smith A. H., 1994). Observers agree, that the recovery of the Slovak 
economy in the mid-1990s (see section 7.4) was indeed export-led (Smith, 1998, 
p. 199; Morvay, 2000). The liberalisation of trade with the West, however, is a double- 
edged sword. Following the removal of trade barriers, in line with the general pattern 
found in the CEECs (see Chapter 4), the Slovak domestic market became flooded by 
Western products (Smith, 1998, p. 199; Gowan, 1995, p. 24), contributing later to a 
chronic negative trade balance and subsequent current accounts deficit (Karäsz et al., 
2000; GO SR, 1999, p. 5). Meanwhile a detailed analysis of Association Agreements 
shows that in several sensitive commodities, considerable EU barriers for Eastern 
exporters remained operational (Gibb and Michalak, 1994; Williams et al., 1998; 
Smith A. H, 1994; inter alia). Furthermore, from a longer-term perspective, the CEECs 
seem to have difficulty trading more sophisticated commodities (cf. Myant, 1999a). 
This includes Slovakia whose exports are found to be of relatively low value added 
(see Outrata, 1999). These emerging trade patterns seem to correspond to `hub-and- 
spoke' economic relations between the East and West evoked by Gowan (1995, p. 17, 
28) and to contribute to the reworking of socio-spatial divisions of labour in Europe 
(cf. Smith et al., 2002; Williams et al, 1998, p. 140) to which Slovakia is increasingly 
subjected. Being one of the smallest and one of the most opened national economies 
among the CEECs10 (see Smith, 1998, p. 199) foreign trade represents a `key 
determinant' of Slovakia's economic development (Käräsz et al., 2000, p. 18). Yet, 
key Slovak exports are made up of a narrow commodity structure (Morvay, 2000, 
p. 27; OECD, 1996c) which is very sensitive to cyclical fluctuations on external 
markets. Slovak fortunes thus inextricably depend on the wider international political 
economy outside direct Slovak control. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Another important element of the wider political economy is foreign direct 
investment (FDI). It was heralded by neo-liberals as yet another vehicle for economic 
9 Smith A. H. argues that the Association Agreements created an anomaly whereas EU members gained 
better access to the market of any one East-Central European country than the other Visegrad countries 
themselves (Smith A. H., 1994, p. 16). This anomaly was later reduced by progressive liberalisation 
within CEFTA. 
lo In 1993 Slovakia recorded export dependency rate of 49 per cent, the highest among Visegrad 
countries (Smith, 1998, p. 199) 
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development, employment, high wages, technology transfer, and the eventual 
economic catch-up of the East with the West (see Chapter 4). Again the reality is 
somewhat different. As revealed in Chapter 4, the FDI inflow into the CEECs 
remained relatively low (Smith, 1998, p. 253, note 44; Poliert, 1999a, p. 112; EBRD, 
1998) and where is does occur, it is highly unevenly distributed among countries and 
regions. 
Slovakia is one of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe where FDI failed to 
establish a significant presence during the 1990s (Ferencikovä et al., 1997). Indeed, in 
per capita terms, FDI in Slovakia remained well below levels recorded in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, and lagging behind the Polish figure (EBRD, 1998). Such 
poor performance could be attributed to various factors. It is likely, that investors 
remained sceptical about the economic viability of the Slovak industrial structure, 
further compounded by doubts about early EU membership. This was not unrelated to 
perceived political instability and uncertainty about the country's overall political and 
economic direction (see also Williams et al., 1998, p. 139; Smith, 1998). On the 
Slovak side, meanwhile, despite proclaimed interest in receiving FDI, very little has 
been done in practical terms. Institutional structures for attracting FDI appear to be 
inadequate (see more in section 7.6). Furthermore, the mid-1990s saw in fact a 
hesitancy in accepting foreign capital and other forms of external participation in the 
Slovak economy (see Smith, 1998, p. 233-234) and official privatisation policy 
favoured domestic investors (see Smith, 1998; Williams et al., 1998, p. 139). Thus, up 
until the end of the 1990s big FDI projects in Slovakia remained rather isolated 
phenomena (see Pavlinek and Smith, 1998). 
Furthermore, FDI contributed to an uneven process of transformation as incoming 
investment clearly favoured the most profitable or potentially profitable (existing) 
enterprises. In geographic terms, most of the investment occurred in the capital city of 
Bratislava exacerbating the country's regional inequalities (see section 7.7). Where 
FDI penetrated into more peripheral regions this did not necessarily translate into 
improved economic and social conditions (Pavlinek and Smith, 1998; Smith, 1998; 
Smith and FerenCikovä, 1998). Taken together, the expected transformative effects of 
FDI for the economy as a whole did not materialise (Smith, 1998, p. 236). 
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Nevertheless, FDI represents yet another element of progressive incorporation of 
Slovakia into the wider political economy and international divisions of labour. 
A flagship investment of Volkswagen (VW) in BAZ Bratislava" is a case in point. 
VW took over an existing plant while shifting to a reliance on external (German) 
sourced inputs and exports markets and integrating it into VW's global strategy of 
cutting production costs of niche market products. Thus, VW Bratislava is directly 
integrated with trans-national production networks and supply chains. Yet, at the same 
time, it created an `enclave development' in which VW Bratislava remains isolated 
from local linkages and the national economy12 (Smith, 1998, p. 236-7; see also 
Pavlinek and Smith, 1998). Besides, as with other FDI ventures, appropriated value 
seems to be flowing in the East-West direction (cf. Smith et al., 2002) thus forming 
part of an emerging particular geometry of European and global value chains. More 
generally, such value chains contribute to a particular position of the Slovak economy 
within the wider international political economy where `the role for Slovakia [is that 
of] a cheap, moderately skilled labour reserve' (Smith, 1998, p. 249). Further direct 
insertion of the Slovak economy into the international value networks occurred in the 
1998-2002 period when foreign investors were allowed to gain control over major 
state banks, telecommunications and energy sectors (see also section 7.5). 
International financial capital 
Another important factor that needs to be taken into consideration (often omitted) is 
financial capital and the workings of the financial markets (cf. Kolodko, 2000). 
However, as far as capital markets in Central Europe remain underdeveloped (Bald!, 
1996), there are two main mechanisms through which the power of financial capital is 
manifested - the mechanism of borrowing and debt and currency exchange rate 
fluctuations. With regard to the former, it is useful to note that Slovakia (together with 
the Czech Republic) inherited low initial levels of foreign debt (in comparison to 
Poland or Hungary) (Baläz, 1996, p. 256). Nevertheless, Slovak external debt was 
11 BAZ Bratislava was built during the state-socialist period as a part of effort of Slovak policy makers 
to achieve greater economic autonomy within Czecho-Slovakia. However, the plant was used mainly 
for component production for Skoda (see also Pavlinek and Smith, 1998). 
12 More recently there have been attempts to embed the plant by supporting supply-networks. 
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growing through the 1990s (Karasz et al., 2000, p. 41) as both government and the 
business sector relied on borrowing from Western creditors (interview NBS, 1999). 
Credits could be seen as important incentives for the economy, however, they quickly 
turn into a constraint when loans and interest have to be paid back (cf. Kahler, 1998). 
The level of external debt of Slovakia is already a matter of concern (interview NBS, 
1999). Indeed, there is a danger that a `vicious circle' can arise where the difficulty of 
paying back original loans, will be translated into a difficulty to get new ones. 
Usually, if new loans are secured at all, they come with an increased cost (higher 
interest) further compounding the problem. At best such a scenario can contribute to 
`fiscal squeeze'. At worst, a country can fall into an `indebtedness trap' resulting in a 
`fiscal crisis' of the state (cf. Kahler, 1998). 
Indeed, conditions for the CEECs for borrowing were not very favourable in the 
1990s reflecting a general uncertainty about the region. Slovakia's position was worse 
that that of Hungary or the Czech Republic given the economic and political problems 
experienced (see more in sections 7.4 and 7.5). This was reflected in the investment 
ratings of the country and was translated into more expensive loans in comparison to 
its two neighbours (MESA10,1998; GO SR, 1999). One way or another, the above 
integration with international financial markets represents a particular form of 
insertion into socio-spatial value chains that is characterised by uneven relations 
between (Western) debtors and their (Eastern) creditors. Slovakia is now directly 
implicated in these relations. In addition, international currency moves and exchange 
rate fluctuations, that are largely beyond Slovakia's control, have direct powerful 
effects on debt repayments, with important repercussions for the Slovak economy as a 
whole (interview Kozlik, 2001). 
Slovakia and international organisations 
Finally, the role of international organisations such as the EU, NATO, IMF, WB, 
EBRD, OECD and WTO needs to be taken into consideration. These organisations act 
as powerful promoters of neo-liberal `transition' and political liberalisation and have 
maintained a powerful role in Central and Eastern Europe (see Chapter 4). Through 
the set of incentives and constraints that they impose, they are directly or indirectly 
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influencing the economic fortunes of CEECs. This is a critical area where independent 
Slovakia literally had to `negotiate' its position. 
It is fair to argue that the initial position of Slovakia was rather difficult, as the 
country was facing several challenges. These included; the transformation to a market 
economy amid an economic slump and growing unemployment (see section 7.4), the 
transformation of a faltering industrial economy, attempts to join the EU combined 
with the challenge of building an independent state following the break-up of Czecho- 
Slovakia. There is no doubt the creation of independent Slovakia was accompanied by 
suspicion by international organisations over Slovakia's political direction and 
economic viability. As Brown (1994, p. 64) put it, the `Slovak' question had became 
`Slovakia' question. 
Nevertheless, all the above mentioned organisations played their role in instituting 
socio-economic change in Slovakia. In the early stages of economic transformation, 
missions of the IMF and the World Bank probably played critical roles. Their 
assistance, however, was not without conditions attached (see Smith, 1998). The 
WTO, which Slovakia joined in 1995, and the OECD of which Slovakia has been a 
member since 2000 played their part in constraining the Slovak economy, as the 
country had to comply with the liberalisation of trade and financial flows as part of its 
membership obligations (cf. EBRD, 1998, p. 188; Jakoby et al., 2000, p. 466). 
However, throughout the 1990s, it was probably the European Union that became the 
single most powerful international partner for Slovakia. The prospect of EU 
membership is in a way seen as the ultimate goal of the transformation process, and 
few have doubts about the positive effects of such membership. Successive Slovak 
governments proclaimed that EU integration was a top priority - one that through the 
1990s enjoyed popular support. However, the process of joining the Union itself could 
be seen as promising attractive incentives while imposing powerful constraints. 
Tangible economic incentives were the technical and financial aid as part of the 
pHARE programme that was supposed to ease the pre-accession process. The overall 
amount of candidate countries assistance was so far low and of problematic value (see 
Gowan, 1995, p. 34-39). Furthermore, in the Slovak case, effective use of this aid was 
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hindered by the difficulties in EU-Slovak political relations under the Mediar 
government as well as the low absorption capacity on the Slovak side (see section 
7.6). 
Meanwhile, powerful constraints have been in operation. These stem from the 
{ conditions that candidate countries have to fulfil in order to join the `rich club', 
including approximation and enforcement of law comparable to that existing in 
member states, but also creating an overall economic and political framework in 
accordance with EU standards. In case of non-compliance with the `rules of the 
game', the EU is ready to step in as a disciplining force. The effect of this was fully 
felt in Slovakia after the EU decided to exclude the country from the first wave of 
negotiations for EU entry due to the non-compliance with political criteria (i. e. a 
perceived democratic deficit). The damage was compounded by the subsequent 
decision of NATO to exclude Slovakia from its first eastward expansion while 
neighbouring Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were included. These 
decisions had important implications for Slovakia's international credibility and had 
repercussions for the domestic economy and polity. 
After 1998 the situation changed dramatically as the new Slovak government devoted 
enormous effort to putting Slovakia back on track for integration with both NATO 
and the EU. In relation to the latter, the government hoped to catch-up with the `first 
group' and to create conditions for early entry into the Union. While this stratagem 
seems to be working, it is not without problems and contradictions. On the legal side, 
the effort to achieve quick approximation of law was remarkable. However, as one of 
the senior Slovak officials disclosed, legislation was often rash at the expense of 
coherence of the country's legal system, while stating bluntly that `[approximation 
laws] are "bad", but have priority' (interview, senior Slovak official, 2000). 
Furthermore, opposition parties (such as Smer) accused the government of advancing 
negotiations without taking into due account national economic interests (see 
Financial Times, 12 August, 2002). 
Meanwhile, the biggest contradiction emerges between the EU integration effort and 
market liberalisation. Not only are the two processes not necessarily mutually self- 
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supporting, they often seem to go against each other. Indeed, the recent attempt to 
further liberalise the economy in order to bring Slovakia closer to EU integration, 
created several paradoxical outcomes. It appears to further destabilise an already 
fragile economy, contributes to growing social and regional polarisation and, last but 
not least, fuels political conflict. All these outcomes (explored later in the Chapter), in 
fact, could be seen as bringing Slovakia further away from the ideals of the European 
Union. Solutions to these problems at the national level become problematic. Indeed, 
social and regional polarisation is reaching alarming proportions precisely at the 
moment when the state is attempting to reduce its social and regional redistribution 
role. Furthermore, there is a direct contradiction between neo-liberal reform and the 
practical needs of EU integration in terms of institutional capacity. Indeed, neo-liberal 
pressure for the state to reduce its administrative burden is coming precisely at the 
moment when extra administrative capacities and institutional resources are needed 
for EU accession. Finally, an additional paradox emerges in relation to the 
`knowledge economy'. The EU is committed to becoming `the most competitive 
knowledge economy in the world' (cf. Chapter 1), however, in candidate countries 
including Slovakia, marketisation apparently contributes to the decline in indigenous 
R&D activities and institutions on which long-term competitive `knowledge 
economy' could be built. Taken together, the combination of the powerful external 
forces could be seen as contributing to the `vicious circle' that will be explored in 
detail in section 7.5. Meanwhile, it has to be acknowledged that the combination of 
market forces (trade, investment, financial capital) and the workings of international 
organisations has a direct impact on Slovakia's position within international divisions 
of labour and ultimately on the country's economic performance to which we now 
turn. 
7.4 Economic performance 
Owing to the historical circumstances discussed in section 7.2, Slovakia at the 
beginning of the 20th century was characterised by a relatively low initial economic 
activity level. This, for the most part, agrarian economy with only a limited industrial 
base was lagging considerably behind the rich industrial Czech economy - the 
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contrast that became much too evident after the creation of Czecho-Slovak Republic 
in 1918. After the Second World War, the state-socialist regime was committed to 
overcoming relative Slovak social and economic backwardness. Through `forced 
industrialisation', (Smith, 1998) the country achieved impressive economic growth 
and (due to factors discussed earlier) the dramatic improvement of social and 
economic conditions. Full employment and growing real standards of living (Cox and 
Mason, 1999, p. 73) characterised the economy despite the economic slowdown of the 
late 1970s and 1980s. 
The eventual collapse of state-socialism in 1989 brought about major economic 
change. For Slovakia this was a critical time as the economic structure, built under the 
state-socialism, became severely tested by marketization and globalisation (Smith, 
1998). The `shock therapy' introduced in January 1991 by the Federal government 
(Dyba and ývejnar, 1994; ýulc, 1998; gvejnar, 1997; inter alia) had shocking 
outcomes (see Adam, 1995; Poliert, 1999a). The depth of `transitional recession' was 
surprising, further compounded by the disintegration of CMEA, the virtual collapse of 
Eastern markets and the simultaneous attack of Western competition on the domestic 
market. Within the first year of `transition', Czecho-Slovak gross domestic product 
(GDP) dropped by 16 % and unemployment jumped from zero to 6.8 %, while 
inflation reached 58 % (OECD, 1993, p. 113). The impact of the `transitional 
recession' had highly uneven regional impacts. Owing to its unfavourable economic 
structure and dependency on collapsing Eastern markets, Slovakia was hit harder and 
suffered a disproportionate share of the decline of GDP and jobs. The Economist 
(1999) estimates that in 1991, the first year of economic `transition', the GDP of the 
Czech Republic dropped by 11.6% as compared to 14.6% in the Slovak Republic. A 
year later, Slovak GDP shrank by a further 6.5% as compared to 3.3% in the Czech 
Republic. At the heart of the decline was the industrial economy. According to 
UNIDO (1992; cited in Pavlinek, 1995) industrial production in 1991 declined by 
19.7% in the Czech Republic, but almost 25% in Slovakia. 
However, the most dramatic disparity between the two Republics had appeared in 
term of job losses (see Figure 7.1 in Appendix). Clearly, unemployment grew much 
faster in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. Following the first year of the `shock 
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therapy', joblessness in Slovakia in December 1991 reached double figures (10.4%) in 
contrast to the Czech rate of 4.1%. During the second year of `transition' 
unemployment in the Czech Republic is actually said to have declined to 2.7% but in 
Slovakia it climbed to 13.5% (Pavlinek, 1995, p. 370, note22). The OECD (1996d, 
p. 37) noted that the uneven distribution of unemployment became the leading regional 
problem within Czecho-Slovak Federation. In retrospect, growing economic 
disparities appeared to be more than just a `regional' problem. Indeed as it will be 
demonstrated in section 7.5, the economic disparity between Slovakia and the Czech 
Lands proved to be critical for the future of the whole state as an important factor 
behind the eventual disintegration of Czecho-Slovak Federation (see also Pavlinek, 
1995). This split was eventually agreed between the Slovak Prime Minister of 
Vladimir Me6iar and the Czech Prime Minister Väclav Klaus. 
On ls` January 1993, Slovakia emerged as an independent trading nation amid fears 
and speculations about its economic future. As already mentioned earlier, 
international institutions were sceptical about the economic viability of the Slovak 
economy. Grim predictions, however, did not materialise. Not only did the Slovak 
economy survive, but in fact it did surprisingly well13. Initially, the first year of 
independence saw the further deterioration of the economic situation. GDP dropped 
by 3.7% and unemployment reached an alarming level of 14.4%, peaking at 14.8% a 
year later (Morvay, 2000). Economic difficulties were accompanied by growing 
political tension and instability culminating in 1994 with the fall and the subsequent 
re-emergence of HZDS-led government of Vladimir Me6iar14. 
Amid the political turmoil (see more in section 7.5), however, the year 1994 was a 
turnaround for the economy. For the first time since the transformation started the 
Slovak economy saw a positive growth of 4.9%. A year later Slovakia enjoyed one of 
the highest rates of output among `transition' countries with GDP soaring by 7.4% 
(OECD, 1996e, p. 135). The strong growth continued in the subsequent years as the 
Slovak GDP increased by 6.6% in 1996,6.5% in 1997 and 4.4% in 1998 (Morvay, 
13 Economic performance of Slovakia, however, was overshadowed by the country's bad political 
reputation after becoming `one of Eastern Europe's new problem children' (Brown, 1994, p. 50). 
14 HZDS formed a coalition with Slovak National Party (SNS) and Association of Workers of Slovakia 
(ZRS). 
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2000, p. 54) making the country one of the fastest growing economies in the region 
(see The Economist, 1997, p. 47) and giving some foundation for the term the `Slovak 
economic miracle' (Smith, 2000, p. 153). Indeed, such a positive trend took observers 
by surprise (cf. OECD, 1996c, p. 1). A particular feature of this performance was that 
is was achieved without substantial participation of foreign capital as FDI inflow 
remained relatively low during that period (see above). This does not mean that the 
external economic environment did not play an important role. Indeed, the main 
driving force behind the 1994 and 1995 growth figures was a surge in export activity 
(Smith, 1998; Morvay, 2000) that formed an important part of the remaking of 
economic relations with the international political economy considered in section 7.3. 
However, it appears that domestic factors played an increasing role behind the growth 
in subsequent years (i. e. between 1996 and 1998). 
In particular the role of the Slovak government proved to be an important factor 
behind this growth through the expansion of public expenditure (cf. Toth, 2000) and 
the realisation of major infrastructural investments. Behind this `expansionist 
financial policy' of the government was a `diversion from liberal models' of 
`transition' and the growing emphasis on the role of the state and the social dimension 
of transformation (Morvay, 2000, p. 40; see also Haughton, 2001). There were also 
more prosaic reasons - the effort to accomplish major investments initiated under 
state-socialism such as the gigantic Danube Dam at Gabdikovo and Mochovce nuclear 
power plant and to make them useful for the national economy (interview Kozlik, 
2001). Further economic stimulus was expected from an ambitious motorway 
construction programme. Besides its obvious long-term transport infrastructural 
importance and being an additional effort to utilise idle domestic construction 
capacities and its labour, it was believed that such programme could trigger multiplier 
effects for the struggling domestic industrial economy (interview NBS, 1999). In 
particular, it was believed that engineering companies would benefit by providing 
machinery necessary for the motorway construction. This, however, proved 
illusionary as domestic engineering companies could not keep up with the 
construction rate and the bulk of the machinery was imported from abroad (interview 
NBS, 1999) contributing to a growing trade imbalance. However, the rate of 
infrastructural development continued apace and probably even accelerated with the 
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approaching critical general elections scheduled for September 1998, where 
infrastructural achievements played an important part of Meciar's HZDS election 
campaign. Even a top HZDS economist and former Deputy Premier and Finance 
Minister Sergej Kozlik admitted in an interview (July 2001) that the rate of public 
expenditure was probably unsustainable and was to be reduced in the aftermath of the 
elections. 
Despite these massive investments of `nationalistic Keynesianism' unemployment 
remained rather high (one of the highest in the region) showing only a modest decline 
from 14.8% in 1994 to 12.5% in 1997 (Morvay, 2000). Furthermore, the particular 
mode of growth described above contributed to growing macro-economic imbalances. 
Indeed, after 1996, the Slovak economy displayed signs of `overheating' alongside a 
growing trade deficit. In 1998, the current account deficit of the balance of payments 
surpassed 10% of GDP for the third consecutive year and the (gross) foreign debt 
reached 60% of GDP. Growing indebtedness of the public sector was accompanied by 
a growing fiscal deficit of government (GO SR, 1999; see also Marendin and Beblavy, 
2000). GO SR (1999) further argued that a two-digit current account deficit is 
unsustainable and that `the Slovak economy avoided an acute financial crisis in 1997- 
98 only due to the relatively low integration of Slovak financial markets with the rest 
of the world' (GO SR, 1999, p. 5). In his overall assessment Morvay (2000, p. 17; 
author's translation) suggests that `Slovakia created an impression of a successful 
country' but that the possibilities of economic growth based on demand-side were 
quickly exhausted. 
A `major change in the conception of transformation' and `return to values of 
liberalism and neo-institutionalism' (Morvay, 2000, p. 45-46) were associated with the 
new coalition government that replaced Me6iar's administration after the September 
1998 general elections. In the name of restoring `economic balance' a sequence of 
austerity measures have been introduced since 1999 (Jakoby et al., 2000) aiming to 
reduce public expenditure and domestic consumption and marked a major 
disengagement of the state from the economy. In addition, price liberalisation 
packages and a new wave of privatisation formed a part of what Business Central 
Europe named `brutal reform' (see BCE, 1999, p. 38). 
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The immediate effects of such reform were indeed dramatic. GDP growth was slashed 
amid growing inflation, a surge in the trade deficit, mounting foreign debt and overall 
destabilisation of the economic environment. The most visible outcomes were falling 
real wages and a rocketing unemployment rate reaching historical highs of 20.8% in 
January 2001 (Kozlik, 2001) and contributing to a sharp rise of regional disparities 
(see section 7.7). There was an important rise in the inflow of foreign capital (see 
Karäsz, 2001), but this was mostly associated with the privatisation of the remaining 
state enterprises including gas and electricity networks, telecommunications and 
major banks. Some of these privatisation deals bear the mark of `panic sales' 
(interview Kozlik, 2001) and represent another major jump of the economy into 
external control and its direct insertion into international value chains. After a 
sluggish 1.9% increase in 1999 and 2.2% in 2000, Slovak GDP growth was slowly 
improving but it remains to be seen how much room there is for a major recovery of a 
small open economy in the context of global economic slowdown. 
In retrospect, the period of economic transformation in the 1990s could be seen as 
certain `disillusionment' (Morvay, 2000, p. 19). Indeed, when neo-liberal `shock 
therapy' was embraced in 1991 few expected such a deep initial decline and 
subsequent economic difficulties. After a painful decade of `transition', Slovakia was 
one of the first CEECs to eventually surpass its 1989 economic level (Kozlik, 2000, 
p. 2; see also EBRD, 1998). However, economic convergence with the EU is proving 
difficult. Following the period of strong economic growth (1994-1998) Slovakia 
experienced slow convergence and approached 50% of average EU GDP level (cf. 
Table 4.1 in Appendix) but then the gap started to grow again as Slovak GDP relative 
to the EU average slipped back again (cf. Kozlik, 2000, p. 2). 
On the background of these macro-economic figures, the Slovak economy and society 
experienced massive transformation. There was a substantial transfer of property from 
collective or state hands to private hands (both domestic and foreign). At least 85% of 
GDP is produced in the private sector (Kozlik, 2000, p. 3; Morvay, 2000, p. 19) while 
new social class relations are emerging (see Smith, 1998) amid growing regional and 
social polarisation (see section 7.7). In structural terms, the economy saw a major 
225 
shift towards tertiarization (Morvay, 2000, p. 20) as the share of tertiary sector in the 
value-added produced increased from 32.2 % in 1989 to 63.8 % in 1996. The share of 
industry (secondary sector) meanwhile declined from 58.3 % to 31 % (Outrata, 1999, 
p. 127). The trend towards a `post-industrial' economy, however, was not 
accompanied by growing `knowledge' and/or `value-intensity'. Indeed, the shift could 
be more attributed to the faltering industrial economy (Smith, 1998) and rapid growth 
of services that were previously suppressed or underdeveloped including financial 
services and retail (Outrata, 1999). Thus, the transformation towards a higher value- 
added economy remains a challenge for Slovakia (Outrata, 1999), while solving the 
growing unemployment crisis becomes a pressing social and political need. The role 
of Slovak institutions in stimulating the economy and the attempts to encourage a 
transformation towards the `knowledge economy' will be now examined in more 
detail. 
7.5 The institutional landscape 
After examining the historical background, the wider political economy contexts and 
recent economic performance of Slovakia, the attention of this section focuses 
primarily on Slovak institutions and their role in economic development. The section 
will first attempt to trace the emergence of Slovak institutions in the context of 
historical developments before turning to more recent institutional changes. In line 
with the argumentation developed in earlier Chapters, it will be demonstrated that 
institutions themselves are part of wider social, economic and political struggles. 
Indeed, the disintegration of the Czecho-Slovak federation and the emergence of an 
independent Slovakia itself can be seen as an outcome of such struggles and provides 
a compelling example of a `vicious circle' scenario occurring under `transition', that 
has been discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, institutional developments within 
independent Slovakia clearly demonstrate that institutions can be seen as outcomes, 
objects and/or subjects of wider struggles. This will be highlighted in the example of 
the process of regionalisation of the country. The section will then move on to 
examine the ability of Slovak institutions to design strategies for tackling economic 
problems of `transition' and to address imperatives of the `knowledge economy'. The 
evidence presented will point to the fact that the unstable economic, political and 
226 
social environment of transformation created rather unfavourable conditions for 
institutional building. In return, unstable institutional structures could be expected to 
have only a limited role in shifting the economic trajectories of the country. 
Institutional development in context 
It is useful to start by putting Slovak institutional developments into a historical 
context. Through the long periods of history, Slovak institutions were noticeable for 
their absence. In fact, it could be said that it was a `miracle' (Steiner, 1973, p. 7; de 
Bray, 1969, p. 51) that the Slovak nation and its identity survived `thousand years of 
alien domination' without formal national institutions 15. The situation started to 
change in the late 18th and 19`h century, on the wave of national awakening (see 
Kirschbaum, 1995; Seton-Watson, 1943). 
In 1848, the Slovak National Council (Slovenskä närodnä rada - SNR) was born 
declaring political autonomy of Slovakia from within Hungary. The political and 
cultural aims of the SNR were firmly connected to economic ones. As famously 
proclaimed by Eudovit 
ýtür, the leader of the national movement, `[i]ndustrialisation 
cannot prosper in an unfree country ... It can flourish only as an organic part of 
national life under conditions of liberty' (cited in Steiner, 1973, p. 11). In order to 
achieve liberty, the SNR even led a rebellion, albeit unsuccessfully, against Hungarian 
rule (Steiner, 1973; Seton-Watson, 1943). After the military and political defeat, 
national leaders began to focus on boosting national identity and consciousness 
through institutions like Matica Slovenskc (The Slovak Mother). Following the 
consolidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (in 1867), however, the emerging 
Slovak institutions such as Matica, were ruthlessly suppressed (see Bosdk, 1991, 
p. 68). 
The situation changed dramatically with the creation of the first Czecho-Slovak 
Republic in 1918. The Slovak language became one of the official languages and the 
Slovak identity and culture was preserved and strengthened 16. The foundations of a 
is Church and Christianity were probably the only significant institutions for a long period of time. 
16 This was despite official ideology of a `Czechoslovak' nation (see Brown, 1994). 
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modem educational system were laid down and the first modem university opened in 
Bratislava in 1919 (Steiner, 1973, p. 19). Besides, for the first time in the modem 
history, Slovaks had some political representation and limited influence over their 
affairs (Steiner, 1973). However, the idea of Slovak political autonomy which was 
guaranteed by the Pittsburgh Agreement signed by Czech and Slovak representations 
in USA in 1918 never came to fruition (Bosäk, 1991, p. 73; Steiner, 1973, p. 18-19). 
Thus up until the late 1930s, Czecho-Slovakia was a unitary state and Slovakia was 
largely governed by the Czechs'7. It was only after the Munich Agreement of 1938 
(carving out border regions of Bohemia to Germany) that Slovakia eventually 
managed to achieve a `fairly high degree of autonomy' (Steiner, 1973, p. 34) and to 
create its own devolved regional government and Parliament, while losing southern 
Slovakia to Hungary (Baläz, 1995, p. 359). In March 1939, Czecho-Slovakia ceased to 
exist as Germans occupied the Czech Lands, while the Slovak autonomous parliament 
declared independence under considerable external pressure (Steiner, 1973, p. 37). 
Owing to these developments Slovakia entered a short-lived and controversial period 
of independence and, under particular war-time conditions, attempted to develop the 
institutions of a fully-fledged country. 
After the Second World War, however, Slovakia was back to square one as Slovak 
institutions were largely superseded by the re-established Czecho-Slovak Republic. 
Furthermore, following the communist take-over in 1948, Slovaks were to be 
integrated into a `socialist' society where the single most important institution was the 
Communist Party leaving little room for national sentiments. National sentiments 
were in fact actively suppressed and several Slovak communists (including later 
Czecho-Slovak President Husak) served prison sentences for `bourgeois nationalism' 
(Steiner, 1973, p. 93; Brown, 1994, p. 53). As Steiner (1973, p. 92) noted, the remaining 
Slovak institutions, gradually became `empty symbols of Slovak nationhood'. 
`Instead of dealing with specifically Slovak affairs, their role was confined 
mainly to the task of implementing all-state laws and instructions. Instead of 
directly promoting Slovak interests they became one of the many instruments 
17 See Steiner (1973, Chapter 3) for details about Czech dominated administration in Prague and 
Bratislava. 
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in the hands of the Czech Communists who were intent on fighting "unhealthy 
tendencies of local patriotism"' (ibid, p. 92) 
However, neither political pressure nor the economic development of post-war years 
could stop Slovak aspirations for more equal national status within Czecho-Slovakia. 
On the wave of democratisation protests of 1968, Slovak leaders managed to negotiate 
a federal settlement18 (Steiner, 1973, chap. 12-22). The constitutional law signed on 28 
October 1968 coming into force on 1St January 1969 transformed Czecho-Slovakia 
into a federal country and gave Slovakia an unprecedented level of influence over 
Czecho-Slovak as well as over its own affairs (Steiner, 1973, chap. 22). The Czecho- 
Slovak Parliament reflected the federal structure. It consisted of two chambers, the 
Chamber of the People, which had proportional representation of the Czech and 
Slovak deputies, and the Chamber of Nations where the Slovaks gained parity 
representation with the Czechs. Meanwhile the two constituent republics were 
formed, the Czech (Socialist) Republic and Slovak (Socialist) Republic, with their 
own `National Councils' (autonomous parliaments with limited legislative powers) 
and governments. 
Thus, 120 years after the first attempt to create the Slovak National Council, Slovakia 
gained control over several `devolved matters' including education, culture and 
limited competencies in economic planning. Meanwhile, functions such as defence, 
foreign affairs, economy and finances, foreign trade, labour and social affairs etc. 
remained firmly in hands of the federal government in Prague (see Steiner, 1973, 
p. 198; Kirschbaum, 1995, p. 243-244). 
As already pointed out in section 7.2, due to the particular historical circumstances, 
the above settlement meant only limited autonomy to Slovakia. Indeed, as Crawford 
(1996, p. 140) noted, it was autonomy only in theory, not in practice. But whatever its 
limitations, this was another important step in Slovak `nation-building' (Brown, 1994, 
p. 54-55). Importantly, it also gave Slovakia an administrative and political platform 
from which subsequent battles could have been fought while creating a constitutional 
18 Not least thanks to Alexander Dub6ek, a Czecho-Slovak Communist Party leader of the `Prague 
Spring', who was Slovak. 
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and legal basis for the modem Slovak statehood. All these factors became important 
following the fall of state-socialism. 
Vicious circle and institutional responses to transformation 
The fall of state-socialism in 1989 could be see as an institutional earthquake and 
subsequent transformation as creating a highly turbulent socio-economic environment. 
Within such an environment, significant economic, political, ideological, cultural and 
institutional battles were fought, having important consequences for the institutional 
landscape of Slovakia. Importantly, a powerful combination of economic, political 
and cultural processes created a `vicious circle' that eventually resulted in the 
dissolution of Czecho-Slovak federation. Indeed, growing economic disparities 
between the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic (see section 7.4) following the 
introduction of `shock therapy' played an important role in the process (Pavlinek, 
1995). As soon as 1991, when the first transitional 'shock' hit the Federation, Slovakia 
witnessed growing electoral support for political forces seeking the transfer of more 
competencies from the federal level and ultimately more autonomy for this smaller 
Republic. More and more Slovaks were ready to believe that inter-republic disparities 
were the result of the policy of the Federal government (dominated by Czechs) that 
paid very little attention to Slovak economic 'specifics'. Moreover, the question of 
`who subsidised whom' had been opened as `transition' exposed economic relations 
between the two republics. Indeed, part of the market reform was a withdrawal of the 
state from the economy and the elimination of subsidies. But following the fall in 
inter-republic redistribution, there was a growing feeling in Slovakia that the Czechs 
were abandoning the Slovaks precisely at the moment when help was needed the 
most. Meanwhile, a growing number of Slovak economists and politicians argued that 
the economic sovereignty of Slovakia, with a reform programme adapted to its 
different economic structure, would be the right answer to its current problems (see 
Pavlinek, 1995; Dedek et al., 1996). 
The critical factor in such a situation was that processes of regional economic 
fragmentation (Pavlinek, 1995) were accompanied by the process of cultural 
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identification and identity formation. Indeed, as soon as censorship was lifted and 
communist ideology removed, the search for new identities, including ethnic and/or 
national identity (re)started. In Slovakia, old national sentiments begun to surface 
again (see Brown, 1994) enhanced by the sense of a `threat' to national survival. The 
awakening Slovak nationalism, nevertheless, did not necessarily mean a support for 
separation. Rather, for most Slovaks, democratisation was a chance to accomplish the 
search for more equal relations between the two federation-forming nations. The 
Slovak aspirations, however, were met with a `lack of imagination' and sensitivity, or 
even `neglect', on the Czech side (Brown, 1994, p. 56-58). This only accelerated 
emerging political fragmentation. 
Indeed, the two issues, the 'economic' and the 'national' one, eventually found a sound 
political expression. A massive political split appeared as a result of the second post- 
communist general elections in June 1992 as the two republics ended-up with political 
representations embodying two very different constitutional and economic agendas 
and resulting in a difficulty to create a federal government. A centre-left Movement 
for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by Vladimir McCiar emerged victorious in 
Slovakia, advocating an idea of `confederation of the two sovereign nations' (Brown, 
1994, p. 58) and supporting an idea of slower pace of economic transition. Meanwhile, 
in the Czech Republic, a right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS) became the 
strongest Czech political party19. Its leader, reformist Väclav Klaus, continued to 
advocate the idea of `shock therapy' with no room for regional variations (cf. Brown, 
1994, p. 61-63). 
The two different concepts of economic reform ('shock therapy' vs. more gradualist 
approach) and the two different constitutional positions (federation vs. confederation) 
proved to be incompatible. The Czech representation was ready to compromise 
neither on the matter of constitution (Brown, 1994, p. 58-59) nor on the matter of 
economic policy and maintained a position of'one federal state, one economic policy'. 
However, the continuation of the federal economic policy that seemed to disadvantage 
Slovakia, was clearly unacceptable for Slovak leaders. As a result of this powerful 
combination of economic, cultural and political processes a deadlock over the further 
19 For detail results of the elections see Mansfeldov'a (1998). 
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continuation of the economic transformation as well as the nature and scale of the 
political change appeared. The `vicious circle' eventually resulted in a 'Velvet 
Divorce' accomplishing the emerging institutional split. By 1st January 1993, Czecho- 
Slovakia peacefully disintegrated into two independent nations. Federal level 
institutions were abolished and the two republics took over remaining federal 
competencies while becoming sovereign subjects of international law. 
Several lessons can be drawn from the Czecho-Slovak case. First, it demonstrates that 
even most advanced CEECs had to face important economic and political problems 
and dilemmas directly linked to implementation of the `transition' agenda. It supports 
the view that the way to capitalism is more complex than neo-liberal project admitted 
(Altvater, 1998; Smith and Pickles, 1998; cf. Chapter 4). Post-socialist transition is 
neither a simple nor necessarily an uni-directional process. The interplay of different 
processes unleashed by the transition may lead to deadlock, which limits the 
continuation of the `transition' itself. The Czecho-Slovak `vicious circle', for instance, 
had to be resolved by sacrificing the common state institutions. 
Ironically, the prospect of integration into the EU played its role in the disintegration 
process of Czecho-Slovakia. Indeed, one of the pro-separation arguments on the 
Czech side was associated with the belief that independent Czech Republic would 
manage to join the EU sooner without crisis-ridden Slovakia. Meanwhile, on the 
Slovak side, the argument revolved around the question of future national 
representation in European structures. A Czecho-Slovak seat in Europe, it was feared, 
would be dominated by Czech interests. What Slovakia needed, it was argued, was its 
own representation in Brussels and its `own star on the European flag'. 
Secondly, there is an important lesson to be learnt from the uneven regional 
development that took place at the early stages of the Czecho-Slovak transition. One 
federal economic policy was implemented across Czecho-Slovakia at that time. The 
differentiated impact on regions of economic transition therefore cannot be explained 
in terms of differentials in policy agendas or speed of its implementation - an 
argument often maintained by neo-liberal rhetoric. Neither, should we be satisfied by 
partial explanations such as demographic differences, differences in generosity of 
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provision of unemployment benefits and the like (see Dedek et al., 1996; for overview 
of factors specific to the Czecho-Slovak context). Rather, it proves that the bulk of 
uneven regional development that has accompanied an implementation of 'shock 
therapy' model is closely linked to structural economic legacies inherited from the 
state-socialist and pre-socialist era (see also Smith, 1998; Surazska et al., 1996) and 
the way these legacies `interact' with the imperatives of the wider political economy 
(Sokol, 2001). This strongly corroborates the arguments presented in Chapter 4 of the 
thesis. 
Thirdly, the Czecho-Slovak divorce demonstrates how closely economic, political and 
cultural processes and struggles are interlocked with each other and how institutions 
are deeply implicated in these struggles. Indeed, the emergence of the independent 
Slovakia itself can be seen as an institutional response or a `product' of such 
struggles. By gaining independence, however, Slovakia did not liberate itself from its 
own legacies or the wider political economy. Nor is independent Slovakia immune 
from important internal struggles that will be examined in turn. 
Institutions and struggles in independent Slovakia 
With the creation of the independent state, a principal condition for economic 
autonomy was fulfilled. Slovakia gained power to design its own institutions and 
policies that would be best tailored to its needs and specific economic circumstances. 
A window of opportunity opened for all the main `stakeholders' to unite and to 
construct a kind of coherent strategy necessary for the country's long-term national 
economic development. From the economic governance point of view, the 
institutional power of Slovakia was indeed considerably strengthened. The country 
gained control over its micro- and macro-economic management and power to address 
both the supply- and demand-side of the economy. The process of designing coherent 
policy and strategy frameworks as well as creating institutional structures that would 
deliver them, however, proved to be rather problematic. The Slovak case thus 
demonstrates that within the conditions of post-socialist transformation, and given the 
constraints of historical legacies and the wider political economy, building 
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institutional structures for an independent country itself can represent a considerable 
challenge. 
Indeed, following the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia, the independent Slovak 
Republic itself displayed signs of a `vicious circle'. Thus, instead of the required 
national coalition building, the powerful interlocking of socio-economic processes led 
to an emergence of conflict situations, contradictions, polarisation and instability. 
Such an environment, it is argued here, could hardly be seen as a favourable for 
institution building. Furthermore, conversely, weak and/or unstable institutional 
landscapes can be expected to have only a limited impact on improving economic 
fortunes. In this way, institutions (their instability) may become part of a `vicious 
circle' thus frustrating hopes for speedy and successful socio-economic 
transformation. In what follows, a brief account of factors contributing to the 
emergence of `vicious circle' situations in post-independence Slovakia will be 
offered. Subsequently, the section will move on to highlight how various factors and 
processes intermeshed during the efforts to create elected regional tiers in the country. 
Finally, the section will point to the difficulties in constructing a coherent national 
economic strategy, and will highlight two proposals that seem to directly address the 
issue of the `knowledge economy' in Slovakia. 
Elements of the 'vicious circle' in independent Slovakia 
Several powerful, intertwined, simultaneously operating and mutually `reinforcing' 
negative factors could be said to have contributed to `vicious circle' tendencies in 
Slovakia. These factors are rooted in economic, political, ethnic, social and regional 
processes. The first critical factor is represented by a problematic economic situation. 
The collapse of the economy in the early 1990s and the subsequent painful 
transformation formed a central feature of socio-economic development in post- 
socialist Slovakia. The economic difficulties described in section 7.4 proved to be a 
primary source of instability as central contributing factor to a `vicious circle' 
tendency by fuelling the processes of political polarisation, social and regional 
fragmentation and contributing to ethnic divisions. Through these latter processes, the 
shaken economy could be said to have been indirectly affecting the stability of the 
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Slovak institutional landscape and its ability to produce a coherent development 
strategy (see below). 
Besides, the difficult economic situation had direct implications on the operation of 
Slovak institutions. This was particularly so for `knowledge-intensive' institutions, 
many of which were dependent on the state budget that was operating under 
considerable financial constraints throughout the 1990s (Toth, 2000). The imperative 
of building institutional structures of an independent country created an additional 
strain on public finances (Baläz, 1995). The scarcity of financial resources meant that 
creating new institutions or even sustaining existing ones proved to be a considerable 
challenge. Consequently, several institutions of critical importance suffered, including 
universities, research institutes and state R&D institutions. These were generously 
funded under the state-socialism20, but had to fight for survival under the `transition' 
to the market. Similar situations had been found in the enterprise sector. It is therefore 
not surprising that in the first years of transformation, R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP declined dramatically from 3.7 in 1989 to 2.2 in 1991 to 1.0 in 
1995 and 1996 (Outrata, 1999, p. 141; see also Zajac, 1997; Pi9i t and Kraus, 2000). 
Simultaneously, the number of R&D workers was halved from 36,607 in 1989 to 
15,967 in 1992 (Zajac, 1997, p. 1089; Zajac, 2001) amid a break-down of the state 
R&D system reflecting the broad pattern found elsewhere in CEEC (see also 
Radosevic, 1999; Williams et al., 1998, p. 141-2). The Slovak Academy of Science, 
the country's main scientific institution, was among those affected (Zajac, 1997) as 
number of its employees was reduced by 48% from 6,220 in 1990 to 3,245 in 1995 
(Rosa, 1997, p. 230). Meanwhile, the higher education sector underwent an expansion 
in terms of numbers of students but accompanied by a steady decrease in expenditure 
during the 1990s, resulting in 50 % drop in funding per student (Pi9üt and Kraus, 
2000). Unsurprisingly, Slovak universities are reported to have `serious financial 
difficulties' (ibid, p. 632). Thus in Slovakia, like in other CEECs, a `transition' aimed 
at boosting economic development, paradoxically undermined the very institutional 
base on which the knowledge-intensive production and long-term competitiveness 
should be based (Myant, 1999a; Williams et al., 1998; see also below). 
20 In 1989, Slovakia's expenditure level on R&D was above the EU average (Zajac, 1997, p. 1086). 
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Meanwhile, political polarisation and instability compounded the effects on the 
Slovak institutional landscape of the economic hardship. Indeed, the political 
turbulence proved to be another critical aspect of the `vicious circle' tendency in 
Slovakia. The Slovak political scene of 1990s could be characterised in terms of 
fragmentation, polarisation, instability and bitter political feuds. Following the 
dissolution of the `one-party polity', the first decade of transformation saw a large 
number of political parties being formed and dissolved, fused and fragmented, 
transformed and regrouped amid ruthless competition for power. With a risk of 
oversimplification, it could be argued that the main political conflict emerged between 
the McCiar-led HZDS and its numerous opponents (cf. Meseznikov, 1997,1999) 
creating a polarised and turbulent political climate. Within the first five years of 
political transformation Slovakia had five different governments (cf. Mansfeldovä, 
1998) as a result of the power struggle. Among the main themes around which this 
struggle has been evolving included sharply polarised views on the matter of 
independence and the `national' question (see Haughton, 2001), highly differentiated 
views on economic policy (see below), diverging visions on privatisation 21, and last 
but not least diverging preference on the style of government. Indeed, much 
responsibility for the polarisation of the Slovak political scene is usually attributed to 
McCiar himself, his perceived authoritarian style of government and the undemocratic 
practices of his administration (see Meseznikov, 1999; Szomolänyi, 2001). The 
political struggle in mid-1990s grew to such a proportion that the EU expressed 
concerns over the stability of the democratic institutions in Slovakia, leading to the 
aforementioned exclusion of the country from EU membership negotiations 
However, channelling well the widespread dissatisfaction with the `transition' and 
playing with national sentiments of Slovaks, HZDS, in electoral terms, remained the 
most successful political party through the decade (Haughton, 2001). But amid 
mounting domestic opposition and pressure of international organisations 
(consistently indicating that there will be no NATO or EU integration with McCiar), 
HZDS eventually lost power after the 1998 elections, despite the political 
manipulations that preceded them (see Meselnikov, 1999) and the aggressive 
21 As one of the Slovak officials put it, `there will be no political peace in Slovakia until the last stone is 
privatised' (personal communication, senior Slovak official, 1998). See also Smith (1998, p. 207-215). 
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economic policy described earlier. The new government was formed as a broad 'left- 
to-right' coalition composed of all anti-Meciar parties (Meseznikov, 1999). But this 
uneasy coalition22 itself nearly fell victim of a `vicious circle' when growing 
economic problems, rampant unemployment, privatisation scandals and, last but not 
least, the disagreement over the regionalisation of the country (see below) led to 
growing tensions within the cabinet23. The coalition government remained in power 
through the full term, but went through a series of crises and saw the disintegration of 
participating political parties amid uncertain prospects for re-election. The run-up to 
the 2002 elections saw the further fragmentation of the political scene both within 
governing parties and the opposition 24 (Tancerovä, 2002). Thus, a decade after 
gaining independence, Slovakia still remains far away from the kind of political 
stability needed for the formation of a national political consensus. 
An additional dimension to the complexity of Slovak political life is wrought by 
ethnic fragmentation. Indeed, following the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia where 
national issues played an important role, the emergence of independent Slovakia 
highlighted its own `national' issues. In particular, the position of the Hungarian 
minority that accounts for nearly 11 per cent of the country's population (concentrated 
mainly along the borders with Hungary) became one of the burning issues (see 
Brown, 1994, p. 63). The Hungarian minority in Slovakia is a residuum of the Austro- 
Hungarian past, but it remains an important force within the country's contemporary 
polity and society. The conflicts that emerged throughout thel990s contributed a great 
deal to political instability and had important implications for the creation of regional 
tiers in Slovakia (see Smith, 2000; see more below)25. 
22 The coalition government included the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the Party of Civic 
Understanding (SOP), the reformed-communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), and the Hungarian 
Coalition Party (SMK) (Smith, 2000, p. 159; Meseinikov, 1999, p. 35). The leading coalition party SDK 
was in fact itself a coalition of five different political subjects including the Christian Democrats 
(KDH), the Democratic Union (DU), the right-wing Democratic Party (DS), the Social Democratic 
Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and the Green Party (SZS) (see Mesecnikov, 1999, p. 66). 
23 There is no doubt that this directly affected the operation of state institutions. Indeed, information 
gathered through interviews conducted between 1998-2001 in Slovakia confirms intensive infighting 
within and between central government bodies, usually fought along political lines. 
24 The 2002 elections have eventually seen the return of the `pro-Western' coalition following the 
claims from the Western diplomatic sources confirming hours before the polls that "we have interfered 
in the internal affairs of Slovakia. We have done so successfully"(FT, 2002,17 September, p. 8). 
25 The picture of the ethnic fragmentation in Slovakia is further complemented by the Roma minority, 
emerging as the most marginalised ethnic group for which social deprivation is often compounded by 
society's racial prejudices (see Va§eirka, 2000). 237 
Further terrain of conflict in post-socialist and post-independence Slovakia has 
opened up along the lines of social fragmentation. Conscious attempts have been 
made to bring state, capital and labour together as `social partners' through social 
tripartite dialogue and annually concluded General Agreements (Myant et al., 2000; 
Machalikovä, 1999; Svorenovä, 2000). However, a fragile `social peace' has become 
tested several times during the 1990s. Meanwhile, the labour movement in Slovakia 
remains relatively strong but is facing growing challenges (interview KOZ SR, 2001). 
Indeed within the context of deepening economic crisis with real wages falling and 
unemployment reaching 20% of the workforce, trade unionists find it even harder to 
fight for their rights. Thus it seems that in Slovakia, like elsewhere in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Poliert, 1999b; Vickerstaff and Thirkell, 2000; see also Casale, 1999; 
Martin, 1999), organised labour and ordinary workers more generally, increasingly 
seem to be loosing ground in a battle for decent well-being. Meanwhile, the social 
divide is growing (see section 7.7) which in turn can provide a basis for the further 
political turbulence and possible social upheavals in the future. Taken together, the 
economic, political, ethnic and social processes described above represent powerful 
elements of the `vicious circle' situations and conflicts in post-socialist Slovakia. One 
area where such a `vicious circle' has manifested itself is related to the responses to 
regional fragmentation that proceeded apace through the 1990s. 
Responses to regional fragmentation 
Indeed, institutional responses to the uneven regional impact of socio-economic 
change in Slovakia highlight very well the challenges that the country is facing. 
Indeed following the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia, where growing regional 
economic divergence played an important role (see above), Slovakia itself has 
experienced significant fragmentation of its own space-economy. After its emergence 
as an independent country, the regional problem within Slovakia became fully 
exposed. And as with the case of uneven development on the Czecho-Slovak level, 
regional fragmentation within the Slovak Republic became a part of the country's 
`vicious circle' of the post-independence period. The scale of the regional problem 
will be presented in detail in section 7.7. Meanwhile, what follows below is an 
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attempt to elucidate how the process of regional fragmentation interacts with the other 
aspects of the `vicious circle'. Indeed, the case of the regional problem and responses 
to it, provide us with an excellent example of the powerful interlocking of economic, 
political, social and ethnic processes in post-socialist Slovakia that deserve closer 
examination. 
It is important to start with an acknowledgement that as with the case of social 
conflict, there is no doubt that attempts were also made by the Slovak state to contain 
the regional problem. Indeed, the foundations of regional policy were laid down 
during the 1990s (BuCek, 1992,1999; Baläz, 1995; Rajcäk, 1998; Finka, 2000; 
Hagovskä, 2000; Niinansky and Siräk, 1999; Siräk, 1999; Smith, 1998; Sokol, 1999). 
Several major impulses could be said to have prompted action by the state at the 
regional level. First, Slovakia's own constitution adopted in September 1992 
explicitly stipulated the creation of self-governing regional tiers. This was regarded as 
an important part of the democratisation of society (Bitugikovä, 2002) in line with the 
democratic values and subsidiarity principle of the EU. In addition, a practical value 
was expected in terms of creating institutional and policy instruments compatible with 
those existing in the EU in order to ensure balanced regional development. An 
additional impulse for regional policy formulation came through tripartite 
negotiations. Indeed, since 1995, via the General Agreements, the government was 
obliged to act in districts with `high unemployment' of over 20 % (ÜSRSVT SR, 
1997a; Siräk, 1999, p. 430). In 1996 there were 16 such `crisis districts' out of total 
number of 79 (ÜSRSVT SR, 1997a, p. 1). However, by the end of the decade, with the 
level of national joblessness climbing to nearly 20 %, 35 out of 79 districts reported 
unemployment above that figure, three of them displaying unemployment above 30% 
(SO SR, 2001, p. 40-41). Initially, programmes for `crisis regions' were administered 
by the Centre for Strategic Studies (CS9). In the second half of the 1990s, the Office 
for the Strategy of the Development of the Society, Science and Technology 
(ÜSRSVT SR) emerged as a central body for designing and implementing regional 
policy. Its approach to regional problems has been described in more detail elsewhere 
(Sokol, 1999). However, given the institutional weakness and limited financial 
resources available, the impact of regional policy was minimal (Sirak, 1999; Smith, 
1998) and regional disparities continued to grow (see section 7.7). 
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In institutional terms, nevertheless, it is useful to notice that besides the above 
mentioned regional programmes implemented from the central level by ÜSRSVT SR 
(see Rajcäk, 1998; ÜSRSVT SR, 1997a) attempts were made to create institutional 
infrastructure in the regions. Indeed, several mini-RDAs emerged across Slovakia, 
alongside the network of BICs and RPICs (see more in ÜSRSVT SR, 1997a; Smith, 
1997b, 1998, p. 216-224; Siräk, 1999, p. 430-431). However, given the limited 
financial and human resources and missing know-how, these institutions had a 
problem to survive let alone to make a difference to struggling regions. As one of the 
Slovak officials put it, when assessing one of the pilot RDAs, `the most important 
regional development contribution this RDA made was that it reduced the 
unemployment in the region by the three people it employed' (personal 
communication, Slovak official, 1998). And while such a statement is probably an 
exaggeration, it does point at the underlying weakness of the emerging regional 
institutional framework (cf. Siräk, 1999). In addition, plans to create a National 
Development Agency (cf. ÜSRSVT SR, 1997a) never materialised. 
Meanwhile the entire institutional framework for regional policy saw a major 
overhaul as the new post-1998 government took a new approach (Hagovskä, 2000). 
Regional development was formally given a higher priority and considered one of the 
central elements of the country's EU accession effort. Administratively the profile of 
regional policy was elevated after the competence was transferred to a new Ministry 
for Construction and Regional Development (MVaRR SR). However, Slovak policy 
makers confirmed (interviews, 1999-2001) continuing difficulties in establishing a 
solid institutional base for the design and implementation of the regional development 
strategy. In addition, as one critic put it, `there is, in fact, no Slovak regional strategy', 
because strategic documents that were elaborated by MVaRR SR represent `... merely 
an attempt to meet requirements for EU funding' (interview, 2001). On the 
background of continuing administrative difficulties (such as lack of staff and staff 
training), legislative progress was achieved (interviews MVaRR SR, 2000-2001) and 
a long-awaited Law on Regional Development was eventually passed in 2001. In 
practical terms, however, the state limited itself in terms of instruments for state 
regional policy and now focuses solely on fighting unemployment by encouraging 
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enterpreneurship - i. e. offering financial contribution for small business start-ups 
(interview MVaRR SR, 2001). Meanwhile, the territorial coverage of regional policy 
had to be extended to cover basically all regions of Slovakia (interviews MVaRR SR, 
2001) as an economic and employment crisis engulfed the country. Besides, a new 
network of mini-RDAs was proposed to cover areas with unemployment of 
catastrophic proportions (mainly southern and south-eastern districts; interview UV 
SR, 2000; interview MVaRR SR, 2000,2001). But there are serious doubts whether 
tiny agencies of 2-3 employees and limited budgets can possibly make a difference in 
crisis regions (interview 
TV SR, 2000). Meanwhile, pre-accession regional aid from 
EU was slow in coming. In part, this was related to the unresolved issue of the 
regional tier, to which we now turn. 
Indeed, a lot was expected from the project of regionalisation of the country, not least 
because it was expected to create the institutional environment for the absorption of 
the Structural Funds at the regional level. Therefore, unsurprisingly, besides wider 
democratisation objectives, regionalisation was also seen as critical pillar of regional 
policy (cf. Baläz, 1995; Siräk, 1999, p. 436). It was argued, that the creation of the 
regional tier would help to reverse rapidly growing regional disparities (interview 
M. E. S. A. 10,2000; Hamalovä, 2001). However, what could have been a 
straightforward exercise, instead turned out to be yet another `neuralgic' element of 
the `vicious circle', where the interlocking of economic decline, fragmented regional 
development, and political, ethnic and social struggles fully manifested itself. 
Indeed, while the Constitution stipulated the creation of the regional tier, it did not 
provide details of it. Thus, the form of regionalisation itself became an object of a 
political struggle. The project of regionalisation was initially initiated under the 
Me6iar administration of 1994-98, in which the country was to be divided into eight 
regions, each including an important urban centre (see Sokol, 1999). Eight regional 
capitals were expected to act as growth poles thus, it was claimed, creating conditions 
for balanced regional development. Interestingly, the plan also foresaw the expansion 
of the university system so that each of the eight regional capitals would have had its 
own university. Besides, each region would have 
its own instruments of regional 
policy (i. e. RDA) that would channel regional, state and EU resources. The 
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regionalisation was expected to happen in two stages. The first stage, involving the 
creation of eight regional offices in respective regional capitals as an element of the 
decentralised state administration, was indeed realised in 1996 (Bituýikovä, 2002; 
Silvan and Zemko, 1996; Smith, 1998,2000). However, the realisation of the second 
phase, involving the creation of eight elected regional assemblies, was halted amid 
growing concerns over the cost of the reform, political manipulation and 
gerrymandering. In particular, the Hungarian minority saw the reform as going 
strongly against its interests of establishing autonomy or any other form of territorial 
organisation along the southern border with Hungary. Indeed, the boundaries of the 
new regions were carefully designed in the North-South direction rather than East- 
West direction preventing the Hungarian minority from reaching a substantial share of 
population (and voting potential) in any one of them (Bitugikovä, 2002, p. 57-59; 
Smith, 1998, p. 279,2000; Surazska et al., 1997). Meanwhile, anti-Me6iar forces saw 
the reform as yet another attempt by HZDS and its allies to extend their grip on power 
in the country (Bitusikovä, 2002, p. 49; Surazska et al., 1997). 
It is therefore not surprising that following the fall of the Me6iar administration in 
1998, the question of regional reform was re-opened (Sokol, 1999). A new proposal 
was drafted for a radical re-organisation and decentralisation of public administration, 
involving the creation of twelve self-governing (mini-)regions with far-reaching 
competencies (interview M. E. S. A. 10,2000; Raj6dk, 2001; Bitugikovä, 2002). The 
authors of the proposal did not hide the fact that such regionalisation formed part of a 
wider project involving the dramatic reduction of the role of the central state (see 
more below) and devolution of power to the regions as a `safeguard of democracy'. 
As suggested by one of the interviewees, `within the highly decentralised state, the 
scope for the political influence of people like Me6iar will be confined to a small- 
scale regional level' (interview Slovak official, 2000). It comes as no surprise that the 
above proposal met stark resistance from the opposition parties of HZDS and SNS 
that saw them as a threat to the integrity of the state. In addition, the proposal also 
inflicted sharp divisions within the ruling coalition parties, each defending its own 
party interests and calculating their regional election potentials (interview Slovak 
official, 2001). The number and therefore size of the self-governing regions became 
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hotly debated again, while time was running out26. Eventually, during the critical 
session of Parliament in July 2001, through a series of amendments supported by both 
opposition and some coalition deputies, the eventual product was a Law creating eight 
self-governing regions within the borders of already existing regional administrative 
boundaries. Such an unexpected outcome (that amounts to a close match with the 
original regional reform initiated under Mediar) proved to act as an explosive among 
coalition partners, with Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) openly threatening to leave 
government (Bitusikovä, 2002, p. 60; see also Verejnä sprc va 2001a, 2001b). Despite 
this, the reform was eventually implemented and, fulfilled a nearly decade-old initial 
constitutional requirement, election to eight regional assemblies took place in autumn 
2001. It is too early to say to what extent the emerging regional government in 
Slovakia will contribute to the goals that stood behind its conception. In particular, it 
remains to be seen, what impact it will have on the landscape of stark regional 
inequality. The process of its painful and contested emergence, nevertheless serves as 
a striking example of how the forces of `vicious circle' interact and compound each 
other creating deadlocks and problems in realising much needed institutional change. 
Towards a coherent development strategy? 
The powerful interlocking of economic, political, cultural, social and regional aspects 
of the `vicious circle' reviewed above could be said to have had devastating effects on 
Slovakia's progress towards a democratic and prosperous society. Part of the problem, 
as already pointed above, is that turbulent aspects of the `vicious circle' provide a 
rather hostile framework for institutional development. Conversely, weak, unstable or 
simply missing institutions can be expected to have only limited (if any) impact on 
solving difficult socio-economic situations. Thus the institutional environment could 
be seen as a consequence and at the same time one of the causes of the `transitional' 
problems. Indeed, the Slovak institutional environment during the `transition' period 
could be characterised as unstable, turbulent, showing considerable weakness and 
frequent difficulty to establish itself let alone to design and implement coherent 
development strategies. This problem is apparent when looking at the area of 
16 If the reforms were not passed by parliament by the beginning of summer 2001, it would be 
impossible to implement it within the government's term of office (Bitugikovä, 2002, p. 59). Thus, one 
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economic policy broadly defined and highlighted when searching for specific 
strategies of transformation towards the `knowledge economy' and institutions that 
would promote such transformation. 
The struggle over economic policy 
The area of economic policy is, of course, of crucial importance for a country aspiring 
to catch-up with its Western European neighbours. To this aim, for Slovakia, like for 
other CEECs, the question of long-term competitiveness is essential and requires 
strong, active policy measures (Myant, 1999a). However, as far as Slovakia is 
concerned, one has to acknowledge that the 1990s were years characterised by 
frequently changing priorities and the struggle over strategic direction (Morvay, 2000, 
p. 17; MarenCin and Beblavy, 2000). Beblavy (2000), for instance, noticed that during 
the first decade of transformation, eight different `industrial policies' were drafted in 
Slovakia. Several of them were not even officially approved by the government before 
being washed away by a new incoming administration. And it was not until the 
second half of the decade that the first policy measures were attempted to address the 
issue of innovation and technology development (Outrata, 1999, p. 141). Therefore, 
within the environment of frequent government changes and bitter political struggles, 
the overall approach to economic restructuring could be at best described as 
`piecemeal' (cf. Smith, 1998). 
However, in retrospect, two competing dominant policy orientations could be detected 
in the muddy policy waters of post-socialist Slovakia. The first approach embodies the 
original `transition' project that emphasised the `shock therapy', quick privatisation 
and liberalisation, free market, opening to the international economy, foreign capital 
and rapid integration with Europe. The leading Slovak think-tank behind this 
approach is M. E. S. A 10, whose policy prescriptions strongly resonate with those of 
the international financial institutions (see M. E. S. A. 10,1998) and `shock therapy' 
enthusiasts such as Sachs (1990). The second policy approach could be seen as an 
attempted alternative to neo-liberal `transition' (cf. Ivanicka, 1996, p. 74) and the 
promotion of `the Slovak road' of transformation (Mihalik, 1998). Indeed, it put 
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emphasis on the Slovak economic specifics, the need for more gradual transformation, 
the continuing importance of the state in the economy, national capital and a domestic 
entrepreneurial class while stressing the social dimension of transformation (see 
Mihalik, 1998, p. 84-91). Economists of this persuasion mostly come from NEZES - 
the Independent Association of Economists of Slovakia (Haughton, 2001, p. 749-750). 
The contours of the economy promoted by NEZES could amount to a sort of `mixed 
economy', seemed to be favoured by the Slovak population in the early stages of 
transformation as an alternative to both state-socialist and free market economy (cf. 
Pavlinek, 1995, p. 363; Mansfeldovä, 1998, Table 7.7 on p. 199). Ivaniirka (1996, p. 74) 
goes as far as to place the approach of NEZES in the context of the competitive 
`knowledge-oriented economy' discourses27. This is in stark contrast to the above 
neo-liberal framework of M. E. S. A. 10 within which the competitiveness of the 
national economy is derived from the unhampered operation of the free market. 
Clearly then, two divergent policy paradigms were present in the Slovak policy 
thinking, both leaving their imprints on policy making in 1990s. The two approaches 
also represented a very different understanding of the role of institutions in the 
economy. The search for an alternative to the neo-liberal `transition' can be associated 
with the rule of HZDS, when NEZES-influenced economic policy was pre-dominant 
(Haughton, 2001). Indeed, during the 1994-98 period, the style of privatisation 
process was changed (cf. Miklog, 1997) while several enterprises were labelled 
`strategic' and excluded from privatisation (see MarenCin and Beblavy, 2000). The 
overall role of state in the industrial economy remained important (Smith, 1998). 
Following the macro-economic stabilisation, the government pursued, as we have 
already seen, expansionist economic policy by boosting public expenditure that was 
channelled to infrastructure and state institutional building. Both hardly fit overriding 
prescriptions given by the international financial organisations such as the IMF (cf. 
Jakoby et al., 2000, p. 467) and one could speculate if this was an additional reason 
behind the frosty reception the McCiar government faced in the West. In retrospect, 
however, the economic acceleration achieved during the 1995-98 period, could be 
seen as the biggest impact the Slovak institutions left on the economy in the last 
decade. 
27 Interestingly, Mihalik (1998, p. 84-85) makes the claim that the `Slovak road' is based on insights 
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The political defeat of Meciar in 1998, however, opened a way back to the original 
neo-liberal economic project. This came under the banner of accomplishing the 
`institutional environment' (Morvay, 2000), but in fact it meant the withdrawal of 
state and public institutions from the economy. Within this liberal `neo-institutional' 
view, only institutions that contribute to the smooth operation of the (invisible hand) 
of the market system, and (more visible hand) of private capital are justified. Thus, the 
austerity packages and cuts in public expenditure were accompanied by deregulation 
and privatisation of the remaining state enterprises and banks (see Jakoby et al., 2000; 
Reptovä and Striebomy, 2000). It remains to be seen how this change will impact on 
the Slovakia's long-term economic prospects. There are, however, immediate 
ramifications for the operation of the country's public institutions. Indeed, within the 
effort to `roll-back' the state, a detailed Audit of public administration was carried out 
(iN SR, 2000) as part of the public administration reform with the intention of drastic 
cuts in the number of public institutions and their staff. The project of the regional 
reform as originally intended by the post-1998 government (see above) formed part of 
this bigger scheme. Indeed, with many competencies intended to be discarded or 
passed onto the regions, several central ministries were risking dissolution (interview 
M. E. S. A. 10,2000). As one official commented, `it looks as if the state was to be 
cancelled' (interview MH SR, 2000). Amid this institutional tectonics the issue of the 
transformation of Slovakia towards a `knowledge society' is grossly overshadowed 
but not completely forgotten. 
Towards a `knowledge economy'? 
Indeed, a major study entitled `Slovakia at the turn of the third millennium' by 19 
authors was published in 1991 (Markus et al., 1991). Summarising the findings of a 
comprehensive research programme of the Slovak Academy of Sciences on the 
`Prognosis of the Scientific-Technological, Economic and Social Development of 
Slovakia', the study, as the authors modestly suggest, can be seen as a `compass on 
the stormy sea' (ibid, p. 150). A closer examination of the document reveals, that in 
fact it amounts to a long-term development strategy for an `information society'. 
from institutional and evolutionary economics. 
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Indeed, one of the main messages delivered by the study was that Slovakia stood 
before a double challenge, that of transforming the bureaucratic command economy 
and overcoming the industrial logic of development (ibid, p. 156) that characterised 
the post-war period. With reference to the latter, the authors call for the abandonment 
of `deeply rooted structures, mechanisms and methods of the so-called extensive stage 
of industrial development' (ibid, p. 165). This is because, as the authors believe, future 
economic growth 
`... will depend more and more on development of services generally, and on 
that of research, software and other informative activities, particularly ... 
Within the tertiary sphere and services, the development focus will 
unequivocally shift to activities of generating, storing and transferring 
information... ' (ibid, p. 166; emphasis added). 
Slovakia at the turn of the millennium thus stands at a `historical crossroad' (ibid, 
p. 163) of changing `the overall approach to social development, joined to a 
breakthrough in social structures and institutions' (ibid, p. 163). If the country was to 
miss the new trend of informatisation and intellectualisation of production and would 
continue the industrial logic of development, it would risk `fatal' lagging behind the 
most advanced countries (ibid, p. 156). The authors thus urge that Slovakia adopts a 
bold approach towards new information-based development logic by promoting two 
main pillars: 
`research, (in order that [Slovakia has] a basic orientation on what is and will 
be going on in worldwide research, and meta-information on what data it 
might obtain from the worldwide research and how to join the stream of 
scientific-technological development), and an information infrastructure, i. e. a 
modern telecommunication network and various types of information services 
(in order that information data from worldwide - and also home - science, 
technology and commerce [can] be rapidly and reliably accessible)' (ibid, 
p. 166; emphasis added). 
Related to this, the authors suggest, there is a `significant relative shift in the social 
division of labour from the primary and secondary, to the tertiary ... activities' (ibid, 
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p. 167). They conclude that the `developmental logic' of Slovak society in future must 
focus on a `modernisation of the sphere of research-developmental networks and 
activities, information infrastructure networks, and other infrastructure networks and 
activities [that] will permit a modernisation of the remaining elements of our national 
economy' (ibid, p. 158; author's translation). A careful reading of the above 
suggestions reveals interesting similarities with the discourses of the `knowledge 
economy' and `learning regions'. Indeed, the authors of the study call for the 
abandonment of sectoral economic policy and a shift towards national and regional 
and local economic stimulation. 
A similar type of thinking can be detected in the work of Ivani6ka (1996) who also 
provides the clearest statement on the `knowledge economy'. Ivanicka starts by 
acknowledging that that `the possibilities of industrial development were already 
exhausted in European society, [that is now] entering a trajectory toward an all- 
civilisation, knowledge-oriented transformation, to a knowledge-oriented society' 
(Ivani6ka, 1996, p. 74). Consequently, he goes on to suggest that if Slovakia was to 
become a successful economy, it has to master three transformations at the same time: 
a) transformation `from centrally controlled to socially and ecologically oriented 
market economy'; 
b) transformation `from federal structures and institutions to those of an independent 
state entity and its new institutionalised organisation'; and 
c) transformation `from the era of modernism to an information society, or 
knowledge-oriented society... ' (ibid, p. 74-75). 
He further argues that `[w]ithout a full appreciation of what a knowledge-based 
economy actually is, Slovakia cannot count on any long-term success or prosperity' 
(ibid, p. 117). 
An interesting feature of Ivani6ka's work is that he explicitly addresses the regional 
dimension of the `knowledge economy' in Slovakia. In doing so, he singles out two 
urban regions of Slovakia - Bratislava, the capital city, and Bansk' Bystrica in 
Central Slovakia. The interest in Banskä Bystrica stems in part from a long-term 
search on the part of Slovak planners for the missing `strategically important core' 
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(ibid, p. 105) in Central Slovakia28, whose existence is perceived as critical for the 
country's `internal compactness' (ibid, p. 63). Ivani6ka argues, however, that building 
such a core `can only be secured by activities of a knowledge-oriented society, 
committed to an increased share of knowledge in the merchandise and services, a 
quick transfer of new technologies, availability of the recent know-how, an inventive 
and innovative approach, promotion of exports, all these leading to an increased 
added value and the national well-being of the citizens' (ibid, p. 105). 
As far as Slovakia's capital city is concerned, Ivanicka asserts that Bratislava is `the 
nation's leading center for innovation' and thus `sharing an international 
responsibility for the creation and diffusion of innovation and successful passage of 
Slovakia to an information-oriented and knowledge-based society' (ibid, p. 91). In this 
context, the fall of the `Iron Curtain' and opening of the cross-border co-operation in 
what he calls Central European `contact zone' comprising Bratislava and Vienna 
offers `extraordinary opportunities' (ibid, p. 99; see also Ivanicka, 1995). We will turn 
our attention to this particular aspect of the developing `knowledge economy' in 
Slovakia in the following section. The section will try to assess the ability or inability 
of the institutions involved to deliver such an ambitious programme for Slovakia's 
capital and to see if these emerging `extraordinary opportunities' in the Slovak- 
Austrian cross-border co-operation were realised. 
7.6 The search for an `animateur' 
This section thus focuses on the specialised economic development institutions that 
could/should have played a crucial role in encouraging, in Ivanicka's words, the 
`successful passage to a knowledge-based society'. In this area, however, the 
inconsistencies and weaknesses of Slovakia's turbulent institutional framework are 
probably the most visible. Indeed, the 1990s could at best be described as years of a 
search for an `animateur'. No single agency or organisation was created that would 
promote in a coherent way, a long-term strategy of putting Slovakia onto the `high 
28 Two main urban centres, Bratislava and Kogice are situated in the extreme west and east of the 
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road' of development. Instead, a plethora of organisations emerged, probably 
contributing to the country's `institutional thickness', but usually acting in an 
uncoordinated manner. Furthermore, as demonstrated below several key agencies 
themselves experienced `survival' problems. 
At the core of the Slovak institutional framework for economic development support 
are central government bodies, the Ministry of Economy (MH SR) in particular. The 
Ministry, together with the Economic Department of the Government Office are the 
major institutions drafting economic policy documents (interview MH SR, 2000). The 
Ministry itself runs several programmes that are aimed at improving economic 
performance of Slovakia (interview MH SR, 2000). However, the possibility of a 
directly active industrial policy was recently severely curtailed by the adoption of a 
Law on State Aid, compatible with the requirements of the EU competition policy 
rules (interview MH SR, 2000). Therefore, in the longer-run, agencies operating 
mostly on the supply-side of the economy may become relatively more significant. 
Several organisations of this type emerged during the 1990s, each with a specific 
mission. The National Agency for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(NARMSP) was created in 1993 to provide support for SME development (interview, 
NARMSP, 2000; Smith, 1997b, 1998). Funded with a substantial contribution from 
EU funds, NARMSP supported the creation of a network of Business Innovation 
Centres (BICs) and Regional Advisory and Information Centres (RPICs) across the 
country. The impact of these on local economies is judged to be positive (interview 
NARMSP, 2001), but probably limited in the larger scheme of economic change 
(Smith, 1997b, 1998). Furthermore, with the recent phasing-out of EU money coming 
precisely at the moment when simultaneous attempts to reduce public expenditure on 
the Slovak side are made, the prospects for the network are somewhat unclear29 
(interview NARMSP, 2001). 
Alongside the institutional support for SMEs, a specific agency for attracting FDI - 
the Slovak National Agency for Foreign Investment and Development (SNAZIR) was 
created in 1991. However, with only 15 staff in 1998 (Outrata, 1999, p. 139), SNAZIR 
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does not seem to have made any significant improvement to Slovakia's poor record of 
FDI inflow. Furthermore, the organisation itself saw major institutional disruption, 
during an attempted merger into a new agency - the Slovak Agency for the 
Development of Investment and Trade (SARIO). Indeed, the realisation of the 
intention to combine FDI and the export promotion function was accompanied by 
disputes over the legal status and exact competencies of the new body, the 
composition of its shareholders and its management amid continuing staff shortages 
(cf. interviews SNAZIR/SARIO, 2000,2001). Thus, despite a proclaimed emphasis 
on FDI by the post-1998 government, the institutional structure to handle it remains 
rather inadequate. A similar verdict can probably be made about the already 
mentioned intended new network of RDAs. One cannot help but get the impression 
that these `micro-animateurs' could turn-out be local `amateurs', with very minimal 
know-how, personnel and financial resources to tackle acute crises in their respective 
regions. The troubled Slovak `institutional thickness', meanwhile, could be said to be 
complemented by various other organisations, including somewhat better organised 
chambers of commerce (interview SOPK, 2000) or an embryonic technology transfer 
. centre SARC30 
However, none of the above agencies seems to be addressing the need for long-term 
strategy making. Attempts to create an institutional base for it were nevertheless 
made. The fate of these institutions, however, reflects the turbulent conditions of the 
Slovak `transition' period. In the early 1990s, the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSSR) 
was established in response to the changed geo-political situation in Europe and in 
search of the role of Slovakia within it. The strategic role was intertwined with the 
regional analysis and CSC was thus laying the ground for the emerging Slovak 
regional policy. In 1995, however, CSC` was dissolved and a new institution, the 
Office for the Development of the Society, Science and Technology (OSRSVT SR) 
was created. The main purpose of this institution was to `learn ahead' and to provide 
the government with a strategy for the development of an independent Slovakia. 
29 There was growing pressure to turn the BICs and RPICs into self-financing organisations, that would 
have to compete for funding, rather than getting automatic financial support from the state (interview 
NARMSP, 2001). 
30 SARC (Centre for Development, Science and Technology) was established in 1992 and was 
supposed to provide a `connecting link' between science and R&D on the one hand, and industry on the 
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Besides, the Office was emerging as a principal body for regional policy making. The 
combination of these functions, together with a competence in managing the research 
potential of the country (Rosa, 1997; Zajac, 1997; USRSVT SR, 1997a, 1997b, 
1997c) gave ÜSRSVT SR a chance of becoming the Slovak equivalent of the famous 
Japanese MITI. However, among internal management problems, frequent personnel 
and organisation changes, lack of quality staff, accompanied by difficulties in 
establishing effective relations with other ministries and, critically, with the Slovak 
Academy of Sciences, the impact of ÜSRSVT SR remained ambiguous. In 1996, the 
organisation had nearly 160 staff ((JSRSVT SR, 1997b, p. 32), but there was a sense 
of frustration both within and outside ÜSRSVT SR about its usefulness. Nevertheless, 
the contours of policies to address the technological and innovation gap of the Slovak 
economy were slowly emerging (see Outrata, 1999, p. 140-141; see also LISRSVT SR, 
1997b, p. 9-1 1). 
However, it remains ironic and at the same time symptomatic for the Slovak 
institutional landscape, that shortly after ÜSRSVT SR started to disseminate its long- 
term development 'vision'31 of Slovakia, the Office itself was dissolved following the 
1998 elections32. Regional development functions were subsequently transferred to a 
new Ministry of Construction and Regional Development (MVaRR SR), but the 
overall `strategic' functions were lost. Thus, following the failure of ÜSRSVT SR, it 
is not entirely clear, who is going to take-up the challenge of providing a vision, let 
alone systematic guidance and support, for the Slovakia's effort to reach the `higher 
road' of development. The story of ÜSRSVT SR, meanwhile, demonstrates the 
limited ability of the Slovak institutional landscape to act in the direction of 
encouraging new technological and economic trajectories. This will be highlighted in 
the example of cross-border co-operation with Austria and the uneasy attempts to 
capitalise on the scientific-technological and economic potential of the Bratislava 
region, in which ÜSRSVT SR was directly involved. 
other one. However, with only 11 staff and activities primarily focusing on international co-operation 
see ÜSRSVT SR, 1997b, p. 27-28) the effects on domestic technology transfer seem to be limited. 
The vision was strongly biased towards the use of 'domestic' resources, especially the 'intellectual 
pZotential' of Slovakia (see ßunlak et al., 1998). 
One interviewee and a former employee of USRSVT SR said that the dissolution of the body was not 
surprising given that it was largely seen as an ideological centre of IIZDS. According to him, the 
dissolution of USRSVT SR was even welcome by the representatives of the European Commission 
(interview, former Slovak official, 2000). 
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Bratislava: `Silicon Valley' of the East? 33 
The Bratislava region occupied a special place in the minds of Slovak policy makers. 
As already mentioned, the capital city, accommodating the bulk of the Slovakia's 
academic, research, scientific and innovation potential (mostly built after WWII), was 
expected to play a decisive role in the country's `passage to the knowledge-based 
society' (Ivani&a, 1996, p. 91). There were hopes that the city and the surrounding 
region would become a part of the Central European `Silicon Valley' (see Trend, 
1995). The potential of Bratislava has been multiplied by its strategic geographical 
position. Located literally on the border with Austria, very close to Vienna, it offered 
an ideal opportunity for cross-border co-operation. Indeed, the Slovak-Austrian border 
region represented a locality better able than most to take advantage of the end of the 
Cold War and the dawn of West-East (re)integration (Sokol, 1999). The considerable 
potential for successful cross-border co-operation stemmed from four main elements. 
Firstly, the Slovak-Austrian border region is unique in relation to the socio-economic 
potential it possesses. Unlike most regions on West-East borders, the end of the Iron 
Curtain, did not expose two neighbouring neglected peripheral areas. Quite to the 
contrary, and uniquely, here the border region is composed of two confident 
metropolitan areas - Vienna and Bratislava - both representing the cores of their 
respective national economics. These two cities (population 1.5 million and 0.5 
million respectively) represent also the political, cultural and scientific heartlands of 
their respective countries. Additionally, Vienna and Bratislava (some 60 km or 40 
miles from each other) are the closest capitals in Europe and probably in the World. 
Secondly, the Vienna-Bratislava metropolitan region has an excellent geographical 
and geopolitical location. It constitutes a core of what can be called the Central 
European 'contact zone' (Ivanidka, 1995,1996), that comprises also the cities of Brno 
(Czech Republic) and Gyor (Hungary) (see Figure 7.2 in Appendix). This macro- 
region has a strategic geo-political position - located within the geographical heart of 
33 This section heavily draws on the author's participant observation while working for the Slovak 
central authorities in the period between 1995-1998. 
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the emerging 'New Europe' - with good transportation links to both the Western and 
Eastern halves of the continent (see Benuska, 1994; Trend, 1995). 
Thirdly, due to the above unique circumstances, the Vienna-Bratislava region is 
believed to have enormous future development potential. Economic prospects for the 
region were highlighted by a number of analyses and studies. Most importantly, in 
1993 the German economic institute EMPIRICA (Empirica Regional Monitor) 
undertook a study of 414 European regions and Bratislava was ranked first - as the 
best location for future investment in Europe (Trend, 1993; see also OECD, 1996d, 
p. 76). Factors considered by the study included labour costs, productivity, quality of 
life, access to markets and R&D level. The Empirica suggested that Bratislava might 
become a future 'Silicon Valley' of the East. Interestingly, the Hungarian region of 
Gyor and the neighbouring Austrian region of Burgenland appeared among the top ten 
regions too. On this basis, the vision of a 'golden triangle' Vienna-Bratislava-Gyor 
generated much optimism (see Trend 1995; see also Gorzelak, 1996, p. 127-128). 
Fourthly, there was political will on both the Austrian and Slovak sides to develop 
successful co-operation. Historically, relations between the two nations were non- 
conflictual. Indeed, Vienna and Bratislava, once being part of the same Empire, have 
a long record of political, economic and cultural ties, interrupted only by four Cold 
War decades. In the new geopolitical situation following the collapse of state- 
socialism, interest on both sides of the border for mutual co-operation has arisen. 
Austria, realising its geographical location, is open to co-operation with its Eastern 
neighbours and is supportive in their effort to join the EU. For Slovakia, the 100 km 
border with Austria is the only border with the European Union and more broadly, 
with the advanced 'West' itself. Therefore, Austria is a strategic partner in Slovakia's 
effort to join the 'rich club'. Indeed, the way from Bratislava to Brussels, leads 
geographically, economically and politically through Vienna. 
In short, the Slovak-Austrian border offered an ideal chance to change the former 
zone of military and ideological confrontation between two implacable blocks into a 
zone of thriving political, cultural, economic, scientific and technical co-operation 
between East and West, in the middle of the New Europe'. Slovak regional policy 
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makers and planners were not blind to this chance and the development of the Vienna- 
Bratislava(-Gyor) 'co-operative region' was considered as a matter of strategic 
importance for the regional development of Slovakia (see Bu6ek, 1992, p. 9; Balaz, 
1995, p. 361; Benuska, 1994, p. 2-4; Sokol, 1995; Smith, 1998, p. 280; OECD, 1996d, 
p. 76; Trend, 1995, p. 7; Tvrdon, 1996, p. 53; ). However, given the financial constraints 
on the Slovak side, the practical capacity for such co-operation was limited. The real 
chance to develop a meaningful border of co-operation appeared only with Austria's 
accession to the EU in 1995, when the Slovak-Austrian border become eligible for the 
INTERREG / PHARE CBC funds. 
Slovak-Austrian PHARE Cross-Border Co-operation Programme 
Indeed, in 1995 the European Commission approved the budget of ECU 20 million 
for the Slovak-Austrian Cross-Border Co-operation Programme (CBC) for the period 
of five years (1995 to 1999). Fifty-six per cent of the total budget was designated to 
infrastructure measures, 19 % to economic development and tourism, 15 % to 
environmental measures and 10 % to small projects funds and the management of the 
programme. It was expected, that the money would be allocated through five 
consecutive annual Financial Memoranda, each amounting to ECU 4 million. The 
programme became the most important regional programme in the country (Sokol, 
1999, p. 6). 
In 1995, the first such Financial Memorandum was designed -4 MECU was aimed to 
support ten pilot projects (see Table 7.1). Two projects were of critical importance for 
the realisation of the Slovak 'Silicon Valley' dream -a study of Science and 
Technology Park in Bratislava, and a study/project for the Special economic zone on 
the Slovak-Austrian border crossing Jarovce-Kittsee. It was expected that both studies 
would be followed by a quick realisation phase financed through subsequent Financial 
Memoranda, both attempting to capitalise on the development potential described 
above. 
Indeed, the successful realisation of the programme would have been of great 
importance for Slovakia. Apart from bringing in badly needed financial resources for 
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the above strategic projects and for the border region more generally, it also had an 
important bearing on political and institutional-building dimensions. Politically, the 
successful progress of such a programme would be an excellent signal of the country's 
commitment to join the European family. Institutionally, the programme 
implementation itself would be a great opportunity to gain experience in the 
management of an EU regional-type programme and to build a capacity able to take 
full advantage of EU funds that would be available to the country after its accession to 
the Union (Structural Funds, INTERREG programme, etc. ). 
However, in retrospect, various factors worked against the successful realisation of 
the first 1995 Financial Memorandum and the programme experienced several 
important delays. Thus, by May 1998, only about half the projects started the 
implementation procedures, while others were still in pre-tendering or tendering 
phases (PMU, 1998). By the end of 1998, Slovak authorities were experiencing 
difficulties in completing contractual obligations needed to access funds before the 
deadline expired on 31 December. Problems with the first Financial Memorandum 
delayed the realisation of a whole programme and concomitantly negatively affected 
all consequent budgets - there was no new money allocated in 1996 nor in 1997. The 
deadlock was finally overcome as late as 1998, when eventually the second Financial 
Memorandum (worth 5 MECU) was signed, some two years late, amid growing fears 
that the large part of the original 20 MECU budget would go unused. The delay, 
meanwhile, directly negatively affected the realisation of the `Silicon Valley' dream 
in Bratislava. The reasons why the Slovak-Austrian PHARE CBC programme faced 
such problems thus deserve a closer scrutiny. It could be argued that a series of 
negative factors went against the successful implementation of the programme. Three 
main groups of factors can be safely identified. 
Programme related factors 
The first group of 'problem' factors is related to the programme itself. Simply put, the 
management of the programme was much more complicated than originally expected. 
The PHARE programme in general is a rather complex administrative and financial 
mechanism. There are strict procedures of planning, endorsing, contracting and 
spending money, supervising implementation and monitoring. Money goes through 
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several cycles of approval by the EC before being allocated and eventually made 
ready for spending. Some procedures are quite complicated and time-consuming and 
delays in endorsement proved that not only authorities in the CEEC but also Brussels 
itself sometimes find their accurate and timely application difficult. PHARE CBC 
programme is a further complicated case. By definition, the programme is a multi- 
sectoral programme, involving both 'soft' (non-investment) projects and 'hard' 
(investment) projects. The programme requires the good co-ordination of the partners 
at a national level (ministries, local and regional authorities, associations and private 
sector) as well as excellent co-operation on the international level. Indeed, efficient 
co-operation with the relevant authorities in the partner EU country is required as a 
complementarity with the INTERREG II programme operating on the EU side of the 
border is sought. 
From this perspective, the first Slovak CBC Programme was perhaps too ambitious in 
terms of both the number of projects involved and their variety. It included too many 
relatively small projects, most of them had to be further divided into sub-projects. 
Each project or sub-project had its 'own life' and its particular problems, each had to 
be treated individually and required the same amount of administrative and 
management work, regardless of its financial value. Needless to say, the programme 
consisted of a great variety of types of projects, and, of course, a great variety of 
procedures to follow too. In addition to this, the PHARE rules themselves kept 
changing. The European Commission in order to increase the `effectiveness' of 
pHARE has been introducing new rules and guidelines. These were supposed to 
simplify and accelerate the implementation of all PHARE programmes. However, 
some of them did not take full account of the particularities of the CBC programme, 
while the sudden introduction of others in the course of implementing the programme 
often caused confusion and further complications. 
Institutional (in)capacity 
Clearly, the successfully managing of the programme was a challenging task and 
required a stable, effective, flexible and experienced operational force, with sound 
negotiation and co-ordination capacity. Instead, mirroring a general turmoil in the 
Slovak administration, the CBC programme experienced changes of responsible 
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bodies, chaos in organisational arrangements and personnel exchanges combined with 
staffing problems. Much of the required functions were expected to be fulfilled by a 
Programme Management Unit (PMU) - the administrative, financial, programming 
and co-ordination core of the programme - that should have operated under the 
relevant ministry or governmental body. Unfortunately, the establishment of the PMU 
and the maintenance of its operability was problematic, owing to frequent institutional 
changes. Indeed, since 1995, the programme has been operating subsequently under 
three different government bodies. It was originally conceived under the auspices of 
the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), subsequently taken-up by the Office for the 
Strategy of Society, Science and Technology of the Slovak Republic (ÜSRSVT SR) 
and finally transferred under the responsibility of the Central PHARE Unit (CPU). 
More recently, attempts were undertaken to transfer the programme to the Ministry of 
Construction and Regional Development (interview MVaRR SR, 2001). These shifts 
of responsibility had rather disastrous consequences in terms of continuity of staff. 
None of the people that were originally dealing with the CBC programme at the 
Centre for Strategic Studies (CSC) were transferred to ÜSRSVT SR and basically new 
people had to start from scratch. The situation was very similar some four years later, 
when from 
ÜSRSVT SR only 2 people working for the programme were transferred 
to CPU34. The consequences were that, each time, there were new people dealing with 
the programme and - learning how to manage it. 
After long delays, the Programme Management Unit (PMU) was eventually 
established within the 
ÜSRSVT SR in 1996. In the absence of the National 
Development Agency and strong regional authorities, the PMU had to rely on its own 
administrative capacity in the programming, negotiating and implementing of the 
programme. This capacity, however, was severely 
limited. Firstly, the PMU did not 
enjoy much-needed stability as 
it was subject to mismanagement and numerous 
changes of organisational structure of 
its home institution. During these organisational 
`earthquakes', the responsibility lines were often ambiguous and co-ordination with 
other departments eroded, without talking about 
difficulties with co-ordination with 
external bodies, including Austrian partners. 
Further to this, there were often changes 
34 one junior officer and one technical assistant were transferred to CPU, none of them had worked 
within the CBC programme for more than 24 months. 258 
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in managerial posts of the PMU. Between 1996 and 1998, the CBC Programme had 
four different Programme Authorising Officers (most senior position of the 
programme) and three different Directors (second most senior position of the 
programme, charged with daily management of the programme). With only one 
exception, all the changes of Programme Authorising Officers, were accompanied by 
temporary, but critical, periods of non-replacement. 
Finally, the PMU faced another crucial problem - staffing. The Slovak authorities 
found it difficult to attract both well qualified, experienced and linguistically skilled 
people to work for the Unit, in part due to the low salaries prevailing in the public 
sector. In May 1996, the PMU had only one person dealing full-time with the 
programme - the PMU Director. Although later that year, three new staff were 
recruited, all were fresh graduates aged under 25 without relevant experience. It was 
not until the end of 1997 that two full-time technical experts started to assist the PMU. 
In its peak in spring 1998, the PMU staff accounted for two technical experts, the 
PMU Director and three junior staff, including one secretary. The most recent 
institutional change arrived in March 1999, when the whole programme was 
transferred under the responsibility of Central PHARE Unit at the Office of 
Government and the PMU as such ceased to exist. 
Political sensitivity 
The picture of 'malaise' of the Slovak CBC would not be complete without 
considering the political aspect of the whole programme. Slovakia at that time, for the 
reasons discussed earlier in the Chapter, was omitted from the first wave of EU 
enlargement negotiations and this had multiple negative ramifications for the country, 
including CBC activities. Indeed, with Slovakia's vanishing prospects for early EU 
integration, the initial optimism regarding development of meaningful co-operation on 
Slovak-Austrian border had been disappearing, and nobody could blame Austria if it 
instead concentrated more on its 'first-wave' neighbours - Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovenia. 
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However, the more influential and more direct impact on all PHARE programmes in 
Slovakia came from Brussels. Clearly, the more political relations between Bratislava 
and Brussels were cooling down, the more the European Commission was inclined to 
'freeze' PHARE financial channels. The misunderstandings that developed in high- 
level political EU-Slovakia relations were mirrored in the organisation of the PHARE 
programme in Slovakia. In 1996, a misconceived Slovak attempt to make the PHARE 
programme more 'effective' resulted in deadlock and disagreement with the 
Commission on the further direction of the whole Slovak PHARE programme. As a 
result, no new annual national PHARE budget was approved for the country by the 
European Commission that year. The situation persisted through 1997 when the EC 
made it clear, that if Slovakia did not fulfil the required political criteria, PHARE aid 
would be ended all together. 
Parallel to this, there was mounting pressure from the European Commission to 
reorganise the Slovak PHARE programme by reducing the number of Programme 
Management Units (PMUs) (and possibly the number of programmes) in the country. 
The EC promoted the establishment of one Central PHARE Unit, the super-body that 
would financially administer all PHARE programmes of the country. In this context, 
the creation of the PMU for Cross-Border Co-operation and the establishment of the 
CBC as an independent financial programme went clearly 'against the flow'. In fact, 
few observers expected that, given the circumstances, the CBC PMU would survive. 
Eventually, the 'threat' materialised in March 1999 when, as mentioned earlier, the 
whole CBC programme was transferred under the responsibility of the Central 
pHARE Unit (interview GO SR, 1999). 
Lessons and beyond 
For Slovakia, some important lessons can be drawn from the experience with the 
pHARE CBC programme. Firstly, PHARE is not a miracle tool that can change 
things and solve problems immediately and easily. Rather, PHARE itself requires a 
great deal of attention and effort before any advantages can be taken. Moreover, the 
effort will not be successful until political and institutional pre-requisites are satisfied. 
The slow and painful launch of the PHARE CBC programme with Austria had several 
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negative implications. The 'real impact' on the border region was so far very limited. 
The most important projects will have to wait still before being realised and it is 
unclear if they will meet the expectations attached to them. This is particularly true for 
the projects whose aspiration was to build the `knowledge economy' in Bratislava. In 
terms of institutional building, the implementation of the programme was a painful 
exercise, however, with no clear institutional capital accumulated. Politically, the 
PHARE programme in Slovakia, especially in the 1994-1998 period, was often part of 
the problem than part of a solution, within the turbulent context of the `vicious circle'. 
However, there are also some positive signals. Most importantly, in 1996, the basis 
for a trilateral Austrian-Slovak-Hungarian Cross-Border Co-operation has been 
created. The programme was named 'Partnership 2000 - Vision and consensus for the 
21st century' and policy makers hope, that it will open 'new opportunities of co- 
operation' in the regional triangle Vienna-Bratislava-Gyor (ÜSRSVT SR, 1997a, p. 2; 
PMU, 1997). Indeed, Partnership 2000 was the only PHARE programme in Slovakia 
that received funding from the European Commission in 1996 and 1997. Within this 
programme, specific measures were proposed by the Slovak side to encourage the 
creation of a `regional information society' in the border region, inspired by similar 
exercises in the EU. A move to promote a `regional information society' within the 
trilateral programme, that could also be seen as an attempt by the Slovak policy 
makers to bypass the deadlock within the bilateral programme in advancing the idea 
of the `knowledge economy'. The idea of the `regional information society' was given 
the highest political support by the trilateral meeting of the Prime Ministers of 
Austria, Slovakia and Hungary respectively. However, it remains to be seen how 
premium political proclamations will be translated into concrete steps. 
Indeed, any progress towards a Central European `Silicon Valley' has to be measured 
against reality on the ground. Here, several contradictions have been emerging in the 
border region. On the one hand, the deepening of EU integration and the application 
of the Schengen Agreements made external EU borders (including the Slovak- 
Austrian one) less 'permeable', quite contrary to the spirit of the CBC programme. On 
the other hand, the late 1990s saw the further erosion of the academic and scientific 
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base on which the regional `knowledge economy' could be built in Bratislava35. An 
important part of the problem is a continuing process of `brain-drain' the extent of 
which, however, is hard to estimate because such critical information is not collected 
by Slovak Statistics (interview SU SR, 2001). It could be safely said that Bratislava 
acts as a `magnet' for skilled labour in Slovakia and therefore attracts `brains' from 
within the national economy. At the same time, however, Bratislava experiences 
important leakages of a highly qualified labour force to neighbouring Austria (see 
Williams et al., 2001) and further afield. Despite this, Bratislava is doing relatively 
well in economic terms and is effectively the second richest region in Central and 
Eastern Europe after Prague (ES, 2000). However, rather that being the outcome of 
the institutional efforts described in this section, the economic position of Bratislava 
has probably more to do with the power of market forces and the effects of circular 
and cumulative causation. Indeed, the relative success of the capital city has to be 
placed in the context of growing domestic social and regional inequalities to which we 
now turn. 
7.7 Social and spatial divides in Slovakia 
The exploration of social and spatial divides in Slovakia has to start with re- 
emphasising the importance of pre-socialist and state-socialist historical legacies. 
Indeed, not only did Slovakia historically lag behind other industrial countries, it also 
displayed wide internal regional and social differences. In broad spatial terms, the 
western half of Slovakia was more industrialised, more urbanised and wealthier than 
the eastern half, reflecting an historical pattern of a wider continental divide (Sokol, 
1999, p. 5) and Slovakia's initial position at the periphery of industrial Europe. Indeed, 
the backward eastern parts of Slovakia historically suffered the most from poverty and 
emigration waves (see Ivani6ka, 1996, p. 116). The 
imbalances between the east and 
the west were further exacerbated during the inter-war first Czecho-Slovak Republic, 
that favoured western Slovak regions closer to the Czech Lands, while the limited 
industrial base in eastern Slovakia was facing `de-industrialisation' (Pavlinek, 1995; 
35 R&D expenditure in Slovakia further declined to 0.86 % of GDP in 1999 (Pi§üt and Kraus, 2000, 
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Selucky, 1991). The state-socialist regime after the Second World War, as pointed out 
earlier, was determined to overcome both social and spatial inequalities. Thus, besides 
attempting to equalise the economic position of Slovakia vis-ä-vis the Czech Lands, 
there were also attempts to encourage economic development in lagging-behind 
corners of the country. Equality, however, was often achieved at the expense of 
efficiency. While Slovakia as a whole underwent massive `forced industrialisation', 
the socialist planners targeted also its peripheral regions with a specific `branch-plant' 
structure reflecting particular divisions of labour under state-socialism (Smith, 1998, 
2000). Meanwhile, in social terms, Czecho-Slovakia displayed one of the most equal 
income distribution systems in Europe (cf. Cox and Mason, 1999). This pattern, 
however, came to an end in 1989. 
Indeed, with the collapse of state-socialism and subsequent neo-liberal marketisation 
of the economy, regional and social divides have seen sharp increases. Independent 
Slovakia through its Constitution committed itself to the `socially-oriented' market 
economy, though it is unable to halt the growing social inequality trend. Within the 
first years of transformation income inequality in Slovakia increased, measured by 
Gini coefficient, from 19.5 in 1989 to 22.5 in 1994 (Dunford and Smith, 1998, p. 36) 
showing a propensity to rise further (see Garner and Terrell, 1998). This trend reflects 
the broader process of growing social polarisation in Slovakia and other `transition' 
countries. On the one hand, political and entrepreneurial elites have been emerging 
(Williams and Bala, 1999; see also Eyal et al., 1998), on the other hand, there is a 
growing army of disadvantaged and marginalised social groups, probably giving birth 
to a new social class structure (cf. Smith, 1998). 
Alongside social differentiation, Slovakia has experienced spectacular regional 
fragmentation (Balaz, 1995; BuCek, 1999; Finka, 2000; Gajdos, 1997; Ivanickova, 
1996; OECD, 1996d; Raj6dk, 1998; Smith, 1994,1995,1996,1997a, 1998,2000; 
Siräk, 1999; Sokol, 1999). This is most apparent in terms of the regional distribution 
of unemployment. Indeed, despite the economic recovery between 1994 and 1998 
unemployment remained quite high and very unevenly distributed. In June 1998 when 
the national average unemployment rate was 13.5 %, joblessness remained relatively 
low in the capital city Bratislava whose five districts reported unemployment rates 
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between 3.1 % to 4.7 %. At the same time, unemployment in most districts of the 
western half of Slovakia outside Bratislava reported rates between 7.2 % and 16.6 %. 
Meanwhile, the contours of the unemployment crisis were looming in the East and 
South-East of the country where the majority of districts reported joblessness ranging 
between 16.7 % and 27.9 % (M SR, 1998a, p. 35-36). The introduction of neo-liberal 
policy packages and the subsequent slowdown of the national economy in the post- 
1998 period has been associated with further dramatic exacerbation of the regional 
problem. By the end of 2000 when the national unemployment rate was approaching 
18%, the figure remained as `low' as 6.4% for the Bratislava region36. Meanwhile, 
joblessness in the worst hit districts of southern and south-east Slovakia jumped to an 
alarming 26% - 32% of their labour force (SÜ SR, 2001, p. 40-41). 
The geographical distribution of unemployment mirrored a deep fragmentation of the 
Slovak space-economy, reflecting the historical legacies of regional economies in 
question and the way they interact with the imperatives of the wider political 
economy. Bratislava, on the border with Austria, consolidated its position as an 
economic 'core' of Slovakia (Smith, 1998). The majority of industrial urban centres 
are clustered in the Western part of the country, forming together what could be called 
a 'centre' of the Slovak space-economy (cf. Ivani6ka, 1996, p. 89). Thanks to their 
more diverse economic base, districts that are part of it, seem to perform better than 
their counterparts in the East and South-East of Slovakia. Indeed, more scarcely 
populated areas with traditional agricultural production or modemised/industrialised 
only recently under the state-socialism, appear to be clear losers of the `transition' to 
the market (Smith, 1998; Smith, 2000). Thus, in the East, Pregov and Kogice, the 
second largest industrial city of Slovakia, constitute the only two major 'islands of 
development' in an otherwise increasingly marginalised region. What (re)emerges 
then, is a clear West-East divide (see Figure 7.3) that combines both urban-rural and 
core-periphery dimensions and fits into the broader east-west economic landscape of 
Central Europe (see Figure 7.2 and Figure 4.2 in Appendix). 
This East-West disparity in Slovakia is further exacerbated by the economic weight of 
Bratislava, located on the very Western extreme of the country (Bu6ek, 1999). The 
36 Five districts of Bratislava city plus districts of Malacky, Pezinok and Senec. 
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capital city produces 34% of the national value-added (SÜ SR, 1998b, p. 13), accounts 
for more than 50% of the FDI inflow (Smith, 1998; Sirdk, 1999) and accommodates 
the bulk of the country's expanding business and financial services (cf. ýÜ SR, 
1998b, p. 9). The contrasting economic fortunes between Bratislava and the rest of the 
country are reflected in regional GDP levels. Measured at purchasing parity standards, 
GDP per capita of Bratislava reaches 99 % of the EU average making it the second 
wealthiest place in CEEC after Prague (EC, 2001). Meanwhile, the remaining Slovak 
NUTS II regions fall far below, with GDP levels ranging from 39 % to 44 % and 
contributing to the country's unimpressive average of 49 % in 1998 (ibid). 
What we witness then, is the emergence of a highly fragmented picture of the Slovak 
space-economy under market conditions. And, despite the attempts of the Slovak 
policy makers reviewed earlier in the Chapter, the extent of the regional and social 
problem are showing a tendency to increase further. This reflects a highly uneven way 
people and regions are being integrated into the wider national and international 
divisions of labour and value chains (see also Smith et al., 2002). Exacerbation of the 
social and regional divides makes the fulfilment of the constitutional promise of being 
`socially friendly' market economy and the requirement of the EU for socially and 
regionally balanced development an ever greater challenge. Indeed, a failure to 
address adequately regional disparities was one of the impediments to Slovakia's entry 
into negotiations for future accession to the EU (Smith, 1998, p. 284). Ironically, with 
the further liberalisation of the economy that aimed at the acceleration of Slovak 
integration into the EU, the regional problem grew bigger. Thus regional and social 
polarisation seems to be just another important element of the `vicious circle' of the 
country in `transition'. With this concern in mind, we now approach the conclusions. 
7.8 Conclusion 
The case of Slovakia presented in this Chapter provides us with some valuable 
insights with regard to the processes of turbulent post-socialist socio-economic 
transformation and simultaneous attempts to emulate shift towards the `knowledge 
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economy' in CEEC. Empirical evidence mobilised through the Chapter allows us to 
formulate the following conclusions. 
Firstly, the case of Slovakia strongly supports the view developed in earlier theoretical 
Chapters that institutions should be seen as being at the same time objects, subjects 
and outcomes of wider socio-economic struggles. Indeed, the emergence of an 
independent Slovak state can be seen as a `product' of struggles that ensued in the 
former Czecho-Slovakia after the fall of state-socialism. The `vicious circle' that 
emerged as a powerful interlocking of economic and social processes had to be 
resolved by dissolving the federation. Second, it could be argued that in 1993 
Slovakia did free itself from the constraints of the federal `nation-state' and gained 
full control over its economic policy and institutional landscape design. However, by 
becoming an `independent' country, Slovakia did not free itself from its own 
historical legacies and a wider political economy. Indeed, after becoming a `nation- 
state' on its own, Slovakia fully exposed itself to the power of the international 
political economy and imperatives of international divisions of labour and value 
chains. Slovak state institutions thus have to be seen as acting in the context of 
powerful `external' forces. Moreover, thirdly, Slovakia's institutions themselves 
became part of the `internal' socio-economic struggles. Instead of national `coalition 
building', powerful interlocking of negative economic, political, social, ethnic and 
regional processes prevailed resulting in the `vicious circle' tendencies in an 
independent Slovakia. Institutions are deeply implicated in such tendencies and thus 
could be seem as part of the problem. 
The point emerging from this analysis is that turbulent socio-economic 
transformations create rather hostile environments for successful institutional 
building. Conversely, unstable, weak or incomplete institutional bases can be 
expected to provide only a limited impact on the economy and society. In this way, 
institutions are becoming a part of the problem. 
This was demonstrated in the example of a slow and painful emergence of the 
regional tier in Slovakia and further highlighted 
in the case of specialised economic 
development institutions that could or should have assisted Slovakia in building a 
more competitive `knowledge-intensive' economy. Indeed, the 1990s could be seen 
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at best as years in the search for an `animateur'. Efforts to create `institutional 
thickness' were present, but given the turbulent political, economic and wider 
institutional environment, the outcomes (effects) are somewhat limited. ÜSRSVT SR 
was singled out as potentially a major `animateur' but it failed to provide the needed 
institutional capacity and itself faced `survival' problems. Consequently, this had 
negative implications for concrete measures that were aiming at capitalising on the 
academic and research-scientific potential of the capital city Bratislava and 
materialising the vision of the Central European `Silicon Valley'. Bratislava, which 
was supposed to assist Slovakia's `passage to a knowledge-based society' (Ivanicka, 
1996, p. 91) meanwhile, emerged as the second wealthiest region in Central and 
Eastern Europe. However, rather than being the outcome of an institutional effort 
described in the Chapter, the relative success of Bratislava can be attributed more to 
the operation of market forces and the circular and cumulative causation process, and 
should be seen in the context of growing social and regional inequalities in Slovakia. 
Ironically, market forces also contributed to the erosion of the R&D base on which 
long-term competitive `knowledge economy' in Bratislava and Slovakia could have 
been built (cf. Myant, 1999a; Zajac, 1997). More recent attempts to secure 
competitiveness through further liberalisation, improved the country's political 
chances of joining the EU, but ironically, led to the further exacerbation of economic, 
political and social problems, highlighting one of the fundamental contradictions of 
the transformation process. Thus, in retrospect, the biggest direct impact Slovak 
institutions have made on the economic performance of Slovakia in the 1990s was a 
`Keynes-inspired' growth between 1996-98 that, as demonstrated above, was not 
without problems. 
At the turn of the millennium, Slovakia remains one of the most economically 
advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but faces considerable challenges. 
With unemployment rising to 20% (one of the highest in Europe) it is no surprise that 
`defensive restructuring' based on cheap labour becomes the norm for most Slovak 
regions (Smith, 2000, p. 173). More broadly, it could be argued that stemming from 
the intersection of its historical legacies and imperatives of the wider political 
economy, Slovakia and its regions are progressively directly subjected to particular 
patterns of international divisions of labour and value chains (cf. Smith et al., 2002) 
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increasingly dominated by West European capital. These processes firmly lock 
Slovakia and other CEECs into the emerging eastern `super-periphery' of the `New 
Europe'. Thus, in the face of powerful forces of the wider political economy and 
uneasy socio-economic legacies, the room for manoeuvre of Slovakia and its 
institutions in altering the country's economic fortunes is severely limited. This 
proposition brings us back to the larger discussion of the regional dimension of the 
emerging `New Europe' to which we now return. The final Chapter will also provide 
a comparison between Slovakia and Scotland before formulating overall conclusions. 
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PART III 
Chapter 8: 
Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has been concerned with the fall of state-socialism and the alleged rise of 
the `knowledge economy', and the implications of these processes for regional change 
in the `New Europe'. In particular, former industrial regions in both Eastern and 
Western Europe and the way they cope with the socio-economic transformations have 
been of prime interest. Particular attention has been given to their efforts to promote a 
transformation from the industrial economic paradigm to a `post-industrial' or 
`knowledge-intensive' one. In doing so, the thesis has engaged with concepts found 
more broadly in the social sciences, and in economic geography in particular, which 
suggest that the regions themselves are capable of mobilising their internal potential, 
to ensure economic prosperity by supporting learning, knowledge creation and 
innovation. In less-favoured regions, the regional development agency is often seen as 
a key institutional precondition to fulfil the function of an `animateur' of economic 
change towards a `learning region' where learning, knowledge and innovation are part 
of a `virtuous circle' of economic success. Following a detailed theoretical 
examination of these concepts and a detailed empirical analysis of two case study 
regions, this Chapter aims to formulate overall conclusions. 
Initially, section 8.2 will summarise the arguments emerging from the theoretical 
analysis. It will argue that the concept of the `knowledge economy' and its regional 
dimension in the form of `learning region' offer an appealing account of 
contemporary economic change; however, they also suffer from serious theoretical 
shortcomings. The need for an alternative analytical framework will thus be 
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underlined and the contours of such an alternative will be briefly outlined. The focus 
will then turn to the empirical material mobilised in the thesis. Section 8.3 will 
summarise the findings from the two case studies, Scotland and Slovakia. It will point 
at the serious difficulties these two region-states - one in the Western European 
periphery, the other in the Eastern `super-periphery' - face on their way to economic 
prosperity. The comparison will reveal striking similarities but also profound 
differences between Scotland and Slovakia and their attempts to promote the 
`knowledge economy'. These findings consequently raise important policy questions 
for social and regional cohesion in an enlarging EU; these will be addressed in section 
8.4. 
8.2 Regional dimensions of the `knowledge economy' 
The exploration of the regional dimensions of the `knowledge economy' started in 
Chapter 2 by addressing the theoretical foundations of the `knowledge economy'. It 
was argued that different or even conflicting accounts can be found in the literature on 
the subject, while different labels are used to capture the phenomenon, including 
`post-industrial society', `information society', `learning economy' or `new economy' 
(Bell, 1973; Castells, 1996; Drucker, 1993; Kelly, 1998; Leadbeater, 2000; Lundvall 
and Johnson, 1994; Webster, 1995; inter alia). Nevertheless, a broad consensus can be 
found among these concepts in terms of the centrality of knowledge in economic 
processes. Indeed, knowledge - in its various forms (tacit or explicit knowledge, 
formal or informal, knowledge embodied in technology, institutions, human/social 
capital, etc. ) - is believed to have become the most important source of wealth 
creation. Consequently, it is claimed, the economy has become knowledge-driven, 
marking the emergence of the `new era' with `new rules'. For some observers this 
means that the contradictions and social conflicts of capitalism will be eased, if not 
replaced, by an emerging economic system based on networks of co-operation, trust 
and knowledge-sharing. These propositions are attractive, but have been subjected to 
critical scrutiny, from which an alternative view has emerged. 
A critique of the `knowledge economy' started by addressing two fundamental 
questions. First, `are we really experiencing a transition to a knowledge-driven 
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economy', and second, `can an economy be knowledge-driven at all'? With regard to 
the latter, this thesis supports the view that there is no convincing evidence that (even 
the most advanced) economies have actually moved beyond the market economy. 
Therefore, it remains debatable whether contemporary economies can be seen as 
knowledge-driven. Rather it should be admitted that the market economy is, and 
always was, profit-driven. Within such an economy, the final goal is not knowledge 
but profit. In fact, the importance of the market imperative for profit is likely to 
increase with the advances of neo-liberal globalisation. This is not to say that 
knowledge does not play an important role; indeed, knowledge can be a part of a 
profit-seeking process (and probably always was). But it is neither the only nor 
necessarily the most important part of the process. Indeed, the crucial evidence of the 
growing importance of knowledge for economic development is still missing. 
Therefore, the notion that we are witnessing a transition towards a `knowledge- 
driven' economy should be questioned. 
Meanwhile, the frameworks for development that highlight knowledge as the main (if 
not the only) factor of economic growth need to be scrutinised. In fact, the very 
assumption that knowledge creates wealth (central to the `knowledge economy' 
thesis) should be seen in a critical light. At best it is an oversimplification that does 
not take into account the influence of other factors (e. g. power). Moreover, it 
overlooks the possibility of a reversed causality (i. e. that wealth creates knowledge). 
Indeed, the cost of `learning' or `knowledge creation' is virtually ignored by the 
literature. Acknowledging the existence of the reversed causality, of course, means 
turning the logic of the `knowledge economy' upside down. As the picture of a 
simple, one-directional relation between `knowledge' and `wealth' disintegrates, a 
more complex (but also more accurate) matrix emerges. This sees `knowledge', 
`wealth' and `power' as being mutually linked through a web of complex, 
multidirectional, direct and indirect relations. 
These criticisms open the way for an alternative conceptualisation of the current 
political economy. Building on parts of the `radical' and `institutional/evolutionary' 
approaches, this alternative starts by acknowledging that the economy should be 
conceptualised as an `institutionalised social process'. As such, the economy is 
shaped by institutions that can simultaneously be seen as being objects, subjects and 
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outcomes of struggles over knowledge, wealth and power'. This thesis supports the 
view that there are important continuities with the past in these struggles and that the 
current socio-economic transformations in the most advanced market economies are 
unfolding within the framework of a capitalist political economy. Consequently, the 
institutions of labour, state (local, regional, national, supranational) and capital 
(productive and financial), seem to have continuing salience in shaping socio- 
economic transformations where contradictions and conflict remain pertinent features. 
However, in what appears to be an increasingly neo-liberal profit-driven economy, it 
is global capital that is gaining momentum, supported by institutions of global 
economic governance (emerging as a category of institution of its own right). Indeed, 
global capital seems to play a pivotal role in shaping emerging global `socio-spatial 
divisions of labour' accompanied by global `socio-spatial value chains/networks' - 
two concepts proposed to capture the workings of the global political economy. 
Within such a political economy, the role of knowledge is indeed changing in that it is 
increasingly commodified. The commodification of knowledge in turn allows for the 
emergence of what could be seen as a `knowledge-intensive sub-economy', but this 
has to be seen in conjunction with the growing socio-spatial division of labour within 
the overall profit-driven economy framework. Therefore, instead of a widespread 
knowledge-sharing process, what can be expected is a process of knowledge 
accumulation as part of a wider circular and cumulative causation mechanism, in 
which knowledge, power and wealth reinforce each other with significant social and 
spatial effects. 
This situation places a question mark over the logic and the very existence of the 
`knowledge-driven economy', which has implications for economic geography 
concepts that see knowledge and learning as key explanatory factors of regional 
development (see Malecki, 2000, for a recent review). These concepts see regions as 
the basic organisational units of today's knowledge-intensive capitalism (Ohmae, 
1993; Florida, 1995), which function as `repositories and collectors' of knowledge, 
supported by regionally-based `entrepreneurial cultures', `untraded 
interdependencies' and `institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Saxenian, 
1994; Storper, 1999). Such regions, we are told, are best described as `learning 
I Hence the use of terms such as `socio-economy' or `political economy' seems to be more appropriate. 
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regions' (Florida, 1995; Asheim, 1996; Morgan, 1997; Boekema et al., 2000). Their 
learning capacity and ability to disseminate knowledge and innovation ensures their 
`virtuous circle' of economic success. Less-favoured regions, meanwhile, are 
encouraged to emulate successful `learning regions' by mimicking their `institutional 
thickness'. Building regional `animateurs' (Morgan, 1995,1998) is considered as part 
of the process in which economic prosperity becomes a `matter of choice' (Porter, 
1998). Moreover, economic prosperity is expected to be shared by all within the given 
region. Such propositions certainly have their appeal, not least for former industrial 
regions, where they raise hopes for economic and social `renewal'. However, the 
detailed analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 points to a much more complicated picture 
of the regional problem. Indeed, the possibility of the reversed wealth/knowledge 
causality sheds a suspicion on the validity of the above concepts. A fundamental 
question arises: are regions economically successful because they are knowledge- 
intensive, or are they knowledge-intensive thanks to the fact that they are 
economically successful? 
An attempt to answer this question has to start with the acknowledgement of growing 
`divisions of labour', accompanying `value chains' (or `value networks') and their 
spatial implications. Building on the conceptualisation of the current political 
economy presented earlier, this thesis supports the view that pockets of high-value 
knowledge-sub-economies can indeed be observed (seen by some as `learning 
regions'). These, however, can only be found in the most-advanced countries, often 
within established economic `hotspots'. Here, knowledge seems to function as yet 
another factor behind the circular and cumulative causation process. The striking 
feature of this process is that, with a handful of exceptions, it reinforces existing 
patterns of inequality. The effects of the `circular and cumulative causation' process 
are well known (Myrdal, 1957). Extended to cover the circulation and accumulation 
of knowledge in the spatial context, this means that economically successful regions 
have resources to invest in quality education, training and costly research and 
development activities. The resulting innovations can be turned into profits and these 
re-invested back into the regional `knowledge-base', attracting further investment and 
skilled workers and creating a possible `virtuous circle' scenario. This can be 
accompanied by a build-up of their power base or political influence. Regional 
economic success potentially opens the way for a more socially cohesive pattern of 
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development, although sharing regional prosperity is by no means automatic2. On the 
adverse side of the process, however, less-favoured regions (LFRs) can be trapped in 
a `vicious circle', stripped of both investment and `knowledge workers'. Their 
development trajectories are curbed by their own historical legacies ('soft' cultural, 
but also `hard' structural), as well as the current wider political economy. Indeed, 
LFRs simultaneously face competition from other regions, while being affected by the 
power and mobility of global capital, the constraints of national, supra-national and 
global bodies, and the power(lessness) and (im)mobility of labour. As a combined 
effect of these forces, LFRs are being integrated into the wider political economy 
through particular `socio-spatial divisions of labour' and `value chains'. In addition to 
the economic subordination, LFRs may find their power influence being eroded. 
It could be argued that such a conceptualisation is itself a simplification. It 
nevertheless raises the question of how much room for manoeuvre there remains for 
less-favoured regions to actively change their position within these `divisions of 
labour' and `value chains'. It is clear that regional actors do not necessarily sit idle 
vis-ä-vis the economic challenges their respective regions face. However, the issue is 
how significant their actions are on the regional level, and what importance the role of 
specialised economic development agencies operating within regions has. Answers to 
these questions must begin by acknowledging that regions themselves are institutions 
and thus they are subjects, objects and outcomes of wider socio-economic struggles. 
This is also true for specific economic development institutions like regional 
development agencies, which are expected to act as `animateurs' for their respective 
regional economies. Furthermore, the institutional power of these agencies has to be 
measured against the power of the wider political economy and the weight of the 
historical legacies of the regions in question. Thus, it could be argued that the room 
for manoeuvre of such regional institutions is limited. What is more, their efforts 
should be seen in the context of `internal' regional `divisions of labour', `value 
chains/networks' and the accompanying social and spatial inequalities these produce 
within regions. 
2 Indeed, many economic leaders, be it regions or cities, display striking patterns of social inequality 
(Castells and Hall, 1994; Castells, 1996; Sassen, 2001; Allen et al., 1998; inter alia). 
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The constraints that regions are facing were highlighted in Chapter 4 during the 
examination of economic trajectories in the `New Europe', with particular reference 
to its `Eastern' half. The Chapter argued that the understanding of the fall of state- 
socialism in Eastern Europe and the subsequent `transition to capitalism' is open to 
academic debate. A well-respected view suggests that state-socialism collapsed due to 
its inability to embrace the emerging `knowledge economy', or as Castells (1996) 
calls it, the `informational mode of development'. This proposition, however, has 
been assessed critically and put into the context of the knowledge-wealth-power 
triangle developed earlier. The thesis then moved on to explore the question of post- 
socialist transformation and uneven development in the `New Europe'. It pointed to 
the fact that there are profound disagreements in the literature about the causes of the 
diverging economic fortunes of regions and countries in post-socialist Eastern Europe. 
Following a critical analysis of the neo-liberal approach and building in part on the 
strengths of `institutional' and `radical' approaches, the Chapter attempted to move in 
the direction of an alternative conceptualisation of uneven development in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This alternative is in broad agreement with the general 
conceptualisation developed earlier, while paying attention to the particular 
circumstances of countries in `transition to capitalism'. The conceptualisation stresses 
the importance of historical legacies (both pre-socialist and state-socialist, `sofft' 
institutional as well as `hard' structural) alongside the power of the wider 
international political economy (market forces and international organisations). It was 
argued that the combination of these historical legacies and the imperatives imposed 
by the international political economy creates powerful incentives and constraints for 
economic development in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Part of 
the problem is the apparent paradox where the `transition' to a market economy aimed 
at improving economic fortunes seems to have eroded the knowledge-base on which 
the long-term competitiveness of CEECs could have been built (cf. Myant, 1999a). 
The regions and countries of Eastern Europe are thus being integrated into the 
international political economy thr iugh particular socio-spatial divisions of labour 
and socio-spatial value chains, where value often flows in the East-West direction. 
All these aspects are reflected in the growing fragmentation of the space-economy of 
the `New Europe', which in turn reopens the issue over the extent to which the 
economic performance of individual regions or countries is a `matter of their choice' 
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vis-ä-vis the wider political economy. What emerges from this line of inquiry is 
essentially a fundamental question about the relationship between structure and 
agency. Such relationships, the thesis suggests, are objects of social struggle and are 
therefore historically and locally contingent. To echo Massey (1995), contingent 
conditions can only be explored through empirical study of individual regions. 
Therefore, the theoretical discussion on the regional dimensions of the `knowledge 
economy' was accompanied by a detailed empirical analysis of two regional cases, to 
which we now turn. 
8.3 Evidence from Scotland and Slovakia (Comparison) 
Reflecting the alternative conceptualisation outlined above, a framework for regional 
analysis was constructed first in Chapter 5. The main points of this analytical 
framework can be summarised as follows. First, regions cannot be treated in an 
ahistorical manner. Instead, regional processes should be seen and analysed as firmly 
rooted in historical struggles. Second, regions cannot be separated from the wider 
political economy context in which they operate, and regional analysis should fully 
reflect that. Third, the historical legacies and imperatives of the wider political 
economy are mirrored in the economic performance of regional economies, which 
should be seen in conjunction with their position within wider divisions of labour and 
value chains. Fourth, action at the regional level that aims at changing the position 
within divisions of labour and value chains requires due attention, but the power of 
regional institutions needs to be measured against the background of the historical 
legacies and imperatives of wider political economy. Finally, `internal' struggles and 
socio-spatial divisions of labour within regions cannot be omitted from the analysis. 
Using such an analytical framework, two regional case studies of Scotland and 
Slovakia were undertaken. The remainder of this section will summarise their findings 
by comparing and contrasting the two cases. 
It is believed that Scotland and Slovakia offer excellent material for such analysis. It 
could be said that the two regions display important similarities as well as 
fundamental differences. The most obvious difference relates to their respective levels 
of economic development. GDP per capita figures (measured at PPS) reveal a 
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considerable economic gap, with Scotland reaching nearly 100% of the EU average, 
while Slovakia ranks below 50%. The difference measured at the current exchange 
rates would be even bigger. Beyond this crude macro-economic indicator, there are 
further important socio-economic dissimilarities. Scotland forms a part of the 
established market economy, and is part of the European Union and the European 
Single Market. Meanwhile, Slovakia is experiencing a turbulent `transition' from 
state-socialism to market capitalism and its simultaneous attempts to join the EU. One 
of the outcomes of the turbulent transformation, was the recent emergence of Slovakia 
as an independent nation. This constitutes a further difference in that Scotland, for the 
time being, remains a region firmly anchored within a wider `nation-state'. At the 
same time, this latter area offers some commonalties nevertheless. Indeed, both 
Slovakia and Scotland were for the long period of their history `stateless nations' 
incorporated within larger `nation-states', but both recently experienced a process of 
nation-building accompanied by an important institutional build-up. As a result, it 
could be argued, they both recently emerged as `regional states' with varying degrees 
of autonomy, but both with a significant `institutional thickness'. In addition, these 
two small nations (of similar population size) had important industrial pasts and both 
are attempting to move towards `post-industrial' or `knowledge economy' futures. For 
these and other reasons outlined in Chapter 5, a comparison between Scotland and 
Slovakia remains invaluable and can offer some important insights into the regional 
processes studied. Based on the material gathered in Chapters 6 and 7, a step-by-step 
comparison of individual analytical areas (historical legacies, wider political 
economy, economic performance, institutional responses, the role of an `animateur' 
and intra-regional socio-spatial divides) will be now undertaken before formulating 
overall conclusions. 
Historical legacies 
History is one of the areas of comparison where interesting similarities between 
Scotland and Slovakia emerge, including the already mentioned industrial past and a 
shared history as `stateless nations'. Indeed, both the Scots and the Slovaks see 
themselves culturally as nations and this is remarkable given the fact that they were 
both dominated by bigger nations and absorbed into larger `nation states' for much of 
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their history. However, a closer examination also reveals fundamental differences 
between the two cases that are often hidden in the `detail'. 
The first important difference between Scotland and Slovakia lies in their position and 
engagement within their respective `nation states'. Scotland appears to be more 
fortunate in this respect. Indeed, although the 1707 `marriage of convenience' with 
England was probably not welcome, it nevertheless gave the Scots the recognition of 
being a (junior) partner with England in Great Britain, a position they continue to 
enjoy. Thus, despite the fact that the relationship with the English may have not been 
easy, it allowed the Scots to exercise a limited influence over British affairs, while 
keeping several elements of their own autonomy intact. These surviving elements of 
Scottish autonomy kept the Scottish identity alive through the centuries and helped to 
lay the foundations for the autonomy of modem Scotland, eventually culminating in 
devolution in 1999. Slovakia, in contrast, lost its autonomy much earlier and went 
through a much tougher and more turbulent historical period. It first completely 
disappeared from the map of Europe after being absorbed into Hungary. The Slovaks 
had to fight for their `survival' for 1000 years while any attempts to establish 
autonomy were actively suppressed. Only by a `miracle of endurance', the nation 
survived. It was then given a lifeline through the 1918 `marriage of convenience' with 
the Czechs. The `marriage' was uneasy, but the struggle for Slovak autonomy 
continued, eventually resulting in a `velvet divorce' in 1992. Throughout history, 
then, in comparison to Scotland, Slovakia's opportunities to influence its own destiny 
were much more limited. 
The second important difference is hidden behind the industrial past of the two cases. 
Indeed, in terms of economic legacies Slovakia was again much less fortunate and 
spent much of its history as a backward agrarian region on the periphery of industrial 
Europe. Limited industrialisation in the 19th century changed little. By contrast 
Scotland was very much in the economic heart of the industrial Europe. It was part of 
the British `workshop of the world' and in the 19th century was one of the important 
industrial `hubs' of the world economy. Among the factors that helped Scotland to 
achieve such a privileged position were large deposits of coal and iron ore, as well as 
the possibilities that arose for Scotland through the expansion of the British Empire. 
None of these factors were present in Slovakia, where a major development boost 
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came only with industrialisation after the Second World War. Meanwhile, Scottish 
economic trajectories in the 20th century were marked by the gradual erosion of the 
country's competitive position culminating in the crisis of the 1970s, after which the 
position of Scotland within the international divisions of labour changed dramatically. 
Slovakia was not spared dramatic socio-economic change either. Following the 
collapse of state-socialism the Slovak industrial structure was eventually also tested. 
Built under the particular conditions of a centrally planned economy, it now 
constitutes an uneasy legacy for the country's post-socialist development. 
One way or another, for both Scotland and Slovakia their respective historical 
legacies (political, cultural, economic) represent an important element of 
understanding their current development trajectories, which cannot be omitted from 
the analysis. Indeed, these legacies are heavily reflected in the current position of the 
two nations vis-ä-vis the wider political economy to which we now turn. 
Wider political economy 
For Scotland, the United Kingdom remains the most important element of the wider 
political economy. Indeed, even after devolution, the UK provides the overall 
economic and policy framework in which Scotland operates. Thus in many ways, the 
fate of Scotland depends on the fate of its relations with the UK. The link with the UK 
is vital and could be said to provide powerful constraints for Scotland. However, 
thanks to a particular combination of historical legacies and more recent 
arrangements, it seems that Scotland also benefits from significant incentives and 
enjoys in a way a privileged position. Importantly, this is reflected in the favourable 
fiscal arrangements (including the controversial Barnett formula) that appear very 
generous, especially when compared with other less favoured regions in the UK. In 
part, the Scots achieved this position through their active engagement in the 
relationship with the wider nation state, in which the (real or exaggerated) `threat' of 
Scottish independence played its role. 
For Slovakia, the `threat' of independence also played a role. However, the Slovak 
situation is different in that once the Czech political elite was ready to sacrifice the 
common state, Slovak nationalists `lost their bargaining chips'. By exiting the 
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federation, Slovakia `liberated' itself from both federal constraints and incentives. 
However, the country did not free itself either from its historical legacies or from the 
constraints of the wider international political economy. Indeed, the European and 
global political economy is now a major element of Slovakia's wider environment. 
While the UK to a large extent mediates the Scottish position within the international 
political economy, Slovakia is fully exposed to its imperatives, and has to `negotiate' 
its position directly. In many ways, this proved to be difficult. The intertwined powers 
of international organisations (including the EU) and market forces (foreign direct 
investment, trade, financial capital) acted as powerful constraints on Slovakia's 
development and contributed to the reworking of the socio-spatial divisions of labour 
and value chains through which Slovakia is subjected to international flows of value. 
This in turn is reflected in the country's economic performance. 
Economic performance 
Indeed, the recent economic performance of Slovakia can be characterised as 
problematic, reflecting the dramatic socio-economic change the country has been 
going through. Initially, Slovakia experienced a deep `transitional recession' in the 
early 1990s reflecting the disintegration of the state-socialist industrial economy. 
Subsequently, the country surprised by a period of dynamic growth, giving some 
grounds for the claims of a `Slovak economic miracle'. Behind this `miracle', 
however, was a strong domestic (government) consumption that created its own 
problems. The economic imbalance was growing (trade balance, indebtedness) and 
unemployment remained high. Subsequent attempts to fully liberalise the economy 
had further immediate negative effects, including unemployment, which reached 
historic highs of 20 % in 2001. After a decade of painful transformation, Slovakia 
surpassed its 1989 economic level, but catching-up with Western Europe remains a 
challenge. Indeed, the Slovak GDP per capita figure remains below 50 % of the EU 
average and under current conditions a quick improvement seems unlikely. Foreign 
capital now controls key sectors of the economy; however, the overall volume and 
impact of FDI on Slovak economic fortunes remains limited. The role of EU pre- 
accession programmes meanwhile seems to be small. Amid the turbulent 
transformation, the Slovak economy did experience a process of `tertiarisation', but 
this was not accompanied by an overall increase in value-added knowledge-intensive 
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production. Instead, `defensive restructuring' on the basis of cheap labour has become 
the norm. Slovakia is thus firmly entrenched in the `super-periphery' of the `New 
Europe'. 
It could be argued that some parallels may be found when comparing the Slovak 
situation with the Scottish one. The Scottish economy experienced an even more 
dramatic `tertiarisation', while several of its key sectors could be said to compete on 
the basis of factor costs. However, owing in part to different historical legacies and 
different engagement with the current political economy, the overall economic 
performance of Scotland is entirely different. Initially, the economic crisis of the 
1970s marked the end of Scottish industrial superiority, and subsequent `de- 
industrialisation' was accompanied by high unemployment. However, after the late 
1980s Scotland saw a recovery with a remarkable acceleration of growth in the 1990s. 
The factors behind this recent growth were entirely different to those found in 
Slovakia. In Scotland, expanding business and financial services were an important 
element of the recovery, while a significant boost came from inward investment. 
Importantly, much of the foreign investment was concentrated in `new economy' 
(manufacturing) sectors contributing to the surge of the `Silicon Glen'. An additional 
contribution to the economic performance of Scotland was provided by the North Sea 
oil industry. Continuing relatively favourable public expenditure levels and the effects 
of EU structural funds should not be discounted either. In addition, Scottish economic 
performance has to be seen in conjunction with the overall positive growth of the UK 
economy. Simultaneously, in further contrast to Slovakia, economic growth in 
Scotland was accompanied by a major reduction in joblessness. Indeed, 
unemployment was reduced to an unprecedented low of around 6% in 2001. With its 
GDP per capita at close parity with the EU average, Scotland is probably one of the 
best performing LFRs in the European `periphery'. However, high structural 
dependence on FDI and external markets makes Scottish fortunes vulnerable to global 
economic volatility. In this respect, attempts to move the Scottish economy up the 
value chain is of critical importance. Slovakia faces a similar challenge, although 
probably of much bigger proportions. The question is to what extent Scottish or 
Slovak institutions can make a difference to their respective regional economies. 
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Institutional responses 
A comparison of the institutional responses of Scotland and Slovakia reveal further 
interesting similarities but also important differences. These are related to both 
general institution building and the operation of specialised economic development 
agencies. In both cases, it is useful to remember that regions themselves and their 
institutions are at the same time subjects, objects and outcomes of wider socio- 
economic struggles. To take the example of general institutional building first, both 
regions displayed a similar propensity to push towards greater autonomy within their 
larger `nation states'. In part, this process can be seen as a response to economic 
difficulties experienced and the perception of a `threat to a nation' more generally. 
The realisation of this autonomy, however, occurred under different historical 
circumstances. 
Slovakia, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, has a long record of rather unsuccessful 
attempts to establish its autonomy. More recently, however, Slovak nationalism 
thrived in the early 1990s on the political turbulence and economic stress wrought by 
the collapse of state-socialism and the subsequent neo-liberal `transition'. The latter 
was seen as an immediate threat to the economic, political and cultural survival of the 
nation and the push towards more solid autonomy was seen as an answer. The fact 
that Slovakia eventually achieved independence, however, could be attributed to both 
the Slovak `push' and the Czech `pull' factors, in a complicated `vicious circle' 
situation. Importantly, the Slovak nation and polity did not stand united behind the 
step toward independence. This in turn contributed to `vicious circle' tendencies in 
post-independence Slovakia, in which economic difficulties, political polarisation, 
ethnic and social tensions and regional fragmentation are omnipresent. As argued in 
Chapter 7, this created a rather hostile environment for institution building and the 
conceiving of coherent development strategies. The resulting institutional instability 
and `piecemeal' policy approaches seem to further aggravate the pain of 
transformation. In retrospect, the biggest impact Slovak institutions left on the 
economy were associated with a Keynes-inspired demand-side macro-economic 
manoeuvre in the mid-1990s. The subsequent return to a neo-liberal project brought a 
very different understanding of the role of the state and its institutions. 
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The situation in Scotland was in many respects both similar and different. Scotland, as 
Slovakia, also displayed a long-term tendency towards autonomy. The recent strong 
drive for autonomy can be seen in the context of, or as a response to, perceived major 
economic and political threats associated with the imposition of a neo-liberal 
economic order since the 1970s. This is not dissimilar to the Slovak response 
described above. However, unlike Slovak independence, Scottish devolution 
eventually materialised within conditions of relative economic prosperity. The 
Scottish case is also different in another respect. In contrast to Slovak institutional 
`jumps' and the `bumpy' road to autonomy, the Scottish institutional landscape 
seemed to build up rather gradually. Indeed, `political' devolution followed decades 
of incremental `administrative devolution'. Consequently, Scottish institutions seem 
to enjoy more stability and continuity, needed for longer-term projects. This is in 
contrast to Slovakia, where the discontinuity and instability of the institutional 
environment is often found, in turn affecting the institutional capacity and efficiency 
to act in the interest of the country. 
This is not to say that Scottish institutions were exempt from socio-economic 
struggles. The evidence presented in Chapter 6 proves that they were very much at the 
centre of these struggles. In addition, some difficult dilemmas and struggles may lie 
ahead. However, importantly, Scottish institutions have seemed strong enough to 
pursue a rather successful strategy of defending Scottish interests vis-ä-vis the British 
state. Indeed, getting the `best possible deal for Scotland' appears to pervade the 
entire Scottish agenda. A striking example of such a `deal' is the aforementioned 
generous funding arrangement that the Barnett formula seems to perpetuate. This 
could be seen as part of a much broader `refined imbalance' that Scotland enjoys 
within the UK. In retrospect, the long-term lobbying power Scottish institutions 
exercised within the UK is probably their biggest contribution to economic 
development in Scotland. 
For such an outcome, however, a united front is needed, where national actors pull in 
the same directions. This area constitutes a further difference between Scotland and 
Slovakia, probably best illustrated by the example of the recent achievement of 
political autonomy and independence respectively. Indeed, Scottish political 
autonomy would be unthinkable without the spectacular `coalition-building' among 
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major actors in Scotland who unite behind the project perceived as being in the 
common national interest. In contrast, such `national consensus' was largely missing 
in Slovakia. Instead, a deep split over the critical issue of independence occurred in 
Slovak society and polity and this was further recycled in policy struggles in the post- 
independence period and hampered the formulation of the Slovak `national interest'. 
This has direct implications for the overall institutional and policy framework. The 
different institutional dynamics of Scotland and Slovakia can be highlighted by the 
example of specialised economic development agencies, which will now be compared 
in turn. 
The role of an animateur 
Indeed, the situation with regard to animateurs displays striking differences between 
Scotland and Slovakia. However, before examining these in more detail, it is 
important to notice interesting similarities in terms of strategy discourse and concrete 
suggestions for regional action. Indeed, both Scotland and Slovakia displayed explicit 
strategy orientation towards the `knowledge economy'. In addition, in both cases, 
concrete local projects for promoting the `knowledge economy' were found. Coming 
under the form of a designated campus or park, these projects can be seen as attempts 
to support a nascent `knowledge economy' in particular regional contexts. Thus 
Scotland went ahead with its Alba Campus project, situated between Edinburgh and 
Glasgow, at the heart of the `Silicon Glen'. The project is a showcase initiative within 
a broader `cluster' approach and is seen as a part of the `Smart Scotland' strategy. In 
Slovakia, the creation of a Science and Technology Park in Bratislava was proposed 
as a means of materialising the Central European `Silicon Valley' and fitting in a 
broader vision of transforming Slovakia into a `knowledge society'. 
However, a more detailed analysis reveals significant differences in terms of building 
consensus around these strategies and implementing relevant projects. In relation to 
the former, it could be said that proposals related to the `knowledge economy' in 
Slovakia were rather isolated and had only limited and/or short-term impact on policy 
formulation. Amid fundamental policy and political struggles and overall socio- 
economic turbulence, the understanding of the `knowledge economy' remains limited, 
its importance underestimated and its promotion neglected. Meanwhile, in Scotland 
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the `knowledge economy' discourse was fully embraced within the mainstream 
economic strategy, and could be seen as being part of a longer-term policy-thinking 
development. There appears to be a broad consensus across the Scottish institutional 
landscape about the need to develop a competitive `knowledge-based' Scotland 
(although differences should not be overlooked). 
Stemming from these differences, the implementation of `knowledge economy' 
projects in Scotland and Slovakia was very different. It could be argued that the 
presence of a strong animateur in one case, and the lack of it in the other, played an 
important role. As seen in Chapter 7, Slovakia faced serious difficulties in 
materialising the vision of the Central European `Silicon Valley'. In part, these 
difficulties have to be seen in the context of wider socio-economic struggles and 
`vicious circle' tendencies, to which economic problems, political turbulence and 
institutional instability were contributing factors. In Scotland, in contrast, the Alba 
Centre was successfully launched, potentially creating a base for a `virtuous circle' 
between `education, innovation and enterprise' within a narrow but important `new 
economy' sector. Apart from several other favourable factors, this was made possible 
thanks to dedicated time, human and financial resources and the concerted efforts of 
Scottish Enterprise. This well-resourced and well-organised development agency was 
able to bring together leading Scottish universities and various other Scottish partners, 
to attract foreign investors and to deliver a prestigious development site. 
More broadly, Scottish Enterprise could probably be seen as the animateur for the 
Scottish economy. Besides its generous budget3, the particular strength of Scottish 
Enterprise comes from the integration of all major economic development functions 
covering areas from skills and training, to SMEs and support for indigenous 
companies, to property management, FDI attraction and export promotion. Such a 
body, on the other hand, was lacking in Slovakia. Instead of a strong national 
animateur, several bodies were emerging, each covering a particular function with no 
apparent co-ordination mechanism between them. Moreover, the agencies themselves 
displayed `survival' problems amid overall institutional instability, lack of resources 
3 The adjective `generous' is of course a relative term when considering budgets, but in comparison to 
other RDAs in Britain, let alone to those emerging in Slovakia, Scottish Enterprise is doing very well. 
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and know-how. Instead of being the local animateurs, mini-RDAs emerging in crisis 
regions, for instance, risk being labelled `amateurs', while the plans for the 
establishment of the strong National Development Agency never materialised. In the 
meantime, the knowledge-base around which the Slovak contribution to the envisaged 
`Silicon Valley' in Central Europe could have been built was largely eroded by neo- 
liberal `transition', furthering the sense of a `vicious circle'. 
In this context, the Scottish Alba project stands-out as a marked success. However, 
the progress of the Scottish Enterprise in transforming Scotland into a world-class 
competitive `knowledge economy' will have to be measured against the power of the 
global political economy. It is too early to say what impact a prime-site development 
like the Alba Centre will make to the Scottish economic performance in the longer 
term and to what extent it will contribute to the process of improving the position of 
Scotland within global socio-spatial divisions of labour and flows of value. 
Ultimately, the question is to what extent a project like this will improve living 
standards for people in Scotland. This question cannot be separated from the context 
of `internal' socio-spatial divisions of labour and accompanying inequalities within 
the given region. 
Socio-spatial divides 
Intra-regional disparities, both social and spatial, constitute the final area of 
comparison. Here, one can find interesting parallels between Scotland and Slovakia. 
Indeed, both countries experienced a reduction in socio-spatial differences in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, while the end of the century was in both cases 
associated with growing social and spatial inequalities. The factors behind this pattern 
are broadly similar. In the post-war period, both Scotland and Slovakia benefited from 
the redistribution policies of their respective `nation-states'. Scotland saw the fruits of 
the generous Keynesian redistribution within the UK `welfare state' (further enhanced 
by the bargaining power of successive Scottish Secretaries), while Slovakia received 
massive fiscal transfers from the Czech Lands as part of the state-socialist planning 
deal. These policies had both social and spatial effects. The post-war period saw 
In part this reflects the relative strength of the Scottish block grant from which the agency is mainly 
funded. 
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Scotland and Slovakia converging quickly with their economically stronger partners. 
In Slovakia an additional effort aimed to reduce intra-regional disparities. At the same 
time, greater social coherence was actively encouraged in both countries. In the post- 
war UK, this was in part due to the relatively strong bargaining position the working 
class enjoyed. In the former Czecho-Slovakia, the state-socialist experiment was 
attempting to achieve a classless society. However, in both Scotland and Slovakia, the 
trends toward greater social and spatial coherence came to an abrupt end after the 
corrective intervention of the state was dramatically reduced. In Scotland, the gap 
between the rich and the poor has been growing and intra-regional disparities seem to 
be on the increase since the collapse of the `post-war compromise' and the 
introduction of the `free market revolution' in late 1970s. In Slovakia, the collapse of 
state-socialism in the late 1980s and the subsequent neo-liberal marketisation had 
similar effects. The decade of the 1990s was associated with a growing social divide 
amid emerging new class relations and a sharp increase in Slovak intra-regional 
disparities. 
A more detailed observation of the recent regional disparity patterns within Scotland 
and Slovakia highlights further interesting similarities. In both cases, capital city- 
regions and major urban areas account for much of the economic weight while 
sparsely populated and remote areas face increasing marginalisation4. This 
corroborates the view that the alleged arrival of the `knowledge economy' era seems 
to exacerbate rather then mitigate existing patterns of uneven development. Cities 
continuously act as `engines' of growth and their strong performance proves that the 
process of circular and cumulative causation remains a salient feature of economic 
geography. Indeed, both Edinburgh and Bratislava could be seen as `magnets' within 
their respective national economies where both investment and knowledge workers 
tend to gravitate, leaving peripheral areas without both investment and human capital. 
This trend is exacerbated further by `external' market forces, most notably FDI, which 
appears to favour the most vibrant economic spots. At the same time, Edinburgh and 
Bratislava are probably part of wider circular and cumulative causation processes and 
`value chains' through which both can be `brain-drained' and `capital-drained' to 
4 Exceptions to the rule are peripheral areas of Scotland benefiting from the oil industry, somewhat 
undermining the claims that natural endowments in the `knowledge-driven economy' do not matter 
anymore. 
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more dominant centres of the nationalinternational political economy. Despite this, 
there is little doubt that both cities enjoy considerable prosperity. They function as 
ICT hubs, accommodate knowledge-rich activities and could be seen as the `learning' 
or `knowledge-intensive cities' of their national economies. 
However, even these economic `hotspots' are not spared of contradictions and 
problems. Importantly, their prosperity is clearly not shared by everybody and due to 
their social divide they can also be seen as `dual cities'. This echoes views in which 
cities are engines of progress and at the same time breeding grounds of social 
injustice, inequality and poverty. This also highlights the relativity of `prosperity' and 
a complex the pattern of inequality that may lie behind it. Meanwhile, socio-spatial 
divides in both Scotland and Slovakia suggest that neither of the two region-states 
resembles a caring, socially and spatially harmonious society posited by various 
`knowledge economy' enthusiasts. In fact, the problems are growing bigger despite 
explicit commitments and efforts in both Scotland and Slovakia to deliver social and 
economic well-being for all their citizens. This in turn leads us back to the 
fundamental issue about the ability of regions to deliver both prosperity and equality. 
On the basis of the available evidence, the lessons from Scotland and Slovakia on this 
issue can be summarised as follows. 
What lessons can be learnt from Scotland and Slovakia? 
A comparison between Scotland and Slovakia revealed many interesting similarities 
as well as profound differences, in terms of their historical legacies, engagement with 
the wider political economy, economic performance, institutional responses and 
socio-spatial divides. Perhaps the most remarkable feature found in both Scotland and 
Slovakia is the mobilisation of their identity as a nation, their persistent drive towards 
autonomy or self-government and accompanying significant institutional build-up. 
Despite this, however, the message transpiring from the above analysis of the two 
regional states is that regional economic prosperity is hardly a `matter of choice' and 
that regional `institutional thickness' cannot be simply equated with economic success 
(cf. Amin and Thrift, 1994b, p. 17). 
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Indeed, the emergence of regions and regional institutions is in itself a contested 
matter, open to negotiation and socio-economic struggles (both `internal' and 
`external'). The cases of Scotland and Slovakia demonstrate this point rather well. It 
may well be that amid these struggles, some regions manage to `negotiate' a better 
deal or to develop more powerful institutions than other regions (in this sense the 
differences between Scotland and Slovakia are instrumental). Ultimately, however, 
the power of regional institutions has to be measured against the power of the wider 
political economy and historical legacies. Indeed, the economic performance of both 
Scotland and Slovakia show just how much history and wider socio-economic 
environment matter. The combination and interplay of the two factors heavily impact 
on the position of the two regional economies within broader socio-spatial divisions 
of labour. These divisions of labour in turn determine places of regions within 
accompanying inter-regional and international flows of value and ultimately account 
for much of their prosperity. The example of Slovakia shows that even a region or a 
small nation achieving formal political independence cannot wrench itself free from 
the power of the wider political economy. Indeed, its economic performance is to a 
large extent dependent on factors outside its control. 
This is not to say that regions or small nations have no room for manoeuvre. Indeed, 
both Scotland and Slovakia showed the ability (with varying success) to construct 
specific institutions and policies to address economic challenges. The Slovak case, 
however, shows how difficult it may be to build consensus around appropriate 
economic strategies and how a fragmented and unstable institutional landscape can be 
part of the problem rather than solution. Scotland, in comparison, offered a picture of 
a more coherent strategy and more solid economic development institutions. Indeed, 
the active engagement of the Scottish Enterprise within the Scottish economy 
provides an example that a regional animateur can create tangible outcomes. 
However, it is important to realise that Scottish Enterprise is an institution that does 
not operate in a void and whose very existence is hardly a `matter of choice'. Rather, 
the agency is nested in, and cannot be separated from, a wider context of wider 
political, institutional and financial arrangements and continuous socio-economic 
struggles of Scotland and the UK. Another important point to emphasise is that the 
overall economic impact of the agency has to be measured against the backdrop of the 
wider political economy. In particular, the power of wider divisions of labour and 
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value chains provides powerful constraints for the regional economy within which the 
agency has to operate. In the light of this, even for a well-organised and well- 
resourced agency like Scottish Enterprise, shaping international socio-spatial 
divisions of labour may prove to be a challenge. Commenting on the ability of 
regional animateurs for the changing fortunes of LFRs, it is hard to disagree with 
Morgan (1995, p. 3 8) that 
`... to do nothing, on the grounds that only "little victories" are possible in the 
short term, is to foreclose all possibility of less favoured regions becoming 
something other than they are today'. 
However, in the larger scheme of things, it is highly questionable whether a strategy 
based solely on regional initiative and mobilisation of `internal' assets will bring 
about balanced regional development and address internal socio-spatial divides (cf. 
Morgan, 1997,1998). Thus, from a wider point of view, the role of economic 
development agencies in inducing `regional renewal', `learning' new development 
trajectories, and achieving social cohesion has to be seen in a critical light (cf. Chapter 
3). The significant limits that regions face in emulating regional prosperity have in 
turn important implications for the debate on uneven development and these limits 
also raise serious questions about strategies for a socially and regionally cohesive 
`New Europe' (cf. Rhodes, 1995a, 1995b), that will be discussed below. 
8.4 Towards the `New Europe'? 
In the light of the above, what are the prospects for regional cohesion in the `New 
Europe'? Can efforts to build `institutional thickness' in regions and countries in 
Eastern and Western Europe provide a basis for more balanced economic 
development across the continent? Can `learning region' strategies help LFRs to enter 
a `higher road' of development and overcome the social and economic difficulties 
they face? Can specialised economic development agencies provide a crucial role in 
the process? On the basis of the theoretical discussion and empirical evidence offered 
above, this thesis supports the view that such strategies need to be seen in a critical 
light. The `learning region' approach may seem attractive; however, its expected 
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effects may prove illusionary. Indeed, the ability of regions to `learn' new 
development trajectories and to `improve' themselves economically within the current 
political economy may be limited. 
This is not to argue that action on the regional level is unimportant or insignificant. 
Indeed, if we acknowledge that an economy is an `institutionalised social process', 
and conceptualise region as a particular form of institution within a wider socio- 
economic context, then it follows that regions both shape, and are shaped by, socio- 
economic processes. However, the power of regions and their institutions in shaping 
these processes needs to be critically assessed. First, it is important to take into 
account that the wider political economy and legacies of the past may provide 
powerful constraints on regional economic development. Even regions or `region 
states' with strong `institutional thickness' and powerful governance structures may 
find the ability to alter their regional economic fortunes severely circumscribed. 
Second, it has to be recognised that the power of regional institutions is not given. 
Instead, it is subject to socio-economic struggles within and outside regions, and thus 
historically and spatially contingent. It is therefore not surprising that a huge diversity 
of the regional institutional landscape in Europe can be observed. As Rhodes (1995c, 
p. 329) noted: 
`... regions have the capacity to influence, if not shape, their futures [but] this 
capacity varies enormously across the European Community.... [T]he range of 
that diversity [is] spanning the cohesive and highly organised region of Baden- 
Württemberg, the much less organised but nonetheless proactive regions of 
Scotland and Wales, the fragmented and strategically divided region of North 
West England, and the weak and disadvantaged regions of southern Europe, 
with their inadequate institutional and associational structures. ' 
This diversity, however, goes beyond the question of `organisation' or evolving 
institutions of regional governance. The difference is manifested also through the very 
presence or absence of a broader set of institutions such as high-tech firms, research 
centres, technical colleges, service centres, universities, training centres, technopoles, 
industrial information and knowledge networks, etc. All these are claimed to be 
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crucial for competitiveness in the new `knowledge economy'. But as Amin and 
Tomaney (1995b, p. 32) argued, 
`[t]hese new competitiveness factors are not the ready properties of Europe's 
less favoured regions, given their dependence on traditional industries 
(especially Objective 2 regions) or the absence of the institutional density, 
diversity and interdependence characteristic of learning-based competition 
(especially Objective 1 regions)'. 
Fundamentally, this means that in contrast to successful regions, many LFRs may be 
short of quality assets or elements around which to `organise' their economic 
strategies. In addition, 
`[a] market-led approach to European integration will compound these 
deficiencies as skills and other resources are drawn to the prosperous regions, 
leaving an insurmountable gap in development potential between the "islands 
of innovation" and the European economic periphery' (Amin and Tomaney, 
1995b, p. 32). 
This latter observation is also of particular interest to regions and countries within the 
Eastern European `super-periphery'. There, a decade of market-led `transition' 
wrought political, economic and institutional turbulence and eroded the knowledge- 
base on which long-term competitive economic growth could have been built. The 
problems experienced in the Eastern half of the `New Europe' could be seen as being 
part of a wider set of contradictions in which neo-liberal `transition', efforts to join 
the European Union and attempts to build a competitive and at the same time socially 
palatable `knowledge economy' can undermine each other. One of the outcomes of 
such contradictory processes is that social and spatial inequalities in Europe appear to 
be growing. Indeed, quite contrary to the original expectations, the crucial gap 
between Western and Eastern Europe has increased. Thus, not only was the `challenge 
of cohesion' (Amin and Tomaney, 1995b) not addressed, the challenge in fact grew 
bigger. Indeed, with the forthcoming Eastern enlargement the EU will embrace 
quantitatively and qualitatively a new dimension of inequality (Dunford and Smith, 
2000) with most candidates displaying unprecedentedly low regional economic levels. 
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Consequently, the `regional dilemma in a neo-liberal Europe' (Amin and Tomaney, 
1995e) became more pronounced than ever before, with competitive pressures 
growing precisely at the time when the need for action on the cohesion side is the 
most pressing. The tension between the two dimensions does not seem to have been 
smoothed-out by the alleged arrival of the `knowledge economy', quite the opposite 
(cf. Hudson and Williams, 1999). 
Meanwhile, through the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union remains committed to 
social and economic cohesion and has to act accordingly. However, thus far the 
response to the growing problems has been rather lukewarm. It is a well known fact 
that the Structural Funds, the main financial instrument of the EU to promote 
cohesion, are probably insufficient considering the nature and scale of the problems in 
the Western European LFRs (Amin and Tomaney, 1995e, p. 179). Amounting to only 
0.24 % of EU GDP, the Funds are very small indeed especially when compared to the 
alleged welfare gains derived from the Single European Market (ibid, p. 179). 
However, rather than raising substantial additional resources, the planned response to 
the growing challenge of cohesion in the enlarged EU is to shift existing funding from 
Western LFRs to the countries and regions of Central and Eastern Europe (see 
Armstrong and Taylor, 2000, p. 315) that face significant challenges (see Bachtler et 
al., 2000b). There is a risk that this manoeuvre will further erode the position of LFRs 
in the West while probably not being enough to offset social and economic problems 
in the Eastern part of the `New Europe'. 
In the context of the financial constraints the EU is facing, the `learning region' 
approach emerges as very attractive strategy to follow (cf. Landabaso, 2000, p. 75). It 
holds a promise to address both the competitiveness and cohesion side of the dilemma 
and implies greater impact for less money (cf. Chapter 3). Unsurprisingly, it is 
favoured by both the European Commission and the member states (Lagendijk, 1999; 
Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000) and is seen by many policy makers as a suitable 
replacement for old and costly regional policies that are largely considered to have 
failed (cf. Malecki, 2000). At the same time, for LFRs in both Eastern and Western 
halves of the continent, the `learning region' approach raises hopes that the 
mobilisation of `hidden potentials' and better organisation of `internal assets' will 
bridge the economic gap and put them on the `higher road' of economic development 
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(Cooke, 1995a; inter alia). Thus in Western Europe, the `learning region' paradigm 
entered `mainstream policy' thinking (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000, p. 300) and 
Scotland is a good example of this. Meanwhile, `cluster' and `learning region' recipes 
are gaining ground in CEECs (see Radosevic, 1999; Dyker and Radosevic, 1999; inter 
alia). In truth, it is hard to discount a strategy that emphasises learning, knowledge 
and innovation and, at the same time, shows a great deal of sensibility for, and 
recognition of, the importance of the regional tier. Indeed, learning, knowledge and 
innovation are important factors of economic and human development. The emphasis 
on regional level institutions should also be welcome, as it seems that there is a scope 
for enhanced co-ordination of policy delivery at the regional level (Tomaney, 1996, 
2000; Rhodes, 1995b, p. 10). Building institutional capacity and experimenting with 
new forms of regional governance, therefore, should be encouraged. It this respect 
this thesis is sympathetic to those voices within the `new regionalist' camp that see 
the greater involvement of actors at the regional level not only as a mean of making 
regions more `competitive', but also as a way of strengthening democratic 
accountability and encouraging greater social cohesion. 
However, it is difficult to see how these objectives can easily be achieved within the 
current profit-driven political economy. Indeed, policy models such as `learning 
region' uncritically embrace the mantra of the `knowledge economy' and often 
unjustifyingly consider the creation and the use of knowledge as unencumbered by 
market forces. From a more critical perspective, as demonstrated in this thesis, 
knowledge, learning and innovation have to be seen as part of the more complex 
picture, where knowledge, power and wealth partake in a circular and cumulative 
causation process within which knowledge can be at the same time cause and 
outcome of economic development. The regional side of the equation also displays 
significant limits, as emphasised through the thesis. Importantly, the `associational' 
power of regional institutions (Amin and Thrift, 1995) has to be measured against the 
power of the wider political economy, in particular that of international capital (cf. 
Lovering, 1999; inter alia). Thus, LFRs cannot hope for a substantial change in their 
position on the map of inequality without dramatically re-shaping inter-regional and 
international divisions of labour and the `flows of value' (cf. Smith et al., 2002) that 
accompany them. 
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In this context, the potential contribution of the `learning region' strategy to the 
eradication of current patterns of uneven development in Europe is questionable. In an 
optimistic scenario, moderate improvements can be achieved in some cases. Some 
regions can indeed benefit from a better co-ordinated institutional framework and 
whose `little victories' could be hailed as being `better than nothing'. A more realistic 
view, however, suggests that this strategy will the leave broad pattern of inequality 
intact, turning `learning region' into an empty policy slogan. Indeed, many regions 
may discover that mimicking `institutional thickness' may simply not be enough to 
emulate economic success while regional development strategies that rely on 
strengthening local learning capacities may misread outcomes for causes. In the worst 
case scenario, the strategy can contribute to the aggravation of regional imbalances by 
supporting a self-defeating army of `learning regions' competing against each other 
(Sokol and Tomaney, 2001). Besides reproducing an unhelpful set of regional winners 
and losers, such competition may also have ramifications for intra-regional 
inequalities. Indeed, heightened competition will require the concentration rather than 
redistribution of resources at the regional level. The concentration of resources in a 
small number of `prestigious' projects (such as the Alba Centre in Scotland) carries 
the risk that the `development in the region' rather than `development of the region' 
(cf. Lovering, 1999) will be achieved, to the detriment of intra-regional socio-spatial 
equality. 
In addition, there is a danger that the `learning region' discourse may further 
undermine the cause of LFRs by obscuring the causal mechanisms of uneven 
development under capitalism. This may have unfortunate policy ramifications. 
Indeed, over-emphasis on the endogenous factors of economic growth may create the 
misleading impression that the `knowledge economy' is essentially a collection of 
`learning regions', where each of the regions is responsible for its own economic 
success. Inevitably, the `failure' of some regions can be ascribed to `pathological' 
factors. This weakens the case for inter-regional (let alone inter-national) 
redistribution and plays into the hands of the neo-liberal orthodoxy (Lovering, 1999) 
that will not hesitate to transfer the responsibility for economic failure from the 
nation-state to the regional level (Vigor, 2000) without addressing the real causes of 
uneven development. As has been made clear in the thesis, the fortunes of regions are 
inextricably linked through socio-spatial divisions of labour and therefore regional 
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economic trajectories have to be seen within a wider socio-economic environment. 
From this point of view, a `learning region' strategy is simply not good enough as a 
tool for addressing broad patterns of regional inequality. 
Therefore, in order to provide more socially and spatially cohesive and sustainable 
models of development, a search for policy alternatives should be encouraged. Such a 
search will have to start with the acknowledgement of the deep regional differences 
wrought by decades of historical development, and how these are translated into the 
patterns of uneven development across the continent. It will have to take into account 
how these historical legacies interact with the power of the wider political economy 
and recognise that the room for manoeuvre of regions and regional institutions within 
the given constraints is limited. In addition, alternative policy frameworks will have to 
give due attention to social and spatial inequalities within regions. When considering 
an appropriate policy action, they will have to recognise the limits of supply-side 
solutions and perhaps explore anew the possibilities of demand-side strategies over 
and above supply-side measures (cf. Smith and Pavlinek, 2000, p. 237; Amin and 
Tomaney, 1995d). There is little doubt that this will require policy-makers to move 
beyond neo-liberal based models of development, and to open a debate on an 
alternative regulatory structure of a future political economy (cf. Michie and Grieve 
Smith, 1995) if more sustainable, and socially and spatially more equitable models of 
development are to be identified. 
The inspiration for such an alternative framework can be drawn from a recent work of 
European Economists for an Alternative Economic Policy in Europe (EEAEPE, 
2002). Their 2002 Memorandum, Better Institutions, Rules and Tools for Full 
Employment and Social Welfare in Europe, outlines a policy approach that is likely to 
be more successful in mitigating social and regional imbalances. A cornerstone of 
their approach for a more cohesive `New Europe' is based on a `European Social 
Model', in which more democratic and efficient macroeconomic policy should be 
strengthened alongside greater commitment to social welfare. Among the policy 
measures to achieve the above, EEAEPE (ibid. ) suggest that the mission of the 
European Central Bank should be broadened to include full employment and 
sustainable growth; that the European Parliament and national parliaments should be 
more involved in economic policy co-ordination; and that tax competition within 
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Europe should be eliminated through harmonisation of corporate taxation and mutual 
information about foreign capital income. 
They also suggest that all members of society should have the unconditional right to 
decent living resources, and that minimum standards for social expenditure should be 
introduced. In addition, public services should be withheld from the `neo-liberal logic 
of unfettered competition' while financial market regulation must be enforced in 
public interest. Importantly, EEAEPE (ibid., p. 2) also call for an increase of the EU 
budget to 5% of European GDP by 2007 and suggest that greater attention be given to 
problems in Europe's eastern periphery which is, in their words, `subordinated to the 
rules of the internal market but excluded from the benefits of the social model' (ibid, 
p. 10). Thus, an all-European development approach is advocated in the pursuit of full 
employment, social welfare and equity and ecological sustainability across the 
continent. 
It could be argued that such an alternative regulatory architecture in the `New Europe' 
should recognise the regional tier as one of its important building blocs (cf. Amin and 
Tomaney, 1995e) and the pursuit of regional cohesion as one of its major aims. 
Regardless of the shape of such a regulatory framework, however, the discussion in 
this thesis supports the view that a major change in the current inequalities in Europe 
is probably unachievable without the active and sustained redistribution of 
knowledge, power and wealth to marginalised people, communities, regions and 
countries. It is a matter of further inquiry whether such a project could be instituted 
from within Europe, or whether a much broader socio-economic change will be 
required. 
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Figure 3.2: The `learning region 
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Figure 3.3: Region in the wider political economy 
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Table 4.1: Super-Peripher' ref 1/u' New Europe 
Indicator: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country 
° 
r 
o 
1999 
GDP PPP 
(millions of 
international 
dollars) 
1999 
GDP PPP 
per cap 
(international 
dollars) 
1999 
GDP per 
capita in 
PPS 
(EU=100) 
1997 
Real GDP 
in 1997 
(1989=100) 
1999 
Real 
GDP/NMP 
(1989-100) 
1989-1998 
FDI inflows 
cumulative 
(millions of 
US dollars) 
1989-1997 
FDI 
inflows 
cumulative 
(US $ per 
capita) 
Hilemploy 
ment 
in 
1998 
(°. 1 
Slovenia 1.981 31,198 15.749 71 99 1053 1.274 639 13,8 
Czech Rep 10.280 126,951 12,349 59 98 95.3 8,473 823 6.7 
Zone a+ 12,261 158,149 12,899 60 ... ... 
9,747 793 7.8 
Hungary 10,068 108,872 10,814 50 90 99.4 16,903 1,667 8.7 
Slovakia 5.396 55,360 10.259 49 95 101.7 1,223 227 13.0 
Poland 38,695 308,788 7,980 37 112 121.8 12,442 321 9.6 
Estonia 1,442 11,144 7,728 36 73 78.3 1.010 695 5.3 
Croatia 4,464 30,562 6,846 32 76 77.9 1,422 297 14.4 
Lithuania 3,699 23,275 6,292 29 61 64.2 1.271 344 5.8 
Latvia 2.430 15.152 6.235 29 56 59 6 1.1158 5113 73 
Zone a+/a 66,194 553,153 8,357 39 ... ... 
35,629 534 9.7 
Romania 22.458 127.195 5,664 27 82 75.8 1,370 149 10.8 
Buicar! <i 0,21 F 10 00,: 3 4.936 22 63 70 7 1 : '. 1.1 ' 111 n 
Zone a 30,674 167,748 5,469 25 _ 
4,592 148 11.4 
Super- 
Periphery A 
(without a-) 
109,129 879,050 8.055 37 49,968 455 10.0 
Yugoslavia. FR (10,616) ... (-! 
L 6) 0-ý Ul 
Macedonia, wN 2.021 8,901 4,404 20 56 76.8 124 59 30.0 
AII'onia 
Zone a- 
3.375 
5,396. 
9.340 
18,241 
2 767 
3.380 
13 
1h 
8O 
T 
l0,7 
-- 
.1ý0 
Y1 l 
lit 
11 j 1ii 
Super- 
Periphery A 114,525 897,291 7,835 36 96 50,565 439 10.4 
Belarus 10,208 62,337 6.107 28 71 81.4 3.; u 3) 2.3 
Ukraine 49,908 1591847 3,203 15 37 39.3 2,696 53 4.0 
Moldova 4,281 9,497 2,218 10 35 31.3 342 80 1.7 
Zone b 210,909 1,150,501 5,455 25 ... ... 
12,585 60 7.9 
Georgia 5.452 28,561 5.239 24 32 31 5 512 95 26 
Kazakhstan 15.438 67,496 4,372 20 63 62-0 5,729 365 14 5 
Turkmenistan 4,779 12,570 2,630 12 42 74.0 762 162 3.0 
Azerbaijan 7,980 19,139 2,398 11 40 46.8 3,233 425 2.6 
Kyrgyzstan 4,744 10,580 2,230 10 57 66.2 309 67 7.5 
Armenia 3,809 8,435 2,214 10 38 60.3 265 72 10.8 
Uzbekistan 24,600 47,258 1,921 9 87 93.9 423 18 0.7 
Ta ikistan 6,218 5.804 933 4 40 33.1 67 15 5,7 
Zone b- 73.020 199,843 2.737 13 ... .. 
11,320 157 5.5 
Pepe 
Periphery B 283,929 1,350,344 
4.756 23,905 
TOTAL 398 -151 ?. 2.17,635 
6 611 26 73 74,470 8.2 
!1ý World Bank t20OO 
(2) World Bank (2000) 
(3) Calculations by author based on World Bank (2000) 
(4) EC (2000. p. 3) and calculations by author 
(5) EBRD (1998, p. 50); Value for super-peripheries is a weighted average; 'Super-Perihery A' excludes Yugoslavia and Bosnr+-Hovcgovina 
(6) ECE (2000, p. 225) 
(7) EBRD (1998, p. 81) and calculations by the author. 
(8) EBRD (1998. p. 81) and calculations by the author. 
(9) Kolodko (2000); Figures for Macedonia, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are for year 1997, figure for Turkmenist, rn is for year 1995 
Note: Totals for zone 'a-' and 'Super-Periphery A' exclude Bosnia-Herzegovina and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) due to non- 
availability of relevant data. 
Figure 4.1: Transitinn: 'model' scenario 
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I'is'ure 4.2: Space-economy n/Mlle 'New Europe' 
Table 7.1: 
Slovak-Austrian PHARE Cross-Border Co-operation Programme (CRC), 
Financial Memorandum 1995 
Priority/ " o"" 
Priority: Infrastructure 
Project 1: investment 0.339 
Ferry Boat Zahorska Ves (Slovakia) - Angern 
(Austria) 
Project 2: study and project 0.200 
Bridge across the Morava river Moravsky Svaty 
Jan (Slovakia) - Hohenau (Austria) 
Priority: Economic Development 
Project 3: study 0.245 
Science and Technology Park in Bratislava region 
Project 4: study and project 0.500 
Industrial Park (Special Economic Zone) Jarovce 
(Slovakia) - Kittsee (Austria) 
Project 5: study 0.300 
Development Study of Bratislava Region 
Priority: Environment 
Project 6: investment 0.315 
Wastewater Treatment Plant in Gajary 
Project 7: investment 0.644 
Wastewater Treatment Plant in Zohor 
Project 8: investment 0.442 
Reconstruction of Wastewater Treatment Plant in 
Malacky 
Project 9: study 0.350 
Reduction of emissions in South West Slovakia 
Priority: Small Projects Fund, 
Management of the Programme 
Project 10: mixed 0.665 
Studies, Small Projects Fund, Management, 
Training 
TOTAL I j 4.0 
Ficrire 7.1: Unemplovin nt in C, -, echo-Slovakia (Auuyust /992) 
m percentage 
Cý 
0.32 - 2.97 
Q 
3.06 - 6.33 
7.57 - 11.65 
®12.28-18.22 
Source: Pavlinek (1995, p. 363) 
Figure 7.2: 
Space-economy of Central Europe and Vienna-Bratislava cross-border co-operation 
potential 
Space Economy of Central Europe 
and Vienna-Bratislava cross-border cooperation potential 
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Figure 7.3: Space-economy of Slovakia 
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APPENDIX A2 - LIST OF INTERVIFWW'S 
No Institution Name, Position Interview 
Date 
1. ONE (One NorthEast - Phil SHAKESHAFT 17.2.2000 
Regional Dev. Agency Head of Strategy Division 
of the North-East of 
En gland) 
2. ONE (One NorthEast) Len SMITH 16.3.2000 
Head of Enterprise, Skills and Employment 
3. ONE (One NorthEast) Karen HARRIS 16.3.2000 
Head of Economic Strategy 
4. ONE (One NorthEast) Tom NIVARBURTON 16.3.2000 
Deputy I lead of Policy and Europe 
5. ONE (One NorthEast) Peter G JACQUES 16.3.2000 
I lead of Regional Intelligence 
6. NERA (North East Stephen 13ARIIER 10.2.2000 
Regional Assembly) Director 
7. NERA Greame REID 10.2.2000 
+Association of North- Policy Officer 
East Councils 
8. GONE (Government Bob DOBBIE 11.2.. 2000 
Office for the North- Director (17.2.2000*) 
East) 
9. TUC (Trade Union Gill HALE 21.2.2000 
Congress) Chair of Regional TUC; 
Regional secretary of UNISON 
10. TEC (Training and Kevin RICHARDSON 29.2.2000 
Enterprise Council) Regional coordinator North-East TFCs 
11. University of Newcastle Ian . ZONES 
11.2.2000 
upon Tyne Research Associate 
12. University of Newcastle David CHARLES 21.1.2000 
upon Tyne CURDS 
A2-1 
13. North-East Chamber of Bill MIDGLEY 7.2.2000 
Commerce President 
14. University of Newcastle Prof. Mike COOMBES 20.1.2000 
upon Tyne CURDS 
15. University of Newcastle Paul BENNEWORTH 31.1.2000 
upon Tyne Research Associate 
16. University of Newcastle Peter O'BRIEN 16.2.2000 
upon Tyne Geography Department 
17. University of Newcastle Simon BISHOP 25.1.2000 
upon Tyne Planning Department 
18. Durham University Prof. David SADLER 14.3.2001 
Geography Department 
A2-2 
N Institution Name Interview 
Date 
1. Scottish Parliament Hike WATSON, MSP 29.3.2000 
Finance Committee convenor 
2. Scottish Parliament Scott BARRIE,. NISP 6.4.2000 
Member of Audit Committee 
3. Scottish Executive Angela CAMPBELL 23.2.2000 
Economic Adviser 
4. SEEL (Scottish Enterprise Paul LEWIS 29.3.2000 
Edinburgh and Lothian - Director of Projects 
Regional Development 
Agency) 
5. SEEL Linda GOSI)EN, 23.2.2000 
Lothian Business Shop Manager 
6. SEEL Steven McGARVA 23.2.2000 
Project Manager 
7. Scottish Chambers of Lex GOLD 11.4.2000 
Commerce Director 
8. Industry/ Electronics sector Graham STEPHENSON 5.4.2000 
Human Resources Manager, 
Cadence Design Systems Limited 
Livingston, West Lothian 
9. Edinburgh Local Authority Garry STURGEON 10.4.2000 
Senior Economic Development Officer 
City of Edinburgh Council 
10. The Alba Centre Lorna EDWARD 5.4.2000 
Scottish Case Executive 
The Alba Centre, Livingston, West 
Lothian 
11. Media Kirsty MILNE 10.4.2000 
The Scotsman 
A2-3 
12. Media Peter JONES 23.3.2000 
The Economist 
13 . Think-tanks Pat HERD 6.4.2000 
Centre for Scottish Public Policy 
14 . Scottish Council for lain DUFF 11.4.2000 
Development and Industry Economist, SCDI 
15 . University of Edinburgh Prof. Lindsay PATERSON, 23.2.2000 
Faculty of Education 
16. SHEFC (Scottish Higher Prof. John SIZER, CBE 11.4.2000 
Education Funding Council) Chief Executive 
17. Scottish Enterprise HQ Rob POLLOCK 25.4.2000 
Manager 
Cluster Development Team 
18. Scottish Enterprise HQ Fergus C McMILLAN 25.4.2000 
Strategic Futures Team 
Strate Executive 
19. Scottish Enterprise HQ Carl TOGNERI 8.5.2000 
Director 
Semiconductors 
20. Scottish Enterprise Glasgow Simon PARSON 25.4.2000 
Property Advisor 
21. Scottish Enterprise Glasgow David DONALD 8.5.2000 
Chief Executive's Office 
22. Scottish Enterprise Grampian, Fiona O'BRIEN 1.12.2000 
Aberdeen Customer Relations & Marketing 
Manager 
23. Scottish Council for Gerry HASSAN 8.5.2000 
Development and Industry Head of Communications 
24. Scottish Trade Union Tracey WHITE 25.5.2000 
Association Policy Officer 
(STUC) 
25. EPRC, Strathclyde Ruth DOWNES 25.5.2000 
University, Glasgow Researcher 
26. Fraser Institute of Economics Gary GILLESPIE 25.5.2000 
27. Scottish Enterprise HQ Kenny RICHMOND 7.6.2000 
28. Fraser Institute of Economics Prof. Brian ASHCROFT 7.6.2000 
29. Scottish CBI Matthew FARROW 13.6.2000 
Head of Policy 
30. Locate in Scotland HQ Claudia TRIQUART 13.6.2000 
Glasgow 
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List of interviews undertaken in Slovakia 
December 1999 - January 2000, 
June 2000, 
December 2000 - January 2001, 
June - July 2001 
N Institution Name Interview 
Date 
1" Slovak Ministry for Regional Mr. Roman S111OS 31.12.1999* 
Development State Secretary 
2. Slovak Ministry for Regional Ing. Peter TAPAK 31.12.1999 
Development Head of Regional Policy Section 
3. Slovak Ministry for Regional RNDr. Ivan ZEMKO 28.12.1999 
Development Head of EU-Slovakia negotiation 
team for regional policies 
4. Slovak Ministry for Regional Mgr. Darinka OBORILOVA 27.12.1999 
Development Policy Officer 
5. National Bank of Slovakia Mr. Branislav SODOMA 29.12.1999 
(NBS) Head of Statistics Section 
6. National Bank of Slovakia Mr. Peter BALA7. 30.12.1999 
(NBS) Head of Section 
Foreign Exchange Liabilities 
Administration 
7. Office of the Government of Mgr. Zuzana SAVITSKA 27.12.1999 
the Slovak Republic Policy Officer 
8. Office of the Government of Ms. Natasa IIRISENKOVA 29.12.1999 
the Slovak Republic PHARF. Officer 
9. Office of the Government of Ms. KOSTOLNA 3.1.2000 
the Slovak Republic PHARE Officer 
10. SNAZIR (Slovak Agency for Ing. Miroslav; IPIKAL 3.1.2000 
Foreign Investment) Officer 
it. Government of the Slovak Ms. Eva SLATINSKA 30.12.2000 
Republic Office for the Public 
Administration Reform 
12. Slovak Regional Society RNDr. Ivan ZEMKO 6.7.2000 
Member; 
Comenius University Lecturer 
13. National Agency for SMEs Ing. KELEMBERGEROVA 10.7.2000 
Development (NARMSP) Section Director. and 
Mgr. Eubica HALLJSICOVÄ 
14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mgr. Mirka VI. A('HOVSKA 10.7.2000 
Policy Officer 
15. Ministry of Construction and Mgr. Zuzana SAVITSKA 1 1.7.2000 
Regional Development and 
Mgr. Darinka OBORILOVÄ 
A2-5 
16. Slovak Chamber of Commerce Ing. KURI OVA 13.7.2000* 
and Industry (SOPK) 
17. Ministry of Economy of the Ing. tefan TURAN 14.7.2000 
Slovak Republic Director 
Regional Development Section 
18. Ministry of Economy of the Ing. Vladimir MRA NA 14.7.2000 
Slovak Republic Director 
SME Development Section 
19. Ministry of Economy of the Ing. Peter ONDREJKA 17.7.2000 
Slovak Republic Director 
Economic Policy 
20. Ministry of Economy of the Ing. Milan PAV EK 17.7.2000 
Slovak Republic and 
Mgr. Livia LIPTAKOVA 
21. Office of the Government of Ing. Jozef VALERA 17.7.000 
the Slovak Republic Director 
and 
Mgr. Jarmila HAVLIOKOVA 
Economic Polic Section 
22. Slovak Agency for Investment Mgr. Miroslav IPIKAL 18.7.2000* 
and Trade (SARIO) Director 
Regional Section 
ýý" Mmistry of uonstruction and Ing. Peter TAPAK 19.7.2000 
Regional Development Head 
Regional Policy Department 
24. Ministry of Construction and Mgr. Ivana HACAJOVA 19.7.2000 
Regional Development Director 
Regional Strategy Section 
25. Office of the Government of RNDr. Milan RAJ AK 18.7.2000 
the Slovak Republic Development of Regions Section 
26" Ministry of Construction and Ing. Julius SLOVAK 20.7.2000 
Regional Development Director 
Regional Management Section 
27. Slovak Chamber of Commerce Ing. VL KO 20.7.2000 
and Industry (SOPK) Secretary to the President 
28. University of Economics, Ing. Martin SIRAK 19.7.2000 
Bratislava 
29. Office of the President of the JUDr. Eva HRU KOVI OVA 21.7.2000 
Slovak Republic Legal advisor 
30. MESA 10 (think-tank) Mr. Miroslav KNAZKO 26.7.2000 
Researcher 
31. Slovak Ministry of the Ing. tefan TURAN 11.1.2001 
Economy Director 
Regional and environmental 
policy division 
32. Slovak National Agency for Mgr. L. JANI KOVI OVA 11.1.2001 
SMEs Dev. (NAPRMSP) Regional Division 
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33. University of Economics, Prof. Milan BUCEK 11.1.2001 
Bratislava Head of Department 
Economic Geography 
34. Slovak Confederation of Trade JUDr. Maria SVORENOVA 12.1.2001 
Unions (KOZ) Legal Advisor 
to the Vice-President 
35. Slovak Ministry for Regional Mgr. Darinka OBORILOVA 18.6.2001 
Development Policy Officer 
Section of Regional Policy 
36. Slovak Ministry for Regional Ing. Anna SOKOLIKOVA 18.6.2001 
Development Policy Officer 
Section of Regional PolicX 
37. Slovak Ministry for Regional Mgr. Zuzana SAVITSKA 22.6.2001 
Development Policy Officer 
Section of Regional Policy 
38. Slovak Ministry for Regional Mr. Zsolt LUKA 6.7.2001 
Development General Director 
Section of Regional PolicX 
39. Slovak Ministry for Regional Mgr. Monika GUNDOVA 6.7.2001 
Development PHARE Regional Development 
Implementation Agency 
40. Slovak Ministry for Regional Ing. Monika JAVORKOVA 17.7.2001 
Development Policy Officer 
41. National Council of the Slovak JUDr. Miroslav IZ 17.7.2001 
Republic (NR SR) Secretary - Committee for public 
administration; 
Member of the SMER (political 
party) Executive 
42. Slovak Ministry for Regional Ms. Lenka E ETKOVA, 18.7.2001 
Development MPhil 
Director, Bureau of Regional 
Development Programmes and 
Co-ordination of the Structural 
Funds 
43. Statistical Office of the Slovak Ing. Peter HEIDINGER 18.7.2001 
Republic Information Service Division 
44. SARIO (Slovak Agency for Ing. Miroslav IPIKAL 18.7.2001 
Investment and Trade) Director 
Regional Section 
45. Slovak Ministry of Interior Ing. Jozef HALCIN 19.7.2001 
Advisor to the State Secretary 
(Responsible for Public 
Administration Reform) 
46. National Council of the Slovak Mr. Sergej KOZLIK 19.7.2001 
Republic (NR SR) Member of Parliament (HZDS), 
Chairman of the Council for 
Economic Development of 
Slovakia; Former Deputy Prime 
Minister/Minister of Finance. 
* Note: telephone interview 
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APPENDIX A3 - QUESTIONNAIRE 
Case Studies: Scotland and Slovakia 
Questions 
A. Institution itself (identification) 
Basic info: legal form, structure and management, staff power, budget (revenues and expenditure), 
date and background of establishment, previous history? 
Comments: advantages/disadvantages of such institutional setting, what future changes expected, 
what challenges ahead? 
B. Policies of the institution 
Basic info: mission of the institution (legal responsibilities /chart); how much autonomy in shaping the 
mission; how the mission relates to other organisations and institutions in the region/country 
what strategies are pursued to fulfil the mission; who defines; who approves; 
who is responsible for implementation; input of other institutions? 
detailed policies of the institution (vis-ä-vis the strategy); exactly what policies/projects are 
pursued; how they are implemented; size of budget for individual policiestprojects; 
what exactly is financed; what conditions; target groups? 
Comments: How'youe policies differ from previous one(s) / policies of other institutions?; 
evaluation of the policy outcomes?; mission/strategy/policies revision?; 
good points/challenges of current mission/strategy/policies?; future changes expected?; 
improvements proposed (in your view)? 
C. Relations with other institutions within/outside region 
Basic info: formal and informal relationships (regulated by law/contracts/...? ); 
subjectquality/frequency and degree of these relationships?; 
dynamics of these relationships?; changes expected in a future? 
Comments: good points/challenges of current relationships (in your view)?; future changes expected 
(+your comments); What should be improved (in your view)? 
D. Strategic knowledge and learning of the organisation 
Basic info: sources of strategic knowledge of your organisation for design of policies (internal/external; 
consultants/think-tanks...? ); 
Monitoring of economic situation/trends in your region: internally/externally?; 
Monitoring of situation/trends in European/World economy: internally/externally? 
Your comments: 
E. Past, present and future of your region I Any other important business 
Discussion: what are the weaknesses and strong points in economic development of your region?; How 
the knowledge-driven agenda will help your region?; 
How do you see the future of the region?; What should be done in your view? 
What general or specific policies / actions / arrangement?; Any other important business? 
DOCUMENTATION...? / Further CONTACTS...? 
Contact: 
Martin SOKOL, Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies 
(CURDS), University of Newcastle upon Tyne, NE I 7RU, England. Tel: 
00-44-191-222 8510; 
Fax: 00-44-191-232 9259; http: //www. ncl. ac. uk/curds/ 
E-mail: Martin. Sokol@ncl. ac. uk 
APPENDIX A4 - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BAZ Bratislava Automotive Plant 
BIC Business and Innovation Centre 
CBC Cross-Border Co-operation 
CBI Confederation of British Industry 
CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries 
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
CPU Central PHARE Unit (Slovakia) 
CSSR Centre for Strategic Studies (Slovakia) 
EC European Commission 
ECU European Currency Unit (now Euro) 
EU European Union 
EUR Euro (currency) 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
GO SR Government Office of the Slovak Republic (ÜV SR) 
HIE Highlands and Islands Enterprise (Scotland) 
HZDS Movement for Democratic Slovakia 
ICT Information and communication technology 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INTERREG EU cross-border co-operation programme 
IS Information society 
IT Information technology 
KE Knowledge economy 
KOZ SR Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic 
KS( Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia 
KSS Communist Party of Slovakia 
LE Learning economy 
LEC Local Enterprise Council (Scotland) 
LFRs Less-favoured regions 
LIS Locate in Scotland 
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LR Learning region 
M. E. S. A. 10 Think-tank (Slovakia) 
MECU Million ECU 
MH SR Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic 
MNC Multi-national company 
MSP Member of Scottish Parliament 
MVaRR SR Slovak Ministry of Construction and Regional Development 
NARD National Agency for Regional Development (Slovakia) 
NASRMSP National Agency for Development of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (Slovakia) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NBS National Bank of Slovakia 
NEZES Independent Association of the Economists of Slovakia 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PHARE CBC PHARE Cross-Border Co-operation 
PHARE Initially 'Poland, Hungary - Aid for Reconstruction of 
Economy', the main financial instrument of the EU assistance 
to all CEEC candidates in 1990s 
PIS Post-industrial society 
PMU Programme Management Unit (PHARE programme) 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
PPS Purchasing Power Standards 
R&D Research and development 
RDA Regional development agency 
RPIC Regional Advisory and Information Centre (Slovakia) 
RSA Regional Selective Assistance (UK) 
SARC Centre for Development, Science and Technology (Slovakia) 
SARIO Slovak Agency for Development of Investment and Trade 
SCDI Scottish Council Development and Industry 
SDA Scottish Development Agency 
SDI Scottish Development International 
SDK Slovak Democratic Coalition 
SDI Democratic Leflwing Party (Slovakia) 
SE Scottish Enterprise 
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SEN Scottish Enterprise Network/National 
SFE Scottish Financial Enterprise 
Sk Slovak Koruna (currency) 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
SNAZIR Slovak National Agency for Foreign Investment and 
Development 
SNDC Scottish National Development Council 
SNP Scottish National Party 
SNS Slovak National Party 
SOP Party of Civic Understanding (Slovakia) 
SR Slovak Republic 
STUC Scottish Trade Union Congress 
ýÜ SR Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
UK United Kingdom 
USA United States of America 
USD US dollars 
ÜSRSVT SR Office for the Strategy of Development of Society, Science and 
Technology of the Slovak Republic 
ÜV SR Government Office of the Slovak Republic 
VW Volkswagen 
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